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"What  is  the  nature  of  emotional  states"?  This  thesis  attempts  to  answer  that 
question,  by  offering  a  "cognitive"  theory  of  the  emotions.  That  is;  it 
emphasises  the  cognitive  component  of  emotional  states,  and  therefore  argues 
that  theories  of  emotion  which  regard  them  as  falling  outwith  the  category  of 
the  rational  are  mistaken.  Against  some  current  versions  of  cognitivism, 
however,  I  argue  that  the  cognitive  element  is  not  a  belief.  The  alternative 
account  offered  here  argues  that  the  cognitive  element  should  be  thought  of  as 
a  "seeing-as". 
This  account  of  the  nature  of  emotional  states  leads  to  two  further  points. 
Firstly,  it  suggests  an  account  of  why  emotional  states  are  valuable.  In 
elaborating  such  an  account,  I  defend  the  claim  that  emotions  offer  a  distinct 
kind  of  cognitive  grasp  not  afforded  by  mere  belief.  I  then  consider  an 
Aristotelian  defence  of  this  point  in  terms  of  the  relationship  between  emotion 
and  character.  This  sort  of  defence,  I  claim,  is,  however  only  partially 
successful;  there  remains  a  class  of  emotions  whose  value  cannot  be  assessed 
in  terms  of  the  contribution  they  make  to  character.  The  second  main  point 
for  which  I  argue  is  that  psychological  explanation  generally  must  allow  room 
for  cognitive  states  other  than  belief.  One  result  of  a  failure  to  do  so,  is,  I 
claim,  an  inaccurate  conception  of  the  nature  of  rationality.  In  addition,  a 
failure  to  acknowledge  the  role  of  other  cognitive  states  leads  to  a  tendency  to 
ignore  a  range  of  types  of  conflict,  both  between  emotional  and  beliefs  and, 
more  generally,  between  beliefs  and  other  cognitive  states.  Lastly,  I  claim 
that,  given  the  forgoing  account  of  emotional  understanding,  we  can  see  how 
the  experience  of  artworks  can  offer  understanding  and  contribute  to  the 
process  of  emotional  education. Introduction  And  Summary.  P.  1 
Chapter  One 
The  Nature  of  Emotions.  P.  11 
1.  Feelings. 
2.  Pain  and  Pleasure. 
3.  Terrible  Joy  and  Pleasant  Grief. 
4.  Psychic  Feelings  and  Affects. 
5.  Emotions  and  Dispositions. 
6.  The  Cognitive  Model. 
7.  Intentionality. 
8.  Recalcitrant  Emotions. 
9.  Arational  Actions. 
10.  Phobias  and  Fictions. 
11.  Propositional  Attitudes. 
12.  Strong  and  Weak  Cognitivism. 
13.  Primitive  Emotions. 
14.  An  Alternative  Account  of  Cognition. 
15.  Stoic  Freshness. 
16.  More  Problems. 
17.  Strong  Cognitivism. 
Chapter  Two 
Humean  Emotions. 
1.  Humean  Emotions. 
2.  What's  Wrong  With  Mr.  Spock? 
3.  Some  Objections. 
4.  Humean  Psychology. 
5.  A  "Moderate"  Cognitivism? 
p.  62 Chapter  Three. 
Aspects  and  Understanding.  P.  91 
1.  Understanding;  "Seeing-as". 
2.  Is  All  Seeing  "Seeing-as"? 
3.  Imagination. 
4.  Particularism. 
5.  Understanding  (b);  Rule  Following. 
6.  Kripke. 
7.  Secondary  Sense. 
8.  Uncodifiability. 
9.  Responsibility. 
Chapter  Four 
Emotion  and  Value. 
1.  Emotions  and  Impartiality. 
2.  Emotions  in  Ethics. 
3.  Second  Nature  and  Existentialism. 
4.  Character. 
5.  Frankfurt's  "Wanton". 
6.  When  Are  My  Emotions  Mine? 
7.  Practical  Necessity  and  Moral  Incapacity. 
8.  Reflection  and  Justification. 
9.  Learning  to  Be  Good. 
10.  Phronesis  and  Emotion. 
11.  Emotion-Free  Values? 
12.  Stoicism. 
13.  Stoic  Accounts  of  Emotion. 
14.  Conclusion;  Conflict  and  Conviction. 
p.  128 Chapter  Five 
Passion  and  Emotion.  p.  184 
1.  Aristotle. 
2.  Plato. 
3.  The  Romantic  Movement. 
Chapter  Six 
Educating  the  Emotions.  p.  210 
1.  Is  Emotional  Education  a  Bad  Thing? 
2.  When  Is  an  Emotion  Educated? 
Chapter  Seven 
A  Strange  Kind  of  Sadness?  p.  235 
1-Ambiguous  Emotion. 
2.  The  Paradox  of  Fiction. 
3.  The  Paradox  of  Tragedy. 
4.  Real  Emotion  and  Attenuated  Engagement. 
Chapter  Eight  p.  257 
Beyond  Belief. 
1.  Davidson's  Argument. 
2.  Arational  Actions  and  Emotional  Responses  to  Fiction. 
3.  Criticisms  of  Davidson. 
4.  Aristotle  and  the  Stoics. 
5.  A  Common  Problem-  Belief. 
6.  Meaning  and  World. 
7.  Davidson  on  Meaning. 
8.  Phenomenology,  Cognitivism  and  the  Will. 
9.  The  Art  of  Persuasion. 1O.  The  Problem  with  Rhetoric. 
11.  Phantasia  and  Conviction. 
12.  Conclusion. Introduction. 
The  ancient  Greeks  conceived  of  human  psychology  by  means  of  an  analogy  with 
political  organisation.  For  Plato,  who  elaborated  the  analogy  in  detail,  warring  forces 
fight  for  control  of  the  human  psyche;  the  desired  outcome  being  order  and  correct 
functioning;  the  other,  less  desirable,  result,  subversion  and  tyranny  of  the  human 
subject-  the  denial  of  freedom  and  self-mastery.  Order  results  when  the  appropriate 
force  -  Reason,  in  Plato's  view  -  triumphs  and  dominates,  tyranny  when  it  is  usurped 
and  denied.  While  this  kind  of  analogy  is  no  longer  in  detail  part  of  our  own  popular 
conception  of  human  psychology,  the  central  picture  of  the  psyche  as  a  battleground 
where  opposing  forces  are  locked  in  continual  struggle  is  familiar  to  us. 
Although  a  great  variety  of  kinds  of  conflict  take  place  there-  between  obligation  and 
desire,  self-interest  and  altruism,  long  and  short  term  benefit,  and  many  others  -  one 
very  general  kind  of  opposition  frames  a  multitude  of  more  specific  ones.  This  is  the 
(alleged)  conflict  between  Reason  and  Emotion.  Our  everyday  talk  is  testimony  to  our 
belief  that  one  part  of  the  mind  is  held  to  be  responsible  for  thinking  in  a  general  sense- 
solving  problems,  doing  arithmetic  and  working  out  what  we  ought  to  believe-  while 
another  is  a  seething  cauldron  of  natural  forces  which  drive  our  desires  and  spill  over 
every  so  often  into  uncontrollable  outbursts. 
These  two  aspects  of  our  mental  life  are  thought  to  be  not  merely  distinct  but 
antagonistic.  Reason,  on  the  one  hand,  is  seen  as  controlled,  benign  and  impartial,  while 
emotion  on  the  other  is  undisciplined,  destructive  and  subjective.  Reason  is  associated 
with  our  capacity  to  grasp  the  truth;  "rationality"  designates  the  methods  we  employ  in 
thinking  which  seem  most  apt  to  lead  to  the  formation  of  true  beliefs.  Emotion,  by 
contrast,  is  credited  with  subverting  this  process  and  misleading  the  intellect.  Passion,  it 
is  said,  makes  people  unreasonable,  and  it  is  generally  held  as  a  truism  that  "getting 
emotional"  is  a  barrier  to  correct  thinking. 
So  much  then  is  at  least  part  of  our  everyday  folklore  concerning  the  emotions.  But 
while  it  is  of  course  undeniable  that  people  often  do  act  unreasonably  while  under  the 
sway  of  emotional  states  (as  they  also  do  while  not  under  their  sway)  it  is  a  quite 
separate  question  whether  emotional  states  are  so  completely  without  positive  value  as 
this  picture  implies.  Underlying  the  view  that  they  are,  may  be  an  implicit  conception  of 
1 the  sorts  of  things  emotional  states  are.  Many  people,  if  asked  to  characterise  emotions, 
resort  to  describing  them  in  terms  of  feelings.  This  in  turn  suggests  a  tacit  assimilation 
to  sensations.  If  this  is  indeed  the  popular  conception  of  the  nature  of  emotional  states, 
then  it  goes  some  way  to  explaining  why  they  are  thought  to  be  brute  forces  of  nature 
with  no  cognitive  value.  In  what  follows  I  shall  argue  that  this  popular  conception  is 
mistaken. 
It  is  not  clear  whether  "Folk  psychology"  is  best  thought  of  as  a  theory  or  not'.  But  if 
it  is,  it  is  a  theory  geared  to  effective  prediction  of  the  behaviour  of  others,  and  not 
primarily  to  fine  distinctions  between  types  of  mental  states.  For  this  reason  it  is  clear 
that  most  people  have  only  the  roughest  idea  of  how  to  specify  what  emotions  are,  since 
our  folk  psychology  does  not  seem  to  embody  any  detailed  account  of  the  kind  of  thing 
an  emotion  is.  And  this  lack  of  clarity  leads  to  some  genuine  puzzlement-  for  while 
there  is  broad  agreement  across  a  range  of  cases  about  which  states  are  emotions  and 
which  are  not,  there  is  a  distinct  lack  of  clarity  about  others;  are  being  interested  or 
amused,  desiring  something,  being  puzzled  also  emotions?  Whatever  we  finally  say 
about  these  cases,  we  have  no  obvious  criterion  already  at  hand  which  will  help  us  settle 
the  matter. 
Furthermore  our  inherited  folk  psychology  is  the  product  of  a  long  history.  The  view 
that  the  mind  is  a  composite  of  distinct  elements  or  forces,  is,  for  example,  a  notorious 
feature  of  much  Enlightenment  philosophy-  both  Hume  and  Kant  are,  in  different  ways, 
good  examples  of  this-  and  is  also  familiar  from  Freudian  psychology.  As  noted  above, 
however,  its  origins  can  be  traced  much  further  back;  at  least  as  far  as  Plato's  tri-partite 
conception  of  the  soul,  with  its  divisions  and  consequent  conflicts.  But  its  roots  may  be 
still  deeper  and  older.  Russell  points  out2  that  Platonic  rationalism  and  particularly  the 
Pythagorean  philosophy  which  inspired  it,  occupy  ambiguous  positions  in  the 
development  of  Greek  thought  and  religion.  Pythagoras,  although  one  of  the  great 
innovators  of  rationalist  mathematical  thought,  was  also  a  reformer  of  the  Orphic  cult, 
while  Orpheus  was  himself  a  reformer  of  the  religion  of  Dionysus.  And  it  was  a  tenet  of 
both  these  cults  that  communion  with  the  deity  required  intoxication-  originally, 
physical  intoxication  through  alcohol,  but  later  spiritual  intoxication-  and  that  their 
'  The  debate  between  those  who  think  it  is  a  theory  (The  "Theory"  theorists)  and  those  who  propose  an 
account  based  on  simulation,  is  now  well  advanced.  I  return  to  this  issue  in  the  final  chapter. 
2  In  The  History  of  Western  Philosophy,  ch.  l.  Also  on  Plato's  relation  to  Pythagoras,  see  E.  R.  Dodds, 
"Plato  and  The  Irrational  Soul"  p.  209,  in  The  Greeks  and  The  Irrational. 
2 rituals  produced  states  known  as  "enthusiasms"  which  allowed  the  god  to  enter  the 
worshipper.  In  this  tradition,  the  path  to  spiritual  truth  involved  an  ecstasy  of  passion, 
through  which  the  worshipper,  as  Russell  puts  it, 
46 
...  recovers  an  intensity  of  feeling  which  prudence  had  destroyed;  he  finds  the 
world  full  of  delight  and  beauty,  and  his  imagination  is  suddenly  liberated 
from  the  prison  of  everyday  preoccupations.  " 
(HWP  p.  36) 
The  importance  of  this  picture  lies  in  its  being  one  of  the  first  recorded  world  views  to 
articulate  the  conviction  that  grasping  the  structure  of  reality  is  essentially  passionate; 
true  understanding  is  not  merely  intellectual,  but  requires  emotion.  However,  it  is  the 
rationalistic  elements  of  Pythagoras'  teachings  which  proved  more  influential,  through 
their  influence  on  Plato,  and  it  is  in  the  tradition  that  stems  from  him  that  we  fmd 
articulated  the  contrary  view,  that  it  is  through  the  intellect  alone  that  we  grasp  the  truth 
about  the  world. 
In  the  Dionysian  conception  we  can  see  prefigured  ideas  which  were  much  later  to 
absorb  the  artists,  writers  and  philosophers  of  the  Romantic  period;  the  opposition 
between  society  and  the  authentic,  and  between  Reason  and  Passion.  The  emphasis  on 
excess,  which  we  fmd  for  example  in  Blake,  and  on  intoxication-  which  looms  large  in 
Byron-  are  prefigured  in  the  ancient  Greeks.  The  complex  of  ideas  known  as 
Romanticism  emerged  in  part  at  least  from  a  rejection  of  the  attitudes  of  the 
Enlightenment-  in  particular,  in  the  present  context,  from  a  rejection  of  the  identification 
of  humanity  with  the  power  of  reason.  And  as  a  result  of  our  inheritance  of  these 
historical  fragments,  we  find  ourselves  left  with  an  often  unnoticed  ambivalence  about 
the  value  of  our  emotional  lives. 
We  are,  for  example,  suspicious  of  emotion  as  a  force  which  brings  bias, 
muddleheaded  thinking  and  inhibits  objectivity.  In  respects  such  as  these  reason  easily 
wins  out  over  emotion.  Yet  at'the  same  time,  we  live  by  our  emotions  and  accord  them 
overwhelming  significance  in  our  daily  lives.  Our  deepest  commitments  are  usually 
emotional  ones;  for  most  of  us,  the  people  we  love,  the  achievements  of  which  we  are 
proud,  the  art  which  moves  us,  are  the  sorts  of  things  which  give  life  significance. 
In  other  respects,  however,  we  not  only  value  emotion  but  tend  to  be  suspicious  of  a 
lack  of  it.  Those  who  cannot  feel  pity,  love,  shame  or  joy  are  felt  to  be  deficient  in  some 
3 way.  The  person  who  does  not  grieve  or  feel  pity  is  seen  as  cold,  lacking  in  real 
attachment  to  others.  This  absence  is  taken  as  a  failure  of  some  sort,  and  one  we  do  not 
regard  as  superficial.  Rather,  we  take  empathy  and  a  range  of  other  emotional 
experiences  as  a  sign  that  someone  shares  the  same  world  as  us.  To  be  confronted  with 
someone  who  does  not  share  our  emotional  orientation  towards  the  world  in  this  way 
can  be  disturbing.  In  this  respect,  the  psychopath  lies  at  one  end  of  a  spectrum  of 
emotional  disorders-  someone  who  is  completely  devoid  of  fellow  feeling  and  empathy. 
And  while  we  may  attempt  to  minimise  the  significance  of  the  psychopath  by 
classifying  his  disorder  as  "pathological"  or  "organic",  we  recognise  that  less  extreme 
cases  are  both  more  familiar  and  nearer  to  us.  Camus'  novel  L'etranger,  for  example, 
features  the  (anti-)  hero  Mersault,  whose  most  striking  characteristic  is  his  emotional 
alienation.  Literature  in  general  offers  many  examples,  both  of  characters  who  struggle 
to  come  to  terms  with  the  undesirable  emotions  they  have  and  others  who  attempt  to 
understand  their  lack  of  emotion.  In  general  then,  we  are  torn  between  two  contrary 
views  of  emotions;  on  the  one  hand  we  regard  them  as  merely  hysterical  impediments  to 
clear  thinking,  and  on  the  other  as  constitutive  of  a  correct  grasp  of  what  is  valuable. 
Our  language,  I  think,  also  reflects  this  ambivalence.  In  English  the  two  words 
"Passion"  and  "Emotion"  3  are  used  almost  interchangeably  -  or  at  any  rate,  there  is  no 
accepted  account  of  a  difference  in  meaning.  But  in  certain  contexts  their  meaning  is  not 
the  same.  To  describe  someone  as  "highly  emotional"  would  generally  be  taken  as 
indicating  some  kind  of  instability,  and  certainly  would  imply  something  negative- 
perhaps  an  inability  to  think  straight,  to  work,  or  to  "  face  facts".  To  describe  someone 
as  "very  passionate",  however,  would  not  be  taken  as  a  critical  or  negative  appraisal, 
but  on  the  contrary,  as  saying  something  positive.  It  is  reasonable  to  suspect  that  this 
confusion,  is  the  result  of  the  fragmentary  nature  of  our  historical  inheritance. 
Putting  Folk  Psychology  to  one  side  now,  the  history  of  philosophical  thinking  about 
the  emotions  is  in  large  part  a  sub-plot  of  the  history  of  philosophical  thinking  about  the 
mind.  That  is  to  say  that  individual  philosophers  have  generally  formed  their  views 
about  the  nature  and  value  of  emotions  under  pressure  from  their  other  philosophical 
commitments;  either  commitments  to  general  theories  of  the  mental  or  to  even  more 
3  Both  of  which  have  classical  roots;  "Passion"  coming  from  the  Greek  "pathe",  and  "Emotion"  which 
comes  from  the  Latin  "movere"  meaning  to  move.  This  is  a  reflection  of  the  "passivity"  of  emotional 
states. 
4 general  metaphysical  and  ethical  views.  Plato's  view  of  what  an  emotional  state  is  and 
his  tri-partite  conception  of  the  soul  -  which  in  turn  is  part  of  a  bigger  metaphysical  and 
epistemological  picture-  is  an  obvious  instance  of  this.  And  what  is  true  of  Plato  is  also 
true  of  Descartes,  Hume,  Spinoza  and,  in  more  modem  times,  Ryle  and  many  others. 
In  this  thesis  I  shall  not  attempt  a  comprehensive  survey  of  the  views  of  different 
philosophers.  Instead,  my  aim  is  to  elucidate  two  questions;  first,  what  are  emotions, 
and  second,  are  they  valuable,  and  if  so  why?  These  questions  are  connected  in  a  fairly 
obvious  way,  since  the  answer  we  give  to  the  first  question  will  constitute  the 
background  to  any  answer  we  offer  to  the  second.  If,  for  example,  it  turns  out  that  an 
emotion  is  in  general  not  unlike  sensation,  that  fact  will  limit  the  kinds  of  reasons  we 
might  credibly  offer  for  valuing  it.  In  general,  I  do  not  think  that  we  do  think  that  an 
emotion  is  at  bottom  something  comparable  to  a  sensation-  despite  what  our  casual  talk 
might  imply-  and  relatedly,  we  think  their  importance  is  quite  distinct  to  that  of 
sensations. 
Although  popular  attitudes  do  not  always  reflect  these  claims,  they  are  -  in  the 
philosophical  literature,  at  least-  no  longer  seriously  controversial.  The  tremendous 
growth  in  the  philosophy  of  mind  since  the  fifties,  and  the  flourishing  of  virtue  ethics  in 
particular,  have  led  to  increasing  interest  in  emotions,  and  consequently  to  a  broad 
consensus  on  what  account  should,  roughly  speaking,  be  given  of  them.  Nevertheless, 
there  remains  substantial  disagreement  about  the  details,  as  will  emerge  below.  More 
generally,  there  are  several  more  general  philosophical  issues  which  are  raised  by 
accounts  of  the  emotions.  One  of  these  is  that  in  the  philosophy  of  mind  (  and  perhaps  in 
philosophy  generally)  there  tends  to  be  a  rooted  bias  in  favour  of  one  kind  of  mental 
state  in  particular-  belief. 
It  is  this  favouritism  which  has  retarded  our  understanding  of  the  nature  of  emotional 
states,  I  claim,  and  led  to  a  multiplication  of  subsidiary  puzzles.  In  the  remainder  of  this 
introduction  I  will  sketch  the  outline  of  the  argument  to  be  developed  later,  and  illustrate 
some  of  the  other  general  claims  I  will  be  arguing  for,  and  how  they  are  connected  to  it. 
5 Summary  of  the  Argument. 
The  position  to  be  argued  for  in  what  follows  involves  several  claims.  The  first  and 
least  controversial  of  these  is  that  the  popular  conception  of  the  relationship  between 
reason  and  emotion  is  a  mistake.  It  is  not,  for  example,  the  case  that  only  reason  offers 
cognitive  grasp  of  the  world.  Nor  is  it  correct  to  claim  that  emotions  are  either  irrational 
or  non-rational.  In  contrast,  I  claim  that  emotions  involve  understanding  and  so  offer 
cognitive  grasp  of  features  of  the  world.  Secondly,  they  can  be  rational  or  irrational, 
appropriate  or  inappropriate. 
These  conclusions  are  in  line  with  what  most  philosophers  would  now  accept  are  the 
correct  outlines  of  a  theory  of  emotions.  This  consensus  has  been  reached  primarily 
through  the  rejection  of  the  kind  of  account  of  emotions  offered  by  Hume  and 
Descartes.  The  most  glaring  deficiency  of  those  theories  was  their  failure  to 
acknowledge  the  intentionality  of  emotions.  Emotions  are  about  things,  they  have 
objects,  and  once  this  is  recognised,  the  gap  between  emotions  and  other  cognitive  states 
is  narrowed  and  it  becomes  clearer  why  it  is  a  mistake  to  refuse  them  entry  to  the  club  of 
potentially  rational  states. 
However,  to  claim  that  emotions  are  cognitive  states  and  can  be  rational,  is  not  to  say 
much,  and  it  leaves  many  questions  unanswered.  One  outstanding  question  concerns  the 
nature  of  the  cognitive  element-  is  it,  for  example,  a  belief?  This  has  certainly  been  the 
majority  view,  although  there  have  been  dissenters.  In  the  argument  to  be  developed,  I 
will  be  siding  with  the  dissenters.  The  significance  of  this  question,  is,  as  hinted  above, 
wider  than  a  concern  merely  with  emotions.  Other  puzzles  arise  if  we  think  of  the 
cognitive  element  of  an  emotion  as  a  belief.  To  take  merely  one  of  these;  how  should 
we  account  for  emotional  responses  to  fiction,  where  there  are  no  beliefs  of  the  relevant 
sort?  This  and  other  difficulties  dissolve,  I  contend,  once  we  recognise  that  there  can  be 
cognitive  states  other  than  beliefs.  My  second  claim  then  is  that  the  cognitive 
component  of  an  emotion  is  not  a  belief.  I  try  to  say  exactly  what  it  is  by  exploring  two 
other  ideas  found  in  the  work  of  two  very  different  philosophers;  Wittgenstein's  concept 
of  "aspect-perception",  and  Aristotle's  use  of  the  concept  of  "phantasia". 
There  is,  in  addition,  a  more  general  issue  connected  to  these,  concerning  the  nature  of 
rationality.  In  contemporary  philosophy  the  dominant  view  is  that  when  it  comes  to 
explaining  behaviour,  we  should  proceed  by  identifying  appropriate  beliefs  and  desires. 
6 This  belief/desire  psychology  would  force  us  to  regard  many  emotional  states,  such  as 
responses  to  fictions  and  others  as  irrational.  My  third  claim  is  that  this  is  a  mistake, 
and  I  try  to  show  how  we  can  grant  these  states  a  rational  status.  As  a  focus  for  these 
concerns,  I  have  chosen  at  various  points  to  consider  the  work  of  Donald  Davidson. 
There  are  several  reasons  for  this.  First,  Davidson's  own  theory  of  emotions  serves  (in 
chapter  one)  as  an  example  of  the  kind  of  view  I  reject.  Second,  his  account  derives 
explicitly  from  his  more  general  advocacy  of  the  belief/desire  view  of  psychology, 
which  I  also  reject.  The  third  reason  is  that  implicit  in  his  account  is  a  picture  of 
understanding  which  is  directly  at  odds  with  the  one  I  propose,  with  the  help  of  the 
Wittgensteinian  notion  of  aspect-perception. 
Turning  next  to  the  question  of  the  value  of  emotions,  it  would  be  natural-  given  the 
account  just  sketched-  to  defend  their  value  as  deriving  from  the  fact  that  they  involve 
understanding.  However,  at  this  point  another  problem  arises.  Whatever  the  cognitive 
component  of  an  emotion  is,  is  it  not  the  case  that  we  can  have  this  cognitive  state-  and 
hence  the  understanding  it  affords-  without  having  the  full  emotional  state?  This  natural 
line  of  thought  would  make  it  harder  to  explain  what  kind  of  cognitive  grasp  of  things 
was  unique  specifically  to  emotions.  But  as  I  indicated  above,  we  are  suspicious  of 
emotional  deficits,  and  the  natural  way  to  understand  this  suspicion  is  in  terms  of  a 
cognitive  failure  of  some  sort.  This  has  certainly  been  the  suggestion  of  some  recent 
philosophers4.  Such  a  view  therefore  owes  some  explanation  of  how  emotions  and  only 
emotions  are  related  to  understanding  in  the  relevant  ways. 
This  in  turn  raises  a  further  general  difficulty,  familiar  from  philosophical  discussions 
in  ethics  and  aesthetics,  namely  the  theory  known  as  cognitivism.  A  "cognitive"  theory 
of  the  emotions  is  generally  taken  to  be  one  which  takes  emotions  to  have  intentionality 
and  contain  a  cognitive  element.  But  this  leaves  it  unclear  exactly  how  the  cognitive 
element  and  the  emotion  as  a  whole  are  related.  In  particular,  is  the  cognitive  element 
sufficient  for  producing  the  emotion?  The  view  that  it  is,  I  label  "strong"  cognitivism 
about  the  emotions.  This  is  distinct  from  two  other  positions,  "weak"  and  "moderate" 
cognitivism.  I  argue  that  only  "strong"  cognitivism  can  fully  deliver  the  sort  of  account 
of  emotions  that  the  aforementioned  intuitions  might  lead  us  to  expect.  This  is  my  fourth 
claim.  My  fifth  claim  is  the  tentative  one  that  "strong"  cognitivism  is  the  correct  view 
and  can  be  defended. 
4  Particularly  Martha  Nussbaum,  for  example  in  The  Fragility  of  Goodness  and  The  Therapy  of  Desire 
7 There  is  another  issue  related  to  this,  also  concerning  the  value  of  the  emotions.  We 
can  put  this  issue  in  the  following  way;  do  emotions  have  intrinsic  value,  or  only 
instrumental  value?  For  example,  many  psychologists5  who  favour  cognitive  views  of 
the  emotions  argue  that  without  emotions  we  cannot  socialise  adequately,  and 
neurologists6  are  converging  on  the  view  that  without  emotions  our  general  decision- 
making  abilities  are  severely  impaired.  I  do  not  disagree  with  these  claims.  However,  if 
the  value  of  emotions  is  only  of  this  sort,  then  emotions  can  only  be  instrumentally 
valuable.  In  contrast,  I  try  to  show  that  in  addition  to  instrumental  value,  emotions  are 
also  intrinsically  valuable. 
In  the  history  of  philosophy  the  most  systematically  developed  account  of  the  value  of 
emotions  is  to  be  found  in  the  ethical  writings  of  Aristotle.  I  spend  some  time  in  chapter 
three  elaborating  this  account;  in  particular  the  notions  of  character  and  integrity  and  of 
moral  education  embodied  in  Aristotle's  moral  psychology.  Aristotle's  account  of  the 
significance  of  emotion  is  ultimately  in  terms  of  its  ethical  value.  Although  there  is 
great  interest  and  appeal  in  this  account,  to  the  distinctively  modem  sensibilities  of 
many,  it  leaves  out  something  crucial. 
Here,  I  believe,  there  is  an  effective  contrast  to  be  drawn  between  Aristotle's  account 
and  the  views  of  Nietzsche.  It  will  be  enough  to  mention  two  aspects  of  this  contrast 
here.  Nietzsche,  although  he  explicitly  disavowed  the  Romantic  movement,  espouses 
views  which  are  nevertheless  unavoidably  Romantic.  In  stark  contrast  to  the  traditions 
of  antiquity,  Nietzsche  gives  supreme  value  not  to  the  sphere  of  the  ethical,  but  to  the 
aesthetic  (Indeed,  the  distinction  itself  is  a  modem  one).  This  is  of  a  piece  with  his 
fulminations  against  the  attempts  of  previous  philosophers  (among  them  Aristotle)  to 
domesticate  and  render  "healthy"  our  passions.  Here,  once  again,  I  think,  we  encounter 
grounds  for  distinguishing  between  "emotions"  and  "passions".  I  pair  these  off  as 
follows;  "emotion"  is  what  Aristotle  is  concerned  with,  I  claim,  in  talking  of  the 
education  of  character,  while  "passion"  is  something  slightly  different,  and  is  what 
concerns  Nietzsche.  This  is  my  sixth  claim. 
So  Nietzsche  is  anxious  to  insist  that  the  value  of  passion  is  not  concerned  with  the 
education  of  character  in  Aristotle's  sense,  but  with  the  aesthetic  value  of  life.  That  is 
the  first  point.  The  second  is  that  he  argues-  in  complete  contradiction  to  Aristotle-  that 
s  For  example,  Daniel  Goleman,  whose  recent  best-seller  Emotional  Intelligence  argues  this  point. 
6  Most  notably,  Antonio  Damasio,  Descartes'  Error,  and  Joseph  LeDoux,  The  Emotional  Brain. 
8 the  education  of  emotion  is  not  only  not  desirable,  but  a  complete  disaster.  This  raises 
the  general  question  of  education.  Can  emotions  be  educated?  And  if  so,  how? 
Secondly,  should  we  take  their  education  to  be  a  good  or  a  bad  thing?  Thirdly,  if  they 
can  be  educated,  what  is  it  that  we  educate?  This  question  brings  us  back  to  previous 
issues;  if  the  cognitive  component  of  an  emotion  is  a  belief,  then  educating  emotions 
will  involve  educating  beliefs.  But  the  sheer  recalcitrance  of  emotional  experience,  its 
reluctance  to  be  educated,  may  alone  be  enough  to  suggest  that  this  is  a  misguided 
account.  In  any  case,  I  think  we  can  establish  that  the  education  of  beliefs  is  not  at  all 
what  is  at  stake,  and  this  leaves  a  need  for  some  account  of  what  is  involved. 
There  are  additionally,  a  spectrum  of  ethical  viewpoints  which  are  generally  hostile  to 
any  attribution  of  value-  at  least,  ethical  value-  to  emotions.  The  Kantian  view  is  the 
most  obvious  one,  although  some  recent  writers  have  qualified  this  picture  in  some 
respects8.  Another  is  Stoicism.  Popular  understanding  of  Stoicism  is  incomplete  and  in 
crucial  respects  misguided.  While  many  of  us  would  be  happy  to  get  rid  of  many  of  our 
own  emotions  and  those  of  others  -  as  the  Stoics  held  was  necessary  for  a  fulfilled  and 
virtuous  life  -  few  if  any  would  get  rid  of  them  all.  Yet  this  is  precisely  the  Stoic  aim. 
Isiah  Berlin  claimed9  that  Stoicism  was  not  so  much  a  historically  local  philosophical 
theory  but  an  instance  of  a  more  general  attitude  towards  the  world  which  has  recurred 
at  different  times  and  in  different  cultures,  and  it  is  certainly  possible  to  see  important 
aspects  of  it  replicated  in  Kantian  thought  and  in  Buddhism,  for  example.  However,  the 
dispute  between  the  Stoics  and  Aristotle  over  the  value  of  emotion  rests  on  a  specific 
dispute  about  human  flourishing.  In  chapter  four  I  argue  that  Aristotle  gets  the  better  of 
the  argument. 
There  is  also  a  disagreement  between  Aristotle  and  the  Stoics  over  the  nature  of  the 
emotional  states.  The  Stoics  hold  a  version  of  what  I  call  "Strong  "  cognitivism.  The 
same  is  arguably  true  of  Aristotle,  I  claim.  But  in  another  respect,  however,  their  views 
are  utterly  different.  The  Stoics  hold  the  view  that  an  emotion  just  is  a  cognition.  This- 
on  the  face  of  it,  implausible-  view  has  recently  been  defended  10as  a  means  of  showing 
7  Or  at  least  much  of  what  he  says  -  some  of  it  specifically  about  Aristotle-  suggests  this.  But  he  is  not  in 
favour  of  unbridled  emotion  either,  and  thinks  strength  of  character  a  virtue.  These  points  are  followed  up 
in  Ch.  3. 
e  For  example,  Nancy  Sherman,  Making  a  Necessity  of  Virtue. 
9  In  "Two  Concepts  of  Liberty",  p.  139. 
10  By  Martha  Nussbaum  in  The  Therapy  of  Desire.  See  Chapter  three. 
9 how  full  understanding  requires  emotion.  But  it  is  an  unnecessarily  strong  view,  since 
"strong"  cognitivism,  I  claim,  can  equally  support  these  claims  about  understanding 
without  any  of  the  disadvantages  that  accrue  to  the  Stoic  view. 
The  final  two  chapters  explore  our  emotional  responses  to  fiction  and  the  role  of  belief 
in  psychological  explanation.  In  the  last  chapter  I  try  to  pull  together  various  themes 
from  previous  chapters,  and  in  particular  to  develop  the  idea  that  phantasia  are 
convincing  or  unconvincing,  quite  apart  from  whether  they  are  assented  to  or  believed 
in.  This  thesis  offers  an  explanation  of  the  conflict  between  emotion  and  judgement,  and 
allows  us  to  see  a  role  for  techniques  of  persuasion  apart  from  the  philosophical  practice 
of  dialectic.  In  particular,  it  offers  a  defence  of  rhetoric,  which,  since  Plato,  has  been 
deemed  to  make  no  contribution  to  real  understanding,  which  is  the  province  of 
philosophy  and  the  result  of  dialectic  and  the  formation  of  true  belief. 
The  nature  of  emotional  states  then,  opens  up  wider  questions  about  the  nature  of 
understanding,  about  what  sorts  of  mental  states  there  are,  and  the  nature  of  rationality. 
The  impetus  behind  the  topic  therefore,  is  not  simply  to  say  what  emotions  are  and  why 
we  value  them-  although  obviously,  that  is  the  immediate  task  in  hand-  but  to  attempt  to 
weaken  the  stranglehold  of  the  philosophical  picture  of  cognition  which  I  mentioned. 
Many  of  these  aims  are  already  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  Wittgenstein.  But  as  I 
shall  argue  in  the  final  chapter,  many  of  the  same  errors  attacked  by  Wittgenstein  are 
still  to  be  found  in  mainstream  philosophy  today. 
10 Chapter  One.  The  Nature  of  Emotions. 
Feelings. 
What  is  involved  in  being  in  an  emotional  state?  When  I  am  angry  or  frightened,  for 
example,  what  does  my  fear  or  anger  consist  in?  It  seems  an  uncontentious  starting  point 
to  say  that  each  state  normally  (though  perhaps  not  always)  involves  (  though  it  may  not 
be  exhaustively  reduced  to)  certain  feelings,  of  both  a  physical  and  non-  physical  nature. 
These  bodily  and  non-  bodily  feelings  then  seem  to  be  at  least  associated  with  emotions, 
whether  or  not  they  are  emotions.  Other  candidates  which  also  seem  associated  with 
emotional  states  might  be  physiological  symptoms  of  various  sorts,  such  as  a  racing 
pulse,  sweating,  and  so  on,  thoughts  of  one  sort  or  another,  desires  to  do  certain  things, 
and  behaviour  of  various  kinds.  In  addition,  there  may  be,  (  and  certainly  must  be  if  any 
kind  of  "identity  theory"  is  true)  different  physical  states  of  the  brain  and  nervous 
system  which,  whether  we  know  it  or  not,  are  involved  in  emotional  states.  Given  then 
that  these  are  the  most  obvious  features  of  emotional  states,  let  us  consider  a  concrete 
example. 
When  we  are  frightened,  what  happens?  Well,  we  can  usually  observe  in 
ourselves  certain  physiological  effects,  such  as  trembling,  sweating,  a  queasy  stomach,  a 
faster  pulse  rate,  adrenaline  being  released  into  the  bloodstream,  and  so  on.  And  it 
seems  certain  that,  as  scientists  and  psychologists  tell  us,  much  more  is  going  on 
physiologically  that  we  are  not  directly  aware  of-  the  blood  rushes  to  the  larger  muscles 
(  for  example,  in  readiness  for  flight  from  danger),  hormones  are  secreted,  the  limbic 
system  is  activated  and  a  certain  pattern  of  neuro-transmitter  activity  takes  place.  Now 
at  least  some  of  these  bodily  events  register  as  physical  feelings-  the  feeling  of 
queasiness  in  the  stomach,  the  feeling  of  an  accelerated  heartbeat,  the  feeling  of 
weakness  in  the  knees.  So  much  then  for  the  physical  symptoms  and  feelings  caused  by 
them. 
In  addition  to  these  physical  events  and  the  physical  feelings  of  at  least  some  of  them, 
an  emotion  also  seems  to  involve  non-  physical  feelings.  Taking  the  case  of  fear  again, 
fear  "feels"  different  to,  say,  joy,  in  a  way  that  is  not  accounted  for  just  by  the  way  its 
physical  symptoms  feel.  Principally,  fear  is  unpleasant(  in  most  cases,  but  perhaps  not 
11 all-  a  point  to  which  I  shall  return)  and  involves  a  non-physical  feeling  of  tension,  stress, 
anxiety.  These  feelings  are  distinct  from  the  physical  feelings  generated  by  the 
physiological  symptoms  of  the  emotional  state,  such  as  the  queasy  feeling  in  my 
stomach. 
The  concept  of  "feeling"  is  a  notoriously  treacherous  one.  Ryles  1,  for  example, 
distinguishes  seven  different  senses  of  it  (the  "Perceptual"-to  feel  the  temperature  of  the 
water;  the  "Exploratory"-to  feel  for  my  keys  in  my  pocket;  the  "Sensory"-to  feel  an  itch; 
of  "General  condition"-  to  feel  a  non-localised  feeling  of  depression  or  laziness; 
"Tentative  judgement"-  to  feel  there  is  something  wrong  with  an  argument; 
"Inclination"-to  feel  like  doing  something;  the  "Mock-perceptual"-  the  condemned  man 
feels  the  noose  round  his  neck  though  he  is  in  his  cell)  and  he  acknowledges  there  may 
be  more  senses.  The  two  senses  of  feelings  described  above-  physical  and  non-physical- 
seem  to  correspond  to  Ryle's  "sensory"  and  "general  condition"  usages.  The  question 
we  shall  begin  with  then  is  this;  is  any  of  these  three  components  of  emotional 
states(two  types  of  sensation  and  the  physiological  symptoms)  either  necessary  or 
sufficient  or  both  for  the  emotional  state  itself? 
Taking  first  physiological  states,  it  has  seemed  obvious  to  some  writers 
that  physiological  symptoms  and  an  awareness  of  them  is both  necessary  and  sufficient 
for  the  emotion;  in  short,  is  the  emotion.  Most  famously  this  view  was  held  by  the 
psychologist  William  James  and  later  by  Carl  Lange  (The  "James-Lange"  view,  as  it  is 
often  referred  to).  In  his  well  known  essay  "What  is  an  emotion?  "12  James  writes, 
"My  thesis,  on  the  contrary,  is  that  the  bodily  changes  follow  directly  the 
perception  of  the  exciting  fact  and  that  our  feeling  of  the  same  changes  as  they  occur  is 
the  emotion.  " 
(James.  P.  13) 
What  this  means  in  detail  is  that  each  emotion  can  be  specified  by  detailing  the  visceral 
reactions,  awareness  of  which  constitutes  the  emotions.  So,  according  to  Lange,  for 
example,  the  difference  between  anger  and  fear  is  that  the  former  is  associated  with 
irregular  breathing,  secretion  of  large  amounts  of  saliva  and  a  swelling  of  the  blood 
vessels,  whereas  the  latter  is  typified  by  trembling,  spasms  of  the  limbs  and  dryness  of 
the  mouth.  On  this  view  then,  an  emotion  just  is  certain  typical  physical  events  or 
11  Ryle,  "Feelings",  Philosophical  Quarterly  1951. 
12  Reprinted  in  Solomon  and  Calhoun  eds.  What  is  an  Emotion? 
12 processes  and  the  physical  feelings  they  produce.  Does  this  seem  to  be  a  plausible 
account  of  what  an  emotional  state  is?  Before  answering,  let  us  consider  the  view  that 
emotions  are  defined  not  by  physical  feelings  but  by  non-physical  feelings 
In  Hume'  s  view,  for  example,  a  significant  feature  of  the  identity  of  an 
emotional  state  is  the  pleasure  or  pain  associated  with  it.  Pride,  for  example,  is  in  his 
view  a  conjunction  of  the  pleasure  aroused  by  a  particular  object,  person  or  action  with 
the  idea  of  the  self.  He  says, 
"  Thus  pride  is  a  pleasant  sensation  and  humility  a  painful;  and  upon  the  removal 
of  the  pleasure  and  pain,  there  is  in  reality  no  pride  nor  humility.  Of  this  our 
very  feeling  convinces  us;  and  beyond  our  feeling,  'tis  here  in  vain  to  reason  or 
dispute.  " 
(Treatise  11,1,5) 
Hume 
,  then,  seems  to  be  saying  that  whatever  perceptions  or  ideas  are  the  causal 
antecedents  of  the  emotion,  it  is  the  quality  of  pleasure  or  pain  thereby  aroused  that 
makes  it  the  emotion  that  it  is.  For  Hume,  an  emotion  is  a  certain  kind  of  non-physical 
feeling  i3,  while  for  James  it  is  a  physical  feeling.  So,  is  an  emotion  just  its  physical  or 
non-physical  feelings,  or  perhaps  some  of  these  in  conjunction  with  physiological  events 
and  processes?  Consider  physiological  events  and  an  awareness  of  them  first.  Is  it  the 
case,  as  the  James-Lange  theory  claims,  that  emotional  states  are  constituted  by  an 
awareness  of  such  events?  On  reflection,  it  seems  the  answer  must  be  "no".  In  the  cases 
of  anger  and  fear,  there  are  many  symptoms  in  common-  increased  blood  flow  to  large 
muscles,  faster  pulse,  and  so  on.  Let  us  suppose  however,  that  there  is  one  or  more 
symptom  which  is  typically  associated  with  only  that  particular  emotion-  say  dryness  of 
mouth  in  the  case  of  fear.  Could  this  be  what  anger  is? 
There  are  two  difficulties  with  such  a  view  which  seem  to  be  fatal  to  it.  First,  it 
implies  that  knowing  what  emotional  state  I  am  in  requires  me  to  observe  and  note  my 
physical  symptoms,  which  in  turn  makes  the  process  of  identification  an  inferential, 
even  inductive  one.  But  this  seems  mistaken  as  an  account  of  how  I  know  what 
emotional  state  I  am  in.  The  reason  is  that  when  I  am  angry  I  typically,  though  perhaps 
13  On  Hume's  account  the  pleasure  caused  by  the  things  that  make  us  proud  is  not  defined  by  the  object 
which  causes  it.  Rather  it  is  simply  one  term  in  a  causal  relation. 
13 not  always14,  know  that  I  am  angry,  and  I  do  not  need  to  consult  my  physiological 
symptoms  to  discover  this.  This  is  a  point  I  will  be  returning  to  at  various  points. 
Second,  experimental  psychologists  (most  famously  the  studies  by  Cannon  and  by 
Schacter  and  Singer)15  have  designed  experiments  to  test  how  well  people  can  identify 
their  emotions  in  this  way.  The  evidence  very  strongly  suggests  that  in  the  absence  of  a 
"focus"  for  their  emotion,  physical  symptoms  alone  are  insufficient  for  people  to 
identify  their  emotional  state.  Lastly,  I  imagined  above  that  there  might  be  some  one  or 
other  physical  event  or  feeling  which  was  obviously  associated  one  kind  of  emotion.  But 
that  supposition  also  seems  false,  for  the  reason  already  suggested,  that  there  is  a  pool  of 
symptoms  which  many  emotions  share. 
The  James-Lange  type  of  view  is  distinct  from  another  view  which  also  emphasises 
physiological  factors.  This  view  says  that  there  is  some  distinctive  physiological  event 
or  pattern  of  events-such  as  neurological  events,  or  chemical  events  in  the  nervous 
system-  which,  whether  or  not  we  are  aware  of  it,  would  serve  to  identify  the  emotional 
state.  Whether  or  not  this  is  in  fact  true,  the  view  I  have  just  been  considering  regards 
awareness  of  physiological  events  as  the  defining  feature  of  emotional  states. 
Straightforward  reductionism  is  not  concerned  with  awareness  at  all.  On  that  view, 
unless  I  am  a  neurologist,  I  will  probably  have  no  idea  which  states  of  my  brain  would 
identify  my  emotion. 
An  extreme  version  of  this  view  is  eliminativism,  which  hopes  to  replace  emotion- 
concepts  and  all  the  rest  of  our  folk  psychology  with  new  concepts  from  the  neural 
sciences.  I  shall  not  present  arguments  against  these  theories  since  they  are  views  about 
mental  phenomena  in  general  and  imply  nothing  particular  about  emotions. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  a  background  assumption  of  the  views  I  will  endorse  that  such  a 
radical  reduction  of  the  mental  to  the  physical  is  not  possible.  Let  us  assume  then  -  what 
we  now  have  good  reason  to  accept  -  that  emotions  cannot  be  identified  and  are  not 
constituted  simply  by  physiological  events  and  an  awareness  of  them.  What  then  about 
the  view  that  emotions  are  non-physical  feelings? 
14  There  may  be  cases  where  we  do  infer  the  identity  of  an  emotion,  or  that  we  are  in  a  given  emotional 
state  from  the  evidence.  The  present  point  is  merely  that  this  is  not  typical,  as  it  would  have  to  be  on  the 
theory  under  consideration. 
IS  Reproduced  in  Solomon  and  Calhoun  eds.  (op.  cit.  ) 
14 Pain  and  Pleasure. 
This  view  has  some  intuitive  appeal-  above  all  perhaps  because  of 
the  fact  that  we  talk  about  emotions  as  feelings  (I  "feel"  angry,  sad  etc.  ).  But  what  sort 
of  things  are  these  feelings  and  how  do  we  identify  them?  I  have  noted  already  Hume's 
claim  that  pain  and  pleasure  are  the  feelings  relevant  to  emotions,  but  what  sort  of 
feelings  are  pain  and  pleasure?  Are  they  physical  feelings  like  sensations,  and  could 
they  be  the  means  by  which  we  identify  our  emotions?  To  see  how  we  should  answer 
these  questions,  consider  sensations  such  as  itches,  burns  and  pains.  In  the  case  of 
physical  pains,  for  example,  I  know  immediately  that  what  I  am  experiencing  is  pain 
(except  perhaps  when  the  pain  "creeps  up  "  on  me  slowly,  as  headaches  sometimes  do)- 
frequently  without  knowing  what  is  causing  it.  About  the  identity  of  some  sensations 
then  there  is  little  doubt.  But  not  all  sensations  are  so  clear  cut-  it  may  in  some  cases  not 
be  immediately  clear  whether  a  sensation  is  pleasant  or  not.  Putting  these  atypical  cases 
to  one  side  however,  I  know  when  I'm  in  a  lot  of  pain,  and  moreover  I  seem  to  know 
this  without  observing  anything  and  without  having  to  make  any  inferences.  Is  it  then 
the  case  that  emotions  can  be  identified  by  reference  to  pains  in  this  way? 
Bums,  cuts  and  grazes  are  all  physical  pains.  If,  as  seems  plausible,  emotions  are 
partly  constituted  by  pains  and  pleasures,  are  they  physical  pains  and  pleasures?  Clearly 
not.  So  can  these  non-physical  feelings  identify  emotions?  If  we  think  of  them  as  simply 
(non-physical)  sensations,  analogous  to  physical  pains  such  as  bums  and  grazes,  except 
non-physical,  we  run  into  a  problem.  Consider  how  I  identify  my  pains.  I  know  my 
current  experience  is  painful  simply  by  experiencing  it.  But  I  may  experience  pain 
without  knowing  what  is  causing  it.  If  someone  sticks  two  pins  into  my  finger,  I  may  be 
unable  to  distinguish  the  pain  from  that  caused  by  three  pins.  We  may  of  course  be  able 
to  offer  a  guess  as  to  the  cause  of  the  pain;  we  may  become  adept  at  distinguishing  the 
kinds  of  sensation  brought  about  by  different  things-  at  distinguishing,  for  example,  a 
dry-ice  bum  from  a  cigarette  bum.  But  knowing  this-  knowing  the  kind  of  pain  it  is-  is  a 
question  of  becoming  good  at  making  inferences. 
Is  the  "pain  "  of  grief  like  this?  Do  I  infer  that  my  pain  is  grief?  We  have  already 
rejected  this  picture  in  the  case  of  physical  feelings,  and  we  have  seen  no  reason  to  think 
it  will  be  more  successful  in  the  present  case.  So  if  pain  and  pleasure  are  what  identifies 
15 emotions  they  can't  be  analogous  to  sensations.  What  this  means  is  that  they  must  have 
intentionality.  This  is  a  point  which  has  also  been  argued  by  Ryle16.  The  pleasure  of 
going  to  the  theatre  is  distinct  from  the  pleasure  of  drinking  beer,  playing  the  violin,  and 
so  on.  But  in  order  to  say  how  they  are  different,  we  have  to  say  something  about  the 
object  of  the  pleasure;  what  we  are  taking  pleasure  in. 
Already  we  can  see  that  we  have  advanced  beyond  the  original  notion  of  a  non- 
physical  sensation  defining  an  emotion.  Granting  Hume's  point  that  pain  and  pleasure 
play  a  crucial  role  in  the  identity  of  emotions,  we  can  now  see  that  with  respect  to  those 
pains  and  pleasures,  we  will  need  to  say  something  about  their  objects.  And  in  fact  this 
agrees  with  experience;  the  pain  of  grief  is  different  from  the  pain  of  jealousy  or  shame, 
but  to  say  how  they  are  different  will  require  us  to  say  what  the  emotion  is  about.  It  may 
be  then,  and  I  think  it  is  true  that,  the  pleasure  and  pain  of  emotions  are  partly 
constitutive  of  them.  But  these  pains  are  not  mere  sensations,  and  cannot  be  described 
without  reference  to  their  objects. 
Terrible  Joy  and  Pleasant  Grief. 
There  is  also  another  way  in  which  the  nature  of  feelings  such  as  pain  and  pleasure 
might  begin  to  worry  us  if  we  emphasise  the  cognitive  elements  of  emotions  at  their 
expense.  If  feelings,  like  physical  feelings,  were  merely  incidental  components  of 
emotions,  the  following  possibility  might  seem  to  arise.  It  could  happen  that  an  emotion 
such  as  grief  could  involve  the  experience  of  quite  different  feelings.  If  the  feelings  of 
joy  and  grief  were  merely  contingently  associated  with  their  emotions,  the  feelings 
could  conceivably  swap  emotions,  and  joy  would  come  to  feel  like  grief  feels,  and  vice 
versa".  If  we  emphasise  the  cognitive  aspect  as  giving  the  identity  of  an  emotion,  the 
cognition  will  in  these  cases  remain  the  same  and  consequently  it  will  still  be  the  same 
emotion. 
16  Ryle,  "Pleasure",  in  Dilemmas. 
17  This  possibility  is  discussed  by  Stephen  Leighton,  "On  Feeling  Angry  and  Elated",  Journal  of 
Philosophy  1988. 
16 Yet  there  seems  to  be  something  wrong  with  this  possibility.  We  feel  that  the  feelings 
of  grief  are  somehow  appropriate  to  the  emotion,  and  likewise  the  feelings  of  joy.  The 
imagined  swap  would  combine  a  negative  cognition  (grief)  with  a  positive  feeling  (joy). 
Perhaps  the  source  of  our  misgivings  about  this  possibility  is  that  the  positive  feeling 
itself  has  intentionality.  However  this  can  only  be  part  of  the  story.  For  one  thing,  there 
is  the  possible  objection  that  all  cognitions  are  affectless  (see  below).  If  this  objection  is 
right,  the  intentional  element  of  pleasure  and  pain  could  be  experienced  without  the 
affect.  So  we  could  have  the  negative  intentional  component  of  the  feeling  of  grief 
without  the  negative  affect. 
But  given  the  arguments  of  the  previous  section  we  might  feel  that  we  now  have  a 
good  reply  to  this  objection;  namely  that  the  negative  or  positive  affect  of  pleasure  and 
pain  cannot  really  be  separated  from  the  intentional  component.  It  might  be  possible  to 
have  the  cognitive  element  without  the  affective  component  18,  but  when  you  do  have 
both,  they  are  inextricably  intertwined.  The  badness  of  the  feeling  of  grief  just  is  the 
negative  way  things  are  conceived;  the  badness  of  the  feeling  is  specific  to  that 
construal  of  the  situation.  This  is  what  we  argued  above-  the  pleasure  or  pain  is  not 
simply  a  free-floating  hedonic  element.  But  although  pleasure  and  pain  are  intentional 
states,  we  do  not  yet  have  an  argument  to  show  that  the  pain  of  grief  and  the  pleasure  of 
joy  must  involve  different  cognitive  construals19.  If  they  did,  then  the  pleasant  feeling  of 
joy  could  not  be  "peeled-off  "  and  stuck  together  with  the  grief-cognition  without  the 
effect  of  double  vision,  since  the  experience  would  involve  two  distinct  cognitive 
construals  of  the  situation.  But  it  may  be  that  the  cognitive  elements  of  both  grief  and 
joy  would  not  be  incongruous,  in  which  case  the  pleasure  of  joy  could  be  grafted  onto 
the  cognitive  element  of  grief  without  disparities  showing  up. 
Suppose  then  that  this  occurs;  we  experience  grief  but  it  feels  pleasant.  Is  there 
anything  to  fall  back  on  which  would  enable  us  to  claim  that  such  a  freakish  case 
involves  anything  inappropriate,  rather  than  being  simply  an  aberration  of  nature?  Well, 
is  there  not  still  the  point  that  the  feeling  is  a  good  one;  it  is  pleasant,  and  this  still 
involves  an  incongruity  with  the  intentional  component?  This  claim  assumes  however 
18  As  non-cognitivists  claim;  see  below. 
19  That  is  to  say;  suppose  two  people  are  confronted  with  the  news  of  somebody's  death,  and  the  first 
reacts  with  joy,  the  other  with  grief.  Must  there  be  a  cognitive  difference  here  in  their  construal  of  the 
facts?  I  am  inclined  to  say  there  will  be 
, 
but  the  non-cognitivist  is  likely  to  deny  it.  For  the  moment  I 
leave  it  an  open  issue,  but  I  return  to  this  question  below. 
17 that  the  cognitive  content  is  itself  either  positive  or  negative.  But  as  we  shall  see  in  the 
next  chapter,  this  is  precisely  the  assumption  which  some  popular,  anti-cognitivist  views 
about  value  -  most  famously  Hume's  -  will  deny.  If  we  think  of  the  cognitive 
components  of  grief  and  joy  as  being  in  themselves  neutral,  then  there  can  be  no 
incompatibility  between  them  and  the  pleasures  or  pains  in  which  they  result.  The 
question  which  remains,  then,  is  whether,  and  how,  the  cognitive  components  of  pain 
and  pleasure  can  be  positive  or  negative.  I  return  to  this  issue  in  chapter  two. 
The  upshot  of  the  foregoing  thought  experiment,  then,  seems  to  be  that  we  should  not 
regard  the  hedonic  component  of  an  emotion  as  a  merely  incidental  feature  of  it.  Rather, 
the  hedonic  element  is  crucial  to  the  nature  of  the  state;  what  distinguishes  grief  from 
fear  and  pride  from  love  is  the  kind  of  pleasure  or  pain  taken  in  the  emotions'  objects. 
And  as  we  have  already  seen,  an  adequate  characterisation  of  this  hedonic  element  will 
involve  an  account  of  its  intentional  content.  This  however  leaves  open  the  question  of 
whether  the  cognitive  component  can  in  itself  be  positive  or  negative. 
11  Psychic"  Feelings  and  Affect. 
Perhaps  though,  in  addition  to  pleasures  and  pains,  there  is  some  other  non-physical 
component  of  emotional  states?  When  someone  is  very  hopeful  about  something  for 
example,  this  may  result  in  a  pleasant  feeling,  as  we  have  just  seen.  Additionally,  they 
may  feel  excited.  This  too  may  be  pleasant,  but  may  not  the  excitement  itself  be  a 
distinct  and  non-  physical  feeling?  Let  us  assume  for  the  moment  that  this  is  so.  Do 
such  feelings  allow  us  to  identify  the  emotions  of  which  they  are  at  least  a  part?  Again, 
the  answer  seems  to  be  "no".  First,  such  excitement  is  not  exclusive  to  hope  but  is 
shared  by  joy,  perhaps  also  by  love.  And  secondly,  even  if  such  a  non-physical  feeling 
were  unique  to  only  one  emotion,  we  would  face  the  same  problems  we  noted  above 
concerning  identification;  how  does  such  a  feeling  help  us  to  know  what  emotional  state 
I'm  in?  Here,  we  run  into  the  problem  of  inference  again,  and  this  consequence  is 
enough  to  discredit  the  present  suggestion.  We  can  sum  up  this  part  of  the  discussion 
then,  by  saying  that  we  require  an  account  of  emotions  which  includes  some  description 
of  what  they  are  about-  what  their  objects  are. 
18 There  are  further  points,  however,  to  be  made  with  respect  to  non-physical 
feelings.  One  of  these  can  be  made  by  asking  whether  our  emotional  states  are  always 
accompanied  by  some  non-physical  feeling,  however  it  is  to  be  identified.  We  may  be 
tempted  to  say  "yes";  just  as  the  "painful"  feelings  of  grief  are  an  essential  part  of  grief, 
so  the  feeling  of  excitement  is  part  of  hope.  To  take  another  example,  joy  involves  a 
"psychic  feeling"  of  "buoyancy"  or  "lightness",  depression,  feelings  of  being  slow  and 
"weighed  down"20 
. 
This  kind  of  non-physical  feeling  is  something  like  a  sensation.  But  could  such  a 
feeling  identify  our  emotional  state  for  us?  The  answer  however  must  once  more  be 
"no",  given  what  we  have  already  said.  In  particular,  we  must  ask  if  the  "buoyancy"  of  a 
good  mood  is  merely  a  sensory  feature  of  the  experience,  akin  to  the  sensory  feeling  of 
pain,  or  whether  its  full  description  makes  essential  reference  to  the  cognitive  element  of 
the  emotion2i.  If  the  former,  it  cannot  identify  the  state  for  reasons  we  have  already 
seen;  and  if  the  latter,  it  can  only  identify  it  -if  at  all-  in  conjunction  with  an  account  of 
the  intentionality  of  the  experience.  So  while  these  feelings  may  play  an  important 
constitutive  role  in  emotional  states,  they  alone  could  not  be  or  identify  emotional  states. 
But  secondly,  we  might  also  wonder;  are  our  emotions  always  felt?  That  is,  do 
emotions  always  comprise  such  non-physical  feelings?  Justin  Oakley  suggests  that  there 
are  cases  where  it  might  seem  that  they  do  not; 
"I  might  be  angry  at  you  for  arriving  late  at  the  cinema..  . 
but  I  might  not  have  any 
feelings  of  anger,  nor  indeed  any  other  feelings...  because  my  attention  is  occupied  with 
the  film.  " 
(Oakley.  P8) 
Oakley  also  points  out  that  we  have  emotions  such  as  love  and  grief  over  long  periods  of 
time  without  necessarily  feeling  them  during  all  that  time.  So,  according  to  him,  I  can  be 
in  an  emotional  state  without  noticing  it.  Both  Oakley  and  Michael  Stocker  22argue  that 
20  These  claims  about  "psychic"  feelings  are  made  by  Oakley,  Morality  and  the  Emotions  (p.  10),  and 
Stocker,  Valuing  Emotions(p.  28  ff).  Stocker  in  particular  argues  for  the  irreducibility  of  such  feelings  to 
desire  or  cognitive  content.  See  below. 
21  Philosophers  who  have  offered  accounts  of  feelings  which  view  them  as  having  intentional  content,  are 
Stephen  Leighton  "On  Feeling  Angry  and  Elated",  Journal  of  Philosophy  1988,  and  Robert  Kraut, 
"Feelings  in  Context",  Journal  of  Philosophy  1986.  Also  the  papers  by  Geoffrey  Madell  and  Aaron 
Ridley,  "Emotion  and  Feeling",  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotlelian  Society,  Supplementary  Volume,  1996. 
22  Op.  Cit. 
19 emotions  involve  irreducible  psychic  feelings.  But  surely  then,  we  might  say,  the 
essence  of  such  a  feeling  must  be  that  it  is  felt?  If,  then,  we  do  have  unconscious 
emotions,  or  emotions  we  are  unaware  of,  doesn't  that  mean  that  we  don't  have  the 
relevant  feelings  in  those  cases?  In  short,  then,  the  putative  existence  of  emotions  we  are 
unaware  of  seems  to  refute  the  claim  that  emotions  always  embody  such  psychic 
feelings.  How  can  there  be  unfelt  feelings? 
However  there  is  a  way  out  of  this  apparent  difficulty.  What  is  required  is  to  make  a 
distinction  between  unfelt  feelings  and  unnoticed  feelings.  This  is  a  distinction  we  are  in 
fact  familiar  with  in  other  areas.  Most  of  us  have  had  the  experience  of  a  "creeping" 
headache;  at  some  point  I  notice  I've  got  a  headache,  though  I  was  unaware  of  it  until 
that  moment.  Should  we  say  the  headache  only  begins  to  exist  when  I  notice  it?  That 
sounds  wrong.  Headaches  generally  build  up  over  time.  What  we  should  say  is  that  I 
had  the  headache  -  and  the  feelings-  but  didn't  notice  them.  In  perception  too,  similar 
things  occur.  We  may  search  in  a  drawer  for  something,  23  and  only  minutes  later,  having 
abandoned  the  search,  realise  that  we  had  in  fact  seen  the  sought-for  object  there  in  the 
drawer.  Here  too,  we  can  say  that  we  saw  the  object,  but  did  not  notice  it.  And  if  there 
can  be  unfelt  headaches,  and  unnoticed  perceptions,  why  not  unfelt  emotions?  This  at 
least  is  how  I  imagine  Stocker  might  argue  for  his  point.  In  fact,  he  merely  records  his 
disagreement  with  those  who  claim  that  feelings  must  be  felt; 
"  It  is  often  held  that  part  of  the  esse  of  affectivity  is  percipi;  that  feelings  must  be 
felt 
...  I  agree  with  the  later  Freud...  I  do  not  think  we  must  be  aware  of  the  feelings  we 
are  having,  or  even  that  we  must  be  aware  of  having  them.  224 
We  might  still  feel  that  what  is  left  of  these  feelings  if  they  are  unfelt  can  only  be  their 
effects.  That  is,  we  might  think  that  although  I  do  not  feel  angry  with  you,  nevertheless  I 
may  be  in  some  state  which  will  have  effects  of  different  sorts  (be  affected  in  different 
ways).  It  may  affect  the  way  I  address  you,  the  desires  I  have  and  they  way  I  behave, 
and  so  on.  The  emotion  I  am  unaware  of,  in  short,  disposes  me  in  various  ways.  We 
might  accept  that,  and  still  deny  that  there  is  anything  occurrent  such  as  a  feeling,  of 
which  I  am  unaware.  Stocker  however  denies  this.  He  insists  that  the  emotion  is 
occurrent25.  Affect,  in  Stocker's  terms,  cannot  merely  be  described  in  terms  of  what  an 
The  example  is  from  M.  G.  F.  Martin  "Perception,  Concepts  and  Memory".  Philosophical  Review  1992. 
Za  Stocker  (op.  cit.  )  (p.  21-22) 
ss  The  same  claim  is  made  by  Oakley  (Op.  cit.  p.  12) 
20 emotion  leads  to,  but  rather  also  refers  to  the  occurrent  state  of  affective  feeling.  And  in 
fact,  why  should  there  not  be  unnoticed  feelings?  What  is  surprising  in  the  idea,  no 
doubt,  is  the  idea  that  there  can  be  states  that  are  somehow  in  consciousness,  but  of 
which  we  are  unaware.  But  once  we  separate  the  idea  of  noticing  something,  from  being 
conscious  of  it,  as  in  the  perception  example,  this  sh6uld  seem  less  strange. 
This  is  also  an  appropriate  moment  to  mention  the  curious  malady  alexythemia26.  This 
unfortunate  affliction  concerns  patients  who  are  unable  to  recognise  that  they  are  in  an 
emotional  state,  or,  if  aware,  are  unable  to  identify  which  emotion  they  are  feeling. 
Goleman  describes  one  of  psychiatrist  Peter  Sifneos'  patients; 
"One  patient  was  so  upset  after  seeing  a  movie  about  a  woman  with  eight  children  who 
was  dying  of  cancer  that  she  cried  herself  to  sleep.  When  her  therapist  suggested  that 
perhaps  she  was  upset  because  the  movie  reminded  her  of  her  own  mother,  who  was 
dying  of  cancer,  the  woman  sat  motionless,  bewildered  and  silent.  When  the  therapist 
then  asked  her  how  she  felt  at  that  moment,  she  said  she  felt  "awful",  but  couldn't 
clarify  her  feelings  beyond  that.  And,  she  added,  from  time  to  time,  she  found  herself 
crying,  but  never  knew  exactly  what  she  was  crying  about.  "  27 
These  patients,  then,  have  emotions  to  which  they  are  either  totally  oblivious,  or  which 
they  are  unable  to  identify.  This  provides  some  empirical  support  for  Stocker's  claim 
that  the  esse  of  feelings  is  not  percipi.  But  these  cases  are  independently  puzzling.  I 
have  pointed  out  that  we  don't  infer  the  identity  of  our  emotions  any  more  than  we  do 
our  thoughts.  Their  content  is  open  to  the  first  person  perspective.  So  is  this  first-person 
feature  of  the  mental  absent  in  these  cases?  How  could  someone  have  an  emotion  that 
they  can't  identify,  if  the  picture  I  have  been  suggesting  is  correct?  It  would  be  like 
having  a  thought  you  can't  identify. 
In  fact,  of  course,  there  is  nothing  entirely  strange  about  this  phenomenon.  Most  of  us 
have  had  emotional  experiences  we  can't  completely  specify  or  even  specify  very 
clearly-  in  "Proustian"  moments  of  recollection,  perhaps;  or  when  listening  to  music. 
And  to  an  extent  this  can  occur  with  thoughts  too;  often  we  understand  more  than  we 
26  This  disorder  is  discussed  by  Goleman  (Emotional  Intelligence  p.  50)  and  Stocker,  (p.  110). 
27  Goleman,  (p.  51).  Goleman  also  draws  on  research  showing  that  some  eating  disorders-  for  example 
those  of  many  obese  patients-  are  the  result  of  an  inability  to  distinguish  and  identify  feelings.  Unable  to 
tell  hunger  from  anger,  Goleman  claims,  they  react  to  all  feelings  as  if  to  hunger.  (p.  248) 
21 can  articulate  or  make  precise.  So  there  is  something  familiar  to  us  about  the  inability  to 
identify  emotions.  But  what  about  the  total  lack  of  awareness  of  them?  This  certainly  is 
more  puzzling,  and  should  perhaps  be  put  into  the  same  class  of  oddities  as  blindsight.  28 
The  point  which  alexythemia  helps  to  emphasise  is  that  one  aspect  of  emotional 
education  which  will  be  important  is  the  ability  to  identify  your  own  emotions.  9 
Returning  to  Stocker's  argument;  what  it  may  be  taken  to  show  is  that  I  can  have 
unnoticed  feelings  and  so  also  unnoticed  emotions,  not  that  I  can  have  emotions  without 
feelings.  30  So  where  does  this  leave  us?  The  claim  we  started  by  considering  was  that 
psychic  feelings  could  identify  or  be  emotions.  We  saw  above  that  this  cannot  be 
correct.  Nevertheless,  if  Stocker  is  right  about  unnoticed  feelings,  there  is  some 
credibility  in  the  claim  that  all  emotions  involve  this  kind  of  feeling.  We  will  have  to 
return  to  the  subject  of  feelings  again  below,  but  for  the  moment  it  is  sufficient  to  have 
disposed  of  one  false  picture  of  their  nature  and  role. 
28  One  attempt  to  show  how  a  theory  of  consciousness  can  account  for  phenomena  such  as  blindsight  is 
Colin  McGinn's  in  The  Problem  of  Consciousness,  ch.  4. 
29  I  return  to  this  issue  in  a  later  chapter. 
30  Unconscious  emotions,  if  they  exist,  may  be  a  different  story.  In  these  cases  the  emotion  is  not  in 
consciousness,  and  perhaps  it  is  less  plausible  that  there  are  in  these  cases  psychic  feelings  we  are 
unaware  of. 
22 Emotions  and  Dispositions. 
What,  then  of  dispositions?  We  noted  above  that  emotions  dispose  us  in  various 
ways.  Part  of  what  an  emotion  is  may  be  the  various  things  it  disposes  me  to  do,  to 
desire  and  to  say.  This  seems  right  enough  as  far  as  it  goes.  What  it  is  to  be  frightened, 
for  example,  is  in  part  to  be  disposed  to  run  away,  to  seek  protection,  to  wish  for  a 
means  of  escape,  to  shout  for  help,  and  so  on.  But  we  need  not  in  fact  do  all  of  these 
things-  we  may  do  none  of  them.  A  disposition  can  be  outweighed  by  other 
considerations.  But  in  any  case,  the  natural  thing  to  say  about  these  dispositions  is  that 
we  have  them  because  of  the  way  we  feel.  In  stark  contrast  to  this,  Ryle  -  the 
philosopher  most  famously  associated  with  dispositional  analysis-  said  that  emotions 
were  simply  dispositions  31,  by  which  he  meant  dispositions  to  behave  in  certain  ways. 
Just  as  to  describe  someone  as  vain  is  not  to  say  that  he  has  experiences  of  vanity  (vain 
people  are  unlikely  to  do  that)  so-  argued  Ryle-  to  attribute  an  emotional  state  to 
someone  is  not  to  say  he  has  various  sorts  of  experiences.  Rather,  like  vanity,  it  is  to  say 
he  is  disposed  to  behave  in  certain  ways. 
It  is  a  consequence  of  this  way  of  thinking  that  when  it  comes  to  an  awareness  of  my 
emotional  states,  another  person  is  in  just  as  privileged  position  as  I  am  myself,  for  my 
emotion,  not  being  any  "inner"  state,  is  as  observable  to  him  or  her  as  to  me-  that  is, 
through  my  behaviour.  And,  people  being  what  they  are,  the  observer  will  perhaps  be 
more  impartial  than  me.  This  is  an  unacceptable  view,  of  course,  and  much  has  since 
been  written  on  the  failings  of  behavioural  analysis.  While  there  is  no  non-circular  way 
to  define  emotions  in  terms  of  behaviour,  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  certain  emotions 
typically  dispose  us  to  behave  in  certain  ways.  Emotion  cannot  be  reduced  to  behaviour 
for  the  following  reason;  someone  can  be  in  a  given  emotional  state  without  manifesting 
any  behaviour  whatsoever.  Fear,  for  example  normally  disposes  me  to  flee  from  the 
object  of  my  fear,  while  love  typically  disposes  us  to  be  with  the  person  we  are  in  love 
with.  But  love  and  fear  are  not  just  behaviour  of  these  sorts.  There  can  be  any  number  of 
reasons  why  someone  might  be  in  these  states  without  behaving  in  the  suggested  ways. 
But  the  behaviourist  cannot  refer  to  these  reasons  without  admitting  intentional  terms 
into  the  analysis.  And  in  any  case  how  is  behaviour  to  be  explained  without  reference  to 
31  Ryle,  The  Concept  of  Mind  (ch.  4). 
23 some  mental  item?  Further,  it  is  obvious  that  someone  could  behave  as  if  he  was  afraid 
or  in  love  and  yet  not  be.  So  it  seems  behaviour  is  neither  necessary  nor  sufficient  for 
emotion.  Yet,  as  noted,  they  do  typically  dispose  me  to  behave  in  certain  ways.  And  just 
as  emotions  dispose  me  to  behave  in  certain  ways  they  similarly  usually  dispose  me  to 
want  certain  things.  There  is  then,  a  kind  of  presumption  that  someone  who  is,  say, 
genuinely  afraid,  will  be  disposed  in  some  of  the  ways  mentioned  above.  If,  for 
example,  they  make  no  attempt  to  escape  the  danger  or  call  for  help,  then  we  will  expect 
there  to  be  some  explanation  for  this.  If  we  find  there  are  no  available  factors  which 
make  sense  of  this  failure,  we  may  begin  to  doubt  that  the  fear  is  genuine. 
The  reason  behavioural  reductions  of  emotions  are  unworkable  is  that,  like  the 
James-  Lange  theory,  they  ignore  how  things  appear  from  the  first  person  point  of  view. 
Working  from  the  assumption  that  if  psychology  is  to  be  "scientific"  it  must  study  what 
is  observable  and  objective,  these  theories  ignore  the  crucial  aspect  of  emotional  states. 
What  identifies  my  emotional  state  is  not  that  I  am  having  certain  physical  and  non- 
physical  sensations,  nor  that  they  are  brought  about  by  certain  events,  but  that  the 
experience  in  some  way  represents  the  event  or  object  that  brought  it  about;  the 
representation  of  the  "object"  of  my  emotion  in  large  part  constitutes  my  emotional 
state.  The  net  result  then  of  the  foregoing  is  this;  by  elimination  of  the  alternatives- 
different  types  of  feelings,  pleasure  and  pain,  physiology  and  behavioural  dispositions- 
we  are  brought  to  the  "cognitive"  model  of  emotional  states,  which  offers  what  these 
other  accounts  did  not. 
Before  leaving  the  issue  of  dispositions  and  behaviour,  we  should  point  out  the  sort  of 
consideration  that  made  theories  emphasising  them  look  credible.  The  Cartesian  picture 
of  emotional  states,  and  mental  states  generally,  was  of  something  whose  nature  was 
exhaustively  inner.  The  identity  of  emotional  states  was  revealed  upon  introspection  for 
precisely  this  reason.  These  Cartesian  assumptions  were  also  the  ultimate  downfall  of 
other  theories  of  the  mental  such  as  Husserl's  phenomenological  project.  Wittgenstein's 
attack  on  this  model  of  the  mental  consequently  emphasised  what  was  outward.  In  his 
famous  Private  Language  Argument,  Wittgenstein  attempted  to  show  that  meaning  is 
not  an  internal  process,  but  something  that  requires  external  and  observable  criteria.  In 
general,  mental  states  do  not  always  exhibit  the  inner  life  the  Cartesian  picture  ascribes 
24 to  them32.  However,  it  is  a  mistake  to  move  from  these  legitimate  objections  to  the 
Cartesian  model  to  a  wholesale  rejection  of  "the  mental",  and  seek  to  analyse  every 
mental  term  exhaustively  in  terms  of  observable  behaviour.  Instead,  subsequent  thinking 
about  the  emotions  in  particular  has  invoked  Brentano's  thesis  of  the  intentionality  of 
the  mental;  that  emotions  take  objects,  and  that  to  identify  an  emotion  we  must 
understand  how  the  external  object  is  represented. 
The  Cognitive  Model. 
In  the  last  section  we  saw  the  need  for  a  theory  of  emotion  to  take  account  of  the  way 
things  are  represented  to  the  subject,  and  we  have  previously  noted  that  emotions  have 
objects.  In  an  emotional  state,  say  fear,  the  object  of  my  emotion  is  represented  to  me  in 
a  certain  way-  typically,  as  being  frightening  or  dangerous.  The  object  of  the  emotion  is 
normally  distinguished  from  its  cause.  To  illustrate  this  distinction,  consider  the 
following  two  examples.  First,  I  have  a  headache  and  am  tense.  In  conversation  with 
you  I  lose  my  temper  over  some  minor  disagreement.  Second,  I  am  worried  by  the  fact 
that  I  have  to  go  to  the  dentist  tomorrow.  Now,  in  the  first  example,  the  object  of  my 
anger-  what  I  am  angry  about-  is  our  disagreement,  while  the  cause  let  us  say,  is  my 
headache.  In  the  second  example,  the  object  of  my  fear  is  my  visit  to  the  dentist 
tomorrow.  But  this  cannot  be  the  cause  of  my  emotion,  for  how  could  a  future  event 
cause  an  event  in  the  present?  Instead,  the  cause  of  my  fear  might  be  my  thought  that  I 
must  go  to  the  dentist.  While  the  distinction  between  causes  and  objects  is  clear  in  many 
cases,  it  isn't  in  all.  But  this  is  not  an  issue  we  need  to  pursue. 
How  does  the  object  of  an  emotion  fit  in  with  all  the  other  components?  In  the  case  of 
fear,  for  example,  when  I  am  confronted  by  some  frightening  object,  say  a  lion,  I 
undergo  the  physiological  changes  mentioned  earlier-  quickened  pulse,  adrenaline 
release,  blood  flow  increases  to  large  muscles,  and  so  on.  In  addition  I  typically  want  to 
get  away  : from  the  object  of  my  fear,  and  this  disposes  me  to  behave  in  certain  ways. 
Furthermore,  there  is  an  unpleasant  sensation  of  tension.  But  all  of  these  things  come 
32  To  offer  just  one  example,  Wittgenstein's  example  of  what  it  is  for  a  person  to  be  expecting  someone  to 
arrive.  Since  the  person  may  be  engaged  the  whole  time  in  other  thoughts  and  activities,  the  state  cannot 
consist  in  inner  conscious  goings-  on. 
25 about  as  a  result  of  and  are  intelligible  because  of,  the  way  I  perceive  my  situation,  and 
in  particular  the  way  I  perceive  the  lion.  But  what  is  it  about  my  perception  of  the  lion 
that  makes  my  emotion  fear?  The  answer  seems  to  be  that  I  think  the  lion  is  dangerous 
or  threatening.  I  am  not  afraid  of  things  I  know  to  be  quite  harmless  or  not  a  threat  to 
me(this  is  not  quite  true,  as  we  shall  see)and  in  all  cases  of  fear  I  do  perceive  the  object 
of  my  emotion  as  threatening  in  this  way. 
Let  us  construct  then  a  parädigm  case  of  fear  according  to  the  cognitive  theory 
which  focuses  on  the  beliefs  involved  in  the  emotion.  When  I  am  afraid  of  the  lion  there 
is  a  belief  I  have  about  it-  that  it  is  threatening  or  dangerous-(call  this  the 
"identificatory"  belief,  as  it  identifies  the  emotion33.  ).  Further,  there  are  other  beliefs  I 
have  about  the  lion,  on  the  basis  of  which  I  have  the  "identificatory"  belief;  such  as  the 
belief  that  lions  are  powerful  and  aggressive  animals,  that  they  have  sharp  teeth  and 
claws  and  so  on.  Call  these  beliefs  "explanatory"  beliefs,  since  their  function  is  to 
explain  the  existence  of  the  identificatory  belief 
. 
On  this  view  my  emotion  has  at  its 
core  representations  of  the  lion  and  those  representations  are  beliefs.  This  is  one  account 
of  the  intentionality  of  emotions.  This  rudimentary  version  of  the  cognitive  theory  will 
shortly  have  to  be  refined,  as  it  will  turn  out  that  there  are  different  versions  of  it.  We 
shall  come  to  these  shortly.  First  though,  I  must  say  a  little  about  intentionality  itself. 
Intentionality. 
Intentionality  is  a  feature  of  the  subject's  awareness  of  the  object.  This  is  a 
crucial  feature  of  any  explanation  of  an  emotional  state,  since  it  will  not  in  itself  be 
sufficient  for  either  an  explanation  or  an  identification  of  my  emotion  to  say,  for 
example,  that  I  see  I  am  confronted  by  a  lion.  For  this  would  not  explain  how  I 
perceived  the  lion  or  whether  I  saw  the  lion  as  a  threat.  If  we  then  ask  what  it  is  about 
the  lion  that  explains  and  identifies  my  emotional  state,  we  seem  to  arrive  at  the  two 
kinds  of  beliefs  described  above. 
Another  important  feature  about  intentionality  is  its  connection  with  intensionality. 
For  example,  if  I'm  angry  at  John  for  stealing  my  car,  I  may  not  be  angry  at  John  for 
stealing  a  twelve  year  old  Ford,  made  in  Detroit,  even  though  they  are  the  same  thing. 
33  1  borrow  this  terminology  from  Gabriele  Taylor,  Pride,  Shame  and  Guilt  (ch.  1). 
26 The  point  was  most  famously  made  by  Frege34  in  his  discussion  of  sense  and  reference. 
The  important  point  is  that  the  object  of  an  emotion  is  always  presented  under  a  certain 
aspect,  and  although  two  of  these  aspects  may  have  the  same  referent,  they  do  not  both 
adequately  capture  the  aspect  under  which  I  recognise  it. 
Another  feature  of  intentional  objects  is  that  they  need  not  exist.  I  may  be  angry  at 
John's  stealing  my  car  even  if  it  turns  out  he  hasn't.  This  reinforces  the  previous  point; 
it  shows  I  cannot  be  angry  at  the  (extensional)  fact  that  John  stole  my  car,  since  in  this 
case,  there  is  no  such  fact.  So,  imagine  I  am  angry  at  John  when  he  has  not  in  fact  stolen 
my  car.  What  am  I  angry  about?  Not,  as  we  have  just  said,  the  fact  that  he  stole  my  car. 
But  equally  the  object  of  my  anger  is  not  my  belief  that  John  stole  my  car.  The  object  of 
my  anger  is  "John's  stealing  my  car",  where  this  is  an  intentional  object-  in  this  case,  a 
non-existent  one3s. 
Is  it  true  that  all  emotions  have  intentional  objects?  This  assumption  was  one  of 
the  things  that  drove  us  from  "feeling"  views  of  emotions.  That  is,  what  was  lacking  in 
all  the  feeling  accounts  was  any  description  of  what  the  emotion  was  about.  But  what 
about  states  such  as  depression,  or  angst,  or  what  about  moods  which  seem  to  just 
descend  and  lack  the  focus  of  an  intentional  object?  This  does  present  an  apparent 
difficulty,  but  not  I  think  an  insurmountable  one.  First,  in  many  cases  the  difficulty  may 
be  a  simple  inability  to  identify  accurately  the  true  object  of  our  emotion.  This  is  not  an 
infrequent  occurrence.  Many  people  for  example  misdirect  their  anger  instead  of 
focusing  on  its  true  object.  Often  this  may  be  wilful,  but  equally  often  it  is  a  failure  of 
identification. 
However,  it  must  be  admitted  that  this  explanation  will  not  work  with  cases  such  as 
depression.  The  cognitivist  has  to  find  something  that  someone  who  is  depressed 
believes.  And  this  belief  will  have  to  explain  the  emotion,  or  make  it  intelligible.  But 
this  seems  to  be  precisely  what  is  missing  in  cases  of  depression36.  There  is  no  one  thing 
that  is  believed,  and  no  one  object  that  it  is  believed  about.  The  cognitivist  cannot 
34  "On  sense  and  Reference",  in  Moore,  ed.  Meaning  and  Reference. 
35  The  problems  surrounding  the  reference  of  non-existent  intentional  objects  are  considerable.  However, 
since  the  issues  are  not  central  here,  and  generally  approved  strategies  for  dealing  with  them  already  exist, 
I  have  ignored  them  here.  A  brief  survey  of  the  issues  is  contained  in  the  appendix  to  Ch.  1  of  Gregory 
McCulloch's  Using  Sartre. 
36  An  enlightening  short  account  of  his  own  long-term  depression  is  given  by  the  novelist  William  Styron 
in  his  book  Darkness  Visible. 
27 ignore  such  cases  by  lumping  them  under  the  label  "exceptional",  or  "pathological", 
because  his  claim  is  that  it  is  the  essence  of  emotions  that  they  have  beliefs.  If  this 
emotion  lacks  beliefs  then  the  cognitive  claim  seems  false.  But  is  this  the  correct 
description  of  the  phenomenon?  Here  is  the  novelist  William  Styron  describing  his  own 
illness; 
"While  I  was  able  to  rise  and  function  almost  normally  during  the  earlier  part  of  the 
day,  I  began  to  sense  the  onset  of  the  symptoms  at  mid-afternoon  or  a  little  later  -  gloom 
crowding  in  on  me,  a  sense  of  gloom  and  alienation  and,  above  all,  stifling  anxiety". 
(p.  12) 
Later,  he  describes  the  occasion  of  a  prize-giving  at  which  he  was  the  guest  of  honour; 
`By  the  time  we  arrived  at  the  museum,  having  dealt  with  heavy  traffic,  it  was  past 
four  o'clock  and  my  brain  had  begun  to  endure  its  familiar  siege;  panic  and  dislocation, 
and  a  sense  that  my  thought  processes  were  being  engulfed  by  a  toxic  and  unnameable 
tide  that  obliterated  any  enjoyable  response  to  the  living  world....  instead  of  the  pleasure 
I  should  be  having...  I  was  feeling  in  my  mind  a  sensation  close  to,  but  indescribably 
different  from,  actual  pain".  (p.  16) 
Now  it  is  clear  from  this  that  it  is  correct  that  the  depression  does  not  have  a  single 
object.  But  it  also  seems  true  that  it  is  not  what  we  would  ordinarily  call  a  single 
emotion;  comprising  a  "sense  of  gloom",  "alienation",  "anxiety"  and  "panic".  Added  to 
these,  Styron  experienced  a  general  and  almost  total  inhibition  of  pleasure  and  a 
peculiar  sort  of  pain.  However,  the  objection  that  seems  to  lie  behind  the  use  of  the 
example  of  depression  is  that  it  shows  the  emotion  is  not  directed  at  features  of  the 
world.  This  much  is  true;  depression  is  not  a  response  to  features  of  the  world,  and  in 
that  sense  it  has  no  object.  Nevertheless,  the  emotion  has  intentional  content.  That  is  to 
say,  when  in  that  state,  the  world  is  experienced  as  being  a  certain  way.  This  is  quite 
clear  in  what  Styron  writes; 
"It  was  not  really  alarming  at  first,  since  the  change  was  subtle,  but  I  did  notice  that 
my  surroundings  took  on  a  different  tone  at  certain  times:  the  shadows  of  nightfall 
seemed  more  sombre,  my  mornings  were  less  buoyant,  walks  in  the  woods  became  less 
zestful....  "(p.  42) 
28 To  put  it  roughly,  and  in  a  way  that  anticipates  what  I  will  claim  later,  things  look 
different  to  him.  Granted,  these  differences  can  be  elusive  and  are  certainly  difficult  to 
describe,  but  they  are  real.  Now  I  agree  that  this  kind  of  case  does  pose  a  difficulty  for 
the  cognitive  theory  we  have  been  considering:  and  that  difficulty  is  that  it  does  not 
seem  at  all  likely  that  these  (cognitive)  differences  are  differences  in  beliefs.  To  this 
extent,  the  objection  is  a  good  one.  As  I  shall  argue  below,  what  this  and  other 
objections  like  it  show,  is  not  that  there  is  no  cognitive  content  to  these  states,  but  that 
the  content  cannot  be  explained  in  terms  of  beliefs. 
So  the  example  of  depression  does  not  constitute  a  devastating  objection.  But  it  is  not 
the  only  possible  counter-example.  Less  dramatic  examples  of  the  same  phenomenon 
are  moods.  Often  we  feel  below  par  or  grouchy,  or,  conversely  in  an  inexplicably  good 
mood,  we  get  up  on  the  "wrong  side"  of  the  bed,  and  so  on.  Again,  we  seem  to  lack 
definite  objects  for  these  states.  But  we  should  emphasise,  firstly,  that  the  fact  that  I 
cannot  identify  the  object  of  my  mood  doesn't  mean  it  hasn't  got  one.  Often  the  true 
object  of  our  anger,  say,  is  revealed  to  us  in  a  moment  of  discovery.  Secondly,  even  if 
we  grant  that  there  is  no  definite  object,  still  things  appear  to  us  in  distinct  ways,  similar 
to  the  depression  case.  We  experience  the  world,  under  a  certain  aspect.  If  I  start  the  day 
having  got  out  of  bed  on  the  wrong  side,  my  mood  will  colour  my  responses  to  the 
situations  I  find  myself  in;  a  generous  gesture,  for  example,  may  leave  me  cold;  I  cannot 
share  someone's  good  spirits;  small  impediments  become  huge  obstacles  and  so  on. 
To  this  extent,  this  kind  of  mood  is  a  disposition;  a  disposition  to  see  specific  things  in 
a  generally  negative  light.  But  it  is  not  merely  that;  it  is  an  occurent  state  also;  it  feels 
like  something  to  be  in  these  moods  and  not  merely  when  the  disposition  is  activated 
and  focused  on  a  specific  object.  Moods  colour  all  our  thoughts  -  or  so  it  feels-  but  this 
global  colouring  amounts  to  intentional  content.  Furthermore,  if  the  points  above  about 
feelings  are  correct,  there  must  be  intentional  content  to  moods.  If  there  wasn't,  all  that 
would  remain  would  be  physical  and  psychic  (non-intentional)  feelings.  But  on  this 
basis  our  means  of  identifying  our  moods  could  only  be  via  an  inference.  But  we  have  a 
strong  inclination,  as  already  pointed  out,  to  deny  this.  What  Cartesian  psychology  gets 
right  is  that  when  I  do  know  the  content  of  my  thoughts  and  emotions,  I  do  so  by 
different  means  to  those  I  use  for  other  things.  Cognitive  content,  in  other  words,  is 
connected  to  the  first  person  perspective  in  a  distinct  way. 
29 The  cognitive  theory  then  -  or  at  least  some  version  of  it-  can  accommodate  moods 
and  objectless  emotions  such  as  depression.  But  the  version  of  that  theory  we  are 
considering  at  present  arguably  cannot.  This  is  because  the  kind  of  content  I  have 
ascribed  to  these  states  does  not  plausibly  look  as  if  it  can  be  analysed  in  terms  of  belief. 
Rather  than  turn  to  an  alternative  theory  already,  it  will  be  profitable  to  see  how  much 
mileage  we  can  get  out  of  the  present  version.  And  it  does  seem  to  cover  a  reasonable 
range  of  emotional  states;  pride,  for  example,  involves  perceiving  some  object  or  action 
as  being  of  value  and  as  being  appropriately  related  to  me  in  some  way;  anger  involves 
the  belief  that  there  has  been  some  personal  slight  or  injustice,  or  an  injustice 
perpetrated  upon  some  third  party,  and  so  on. 
This  kind  of  model  of  the  emotions  is  not  new.  Hobbes  for  example  defines  fear  as, 
"aversion  with  opinion  of  hurt  from  the  object"37and  Hume  describes  pride  as  a  pleasant 
sensation  in  conjunction  with  the  concept  of  self.  38  This  model  of  emotional  states  has 
some  major  advantages  over  the  previous  models  we  have  considered.  First,  it  shows 
how  we  can  identify  our  emotions  without  having  to  make  inferences.  Second,  it  offers 
some  explanation  of  the  other  components  of  emotions  such  as  desires,  behaviour, 
pleasure  and  so  on  and  gives  an  account  of  the  relations  between  them.  On  this  view,  the 
belief  is  crucial,  and  the  belief  in  conjunction  with  a  desire  produce  pleasure  or 
displeasure  of  a  given  kind.  This  is  in  turn  accompanied  by  feelings  and  sensations,  and 
the  whole  complex  is  the  emotion. 
But  third,  and  perhaps  most  significantly,  it  shrinks  the  gulf  between  the  popular 
conception  of  reason  and  emotion  which  I  identified  at  the  outset.  This  is  because,  if  an 
emotion  were  simply  a  sensation  or  feeling,  or  feeling  plus  physiological  events,  this 
would  seem  to  confirm  the  common  conception  that  emotions  are  irrational  or  non- 
rational-  how  could  you  argue  with  a  sensation?  But  if  emotions  are  identified  and  in 
large  part  constituted  by  beliefs  about  their  objects,  then  those  beliefs  like  any  others 
can  be  assessed  for  rationality,  and  so  the  popular  conception(  what  Solomon  calls  "The 
Myth  of  the  passions"39)  is  a  mistake  and  emotions  can  be  rational  and  irrational  as 
much  as  anything  else. 
37  Leviathan. 
3"  Although  Hume's  theory  would  not  count  as  a  cognitivist  one. 
39  Robert  Solomon,  The  Passions. 
30 This  constitutes  a  great  advance  on  previous  accounts  we  have  considered  There  are 
however  serious  problems  facing  the  cognitive  model,  and  I  argue  below  that  it  will 
have  to  be  revised.  Before  doing  that  though,  it  is  worth  pointing  out  something 
important  that  the  model  seems  to  imply;  namely,  what  it  implies  about  educating  the 
emotions.  If  I  am  proud  of  my  daughter's  first  prize  in  the  school  race,  this  is,  as  we 
have  seen,  because  I  have  certain  beliefs;  I  believe  she  won  the  prize,  I  believe  the  prize 
to  be  of  value  and  I  believe  her  to  be  related  to  me  in  some  appropriate  way.  It  follows 
that  if  I  should  discover  any  of  these  beliefs  to  be  false,  my  emotion  will  disappear.  If  it 
turns  out  that  she  didn't  in  fact  win  it  or  that  everyone  who  ran  got  a  first  prize,  then  my 
emotion  should  cease.  Of  course,  this  is  just  what  we  would  expect  to  happen  in  a  range 
of  cases,  and  it  encourages  the  view  that  the  emotions  will  be  as  open  to  contradiction 
by  the  facts  and  by  argument,  as  the  most  "rational"  belief.  But  while  this  is  an  accurate 
description  of  some  cases,  it  fails,  as  we  shall  see,  with  others.  The  real  reason  for  the 
failure,  I  shall  argue  is  that  the  cognitive  component  of  the  emotion  is  not  in  fact  a 
belief. 
Recalcitrant  Emotions. 
The  first  difficulty  for  the  cognitive  model  arises  in  those  cases  where  these 
expectations  of  optimum  rationality  are  not  fulfilled.  There  are  many  cases  (for 
example,  those  discussed  in  Rorty  198040)  in  which  emotions  are  "recalcitrant";  when 
the  belief  upon  which  they  are  thought  to  rely  is  falsified  or  disavowed,  but  the  emotion 
persists.  This  is  not  a  feature  peculiar  to  emotions-  some  of  our  beliefs  may  be 
recalcitrant  also,  although  this  may  in  turn  be  because  they  are  rooted  in  recalcitrant 
emotions. 
How  big  a  problem  is  this?  Is  it  not  the  case  that  if  the  belief  is  genuinely  abandoned 
or  disavowed  then  its  persistence  must  be  attributed  to  some  rogue  causal  connection 
between  the  emotion  and  its  object-  it  doesn't  show  that  emotions  aren't  rational,  in 
other  words.  In  a  way  this  reply  misses  the  real  difficulty,  which  is  that  if  the  emotion 
persists  and  if,  as  we  have  said,  an  emotion  represents  its  object,  and  if,  in  addition,  the 
40  Amelie  Rorty,  "Explaining  Emotion"  in  Rorty  (ed.  )  Explaining  Emotion. 
31 belief-representation  is  disavowed,  then  the  question  is;  what  is  the  representation  at  the 
centre  of  the  emotion?  The  reply  we  have  just  considered  implies  that  it  is  still  the  same 
belief;  it's  simply  that  the  person  can't  effectively  give  it  up-  the  object  keeps  causing 
its  resurgence.  But  this  means  that  when  he  has  the  emotion  he  really  does  have  the 
belief  again.  But  this  is  what  the  examples  seem  to  lead  us  to  deny.  Let's  take  a  specific 
case. 
In  one  of  Rorty's  examples  a  man  resents  and  gets  angry  with  his  female  boss,  has  a 
habit  of  depreciating  her  capabilities  and  speaking  very  critically  of  her.  It  seems  he 
dislikes  her  or  is  angry  with  her  about  something.  When  confronted  with  this  thought  he 
denies  it.  Of  course,  he  could  be  lying,  but  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  this  must  be  the 
case.  Is  there  an  alternative  explanation?  Could  it  be  that  only  when  in  the  grip  of  the 
emotions  themselves  does  he  have  these  beliefs,  or  perhaps  that  he  harbours  them,  not 
even  admitting  them  to  himself?  This  last  is  of  course  a  possibility-or  perhaps  he  doesn't 
realise  what  he  believes.  Or  again,  perhaps  his  belief  is  unconscious?  But  must  we 
assume  this?  It  remains  possible  that  he  genuinely  does  not  have  any  of  the  negative 
beliefs  about  his  female  boss,  yet  the  emotions  persist.  There  may  well  be  unconscious 
processes  at  work,  but  why  must  we  assume  that  what  is  unconscious  is  a  belief? 
To  believe  something  is  to  think  it  is  true.  Which  beliefs  are  the  most  plausible 
candidates  for  the  ones  repressed  in  this  case?  It  would  have  to  be  the  belief  that  his 
boss  is  a  poor  worker,  has  inferior  capabilities  or  something  of  that  sort,  and  this  belief 
is  unpleasant  to  him  because  it  ill-fits  with  his  conception  of  himself  as  tolerant,  not 
spiteful,  and  so  on.  So,  the  belief  is  repressed.  As  just  noted,  the  key  thing  about  belief  is 
that  it  is  something  that  is  thought  to  be  true.  What  advantage  is  there  to  explaining 
these  cases  by  concentrating  on  beliefs?  To  do  so  merely  gives  rise  to  the  problem  of 
explaining  why  the  belief  is  disavowed.  Rorty  instead  provides  a  similar  kind  of 
explanation  in  terms  of  what  she  calls  "prepropositional  but  intentional  habits  of 
salience,  organisation  and  interpretation". 
Her  own  re-construction  of  the  case  begins  with  the  supposition  of  recurrent  reactions 
of  this  sort  by  the  same  person  to  various  women  in  positions  of  power.  This  in  itself 
makes  it  seem  less  likely  that  the  belief  is  the  straightforward  one  that  his  boss  is 
incompetent,  and  suggests  some  deeper  "habit  of  salience".  Rorty  suggests  that  there  is 
some  way  the  subject  perceives  or  represents  these  women  on  the  basis  of  past 
experiences,  but  that  this  is  not  at  bottom  a  question  of  what  the  subject  believes  about 
women.  If  this  is  credible  it  suggests  that  we  may  need  to  cast  a  wider  net  than  an 
32 exclusive  preoccupation  with  belief  will  allow  us.  The  hurdle  to  be  overcome  is  the 
natural  tendency  to  assume  that  cognition  and  representation  in  mental  states  must  mean 
beliefs.  I  shall  argue  that  this  is  what  must  be  abandoned,  and  I  shall  proceed  by 
considering  a  range  of  difficulties  for  the  "belief'  model  which  will  I  hope  support  this 
contention. 
Arational  Actions. 
To  continue  then  with  the  cognitive  model,  I  will  begin  with  a  general  point 
concerning  the  explanation  of  behaviour.  The  point  is  that  much  behaviour  brought 
about  by  emotional  states  cannot  be  adequately  explained  by  reference  to  the  usual 
belief  and  desire  psychology.  Examples  given  by  Rosalind  Hursthouse  41include; 
talking  to  the  photograph  of  a  loved  one;  destroying  something  belonging  to  someone 
you  are  angry  with;  jumping  for  joy;  kicking  furniture;  covering  your  eyes  in  horror 
when  they  are  already  shut;  hiding  under  the  bedclothes  in  fear.  Her  claim  is  that  there  is 
no  available  belief  and  desire  which  we  could  attribute  in  these  cases  which  will  render 
the  action  "rational"; 
"  If  the  explanatory  desire  in  this  case  is  the  desire  to  scratch  Joan's  face, 
then  the  appropriate  belief  has  to  be  something  absurd,  such  as  the  belief  that 
the  photo  of  Joan  is  Joan,  or  that  scratching  the  photo  will  be  causally 
efficacious  in  defacing  its  original.  "(Hursthouse.  P.  60.  ) 
What  is  it  that  people  in  such  cases  believe?  To  believe  something  is  to  think  it  is  true, 
as  we  have  already  pointed  out.  But  what  do  these  people  think  is  true  which  will 
explain  their  actions?  There  seems  to  be  no  coherent  belief  that  can  be  attributed  to 
them.  Hursthouse's  conclusion  is  that  such  actions  are  arational  rather  than  irrational, 
they  are  not  done  in  the  belief  that  the  action  will  achieve  any  goal  or  on  the  basis  of  any 
belief  that  would  make  them  rational.  What  do  these  cases  show?  If  Hursthouse  is 
correct  in  thinking  that  such  actions  are  not  rational  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  they  are 
intelligible.  Hursthouse's  argument  is  not  immediately  about  emotions,  but  about  the 
actions  we  perform  under  their  influence.  It  would  not  itself  show  that  emotion  does  not 
41  Hursthouse,  "Arational  Actions",  The  Journal  of  Philosophy,  1991.  I  return  to  Hursthouse's  argument 
in  the  final  chapter,  where  I  consider  a  more  general  diagnosis  of  the  difficulties  it  raises. 
33 involve,  or  is  not  identified  by  belief.  Or  at  least,  not  directly.  Instead  it  shows  that  much 
of  what  we  do  when  in  the  grip  of  emotions  is  more  bizarre  than  we  take  it  to  be.  But  it 
may  also  imply  something  about  emotions  themselves.  I  suggest  later  that  at  least  some 
of  these  problematic  actions  are  problematic  precisely  because  it  is  not  belief  that 
explains  them.  The  same  problem  that  Hursthouse  highlights  here  with  emotional 
behaviour  arises  also  with  emotions  themselves.  If,  as  Hursthouse  says,  there  is  no  belief 
to  explain  why  I  hide  under  the  bedclothes  or  kick  the  table,  it  will  soon  become 
apparent  that  there  are  many  emotional  states  which  are  not  explained  by  any  belief 
held  by  the  subject;  for  example,  cases  of  phobias  and  emotional  responses  to  fiction. 
Phobias  and  Fictions. 
Unlike  a  fear  of  a  lion,  phobias  do  not  involve  rational  or  even  irrational  beliefs. 
The  man  who  is  frightened  of  the  lion  believes  it  is  dangerous  or  threatening,  and  he 
believes  this  because  of  other  features  of  the  lion.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  I  have  a  phobia 
about  spiders  or  small  spaces,  it  is  not  that  I-  quite  unreasonably-  believe  spiders  to  be  a 
real  danger  (because,  say,  I  think  they  are  poisonous).  That  would  merely  be  a  false 
belief,  which,  when  corrected,  should  mean  I  am  no  longer  afraid  of  spiders.  But 
phobias  typically  do  not  depend  on  belief  in  this  way.  Treatment  for  phobias  may 
involve  reassuring  sufferers  that  their  fears  are  groundless,  but  this  will  not  ensure 
instant  relief  if  phobias  are  not  based  on  beliefs  at  all. 
I  may  be  terrified  of  spiders  but  when  asked  if  I  believe  they  are  dangerous  will 
answer  "no".  The  problem  for  the  cognitive  theory  stems  from  the  fact  that  to  believe 
something  is  to  think  it  is  true,  and  in  the  case  of  phobias  there  will  probably  be  nothing 
I  think  true  of  spiders  which  will  amount  to  thinking  they  are  dangerous.  Is  a  phobia 
then  a  purely  causal  connection?  That  is,  if  there  are  no  beliefs  involved,  is  the  response 
just  a  reaction  spiders  bring  about  in  me?  The  difficulty  with  this  is  that  it  suggests  that 
my  emotional  state  is  no  different  to  a  physical  sensation  that  might  be  caused  in  me  by 
a  chemical,  say.  Consequently,  in  line  with  arguments  we  have  already  looked  at,  I 
would  have  to  infer  the  identity  of  my  state.  I  would  simply  find  myself  shaking  etc. 
whenever  I  saw  a  spider  and  no  doubt  I  would  soon  grasp  the  link. 
34 What  has  been  left  out  is  the  content  of  the  experience.  My  fear  is  directed  onto  the 
spider,:  I  am  in  no  doubt  about  the  object  of  my  emotion.  Furthermore,  although  there  is 
nothing  I  believe  to  be  threatening  about  the  spider,  I  certainly  experience  it  as 
frightening.  There  may  even  be  features  of  the  emotional  object  which  are  a  focus  for 
my  fear,  although  even  here  there  need  be  nothing  I  believe  that  would  make  fear 
rational.  Similar  difficulties  arise  in  the  case  of  emotional  responses  to  fiction.  Here  the 
problem  is  that  if  I  have  an  emotional  reaction  to  reading  say  Anna  Karenina42 
,  what  is 
it  that  I  believe  of  her  that  grounds  the  emotion.  If  I  feel  pity,  do  I  believe  some  great 
misfortune  has  befallen  her?  That  would  seem  to  be  what  the  cognitive  model  requires, 
Yet,  how  could  I  believe  any  such  thing  since  I  know  perfectly  well  that  she  is  a 
fictional  character  and  does  not  exist.  No  great  misfortune  has  befallen  her  because  she 
does  not  exist.  As  I  know  this,  that  cannot  be  what  I  believe.  But  what  account  can  we 
give  of  my  emotion  then,  if  there  is  no  belief  to  ground  it? 
Phobias  and  emotional  responses  to  fiction  then  seem  to  provide  two  cases  of  kinds  of 
emotional  states  which,  like  the  emotional  actions  discussed  by  Hursthouse,  lack  a 
rational  explanation  in  terms  of  belief.  This  kind  of  argument  would  show  that  in  these 
cases  belief  is  not  necessary  for  the  emotion,  and  therefore  that  since  these  cases  are  just 
as  much  emotions  as  any  other,  belief  cannot  be  a  necessary  condition  of  emotion  as 
such,  although  it  might  still  be  the  case  that  it  was  necessary  for  some  emotions.  Now  I 
will  turn  to  another  argument  which  is  directed  against  the  role  of  belief  in  emotional 
states. 
42  The  discussion  of  cases  of  this  sort  begins  with  Colin  Radford's  article  "How  can  one  feel  pity  for  the 
Fate  of  Anna  Karenina?  "  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Society  1976,  and  Kendall  Walton,  "Fearing 
Fictions",  the  Journal  of  Philosophy  1978.  I  discuss  the  problem  of  responses  to  fictions  at  greater  length 
in  later  chapters. 
35 Propositional  Attitudes. 
Gabriele  Taylor43  has  offered  some  criticisms  of  the  account  offered  by  Donald 
Davidson44  of  the  structure  of  emotional  states.  Apart  from  the  intrinsic  merits  of  her 
criticisms,  a  brief  discussion  of  her  arguments  will  also  allow  me  to  introduce  a  theme 
which  will  be  developed  in  later  chapters-  the  conflict  between  two  pictures  of 
understanding,  "Particularism"  and  "Universalism".  This  issue  is  of  importance  both  for 
a  correct  account  of  emotions  and  more  generally  for  a  correct  account  of  understanding 
generally. 
Davidson  argues  that  in  order  to  be  rational  and  intelligible  emotions  must,  as  has 
already  been  suggested,  involve  beliefs.  But  he  also  makes  a  stronger  claim  than  this, 
that  beliefs  lead  to  emotional  states  much  in  the  way  premises  lead  to  a  conclusion  in  a 
syllogism.  That  is,  given  the  premises,  the  agent  is  committed  to  the  conclusion. 
In  detail;  if,  for  example,  I  am  proud  of  my  new  house,  I  must  have  first;  the  belief  that 
this  beautiful  house  is  mine.  This  is  the  minor  premise  of  the  syllogism.  Second,  I  must 
also  have  the  belief  that  the  owners  of  beautiful  houses  are  in  some  way  praiseworthy. 
This  second  belief  is  universal,  and,  in  conjunction  with  the  first  premise,  entails  the 
belief  that  I  am  praiseworthy.  It  is  this  belief,  according  to  Davidson,  which  expresses 
the  emotion  of  pride.  In  this  way,  Davidson  tries  to  show  how  emotions  are  rational  in  a 
strong  sense-  that  they  follow  as  a  matter  of  deduction  from  other  beliefs  that  the  agent 
has.  One  final  feature  of  Davidson's  picture  is  worth  mentioning;  on  his  account, 
emotional  states  come  about  as  a  result  of  inference.  This  is  of  a  piece  with  other  aspects 
of  Davidson's  general  philosophy  of  mind  and  language  which  I  will  return  to  in  the 
final  chapter.  It  is  worth  mentioning  this  now  since  the  account  of  understanding  to  be 
given  in  what  follows  is  explicitly  opposed  to  such  an  account. 
Taylor's  main  objection  to  Davidson's  account  is  with  the  requirement  of  the 
universal  premise.  While  she  is  sympathetic  to  the  idea  that  emotions  can  be  assessed 
for  rationality,  she  denies  both  that  they  can  be  shown  to  be  entailed  by  an  agent's  other 
beliefs,  and  that  universal  beliefs  of  the  kind  Davidson  describes  can  be  a  requirement 
on  emotional  states.  First,  she  makes  the  methodological  point  that  the  reason  for 
43  Gabriele  Taylor,  Pride,  Shame  and  Guilt  ch.  1. 
44  Various  papers  by  Davidson  mention  emotions,  but  he  deals  with  them  at  length  in  "Hume's  Cognitive 
Theory  of  Pride"  in  Essays  on  Actions  and  Events. 
36 postulating  the  existence  of  such  universal  beliefs  is  that  they  alone  make  the  emotion 
intelligible-  it  is  only  intelligible  that  I  think  myself  praiseworthy  when  we  discover  the 
universal  belief  that  owners  of  beautiful  houses  are  praiseworthy. 
Taylor  does  not  dispute  the  fact  that  we  could  always  find  a  universal  belief  which  is 
consistent  with  other  beliefs  an  agent  has,  and  with  his  emotions.  But  that  by  itself  does 
not  make  the  imputation  of  the  belief  to  the  agent  necessary.  For  that,  the  belief  actually 
has  to  have  an  explanatory  role,  such  that  without  it  the  emotion  is  unintelligible.  The 
universal  belief,  in  short,  must  constitute  a  step  in  the  reasoning.  45 
Taylor  sets  out  to  show  that  there  are  cases  where  such  a  universal  cannot  plausibly  be 
said  to  play  this  kind  of  role.  She  chooses  as  an  example  a  scene  from  Joyce's  story 
"The  Dead".  The  main  character  Gabriel  is  alone  with  his  wife  Gretta  after  a  party  at 
his  Great  Aunts',  and  she  has  just  related  to  him  the  story  of  a  boy  from  her  past  who 
was  in  love  with  her  and  who  dies  tragically.  Joyce  describes  his  reaction  on  hearing  her 
reminiscences  like  this; 
"Gabriel  felt  humiliated  by  the  failure  of  his  irony  and  by  the  evocation 
of  this  figure  from  the  dead,  a  boy  in  the  gasworks.  While  he  had 
been  full  of  memories  of  their  secret  life  together,  full  of  tenderness 
and  joy  and  desire,  she  had  been  comparing  him  in  her  mind  with  another. 
A  shameful  consciousness  of  his  own  person  assailed  him.  He  saw 
himself  as  a  ludicrous  figure,  acting  as  a  penny  boy  for  his  aunts,  a 
nervous,  well-meaning  sentimentalist,  orating  to  vulgarians,  and 
idealising  on  his  own  clownish  lusts,  the  pitiable  fatuous  fellow 
he  has  caught  a  glimpse  of  in  the  mirror.  "  (Taylor.  P.  9). 
What,  Taylor  asks,  could  be  the  relevant  universal  lying  behind  Gabriel's  shame  here? 
She  considers  various  possibilities;  the  most  comprehensive-  taking  into  account  the 
more  salient  details  of  Gabriel's  comprehension  of  his  situation-  being;  the  belief  that 
"When  there  is  someone  in  one's  wife's  past  who  loved  her;  when  he  worked  in  the  gas 
as  That  is  to  say;  we  might  hold  that  the  emotion  was  based  on  understanding  of  the  situation-  perhaps 
involving  beliefs-  without  thinking  that  the  agent  must  have  in  mind  some  universal  proposition.  So  the 
only  reason  for  ascribing  such  a  thing  would  be  that  it  constituted  a  step  in  his  reasoning.  What  counts  as 
being  a  step  in  the  reasoning  is  ambiguous.  It  needn't  be  explicit,  but  it  must  be  plausible  to  say  that  it 
played  a  role.  If  we  can  get  by  without  it,  the  attribution  is  unnecessary.  In  addition,  in  Taylor's  examples 
it  starts  to  look  unlikely  that  such  a  principle,  even  in  a  tacit  form,  does  play  a  role. 
37 works;  when  one's  attempts  at  irony  have  failed,  [as  his  had]  when  one  has  "orated  to 
vulgarians",  and  so  on....  then  ..  one  should  be  ashamed.  "  But,  in  the  first  place,  to  be 
explanatory  the  belief  has  to  have  all  the  remaining  details  filled  in.  And  this  is  no  easy 
task.  It's  difficulty  and  length  make  the  explanatory  role  of  the  universal  doubtful.  But 
even  supposing  we  could  complete  all  the  details,  would  we  be  any  further  forward? 
"No",  says  Taylor,  because  this  universal  would  be  "entirely  concocted  from  his 
particular  beliefs  about  this  situation.  "  (p.  11).  In  other  words,  we  have  no  trouble 
explaining  the  emotion  on  the  basis  of  particular  beliefs  that  the  agent  has  in  this  case. 
Davidson's  case  rested  on  the  assumption  that  without  the  universal  belief  the  emotion 
not  only  could  not  be  justified  but  would  be  reduced  to  something  which  was 
unintelligible.  But  this  is  not  the  case.  Explanation  by  particular  belief  need  not  deprive 
the  emotion  of  rationality  or  intelligibility. 
If  Taylor's  criticism  of  Davidson's  are  fair  then  it  is  a  mistake  to  think  that  emotions 
are  based  on  the  kind  of  universal  beliefs  he  claims,  and  it  is  also  a  mistake  to  claim  that 
emotions  are  the  result  of  an  inference  from  such  beliefs.  These  points  are  particularly 
obvious  in  cases  such  as  love,  or  aesthetic  emotions,  for  example  those  that  might  be 
aroused  by  music,  say.  In  these  cases,  as  no  doubt  in  others,  it  is  very  difficult  to 
imagine  that  universal  beliefs  are  at  the  core  of  these  emotional  states. 
Taylor's  argument  does  not  however  offer  any  obvious  reason  for  disputing  an 
analysis  of  the  cognitive  element  of  an  emotion  in  terms  of  beliefs  of  some  sort.  But  this 
is  exactly  what  we  have  already  seen  reason  to  doubt.  If,  as  frequently  happens,  music 
arouses  emotion,  what  exactly  is  it  that  I  believe  about  the  music?  Beliefs  such  as  that 
the  music  is  sad  or  even  beautiful,  are  inadequate.  And  even  if  we  could  make  explicit 
some  belief  I  have  about  the  music,  what  is  important  is  the  way  I  hear  the  music,  and 
any  belief  I  do  have  is  grounded  in  that.  Only  ignoring  the  fact  that  hearing  the  music 
has  intentional  content  could  make  it  plausible  that  the  cognitive  content  of  my 
experience  is  the  belief.  We  may  be  able  to  extract  a  parallel  point  to  this  from  Taylor's 
example  of  Gabriel.  He  does  have  particular  beliefs  about  his  situation,  but  it  is 
plausible  to  suggest  that  these  are  grounded  in  his  experience  of  the  situation-  that  he 
experiences  it  as  shameful-  just  as  my  beliefs  about  the  music  are  grounded  in  my 
experience  of  it.  This  is  the  possibility  I  will  eventually  argue  for  below. 
38 Strong  and  Weak  Cognitivism. 
Earlier,  I  looked  at  cases  of  emotions-  phobias  and  emotional  responses  to  fiction- 
which  imply  that  beliefs  are  not  necessary  for  emotion  in  every  case.  Now  it  is  time  to 
consider  another  argument,  this  time  to  the  effect  that  belief  is  not  sufficient  for  an 
emotional  state.  The  objection  has  many  supporters.  Justin  Oakley  for  example,  argues; 
"An  initial  problem  for  cognitive  accounts  of  emotion  is  that  it  does 
not  always  seem  possible  to  distinguish  between  emotions  solely 
in  terms  of  the  cognitions  that  they  involve.  For  example,  the  cognition 
of  another  person  in  distress  seems  to  be  involved  in  compassion, 
but  we  may  well  have  this  cognition  and  feel  Schadenfreude  or 
malice  instead.  Similarly,  we  may  construe  a  certain  situation  as 
dangerous  with  feelings  of  either  fear  or  excitement.  What  seem  to 
distinguish  our  emotions  here  are  their  feelings  or  affects  rather 
than  their  cognitions.  "(Oakley  p.  25)46 
So,  the  objection  is  that  two  emotions,  fear  and  excitement  for  example,  cannot, 
contrary  to  the  cognitive  theory,  be  distinguished  by  the  beliefs  they  embody  because 
they  are  both  "  identified"  by  the  belief  that  something  is  dangerous.  Yet  in  one  instance 
I  feel  fear,  in  another  excitement.  If  the  cognitive  theorist  can  find  no  way  of 
distinguishing  between  these  states  despite  their  similar  belief-base,  then  he  must 
concede  that  belief  alone  is  insufficient  for  emotion,  and  that  the  emotion  proper  only 
comes  about  when  the  belief  brings  about  the  relevant  affect,  desires,  feelings  and  so  on, 
and  it  is  some  combination  of  these  that  confers  identity  upon  the  emotion.  Not  only  is  it 
the  case  that  two  emotions  share  the  same  belief-base,  but  it  seems  quite  clear  that 
someone  could  hold  the  beliefs  relevant  to  a  given  emotion  without  having  any  emotion 
at  all.  A  practised  lion-tamer  who  was  rather  blase  about  the  dangers  of  his  trade  might 
feel  no  fear,  although  he  may  be  none  the  less  aware  that  the  lions  are  dangerous.  So  we 
can  now  set  out  three  questions  which  we  will  need  to  answer  about  the  cognitive  theory 
of  the  emotions. 
First;  is  a  belief  a  necessary  component  of  an  emotion? 
Second;  is  a  belief,  or  complex  of  beliefs  sufficient  for  an  emotion? 
39 Third;  is  it  the  belief  component  which  identifies  the  emotion? 
Oakley's  objection,  above,  attempts  to  show  that  the  answer  to  the  second  of  these 
questions  must  be  "no".  The  cases  of  phobias  and  recalcitrant  emotions  we  have  looked 
at  suggest  that  the  answer  to  the  first  question  is  also  "no".  Since  a  negative  answer  to 
the  first  question  need  not  imply  a  negative  answer  to  the  second47,  it  seems  as  if  it  is  the 
claim  of  necessity  that  is  more  important  to  the  cognitivist.  It  is  also  important  to 
distinguish  the  third  question  from  the  first  two. 
One  claim  we  have  met  several  times  now  is  that  it  is  the  cognitive  element  in  an 
emotion  that  identifies  it.  Without  it,  I  have  argued,  we  could  only  infer  the  identity  of 
our  emotion.  But  this  claim  is  distinct  from  the  claims  of  necessity  and  sufficiency. 
For  example,  it  might  be  that  beliefs,  desires,  dispositions  and  physiological  symptoms 
are  all  individually  necessary  and  jointly  sufficient  for  an  emotion,  without  the  belief 
component  being  what  conferred  identity  upon  the  state.  The  fact,  if  it  is  one,  that  a 
belief  is  necessary  for  an  emotion  is  simply  an  ontological  fact,  no  different  in  kind  to 
the  claim  that  a  certain  pattern  of  neurotransmitter  activity  is  necessary.  The  claim  that 
the  belief  identifies  the  emotion  is  an  epistemological  claim.  It  refers  to  the  way  we 
come  to  know  about  the  identity  of  our  emotional  states.  Oakley's  objection  seems  to 
attack  not  merely  the  sufficiency  claim  but  the  identity-conferring  claim  also;  he  argues 
that  having  the  mere  belief  that  something  is  dangerous  won't  identify  my  emotional 
state-  when  I  am  in  one-  as  either  fear  or  excitement,  and  in  addition,  that  I  can  have  that 
belief  without  being  in  any  emotional  state. 
If  the  insufficiency  claim  is  true  cognitivism  will  have  to  take  account  of  the  fact  that 
factors  other  than  belief  must  be  present  if  I  am  to  have  an  emotion.  In  short,  what  I 
shall  call  "  strong"  cognitivism  (the  claim  that  the  belief  is  sufficient  for  producing  an 
emotional  state  48)  would  be  false.  If  the  claim  that  belief  is  not  necessary  is  true,  it 
46  Oakley's  target  in  this  passage  is  the  account  of  emotional  states  offered  by  Wiliam  Lyons  in  his  book 
Emotion.  Lyons'  own  account  is  given  in  terms  of  evaluative  beliefs,  which  he  argues  distinguish 
emotions.  I  return  to  this  issue  below. 
47  Logically  speaking,  it  remains  possible  that  a  feature  of  a  given  thing  or  state, 
although  not  necessary  for  it,  may  be  sufficient.  It  is  not  necessary  to  be  in  Liverpool  for  it  to  be  true  that 
you  are  in  England,  but  it  is  certainly  sufficient  for  it.  Similarly  a  belief  may  not  be  necessary  if  a  state  is 
to  be  a  case  of  fear,  but  in  a  given  case,  such  a  belief  might  logically  be  sufficient  for  its  being  fear. 
48  It  is  important  to  distinguish,  when  talking  about  sufficiency,  between  a  beliefs  being  sufficient  for 
constituting  an  emotion,  and  its  being  sufficient  for  bringing  about  an  emotion.  Oakley's  argument  is  to 
the  effect  that  beliefs  of  the  sort  described  are  sufficient  in  neither  sense.  The  Stoics,  for  instance,  claimed 
that  beliefs  are  sufficient  in  the  first  sense.  It  is  important  to  distinguish  the  two  senses  since,  as  I  shall 
argue  in  the  next  chapter,  there  is  an  additional  objection,  deriving  from  Hume,  to  the  claim  that  beliefs 
40 seems  nothing  will  remain  of  the  theory  at  all,  since  a  weaker  form  of  cognitivism  would 
also  be  false.  The  weaker  version  would  be  that  the  belief  is  necessary  for  the  emotion 
and  identifies  it.  A  third  outcome  might  be  the  one  mentioned  above;  that  belief  is 
necessary  but  not  sufficient,  and  in  addition  belief  is  not  responsible  for  the  identity  of 
an  emotion.  Perhaps  this  would  be  the  result  of  a  reductionist  or  eliminativist  view  of 
emotion. 
So,  having  distinguished  these  three  claims,  what  should  we  make  of  them?  It  seems 
obvious,  as  argued  above,  that  the  insufficiency  claim  is  in  fact  true;  beliefs  are  not 
sufficient  for  emotions.  What  about  the  claim  that  belief  is  not  necessary?  We  have 
already  looked  at  one  argument  for  this  claim  based  on  phobias  and  emotional  responses 
to  fiction,  and  will  shortly  consider  another.  Each  of  these  arguments  I  think  creates  a 
serious  problem  for  the  present  version  of  cognitivism.  Taken  together,  I  think  they 
should  encourage  us  to  abandon  that  theory. 
What  about  the  objection  to  the  identity-conferring  powers  of  beliefs?  Cognitivists 
might  respond  to  the  objection  that  fear  and  excitement  can't  be  distinguished  in  terms 
of  beliefs  about  their  objects,  by  insisting  that  some  distinguishing  beliefs  can  in  fact  be 
found  when  we  look  in  sufficient  detail.  So,  for  example,  though  both  fear  and 
excitement  seem  to  be  based  on  a  belief  that  something  is  dangerous,  there  is  in  fact  the 
further  difference  that  in  the  case  of  fear  the  danger  is  believed  to  be  a  threat  while  in 
the  case  of  excitement  it  is  believed  to  be  a  challenge.  While  this  seems  to  give  some 
grounds  for  distinguishing  the  two  cases,  there  may  be  some  doubt  concerning  what 
exactly  now  distinguishes  them.  What,  for  example,  is  the  difference  between  believing 
something  is  dangerous  and  believing  it  is  a  threat?  . 
Aren't  they  both  just  similarly 
neutral  beliefs  that  things  of  a  certain  sort  (bad  things,  mostly)  may  occur  ? 
In  other  words,  the  suggested  response  to  the  original  objection  attempts  to  smuggle 
;  believing  that  something  is  a  affective  connotations  into  the  descriptions  of  the  beliefs  49 
(and  more  generally,  cognitions)  are  sufficient  in  the  second  sense.  "Strong"  cognitivism,  as  I  intend  it,  is 
the  view  that  beliefs  (or  cognitions),  are  sufficient  for  bringing  about  an  emotional  state,  where  such  a  state 
is  taken  to  comprise  other  elements,  such  as  desires,  physiological  symptoms,  dispositions  and  so  on. 
49  Some  cognitivists  such  as  William  Lyons  (Emotion)  distinguish  between  two  kinds  of  belief;  "factual" 
and  "evaluative".  They  claim  that  evaluative  beliefs  and  not  factual  ones  distinguish  types  of  emotion.  I 
would  argue  that  such  a  claim  is  doubtful,  for  the  sorts  of  reasons  considered  above.  However,  the  point 
of  greater  interest  for  my  purposes  (see  the  following  chapter)  is  whether  the  beliefs-  whether  or  not  they 
identify  the  emotions-are  sufficient  for  producing  them.  It  is  at  this  point-as  mentioned  above  (footnote 
48)-that  another  objection  arises.  This  is  the  Humean  objection  that  such  a  belief  is  not,  when  properly 
understood,  a  cognitive  state  at  all.  That  is  because-according  to  this  line  of  thought-it  is  not  merely  a 
neutral  cognition,  but  one  that  motivates,  and  since  no  cognition  alone  motivates  (it  is  claimed),  there 
must  be  some  non-cognitive  element  present.  The  Humean  claim  then-to  return  to  the  distinction  made 
41 threat  is  just  believing  it  is  a  danger  and  not  liking  it,  whereas  believing  it  is  a  challenge 
is  believing  it  is  dangerous  and  liking  it.  Perhaps,  though,  believing  it  is  a  challenge  does 
after  all  involve  other  beliefs  -  doesn't  it  for  example  involve  the  belief  that  something 
will  be  good  for  you,  that  it  is  valuable,  or  at  least  that  you  will  enjoy  it? 
But  while  someone  may  have  such  beliefs,  it  seems,  that  at  least  in  the  first  two  cases 
they  could  feel  excitement  at  the  prospect  of  danger  without  them.  What  about  the  third 
example?  This  does  seem  a  likely  belief  to  have  if  danger  excites  you,  but  it  is  putting 
the  cart  before  the  horse  to  suggest  that  this  belief  is  what  makes  your  emotion  one  of 
excitement.  You  will  only  enjoy  it  because  it  excites  you.  We  would  surely  not  try  to 
argue  that  fear  is  fear  because  of  your  belief  that  it  will  make  you  sick.  Beliefs  about 
how  you  will  react  to  the  object  of  your  emotion,  or  to  the  emotion  itself  cannot  serve  as 
beliefs  about  the  object  of  your  emotion.  Of  course  you  may  have  any  number  of 
additional  beliefs  about  the  object  of  your  emotion  (for  example,  you  may  think  the  lion 
you  are  facing  has  a  particularly  fine  mane)  but  what  is  required  is  a  belief  that  will 
identify  your  emotional  state.  So  the  difference  between  excitement  and  fear  can't  be 
made  out  just  in  terms  of  beliefs.  It  seems  then  that  the  identity  objection  has  some  bite, 
although  I  will  not  suppose  that  it  has  been  shown  to  be  false.  so 
Whether  or  not  the  insufficiency  claim  is  true-  and  I  have  said  that  it  is-  there  is  clearly 
reason  to  be  worried  by  the  claim  that  belief  is  not  necessary  to  emotion.  The  reason  is 
this;  if  an  emotion  which  I  experience  does  not  require  a  belief,  the  question  arises  how 
I  identify  it  as  that  emotion.  We  considered  this  objection  before  in  connection  with 
"feeling"  theories  of  emotion;  there,  we  saw  that  the  other  components  of  an  emotion 
would  allow  only  an  inference  from  whatever  feelings  I  have  to  an  awareness  of  the 
identity  of  my  emotion.  But  if  beliefs  are  not  necessary  to  emotions  this  would  seem  to 
imply  that  knowing  your  emotional  state  is  an  inferential  matter  after  all,  since  there  is 
nothing  else  it  could  be.  However,  we  might  respond  to  this  argument  by  saying, 
conversely  that  since  our  knowledge  of  our  emotional  states,  at  least  in  a  large  number 
of  cases,  is  not  a  matter  of  a  process  of  inference,  and  since  it  is  perhaps  true  (see 
above-is  that  the  cognition  alone  is  not  sufficient  for  producing  the  emotion,  rather  than  that  it  is  not 
sufficient  for  identifying  it. 
S0  One  way  to  supplement  the  account  given  so  far  would  be  by  appealing  to  pleasure.  So  fear  involves 
being  pained  at  the  thought  of  a  danger.  And  the  pain  here  is  intentional,  involving  a  characterisation  of 
the  danger.  However  this  will  not  help  the  cognitivist  account  since  pleasure  cannot  be  analysed  in  terms 
of  beliefs. 
42 below)  that  belief  is  not  necessary  to  emotional  states,  that  some  other  kind  of  cognitive 
state  must  therefore  be  involved.  This  seems  to  me  a  strong  point  in  favour  of  the 
involvement  of  cognitive  states  of  some  sort  in  emotions. 
But  what  arguments  are  there  for  saying  that  beliefs  are  not  at  least  necessary  to 
emotional  states?  I  have  already  looked  at  one  restricted  argument  to  this  effect,  since  it 
only  concerned  certain  emotional  states  (phobias  etc.  ).  Time  now  to  look  at  a  different 
argument  which  implies  the  same  conclusion. 
43 Primitive  Emotions. 
Several  philosophers51  have  argued  against  the  weak  cognitivist  model  on  the  grounds 
that  it  focuses  exclusively  on  relatively  sophisticated  emotional  states  and  ignores 
emotions  at  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum,  such  as  the  emotional  states  of  young 
children  and  animals  and  other  "hardwired"  reactions  we  all  share.  These  philosophers 
object  not  merely  to  a  lack  of  balance  but  claim  the  resulting  theory  is  simply  mistaken; 
it  cannot  be  true  that  beliefs  are  either  necessary  for  emotional  states  since  the 
"primitive"  emotions  they  offer  as  counter-examples  do  not  involve  beliefs  at  all. 
Jenefer  Robinson,  in  her  article  "Startle",  for  example,  proposes  that  we  consider  the 
human  startle  response  as  a  model  for  human  emotion,  in  contrast  to  more  "cognitive" 
examples  such  as  shame  and  jealousy.  The  startle  response  itself  is, 
"..  an  invariant  response  in  humans  to  a  sudden,  intense  stimulus,  such 
as  a  loud  noise  like  a  revolver  shot.  " 
(Robinson.  P.  54) 
Robinson  quotes  the  findings  of  the  psychologists  Landis  and  Hunt  who  studied  the 
response,  to  the  effect  that  it  includes  the  following  reactions;  blinking  of  the  eyes, 
forward  head  movement,  contraction  of  the  abdomen,  bending  of  the  knees,  and  so  on. 
The  response  is  found  in  all  humans  from  infancy  to  old  age  and  takes  normally  less 
than  half  a  second  for  the  response  to  be  completed.  It  is  involuntary  and  cannot  be 
controlled  or  successfully  imitated.  Nor  does  it  depend  on  the  element  of  surprise.  The 
reaction  occurs  even  in  cases  where  subjects  fired  the  revolver  themselves.  There  are 
additionally  physiological  changes  of  the  sort  familiar  from  previous  discussions; 
alterations  in  blood  pressure,  reduced  electrical  resistance  in  the  skin,  checked  then 
accelerated  breathing,  and  so  on. 
This  response,  Robinson  claims,  belongs  to  the  spectrum  of  emotions.  She  has  two 
initial  reasons  for  supposing  this.  First,  the  response  apparently  shares  certain  patterns  of 
autonomic  nervous  system  activity  with  clearly  emotional  states.  Second,  it  seems  to  be 
a  developmentally  early  form  of  fear.  In  reply  to  the  objection  that  such  a  response  is 
51  Principally  Jenefer  Robinson,  "Startle"  Journal  of  Philosophy  1995,  and  John  Deigh,  "Cognitivism  in 
the  Theory  of  the  Emotions".  Ethics  1994.  Also  John  Morreall,  "Fear  Without  Belief',  Journal  of 
Philosophy,  1993. 
44 clearly  not  an  emotion  because  it  involves  no  cognitive  element,  Robinson  cites  the  case 
of  anger  in  children, 
"..  the  earliest  examples  of  rage  occur  when  some  ongoing  activity  is 
interrupted;  later,  the  infant  gets  angry  when  some  specific  object  is 
made  unavailable;  and  later  still  when  the  cause  of  anger  is  not  present, 
as  when  the  infant  gets  angry  at  the  absent  mother..  " 
(p.  60) 
The  early  examples  of  anger  seem  to  be  no  less  a  reflex,  although  Robinson  admits  that 
"cognitive  processing  "  becomes  more  important  in  the  later  stages.  Still,  it  is  not  just  a 
reflex;  it  is  unlike  the  knee-jerk  reflex,  for  example,  and  the  difference  according  to 
Robinson  is  that  the  knee-jerk  reflex  has  no  function.  Developed  anger  and  fear  serve 
the  same  biological  function  as  their  immature  forms,  the  young  child  s  rage  and  the 
startle  response;  they, 
" 
.. 
focus  on  some  event  in  the  (internal  or  external)  environment,  and  register  it 
as  significant  to  its  goals,  wants  or  motives  ...  the  [startle]  response  "tells"  the 
organism  that  the  event  is  a  significant  event,  something  potentially  dangerous 
which  needs  investigating  further.  " 
(p.  65) 
In  Robinson's  view,  to  be  an  emotion  something  must  possess  three  features; 
first,  it  must  be  a  bodily  response.  Second,  the  response  must  register  something  as 
salient  to  the  organism,  and  thirdly  what  is  registered  as  salient  must  be  relevant  to  its 
well-being.  This  model  she  thinks  can  be  successfully  applied  to  all  emotional  states, 
whether  it  is  anger  at  your  government's  foreign  policy  or  compassion  for  Anna 
Karenina.  Robinson  acknowledges  that  by  her  criteria  pain  and  hunger  may  also  be 
emotional  states,  which  she  accepts  may  seem  a  counterintuitive  consequence  of  her 
argument,  and  one  which  counts  against  it.  However  emotional  states  don't  really  form 
an  easily  definable  class,  and  any  suggestion  as  to  what  they  essentially  are  will  be 
fuzzy  at  the  edges52.  So  perhaps  we  shouldn't  take  exception  on  those  grounds  alone. 
However,  the  first  of  Robinson's  conditions  is  ambiguous  between  a  felt  and  an  unfelt 
bodily  response.  In  view  of  the  second  condition,  that  it  alerts  the  organism,  we  can 
52  In  the  case  of  emotions  not  only  is  it  true  that,  as  with  other  "family  resemblance"  concepts,  there 
would  be  no  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions,  but  in  addition,  unlike  most  of  those  cases,  there  are  real 
uncertainties  when  it  comes  to  our  judgements  regarding  what  is  and  what  is  not  a  member  of  that  class. 
That  we  are  unsure  whether  to  call  puzzlement  (for  instance)  an  emotion  is  not  due  simply  to  the  fact  that 
"emotion"  may  be  a  family  resemblance  concept. 
45 suppose  it  must  be  felt.  Yet  we  saw  earlier,  in  our  discussion  of  Oakley,  that  there  is 
some  reason  to  suppose  that  not  all  emotions  need  be  felt.  Many  are  unnoticed,  or 
unconscious.  But  perhaps  an  emotion  can  have  the  function  Robinson  attributes  to  it 
without  being  felt.  There  is  also  the  familiar  Brain-in  the-vat  objection  to  the  first 
condition.  That  is,  we  could  imagine  having  emotional  states  even  though  I  might  be  a 
brain  in  a  vat,  and  so  not  have  any  bodily  reactions  at  all.  All  that  would  be  required  is 
that  I  have  experiences  that  feel  like  bodily  experiences. 
Before  considering  the  implications  of  Robinson's  claims  for  the 
cognitivist  theory,  it  is  important  to  insist  that  even  in  the  cases  of  children's  rage  and 
animal  fear,  the  situation  is  represented  somehow  in  the  child  `s  or  animal's  experience, 
so  there  is  some  kind  of  cognitive  content,  however  it  is  to  be  analysed.  But  is  there 
always  such  intentional  content?  What  about  the  "startle"  response?  John  Morreall 
offers  some  examples  which  he  thinks  reveal  cases  which  lack  such  intentional  content. 
If  I  bite  into  an  apple,  he  says, 
"...  and  unknowingly  start  chewing  a  bitter  tasting  worm,  I  can  spit  out  the  mouthful  in 
disgust  without  identifying  the  taste  as  taste  of  worm,  or  thinking  what  harm  worm- 
eating  might  cause  me.  Indeed,  I  can  spit  out  the  worm  in  disgust  without  going  through 
any  mental  representations  at  all.  "53 
So  disgust,  he  argues,  need  not  involve  any  representation  or  intentional  content.  But  is 
this  correct?  Certainly,  Morreall  is  right  that  I  don't  need  to  identify  the  taste  as  that  of 
"worm";  nor  do  I  need  to  reflect  on  possible  harms  that  might  result  from  it.  But  is  there 
nothing  I  experience  the  situation  as?  Is  it  not  plausible  that  I  must  at  least  experience  it 
as  "a  disgusting  taste"?  Morreal  seems  to  roll  two  points  into  one;  the  first  is,  identifying 
"a  specific  object"  of  my  emotion.  On  hearing  a  loud  noise  I  do  not,  as  he  rightly  says, 
need  to  identify  the  source  (  have  some  specific  representation  of  it)  in  order  to  be 
momentarily  afraid.  But  the  necessity  of  being  aware  of  something,  under  some 
description  appropriate  to  the  emotion,  is  a  quite  separate  point.  And  neither  his 
arguments  nor  Robinson's  effectively  show  that  this  more  general  sense  of  intentional 
content  is  not  a  necessary  feature. 
Robinson  discusses  another  case  in  which  someone  has  been  involved  in  a  car 
accident.  Later,  when  driving,  the  car  she  is  in  skids  slightly.  If  she  reacts  with  fear,  can 
we  attribute  any  belief  to  her?  Is  it  not,  as  Robinson  claims,  a  kind  of  conditioned 
53  Morreall  (op.  cit.  p.  361). 
46 reflex?  Admittedly,  it  does  seem  as  if  our  bodies  are  capable  of  learning  in  this  way54 
But  this  in  itself  does  not  show  there  is  no  cognitive  content  in  the  subject's  experience. 
Does  she  merely  find  herself  with  racing  heartbeat  and  all  the  other  symptoms  but 
without  any  idea  what  has  happened,  as  in  the  case  of  the  startle  reaction  itself?  This 
seems  unlikely.  When  these  experiences  occur  we  have  some  understanding  of  what  is 
going  on,  though  of  course  it  need  not  be  expressed  explicitly  in  any  way.  But  this 
suggests  that  the  situation  is  represented  to  her  in  some  form. 
Robinson  claims  that  emotion  points  out  to  the  organism  something  salient  and 
relevant  to  its  well-  being  so  that  action  can  be  taken.  But  how  does  the  organism  know 
what  is  being  pointed  out,  what  is  salient  or  what  action  is  to  be  taken?  This  may  not 
seem  to  be  much  of  an  objection  if  we  are  thinking  about  antelope,  but  it  does  present  a 
problem  in  the  case  of  many  human  emotions.  The  reason  is  the  one  we  have  now 
encountered  on  various  occasions,  that  I  do  not  typically  identify  my  emotional  state  by 
a  process  of  inference.  However,  if  Robinson  were  right,  this  would  be  the  only  way  I 
could  know  what  my  emotional  state  was.  When  I  am  angry  or  afraid  I  usually  know 
what  I'm  angry  about  or  afraid  of-  "That  noise",  "That  taste",  "that  sudden  movement". 
But  this  could  only  be  possible  thanks  to  the  cognitive  content  of  the  emotion. 
Robinson  and  Morreal  face  a  choice.  Either  they  can  insist-  unreasonably,  as  I  have 
suggested-  that  these  states  involve  no  intentional  content-  in  which  case  we  seem  to  be 
left  simply  with  a  neuro-physiological  process.  It  is  then  less  clear  than  Robinson  and 
Morreall  make  out  that  these  are  really  cases  of  emotions55-  or  they  can  allow  that  they 
do  contain  the  more  general  kind  of  intentional  content  described  above. 
54  Ledoux  and  Goleman  (op.  cit),  for  example  provide  much  of  the  neurological  detail  of  how  neural 
pathways  are  conditioned  by  experience,  and  particularly-  in  ways  that  it  is  difficult  to  reverse-  by 
traumatic  experiences. 
ss  Here  Robinson  falls  back  on  the  functional  argument.  But  as  I  have  suggested,  this  is  itself  contestable. 
Most  of  us  in  any  case  are  familiar  with  states  such  as  the  mild  anxiety  caused  by  drinking  too  much 
coffee.  Should  we  say  this  is  an  emotion?  Certainly  it  is  similar  in  some  ways  to  fear;  both  share  an 
accelerated  pulse,  an  increased  adrenaline  now,  and  heightened  awareness.  Perhaps  there  are  also  shared 
patterns  of  neuro-transmitter  activity.  But  what  is  missing  in  the  case  of  coffee-induced  anxiety  is  any 
cognitive  component.  I  may  have  no  difficulty  in  identifying  my  symptoms  as  like  those  I  experience 
when  afraid  -I  may  even  say  that  I  feel  afraid-  but  there  is  nothing  I  am  afraid  of.  Not  only  is  there  no 
specific  object  I  am  afraid  of,  but  the  world  is  not  represented  as  being  fearful.  This  is  importantly  unlike 
the  case  of  depression,  for  example.  Nor  is  the  objection  here  simply  that  the  anxiety  is  chemically 
induced.  Delirium  tremens  is  a  more  extreme  state  than  coffee-induced  anxiety,  yet  it  too  is  chemically 
47 However,  the  kind  of  considerations  just  offered  in  reply  to  Robinson  and  Morreall 
may  not  be  enough  to  save  the  cognitive  theorist.  It  remains  doubtful  whether  in  all 
cases  the  intentional  content  of  these  states  must  involve  beliefs.  Most  obviously  this  is 
likely  in  the  case  of  the  emotions  of  animals  and  small  children.  The  cognitivist  must 
either  deny  that  the  startle  response  and  the  emotions  of  young  children  and  animals  do 
in  fact  belong  to  the  class  of  emotions  (  which  seems  both  counterintuitive  in  at  least 
some  cases  and  stipulative)  or  he  can  accept  that  they  are  emotions,  but  insist  that  they 
fall  into  a  different  class.  This  would  require  providing  a  legitimate  reason  for  saying 
these  emotions  belong  to  a  sub-class  and  then  restricting  the  cognitivist  claim  to  the 
other,  main  class. 
But  what  could  justify  saying  that  these  emotions  form  a  distinct  group?  And  even 
assuming  they  do  belong  to  a  separate  group,  what  difference  would  that  make?  It  still 
means  that  some  emotions  don't  require  beliefs,  and  so  weak  cognitivism  seems  false. 
But  is  there  any  reason  why  we  should  say  that  these  emotions  fall  into  a  separate 
group?  It  cannot  be,  as  John  Deigh  argues,  that  they  do  not  possess  intentionality; 
"The  emotions  of  antelope,  for  instance,  though  neither  rational  nor  irrational 
are  not  objectless  states;  bucks,  when  rutting,  display  anger  towards  their  rivals 
....  the  herd  when  under  attack  bolts  in  fear  from  its  attacker.  Similarly  with  babies 
delighted  with  new  toys,  frightened  of  large  dogs...  " 
(Deighp.  848) 
Deigh  may  be  right  about  the  intentionality  of  these  emotions,  and  so  the  cognitivist 
must  concede  that  beliefs  are  not  essential  to  everything  that  could  be  classed  as  an 
emotion.  Nevertheless,  he  can  claim  there  is  good  reason  for  thinking  of  these  belief- 
free  states  as  falling  into  a  distinct  group.  One  consideration  which  might  be  offered  in 
support  of  this  claim  is  the  different  relationships  between  emotional  states  and 
consciousness  in  animals  and  humans.  For  example,  are  animals  aware  what  their 
emotional  states  are?  Most  of  us  would  say  they  are  conscious  of  the  object  of  their 
emotions,  but  are  not  reflectively  aware  of  having  those  emotions.  Presumably  then, 
produced  (all  mental  states  must  of  course  be  chemically  produced  since  they  are  all  in  some  way  states  of 
the  brain).  However  there  are  more  grounds  in  the  case  of  D.  T.  's  for  allowing  that  emotional  states  are 
involved,  since  the  world  is  experienced  as  frightening,  even  terrifying.  A  state  which  consisted  purely  of 
physiological  symptoms  should  not,  I  conclude,  be  counted  as  an  emotion.  A  similar  view  of  such 
examples  is  taken  by  Nancy  Sherman  in  Making  a  Necessity  of  Virtue  p.  64. 
48 they  cannot  identify  their  emotions  in  the  way  we  can.  But  even  if  this  point  is  granted  56 
wouldn't  it  show  merely  that  belief  in  our  case  is  necessary  for  identifying  the  emotion 
reflectively,  but  not  necessary  to  the  emotion  itself?  For  example,  I  may  have  a  pain  in 
my  leg  as  much  as  an  antelope  but  I  know  that's  what  I  have-perhaps  the  antelope  does 
not  possess  that  degree  of  self-awareness.  Of  course,  the  antelope  knows  it  has  a  pain  in 
the  leg  in  the  sense  that  it  is  conscious  of  the  pain,  but  may  be  unable  to  reflect  on  the 
fact  that  it  is  experiencing  a  pain.  And,  it  may  be  claimed,  it  is  merely  this  ability  to 
reflect  on  my  mental  states  that  requires  beliefs. 
But  in  many  cases  at  least  the  belief  does  enter  into  the  constitution  of  the  emotion,  and 
it  is  in  virtue  of  that  that  we  do  know  what  we  are  angry  or  happy  about.  The  question  of 
exactly  how  the  ability  to  apply  concepts  to  experience  affects  the  nature  of  that 
experience  is  controversial  . 
Some  writers  claim  that  basic  phenomenal  experience  is 
unconceptualised,  while  others  have  argued  that  there  is  no  basic,  "raw"  phenomenal 
experience. 
John  McDowell  takes  the  latter  position,  while  Michael  Tye57  takes  the 
former.  Tye  argues  that  phenomenal  experience  is  unconceptualised  since  it  is  too  "fine- 
grained"  to  be  conceptual.  In  the  case  of  colour  perception,  for  example,  he  argues  that 
there  are  many  more  shades  of  the  colour  red  -  which  we  can  distinguish  phenomenally- 
than  there  are  concepts  of  redness  (  Tye.  p.  104  ).  This  is  denied  by  McDowell; 
"We  do  not  need  to  say  that  we  have  what  mere  animals  have, 
non-conceptual  content,  and  we  have  something  else  as  well,  since  we  can 
conceptualise  that  content  and  they  cannot.  Instead  we  can  say  that  we 
have  what  mere  animals  have,  bur  we  have  it  in  a  special  form.. 
. 
Our  perceptual 
sensitivity  to  our  environment  is  take  up  into  the  faculty  of 
spontaneity,  which  is  what  distinguishes  us  from  them.  " 
(McDowell.  P.  64) 
"Spontaneity"  for  McDowell  is  the  ability  to  conceptualise.  And  his  view  is  that  an 
animal's  perception  of  its  environment  is  quite  unlike  our  own,  because  unlike  Tye,  he 
does  not  think  we  share  with  animals  an  unconceptualised  phenomenal  input. 
s6  In  the  final  chapter  I  consider  the  case  of  animal  emotions  and  reflexive  awareness  in  more  detail,  by 
focusing  on  Davidson's  argument  that  animals  are  incapable  of  having  beliefs  and  so,  on  his  view,  are 
incapable  of  having  emotions. 
57  John  McDowell,  Mind  and  World,  and  Michael  Tye,  Ten  Problems  of  Consciousness. 
49 Since  animals  are  without  concepts,  he  claims,  they  can  have  no  conception  of  the  self 
or  of  existence  through  time,  according  to  McDowell.  Consequently  they  have  no 
reflexive  awareness  and  no  sense  of  time.  This  recalls  Wittgenstein's  remark  that  we  can 
imagine  a  dog  wishing  its  master  would  return,  but  not  wishing  he  would  return  next 
Wednesday  S8.  For  Tye,  my  pain  and  the  animal's  are  the  same  in  character,  the  only 
difference  between  us  being  that  I  can  talk  about  mine  in  concepts. 
McDowell's  views  are  controversial  and  it  would  therefore  be  unwise  for  the 
cognitivist  to  rely  on  them  for  his  defence  against  the  arguments  of  Robinson  and 
Deigh.  Nevertheless,  they  do  offer  some  grounds  for  thinking  that  a  legitimate 
distinction  can  be  made  between  the  emotions  of  animals,  say,  and  our  own.  A  more 
general  reply,  however,  would  be  the  Wittgensteinian  one  that  we  should  not  look  for 
necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  membership  of  a  class.  All  that  can  realistically 
be  hoped  for  is  an  overlapping  set  of  criteria  some  of  which  must  be  possessed  for 
membership.  This  "family  resemblance"  view  may  be  plausible,  given  that-  as  we  have 
already  had  occasion  to  note-  emotions  do  not  seem  to  form  an  easily  definable  class, 
and  many  grey  areas  can  be  found.  Nevertheless  it  will  not  help  the  cognitivst,  who  does 
want  to  defend  the  claim  of  necessity.  However,  against  the  Wittgensteinian  and  the 
cognitivist,  I  claim  it  remains  plausible  to  maintain  that  emotions  do  all  have  intentional 
content,  but  that  this  content  does  not  require  beliefs. 
The  arguments  of  Robinson  and  Deigh  therefore  succeed  in  showing  that  there  are 
some  emotions  which  do  not  involve  the  kinds  of  beliefs  we  would  expect  if  the 
cognitivist  model  were  correct.  And  we  have  previously  surveyed  a  number  of  other 
arguments  which  also  seem  to  show  that  beliefs  are  not  necessary  for  emotions  (the 
existence  of  phobias;  emotional  responses  to  fiction).  But  these  arguments  do  not  affect 
the  claim  that  emotions  have  cognitive  content.  As  far  as  that  claim  goes,  the  arguments 
are,  I  think,  decidedly  in  favour  of  it.  So  the  question  arises  whether  there  might  be 
cognitions  which  are  not  beliefs. 
SB  Philosophical  Investigations. 
50 An  Alternative  Account  of  Cognition. 
So  far,  then,  I  have  been  considering  objections  to  the  cognitivist  view.  Weak 
cognitivism  as  I  have  described  it  is  the  view  that  belief  is  necessary  for  an  emotional 
state  and  gives  the  emotion  its  identity  in  virtue  of  the  way  it  represents  the  object  of  the 
emotion.  A  stronger  version  of  cognitivism  might  claim  that  belief  is  also  sufficient  for 
the  emotion.  I  will  consider  this  view  presently. 
At  the  moment  let  us  consider  an  alternative  to  the  belief  theory.  We  have  seen  three 
problems  it  creates  by  focusing  on  belief.  One  is  that  belief  is  tied  to  truth,  and  perhaps 
not  all  cognitions  are  linked  to  truth  in  that  way.  A  second  reason  is  that  it  is 
propositional.  But  why  should  we  suppose  that  all  cognitive  states  are  like  that?  A  third 
reason,  which  we  will  now  consider  is  that  belief  is  too  insubstantial  a  thing  to  be  the 
basis  of  emotion.  I  will  then  set  out  an  alternative  view,  claiming  that  what  is  required 
for  emotion  is  not  merely  belief  but  a  form  of  cognition  more  like  perception. 
I  shall  argue,  along  with  Deigh,  that  the  basic  error  of  the  cognitivist  is  to  assume  that 
since  emotions  possess  intentionality  they  must  be  centered  round  beliefs. 
Various  philosophers59  have  suggested  that  emotional  cognition  is  something  like 
perception.  I  will  begin  by  considering  the  views  of  Cheshire  Calhoun,  since  her  views 
on  the  inadequacy  of  beliefs  mirror  arguments  offered  in  this  and  the  third  chapter. 
Calhoun60,  after  considering  some  of  the  objections  raised  above-  phobias,  recalcitrant 
emotions  and  primitive  emotions  -  concludes  that  the  cognitivist  must  grant  that  some 
emotions  are  felt  without  the  relevant  beliefs.  Her  point  in  doing  so,  however,  is  not 
merely  to  segregate  emotional  states  into  two  groups,  as  discussed  above,  but  to 
questions  the  concentration  on  belief  as  the  only  candidate  for  the  cognitive  element  of 
emotion.  Since  if  it  is  true  that  not  all  emotions  involve  beliefs,  but  it  is  also  true  that 
59  For  example,  David  Hamlyn,  "The  Phenomena  of  Love  and  Hate",  and  "Learning  to  Love",  both  in 
Learning,  Perception  and  The  Self;  Noel  Carroll,  The  Philosophy  of  Horror,  Ch.  2.;  Robert.  C.  Roberts, 
"What  an  Emotion  is",  The  Philosophical  Review  1988;  John  Morreal,  "Fear  Without  Belief',  The 
Journal  of  Philosophy  1993;  Patricia  Greenspan,  "Reasons  and  Emotion'  ;  Amelie  Rorty  (op.  cit.  )  and 
Michael  Stocker,  "Emotional  Thoughts",  American  Philosophical  Quarterly  1987. 
60  Calhoun,  "Cognitive  Emotions?  "  in  Solomon  and  Calhoun  (eds)  What  is  an  Emotion? 
51 some  kind  of  cognitive  state  is  involved,  what  kind  of  state  can  it  be?  Take  a  case  of 
recalcitrant  emotion  such  as  Amelie  Rorty's  case  which  I  considered  earlier.  Calhoun 
offers  the  example  of  a  subject  who  professes  liberal  beliefs  about  homosexuality,  yet 
when  a  friend  confesses  to  being  a  homosexual,  she  responds  with  feelings  of  shock  and 
revulsion.  It  seems  there  is  no  clear  reason  why  we  should  doubt  her  claim  to  believe 
that  homosexuality  is  to  be  tolerated.  How,  then,  would  the  belief-centred  cognitive 
theory  deal  with  this? 
Does  she  then  have  -  as  the  cognitivist  would  have  to  claim  -a  conflicting  belief 
which  produces  the  reaction  of  revulsion?  It  may  be,  Calhoun  suggests,  that  she  may 
have  conflicting  beliefs  at  different  "levels".  So  for  example,  she  may  abstractly  believe 
that  homosexuality  is  not  bad,  but  have  problems  when  it  comes  to  the  detail  of  a 
homosexual  lifestyle.  The  main  difficulty  with  this  description  is  that  there  may  be  no 
evidence  for  this  contrary  belief.  The  subject  herself  denies  she  does  believe  a 
homosexual  lifestyle  to  be  repellent.  To  insist  then  that  there  must  be  such  a  belief  begs 
the  question.  But  it  is  clear  enough  that  something  is  going  on  in  these  cases-  something 
is  in  conflict.  A  suggestion  which  seems  natural  is  that  there  is  some  cognitive  element 
which  generates  her  revulsion,  though  it  is  not  a  belief,  and  it  seems  natural  to  talk  in 
terms  of  her  perception  of  things.  The  same  thought  would  explain  the  other  problem 
cases  too.  Phobias,  for  example,  are  a  problem  because  the  subjects  do  not  think  true 
what  we  would  expect  them  to  think  true  if  their  only  cognition  was  a  belief.  If  we 
suggest  instead  that  they  see  the  object  of  their  emotion  in  a  certain  way  this  may  solve 
the  problem.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  perception,  as  we  shall  see,  is  not  tied,  as  belief 
is,  to  the  truth  of  the  representation.  The  fact  that  belief  is  tied  to  truth  is  one  problem. 
Another  is  that  in  a  sense  it  is  too  "thin"  or  too  insubstantial  to  be  the  basis  of  emotion 
Calhoun  distinguishes  two  sorts  of  belief;  "believing  experientially",  and  "belief  based 
on  inference", 
"Sometimes  our  beliefs  are  borne  out  by  our  own  experience.  I  hold  this  belief: 
Main  street  is  heavily  trafficked.  When  I  survey,  from  my  front  porch,  the  stream 
of  traffic  down  Main  street,  this  perceptual  awareness  bears  out  my  belief  (The 
content  of  my  belief  is  immediately  experienced.  )  At  such  times,  I  hold  my  belief 
evidentially.  "(Calhoun  p.  336) 
By  contrast,  someone  could  arrive  at  the  same  belief  because  I  tell  them  the  street  is 
busy,  and  they  trust  me,  or  because  they  see  from  a  map  that  it  is  a  main  street  and  infer 
it  will  be  busy.  Here,  their  belief  is  not  borne  out  by  and  based  in,  experience.  On  the 
52 other  hand,  some  beliefs  cannot  be  held  evidentially,  such  as  a  belief  in  four 
dimensional  space  or  a  belief  about  prehistoric  times.  Some  beliefs  can  be  held 
evidentially  but  are  only  held  by  inference.  A  very  young  child  may  believe  that 
something  is  wrong  because  its  parents  tell  it  so,  but  it  lacks  the  experience  of  its 
wrongness.  Take  the  case  of  colour  experience.  A  blind  man  can  arrive  at  the  correct 
beliefs  about  the  colour  of  the  traffic  lights  (on  the  basis  of  sound,  for  example).  But  the 
reliability  of  this  inference  is  compatible  with  his  complete  lack  of  colour  experience.  In 
a  clear  sense  he  has  no  understanding  of  colour.  Here  understanding  requires  a  kind  of 
acquaintance  which  cannot  be  analysed  in  terms  of  belief6t.  More  generally,  it  is  a 
feature  of  "beginners"  in  many  activities  that  they  begin  with  inferentially  derived 
beliefs  -  on  trust  so  to  speak,  by  means  of  some  rule  or  other  procedure  -  and  then  as 
they  gain  the  relevant  experiences  they  abandon  the  rules,  which  they  have  by  now 
discovered  were  only  partially  accurate  anyway. 
Calhoun's  suggestion  is  that  emotion  is  not  concerned  with  inferential  beliefs.  Such 
beliefs  are  simply  too  insubstantial  to  form  the  basis  of  an  emotion.  Instead  what  is 
relevant  to  emotion  is  seeing  things  in  particular  ways.  These  "perceptual"  experiences 
may  give  rise  to  beliefs  (  and  perhaps  typically  will)-  Calhoun's  "experiential"  beliefs- 
but  then  again,  they  may  not.  In  the  example  of  the  girl  outraged  by  her  friend's 
homosexuality,  she  sees  homosexuality  as  repellent,  but  she  does  not  believe  it  is  a  bad 
thing.  Although  she  sees  things  one  way  she  does  not  feel  that  the  way  that  experience 
represents  those  things  is  correct. 
Such  perceptions  may  be  the  product  of  upbringing,  of  particular  experiences  the  subject 
has  had,  and  so  on.  What  this  conception  of  emotion  implies,  is  that  a  person's 
emotional  reactions-  and  his  cognitive  attitudes  towards  something  generally-  are  a 
much  more  complicated  affair  than  the  belief-model  suggests.  Calhoun  writes, 
"In  short,  our  cognitive  life  is  not  limited  to  clear,  fully  conceptualised, 
articulated  beliefs.  Instead,  beliefs  constitute  only  a  small,  illuminated  portion  of 
that  life.  The  greater  portion  is  rather  a  dark,  cognitive  set,  an  unarticulated 
framework  for  interpreting  our  world,  which,  if  articulated,  would  be  an  enormous 
network  of  claims,  not  all  of  which  would  be  accepted  by  the  individual  as  his 
61  On  the  argument  that  perceptual  experiences  cannot  be  analysed  in  terms  of  beliefs,  see  the  final 
chapter. 
53 beliefs.  "  (p.  338) 
Calhoun  mentions  the  notion  of  "seeing  the  world  as...  "  but  does  not  elaborate  on  what 
form  this  kind  of  experience  takes.  The  idea  of  "seeing-as"  derives  from  Wittgenstein, 
and  in  the  next  chapter  I  shall  say  more  about  the  phenomenon  and  in  particular,  how  it 
is  linked  to  understanding  and  imagination.  But  Calhoun  is  not  the  only  contemporary 
philosopher  to  argue  that  emotion  involves  perception  rather  than  belief62.  David 
Hamlyn,  in  a  number  of  articles,  explicitly  refers  to  Wittgenstein'  s  notion  of  "seeing- 
as",  in  particular  in  the  course  of  a  discussion  of  love.  This  is  a  topic  I  will  return  to 
later;  we  can  reasonably  claim,  at  the  moment,  however  that  love  is  a  clear  example  of 
the  deficiencies  of  the  belief  model,  and  one  that  shows,  by  contrast  the  advantages  of 
the  perceptual  model.  As  Hamlyn  argues,  there  are  no  necessary  beliefs  in  the  case  of 
love63,  as  there  might  plausibly  be  in  the  case  of  fear  or  anger; 
"..  it  is  very  difficult  to  think  of  any  particular  belief  that  the  lover  must 
have  about  the  beloved,  or  any  way  in  which  the  lover  must  see  the  beloved" 
(Hamlyn  p.  277) 
and  more  generally, 
"How  one  sees  things  can  be  a  function  of  one's  beliefs  in  a  variety  of 
ways;  it  may  however  be  a  function  of  other  things,  and  it  is  certainly  not 
that  whenever  one  sees  something  as  such-and-such  one  has  ipso  facto 
a  belief  to  that  effect...  There  is  what  has  been  called  non-epistemic 
seeing  in  that  way  at  least.  The  same  applies  to  seeing  mice  as  frightening. 
That  may  be  a  function  of  beliefs,  but  the  seeing  need  not  be  believing  ." 
(Hamlyn.  P.  272) 
0 
Nor,  in  the  manner  of  Davidson's  model,  could  the  major  premise  be  set  out,  stating 
the  qualities  valued.  How  much  more  plausible  to  think  of  love  instead  as  a  "seeing-as" 
experience.  Furthermore,  the  phenomenon  of  seeing-as  would  also  help  to  explain  why 
62  See  references  to  n.  54.  Above. 
63  In  stark  opposition  to  Hamlyn,  Gabriele  Talyor  argues  that  we  can  state  necessary  beliefs  for  love,  in 
her  article  "Love",  Proceeding  of  the  Aristotelian  Society,  1975.  However,  Taylor's  argument  does  not,  I 
think,  succeed. 
54 emotions  "seduce  judgement",  in  Aristotle's  phrase.  Once  I  see  things  a  certain  way,  it 
will  not  be  enough  to  change  my  perception  that  I  discover  or  come  to  believe  certain 
relevant  facts.  Indeed,  as  is  notoriously  the  case  with  love,  emotions  can  blind  us  to  the 
existence  of  these  facts.  Aristotle,  in  De  Somniis4  writes, 
"...  we  are  easily  deceived  about  our  perceptions  when  we  are  in  emotional 
states...  e.  g.  the  coward  in  his  fear,  the  lover  in  his  love;  so  that  even  from 
a  very  feint  resemblance  the  coward  expects  to  see  his  enemy,  and  the  lover 
his  loved  one,  and  the  more  one  is  under  the  influence  of  an  emotion 
the  less  similarity  is  required  to  give  these  impressions.  " 
(460b1-16) 
Aristotle  here  desrcibes  the  way  in  which  emotion  can  seduce  judgement  by  creating 
certain  expectations  which  in  turn  cause  misperception  or  erroneous  judgement.  This  is 
not  a  question  of  beliefs  at  all.  Similarly  of  anger,  Aristotle  writes, 
"  Anger  seems  to  listen  to  argument  to  some  extent,  but  to  mishear  it, 
as  do  servants  who  run  out  before  they  have  heard  the  whole  of  what 
one  says,  and  muddle  the  order,  or  as  dogs  bark  if  there  is  a  knock 
on  the  door,  before  looking  to  see  if  it  is  a  friend.  " 
(N.  E.  1149a24-27) 
So  what  the  lover  and  the  angry  man  get  wrong  is  that  they-  literally  -perceive  wrongly. 
These  points  will  be  important  when  I  later  come  to  consider  what  might  be  involved  in 
educating  the  emotions. 
64  Quoted  in  Stephen  Leighton,  "Aristotle  on  Emotion"  in  Rorty  and  Nussbaum  eds.  Essays  on  Aristotle's 
De  Anima. 
55 Stoic  Freshness. 
The  view  of  emotions  being  suggested  here  bears  considerable  similarity  to  some  Stoic65 
views  of  emotional  states.  They  too  believed  that  emotions  were  cognitions,  but  as 
Michael  Frede  argues66,  they  did  not  think  them  ordinary  beliefs,  since  that  view  is  open 
to  the  -  by  now,  familiar-  objections.  We  can  understand  their  view  more  clearly  if  we 
distinguish  between  a  proposition  and  the  propositional  content  of  an  experience.  If  I 
believe  that  tomorrow  is  your  birthday  then  I  believe  a  proposition.  Similarly,  when  the 
blind  man  at  the  traffic  lights  believes  that  the  light  is  green,  he  believes  a  proposition. 
The  sighted  person,  however,  sees  the  green  light.  He  too  will  typically  believe  that  the 
light  is  green,  but  apart  from  this  belief,  his  visual  experience  also  has  propositional 
content. 
Or  consider  another  example;  when  we  look  at  the  Muller-Lyer  illusion  what  we  see 
are  two  parallel  lines  that  appear  to  be  of  different  lengths.  But  the  lines  are  in  fact  the 
same  length,  and  someone  familiar  with  the  illusion  will  know  this.  Consequently  they 
will  believe  -  correctly  -  that  the  lines  are  the  same  length.  Nevertheless  this  will  not 
prevent  their  visual  experience  having  the  quite  different  propositional  content  that  the 
lines  are  different  lengths. 
The  Stoic  account  of  an  emotion  was  that  it  involved  assenting  to  the  propositional 
content  of  an  experience  of  this  sort  (a  phantasia)67  -  to  an  "appearance".  So  it  is  not,  for 
them,  simply  a  question  of  accepting  a  proposition,  but  of  accepting  or  assenting  to  the 
way  in  which  a  proposition  presents  itself  to  us.  So  it  has  a  basis  in  experience,  in  the 
same  way  as  Calhoun's  account  of  experiential  beliefs. 
The  Stoics  themselves  pointed  out  another  feature  of  some  emotional  states  which  a 
belief  model  is  ill-equipped  to  deal  with.  Julia  Annas  68 
,  explaining  the  Stoic  position, 
65  Stoic  views  are  discussed  in  more  detail  in  a  later  chapter. 
66  Michael  Frede,  "The  Stoics  Doctrine  of  the  Affections  of  the  Soul"  In  Schofield  and  Striker,  The  Norms 
of  Nature.  Frede's  view  is  supported  by  other  writers,  among  them  Nussbaum,  cf.  "  The  Stoics  and  the 
Extirpation  of  the  Passions"  in  The  Therapy  ofDesire. 
67  Phantasia  are  discussed  in  more  detail  in  the  final  chapter. 
68  Julia  Annas,  Hellenistic  Philosophy  of  Mind. 
56 argues  that  a  joke  when  first  heard  has  a  "freshness"  which  makes  us  laugh.  Upon 
repeated  hearing  this  freshness  fades  and  we  cease  to  find  it  funny.  It  no  longer  makes 
us  laugh,  but  our  beliefs  about  it  may  not  have  altered  at  all.  In  particular  we  still  believe 
it  is  a  funny  joke.  Something  similar  happens  with  grief.  In  time  the  pain  of  loss 
becomes  less  constant  and  intense.  Whatever  beliefs  are  relevant  seem  not  to  alter 
however.  This  seems  to  confine  the  existence  of  perceptual  cognitions  in  emotional 
states.  Our  perception  of  the  objects  of  our  emotions  has  subtly  altered.  The 
phenomenon  is  in  fact  widespread,  and  is  not  confined  to  emotions,  as  I  shall  later 
argue;  much  aesthetic  experience  for  example,  involves  shifts  of  this  sort. 
It  should  be  clear  now  how  this  different  view  deals  with  some  of  the  problems  we 
have  looked  at.  For  example,  the  problem  with  phobias  and  responses  to  fiction  was  that 
they  could  not  be  seen  in  terms  of  belief  because  nothing  was  thought  to  be  relevantly 
true  about  the  objects  of  the  emotions.  Now  we  can  describe  the  emotions  as  seeing 
something  as  frightening,  or,  seeing  the  fate  of  Anna  Karenina  as  sad,  without  being 
committed  to  the  truth  of  the  relevant  beliefs.  Similarly,  the  loved  one  is  seen  in  a 
certain  way.  This  also  coheres  with  what  we  found  earlier  in  the  case  of  depression.  In  a 
state  of  depression  things  seem  bleak,  they  look  different.  So  while  the  depressed  person 
may  have  no  particular  beliefs,  he  may  see  things  differently.  Of  course,  some  account  is 
owed  of  the  nature  of  this  "seeing",  and  I  will  try  to  provide  it  in  the  next  chapter. 
57 More  Problems. 
I  hope  then  to  have  made  plausible  an  alternative  to  the  belief  model  of  emotional  states 
which  is  both  intuitively  plausible  and  copes  with  what  were  serious  problems  for  the 
other  view.  But  we  are  not  out  of  the  woods  yet.  Several  questions  remain  unanswered. 
First,  even  if  such  "seeing  -as"  experiences  are  a  feature  of  some  emotional  states,  is  it 
credible  to  think  that  they  are  present  in  all  emotions?  Second,  I  noted  above  that  one  of 
the  attractions  of  the  belief  model  was  that  it  promised  to  bring  emotions  into  the  arena 
of  rational  criticism.  This  is because  belief  is  rational  or  irrational.  If,  instead  of  belief, 
emotions  are  based  upon  perceptions  which  are  not  tied  to  truth,  doesn't  that  mean  that 
the  common-sense  conception  of  emotion  as  powerfully  irrational  with  which  I  began,  is 
after  all  correct?  Third,  and  most  serious;  if  what  I  have  suggested  is  accepted,  surely  all 
that  has  been  shown  is  that  a  type  of  cognitive  state,  quite  different  from  belief,  is 
involved  in  emotion.  It  has  not  been  shown,  above  all,  that  such  states  are  sufficient  for 
emotion.  And  so,  even  if  correct  the  present  account  will  have  to  recognise  the 
importance  of  the  other  components,  and  in  particular  of  desires  or  interests  or 
something  similar. 
The  third  objection  is  a  serious  one  and  I  postpone  consideration  of  it  for  the  moment. 
The  other  two  objections  seem  to  me  less  serious.  The  first  suggests  that  there  may  only 
be  a  limited  range  of  emotional  states  to  which  seeing-as  experiences  apply.  Do  being 
frightened  when  standing  at  the  edge  of  a  precipice,  or  being  startled  by  a  loud  noise,  or 
being  jealous  ofsomeone,  or  losing  your  temper  because  of  a  headache,  all  involve 
seeing-as  experiences?  I  think  it  is  plausible  that  they  do.  Resistance  to  this  claim  is  I 
think  rooted  in  two  assumptions  we  might  be  tempted  to  make,  which  are  both  false. 
The  first  is  our  common-sense  idea  of  "perception";  we  generally  suppose  that  what  can 
be  seen  are  features  such  as  line,  shape  and  colour.  Anything  apart  from  this  we  are 
inclined  to  think  of  as  interpretation  of  what  is  seen.  So  alteration  in  a  wide  variety  of 
more  subtle  features,  such  as  the  intentional  features  of  the  objects  of  emotions,  are  not 
something  that  can  correctly  be  said  to  be  seen  at  a1169.  But  as  I  shall  argue  in  the  next 
chapter,  this  account  is  wrong.  Once  such  an  account  is  rejected,  it  ceases  to  be 
69  These  remarks  merely  sketch  the  kind  of  argument  offered  by  Wittgenstein  in  criticism  of  the  empiricist 
account  of  perception.  I  consider  it  in  detail  in  the  next  chapter. 
58 ridiculous  to  claim  that  the  person  who  is  afraid  of  the  precipice  and  the  person  who  is 
not,  do  not  "see"  things  the  same.  The  second  source  of  resistance  my  be  our 
assumptions  about  cognitions;  that  if  there  is  a  cognitive  difference  it  must  be  a 
difference  in  belief.  I  think  that  in  view  of  the  difficulties  such  a  view  faces-  like  the 
ones  we  have  already  reviewed-  we  already  have  ample  warrant  to  reject  it. 
When  at  the  edge  of  the  precipice,  why  should  it  be  implausible  to  suggest  that  I 
perceive  my  situation,  and  in  particular  the  height,  in  a  particular  way,  and  that  this 
provokes  my  fear?  If  it  makes  sense  to  say  that  my  fear  of  spiders  is  a  result  of  the  way  I 
perceive  them,  why  not  in  this  case?  Some  cases  may,  perhaps,  seem  unlikely;  when  I 
am  startled,  is  there  any  way  I  perceive  things  along  the  same  lines?  I  have  already 
argued  not  only  that  there  is,  but  that  there  must  be.  As  far  as  the  question  of  whether 
animals  could  experience  seeing-as  experiences  goes,  I  can  think  of  no  reason  to 
presume  they  can't.  In  the  final  chapter  I  will  return  to  this  possibility  in  more  detail. 
The  second  objection  (above)  asks  whether  we  have  not  abandoned  emotions  to 
irrationality.  The  answer  here  is  that  if  beliefs  and  perceptual  experiences  keep  in  step 
then  emotions  can  still  be  rational.  For  example  if  Calhoun's  subject  had  not  responded 
with  revulsion  but  had  reacted  in  a  more  liberal  and  understanding  manner,  this  may 
have  been  more  in  line  with  her  beliefs.  Her  emotion  is  appropriate  and  rationally 
defensible.  If  my  experiences  are  educated  and  kept  in  line  with  my  beliefs,  the  result  is 
rational  emotions.  Where  these  experiences  are  not  like  this,  but  are  in  conflict  with  my 
beliefs,  and  have  a  different  kind  of  origin-  for  example  the  cases  of  phobias-  here  the 
way  I  experience  it  is  arational  rather  than  irrational.  If  I  lose  my  temper  with  you 
because  of  my  headache,  and  regret  it,  then  my  reaction  was  not  rational.  In  short, 
allowing  that  emotions  are  not  primarily  constituted  by  beliefs  need  not  mean  that 
emotions  cannot  be  educated  in  line  with  normative  considerations  we  value;  what  is 
right,  appropriate,  fitting,  and  so  on.  Two  of  the  three  objections  then  fail.  It  is  time  now 
to  consider  the  third  of  these,  which  brings  us  back  to  the  issue  of  "strong"  cognitivism. 
59 Strong  Cognitivism. 
The  third  objection  above  is  that  the  seeing-as  experiences  will  not  alone  be  sufficient  to 
produce  an  emotional  response.  Those  experiences  will  somehow  have  to  be  related  to 
the  subject's  interests  or  desires.  Cognitions-  of  whatever  sort,  whether  beliefs  or  not- 
will  not  be  enough  for  an  emotion.  It  has  not  been  sufficiently  remarked  upon,  to  my 
knowledge70,  that  the  objection  here  precisely  parallels  non-cognitivist  objections  in 
ethics  and  aesthetics. 
The  non-cognitivist  camp  in  both  aesthetics  and  ethics  draws  inspiration  from 
Hume's  Treatise,  and  his  Essay  on  Taste.  The  arguments  against  cognitivism  there  have 
a  direct  bearing  on  the  case  of  emotions.  We  can  see  this  if  we  return  for  a  moment  to 
the  example  from  Julia  Annas  I  quoted  above.  Clarifying  the  Stoic  account,  she  claimed 
that  the  "freshness"  of  a  joke  was  what  was  initially  seen  in  the  joke,  apart  from  belief. 
As  the  joke  ceases  to  be  funny-  through  repeated  hearing-  it  is  not  our  beliefs  about  it 
which  change,  but  the  freshness  which  fades. 
But  there  is  an  ambiguity  in  how  we  should  understand  this,  and  on  one  interpretation 
this  claim  involves  making  a  tacit  and  hotly  disputed  assumption.  One  way  to  interpret 
Annas  is  that  when  the  freshness  fades,  and  my  cognitive  state  is  altered,  this  fact  alone 
is  sufficient  to  produce  an  effect  on  me,  namely  that  I  stop  laughing  at  the  joke.  On  this 
view,  fmding  the  joke  funny  -  and  conversely,  ceasing  to  find  it  funny-  are  cognitive 
states.  This  involves  the  assumption  that  the  way  something  strikes  me  cognitively, 
whether  in  the  förm  of  a  belief  or  in  the  propositional  content  of  an  experience,  it  will  be 
sufficient  to  affect  me71.  This  will  be  denied  by  Humeans  who  will  insist  that  any 
cognitive  state  only  motivates  or  produces  an  affect  in  conjunction  with  a  desire  or 
disposition.  Consequently,  fording  something  funny,  for  example,  cannot  be  just  a  72 
70  One  of  the  few  philosophers  to  do  so  is  Michael  Stocker,  in  Valuing  Emotions.  Ch.  1 
71  The  same  problem  arises  with  respect  to  Frank  Sibley's  arguments  about  aesthetic  experience  (In 
"Aesthetic  Concepts".  Philosophical  Review  1954.  ).  Sibley  argues  that  aesthetic  understanding  is  not 
reducible  to  beliefs.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  believe  that  a  piece  by  Mozart  is  beautiful,  you  have  to  hear  it. 
But  what  the  non-cognitivist  will  deny  is  that  the  "beauty"  of  the  piece  is  something  that  can  be  heard.  All 
that  can  be  heard  are  neutral,  inert  features  of  the  music-  sounds.  Only  when  these  inert  perceptions  are 
combined  with  an  already  existent  desire  or  disposition  is  the  result  anything  that  can  be  called  "beauty". 
72  See  next  chapter. 
60 matter  of  being  in  the  right  cognitive  state.  An  alternative,  and  weaker,  interpretation  of 
Annas  would  be  that  the  freshness  of  the  cognition  is  necessary  but  not  sufficient  for 
finding  the  joke  funny.  However,  given  the  Stoic  view  of  emotion  as  being  entirely 
cognitive,  the  stronger  interpretation  is  more  likely. 
Some  philosophers  who  prefer  a  cognivitist  theory  of  emotions  do  so  at  least  in  part 
because  it  supports  a  cognivitist  account  of  values.  Martha  Nussbaum,  for  example, 
argues  that  emotional  failures,  where  we  do  not  have  the  appropriate  emotional 
response,  show  a  failure  to  "see"  things  correctly,  and  that  such  cognitive  failure  is  also 
an  ethical  failure73.  These  issues  will  be  addressed  in  the  next  chapter. 
A  further  point  which  I  have  not  emphasised  so  far  arises  here;  the  question  of  affect. 
Isn't  it  one  of  the  key  features  of  emotional  states  that  they  affect  us,  and  often  quite 
strongly?  How  could  this  fact  be  captured  by  any  account  which  says  emotion  is  a 
cognitive  experience  like  a  perception?  74  However,  while  the  Stoics  do  claim  that 
emotions  are  cognitions,  strong  cognitivism  merely  says  that  cognitions  are  sufficient 
for  emotions  but  allows  that  emotions  comprise  other  elements.  The  possibility  of  strong 
cognitivism  about  emotions  stands  or  falls  with  cognitivism  about  value  generally,  so 
this  is  the  issue  I  will  look  at  briefly  in  the  next  chapter.  I  will  not  attempt  to  settle  this 
difficult  issue,  but  merely  to  set  out  what  is  involved  in  it  and  offer  some  reasons  why 
we  should  not  reject  the  idea,  and  some  tentative  reasons  in  favour  of  it. 
73  See  next  chapter. 
74  This  is  a  point  Stocker  emphasises  in  Valuing  Emotions,  1.4.  see  below. 
61 Chapter  Two 
Humean  Emotions? 
At  the  end  of  the  previous  chapter  we  distinguished  two  general  positions 
regarding  the  relation  between  cognition  and  emotion.  The  first,  to  which  I 
gave  the  label  "weak  cognitivism",  claims  that  cognitions  are  necessary  for  an 
emotion'.  According  to  this  view,  without,  say,  the  thought  that  he  has  been 
slighted,  a  person  cannot  be  said  to  be  angry;  without  the  thought  that 
something  is  dangerous  or  threatening,  he  is  not  afraid.  According  to  this 
view  then,  is  it  the  cognitive  element  which  also  confers  the  identity  of  an 
emotion?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  unclear.  We  saw  in  the  previous 
chapter  that  two  people  could  have  the  same  thought  -  for  example,  that 
something  is  dangerous-  but  be  in  different  emotional  states;  one  viewing  the 
situation  with  excited  anticipation,  the  other  with  fear. 
What  makes  the  difference  we  might  say,  is  that  one  finds  this  thought 
pleasant  while  the  other  finds  it  unpleasant.  As  also  argued  in  chapter  one,  it 
may  be  that  the  cognitive  elements  of  the  pleasure  and  displeasure  are 
identical.  In  short  then,  the  difference  is  not  a  cognitive  one,  and  the  identity 
of  the  state  is  conferred  by  the  cognitive  element  plus  either  pleasure  or 
displeasure.  This  is  still  a  form  of  cognitivism  since  the  cognitive  element  is 
necessary  for  the  emotion. 
However  a  different  view  is  also  compatible  with  weak  cognitivism.  This 
would  be  the  view  that  the  cognitive  elements  of  fear  and  excited  anticipation 
are  distinct.  So,  on  this  view,  both  people  may  have  the  belief  that  the 
situation  is  dangerous,  but  over  and  above  this  common  cognitive  element, 
they  may  perceive  the  situation  differently;  for  example,  different  features  of 
the  situation  may  become  salient  in  each  case,  and  it  may  therefore  assume  a 
11  assume  henceforth,  in  discussing  both  forms  of  cognitivism,  that  "cognition"  refers  to  some 
kind  of  state  other  than  belief  That  is,  I  assume  that  the  original  form  of  cognitivism 
considered  at  the  beginning  of  chapter  one  has  been  discredited. 
62 different  aspect2.  According  to  this  view,  since  the  cognitive  element  is 
distinctive  in  each  case,  it  is  also  that  element  which  confers  identity  upon  the 
emotion.  Deciding  between  these  two  versions  of  weak  cognitivism  will 
depend  on  the  view  taken  of  cognition  and  what  kind  of  content  it  can  have. 
The  arguments  to  be  offered  below  will-  if  successful-  by  implication  support 
the  identity-conferring  version  of  weak  cognitivism.  However  the  really 
controversial  issue  is  not  this  one.  The  issue  with  which  I  will  be  concerned  in 
this  chapter  concerns  the  difference  between  the  weak  form  of  cognitivism 
and  its  stronger  rival. 
Weak  cognitivism  in  both  of  the  versions  we  have  considered  allows  for  the 
following  picture;  somebody  could  have  all  the  cognitions  relevant  to  a  given 
emotional  state  and  yet  fail  to  have  the  emotion.  This  may  not  seem  too 
worrying  a  consequence;  indeed  it  might  seem  a  natural  one  to  be  welcomed. 
But  this  conclusion  would  be  a  mistake,  I  think,  and  I  attempt  to  show  why 
below.  The  central  difficulty  weak  cognitivism  makes  inevitable  is  that  of 
showing  how  it  could  be  that  emotional  states  provide  any  kind  of 
understanding  that  could  not  be  provided  by  other  sorts  of  states.  Or,  put 
slightly  differently,  how  could  it  be  that  someone  who  was  affectless,  who  did 
not  respond  emotionally,  was  cognitively  deficient  in  some  way?  I  suggested  at 
the  beginning  of  chapter  one  that  we  do  indeed  have  this  intuition,  and  I  will 
attempt  to  support  this  claim  below.  But  the  central  difficulty  is  that  such  an 
intuition  requires  us  to  show  how  there  is  a  form  of  cognition  which  is 
available  only  through  emotional  experience. 
Weak  cognitivism  fails  to  do  this,  and  it  is  obvious  why.  If  the  cognitive 
element  of  an  emotion  is  quite  separable  from  the  emotion  itself  and 
insufficient  for  producing  it,  then  any  understanding  afforded  by  the 
emotional  state  is  afforded  also  by  the  cognitive  element  alone,  when 
unaccompanied  by  the  resulting  emotional  complex.  Since  the  difficulty  here 
2  In  the  terminology  of  those  such  as  John  McDowell  and  Jonathan  Dancy,  who  favour  this 
view,  the  situation  takes  on  a  different  "shape"  in  each  case.  These  views  will  be  discussed 
further  below.  Cf  McDowell,  "Virtue  and  Reason"  in  R.  Crisp  (ed),  Virtue  Ethics,  and  Dancy, 
Moral  Reasons. 
63 results  from  the  separability  of  the  cognitive  element  from  the  emotion  and  its 
productive  insufficiency,  one  way  to  try  to  get  round  the  problem  would  be  to 
bind  the  cognitive  element  more  closely  to  the  emotional  state.  This  would 
involve  claiming  that  the  relevant  cognitive  element  is  only  available  through 
or  as  part  of  the  emotional  state.  This  is  the  view  that  I  will  call  "strong 
cognitivism".  It  goes  beyond  weak  cognitivism  in  claiming  that  the  cognitive 
element  of  the  emotion  is  not  merely  necessary  for  the  emotion  it  is  sufficient 
for  it  also.  Before  continuing,  then,  we  can  set  out  the  two  positions,  weak  and 
strong  cognitivism,  as  follows; 
Weak  Cognitivism 
a)  Cognitive  element  and  affect  are  causally  related. 
b)  Cognitive  element  and  affect  are  conceptually/  logically  distinct. 
c)  Whether  the  cognitive  element  produces  affect  relies  on  the  existence  of  a 
disposition  as  an  additional  causal  factor.  Cognition  alone  cannot  produce  this 
disposition. 
Strong  Cognitivism. 
a)  Cognitive  element  and  affect  are  causally  related. 
b)  Cognitive  element  and  affect  are  conceptually/  logically  distinct 
c)  Cognitive  element  is  sufficient  for  production  of  affect. 
In  summary,  both  forms  share  the  same  first  two  claims,  which  are  obviously 
related.  If  the  cognitive  element  and  the  affect  are  causally  related  then 
clearly  they  are  logically  distinct.  Where  the  two  theories  differ  is  over  their 
respective  third  claims.  Because  strong  cognitivism  says  that  the  cognitive 
element  is  sufficient  to  produce  the  affect,  then  in  a  case  of  the  affectless 
64 person,  although  a  cognitive  element  is  present,  it  is  not  the  right  cognitive 
element.  Consequently,  such  a  person  is  cognitively  deficient3. 
In  what  follows  I  attempt  to  do  two  things.  First  of  all,  I  aim  to  show  that 
the  disagreement  between  weak  and  strong  forms  of  cognitivism  about 
emotions  is  in  fact  a  local  variant  of  the  more  general  issue  of  cognitivism  as 
it  has  been  discussed  in  relation  with  ethical  and  aesthetic  value.  The  title  of 
this  chapter  is  not  then  primarily  a  reference  to  Hume's  theory  of  the 
emotions,  but  to  the  general  Humean  conception  of  psychology  which  lies 
behind  all  forms  of  non-cognitivism  about  value.  If  that  conception  of 
psychology  is  correct,  then  all  forms  of  cognitivism4  are  mistaken,  including 
strong  cognitivism  about  the  emotions. 
My  second  aim  then  is  to  provide  some  reason  for  thinking  that  the  Humean 
conception  may  not  be  correct.  I  do  not  claim  to  refute  that  conception,  nor  do  I 
claim  to  settle  a  variety  of  other  important5  questions  which  will  arise  along 
the  way.  My  aim  is  merely  to  show  that  strong  cognitivism  is  a  plausible  view, 
and  that  our  intuitions  about  emotions  cannot  be  satisfied  by  weak 
cognitivism  alone. 
I  begin  then  by  trying  to  show  that  we  do  in  fact  think  that  emotions  offer  a 
kind  of  understanding  not  available  outwith  those  states.  Second  I  set  out  the 
problem  of  cognitivism  with  respect  to  value,  what  Michael  Smith  calls  "The 
3  Strictly  speaking,  he  is  cognitively  different.  Further  argument  would  be  required  to  show 
that  this  difference  was  a  deficiency.  Arguments  of  this  sort  are  considered  below. 
4  Obviously  weak  cognitivism  about  emotions  would  not  be  affected,  but  this  kind  of  theory  is 
not  really  the  kind  of  view  that  would  be  classed  as  "cognitivist"  along  with  cognitive  theories 
of  value.  Cognitivism  about  value  means  something  analogous  to  "strong"  cognitivism  as  I 
have  defined  it. 
B  For  example,  between  different  cognitivist  positions  there  is  disagreement  about  the  nature 
of  moral  facts.  Some  cognitivists  claim  that  values  are  a  distinct  kind  of  fact,  that  they  are  sui 
generis.  This  kind  of  realism  about  a  distinct  kind  of  property  is  not  shared  by  those 
cognitivists  who  claim  that  the  facts  in  question  are  natural  facts,  with  "resultant"  or  even 
"supervenient"  properties  on  top.  Those  like  Dancy,  (op.  cit)  think  the  latter  position  does  not 
collapse  into  a  version  of  the  former.  I  do  not  attempt  to  resolve  this  issue,  but  some  points 
relevant  to  it  are  made  below. 
65 Moral  Problem".  6  I  then  try  to  show  that  these  two  issues  are  connected. 
Fourth,  I  consider  some  responses  which  other  philosophers  have  made  to  this 
question,  and  lastly  I  try  to  relate  the  discussion  to  two  wider  issues  which 
will  figure  in  later  chapters;  the  nature  of  rationality,  and  of  understanding. 
What's  wrong  with  Mr.  Spock? 
What  in  fact  do  we  think  about  those  who  are  immune  to  emotion? 
Psychopaths,  as  noted  earlier,  are  an  extreme  case  and  a  worrying  one,  for 
the  psychopath  is  not  merely  unable  to  sympathise  and  empathise  and  so 
unable  to  share  a  range  of  emotions  such  as  pity  and  guilt,  but  his  deficiencies 
often  lead  to  a  range  of  aggressive  or  violent  behaviour.  The  psychopath  is 
not,  however,  completely  devoid  of  emotion;  his  deficits  concern  the  inability 
to  be  moved  by  what  happens  to  other  people.  For  an  example  of  someone  who 
is  a  complete  stranger  to  emotional  states,  we  have  perhaps  to  turn  to  science 
fiction.  The  character  of  Spock  from  the  television  programme  Star  Trek  has 
been  discussed  by  at  least  two  philosophers  in  this  context7. 
The  interesting  feature  of  Spock  is  that  he  is  not  noticeably  deficient  in  his 
cognitive  abilities;  he  can  reach  the  correct  beliefs  and  he  can  evaluate  things 
well  enough,  (though  this  may  turn  out  to  be  an  illusion).  At  any  rate,  the 
absence  of  emotion  does  not  seem  to  impair  his  faculties  in  any  obvious  way, 
so  the  question  arises,  exactly  what  contribution  do  our  emotions  make  to  our 
cognitive  lives?  As  weak  cognitivism  entails,  it  may  be  that  the  cognitive 
elements-  of  whatever  sort-  of  an  emotion  can  be  had  without  having  the 
emotion.  Consequently  an  absence  of  emotion  need  bring  with  it  no  cognitive 
loss. 
6  Cf.  Michael  Smith,  The  Moral  Problem.  Ch.  1. 
7  C£  Robert  Nozick,  "Emotions",  ch.  9  of  his  collection  The  Examined  Life.  Michael  Stocker  also 
refers  to  Spock  in  Valuing  Emotions. 
66 Does  this  seem  acceptable?  Intuitively,  it  does  not.  We  are,  I  think,  inclined 
to  say  that  someone  who  does  not  feel  grief  at  the  death  of  a  loved  one,  say,  or 
does  not  take  pride  in  their  achievements  or  the  achievements  of  those  close 
to  them,  or  who  is  incapable  of  feeling  shame,  has  a  different  grasp  of  the 
situation  to  the  person  who  does.  Do  we  really  want  to  say  that  the  only 
difference  grief  makes  is  that  the  cognition  produces  certain  affects,  but  that 
there  is  no  cognitive  difference?  To  return  for  a  moment  to  the  question  of 
pain  which  we  considered  in  the  previous  chapter,  we  noted  that  pain  was  a 
crucial  element  of  grief.  And  we  considered  there  the  question  of  whether  the 
cognitive  element  of  pain  could  be  had  without  the  affect,  without  the  pain.  In 
such  a  case  do  we  want  to  say  that  the  cognitive  element  is  the  same  when 
accompanied  by  pain  as  without  it?  In  that  case  what  does  the  pain  itself  add? 
Why  would  we  regard  its  absence  as  a  kind  of  deficiency?  According  to  the 
Humean  picture,  which  we  shall  consider  shortly,  it  cannot  be  a  deficiency, 
since  the  absence  merely  reveals  that  a  causal  connection  between  the 
cognition  and  a  non-cognitive  disposition  (the  pain)  has  not  established  itself 
in  this  particular  person.  But  whether  someone  has  this  disposition  is  a 
matter  of  lucks-  it  cannot  be  brought  about  by  "seeing  things  correctly".  A 
view  of  this  sort  is  explicitly  held  by  William  James,  in  The  Varieties  of 
Religious  Experience; 
"It  is  notorious  that  facts  are  compatible  with  opposite  emotional  comments, 
since  the  same  fact  will  inspire  entirely  different  feelings  in  different  persons, 
and  at  different  times  in  the  same  person;  and  there  is  no  rationally  deducible 
connection  between  any  outer  fact  and  the  sentiments  it  may  happen  to 
provoke...  So  with  fear,  with  indignation,  jealousy,  ambition,  worship.  If  they 
8  The  topic  of  "moral  luck"  is  of  considerable  relevance  to  the  emotions,  and  I  discuss  it  in 
chapter  four.  However  it  usually  arises  in  terms  of  the  events  that  befall  someone  and  decide 
his  happiness.  It  would  be  an  additionally  cruel  aspect  of  such  luck  if  it  were  simply 
fortuitous,  as  the  Humean  claims,  whether  a  given  way  of  looking  at  things  brings  about  the 
pain  of  grief  in  me  or  not.  Part  of  our  hostility  to  this  picture  is  perhaps  this  fact,  that  we  do 
retain  a  hope  that  emotion  can  be  educated,  a  hope  which  experience  supports,  at  least  to 
some  extent. 
67 are  there,  life  changes.  And  whether  they  shall  be  there  or  not  depends 
almost  always  upon  non-logical,  often  on  organic  conditions.  "9 
According  to  this  view,  there  is  nothing  wrong  with  Mr.  Spock;  nothing  he 
doesn't  grasp.  When  his  relatives  die  he  regards  their  demise  unmoved,  and 
the  same  occurs  in  all  other  instances  which  would  normally  produce  emotion 
in  us.  But  there  is  nothing  he  fails  to  understand.  The  contrary  view  -  that 
there  is  something  he  doesn't  grasp-  is  articulated  by  Martha  Nussbaum.  She 
is  discussing  Aeschylus'  Agamemnon  who  kills  his  daughter  as  a  sacrifice  in 
order  to  appease  the  Gods  and  enable  the  fleet  to  sail  for  Troy.  Nussbaum's 
view  is  that  because  Agamemnon  is  not  grieved  by  his  daughter's  death,  his 
understanding  is  deficient.  After  considering  the  view  that  a  full 
understanding  of  our  situation  is  available  to  the  intellect  alone,  she  goes  on; 
"We  would  do  more  justice  to  the  Aeschylean  claim  by  considering  another 
possibility.  Here  we  would  see  the  passional  reaction,  the  suffering,  as  itself  a 
piece  of  practical  recognition  or  perception,  as  at  least  a  partial  constituent  of 
the  character's  correct  understanding  of  his  situation  as  a  human  being-And 
in  general:  to  grasp  either  a  love  or  a  tragedy  by  intellect  is  not  sufficient  for 
having  real  human  knowledge  of  it.  Agamemnon  knows  Iphigenia  is  his  child 
all  through,  if  by  this  we  mean  that  he  has  the  correct  beliefs,  can  answer 
many  questions  about  her  truly,  etc.  But  because  in  his  emotions,  his 
imagination  and  his  behaviour  he  does  not  acknowledge  the  tie,  we  want  to 
join  the  chorus  in  saying  that  his  state  is  less  one  of  knowledge  than  one  of 
delusion.  He  doesn't  really  know  that  she  is  his  daughter.  A  piece  of  true 
understanding  is  missing.  "la 
Suppose  that  rather  than  grief,  Agamemnon  took  pleasure  in  the  death  of  his 
child.  Would  we  say  that  his  cognitive  grasp  was  unaltered  but  unfortunately 
by  a  quirk  of  fate,  that  (negative?  )  cognition  produced  in  him  a  feeling  of 
9  William  James,  The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience  (P.  150). 
10  Martha  Nussbaum,  The  Fragility  of  Goodness  (p.  45-46). 
68 pleasure.  We  want  to  say,  surely,  that  his  cognitive  grasp  is  different.  "  So  I 
think  we  want  to  say  two  things;  first  that  pleasure  and  pain  involve  different 
cognitive  elements,  and  second,  that  the  cognitive  elements  involved  are  not 
the  same  as  those  which  exist  minus  the  affect.  That  is;  the  pain  of  grief  is 
cognitively  distinct  from  the  pleasure  of  joy  (in  the  same  object)  and  secondly, 
those  cognitions  are  not  the  same  as  those  neutral  cognitions  Mr.  Spock 
would  have.  And  these  claims  together  amount  to  strong  cognitivism. 
Some  Objections. 
An  objection  that  might  be  raised  at  this  point  is  this;  it  might  be  said  that 
weak  cognitivism  would  be  enough.  Mr.  Spock  is  certainly  not  cognitively 
deficient,  it  might  be  said,  but  it  is  still  some  kind  of  a  deficiency  -  though  not 
a  cognitive  one-  that  he  is  not  pained  by  the  death  of  his  loved  ones.  The  real 
deficiency  is  not  located  by  searching  for  a  cognitive  difference,  the  objection 
might  continue;  the  real  problem  is  that  he  doesn't  feel  bad  as  a  result  of  what 
he  knows'2. 
I  agree  that  we  do  locate  the  important  difference  in  the  first  place  in  the 
fact  that  he  does  not  feel  pained.  However  the  real  issue  is  whether  it  can  be 
said  to  be  a  deficiency.  If  the  only  difference  were  that  mental  pain  was  not 
11  Although  granting  this  does  not  amount  to  accepting  strong  cognitivism,  as  noted  in  the 
last  chapter. 
12  Robert  Nozick  (Op.  Cit.  )  argues  in  this  way.  He  then  has  to  explain  why  the  feeling  of  an 
emotion  is  valuable  and  its  absence  open  to  criticism.  His  solution  is  what  he  calls  the 
"Analogue"  defence;  he  argues  that  the  sense  in  which  the  feeling  of  an  emotion  is  appropriate 
to  the  judgement  component  is  that  it  is  an  "analogue"  of  that  judgement.  In  chapter  one  I 
mentioned  one  way  in  which  feeling  and  judgement  are  appropriate,  which  is  similar  to 
Nozick's.  But  explaining  why  the  feeling  is  appropriate  does  not  explain  why  its  absence 
should  be  a  fault.  (See  above). 
69 produced  in  him  by  his  cognitions  it  is  hard  to  see  how  this  would  constitute 
a  deficiency.  If  by  that  term  we  mean  something  neutral  akin  to  a  lack,  then 
we  merely  restate  the  fact  that  he  is  not  pained-  he  lacks  pain.  But  as 
Nussbaum's  remarks  suggest,  we  are  inclined  to  think  that  this  is  not  merely 
a  lack  but  a  failure.  To  describe  Agamemnon  as  emotionally  deficient  is  a 
criticism.  But  it  could  only  be  a  criticism  if  his  feeling  pained  or  not  was 
something  more  than  simply  a  matter  of  luck.  But  that  is  just  what  it  cannot 
be  if  weak  cognitivism  is  true.  Either  the  cognitive  element  produces  pain  or 
it  does  not.  But  which  it  is,  is  beyond  the  control  of  the  agent13. 
Nevertheless,  we  might  feel  bound  to  insist  that  there  is  something 
appropriate  in  the  painful  feelings  of  grief;  that  they  are  appropriate  to  the 
cognitive  element  in  a  way  that  pleasurable  feelings  would  not  be.  This  is  an 
important  point;  we  should  be  wary  of  over  intellectualising  the  emotions. 
After  all,  a  crucial  fact  about  emotions  is  the  way  they  feel.  Agamemnon's  lack 
of  emotion  is  a  lack  of  feeling  pained.  The  person  who  feels  grief  feels  a  pain 
that  "complements"  the  cognitive  state  he  is  in.  So  we  are  entitled  to  say  that 
the  person  who  lacks  emotion  lacks  an  appropriate  element.  However, 
although  this  is  an  important  point  to  emphasise,  I  do  not  see  that  this 
thought  entitles  us  to  criticise  those  who  lack  emotions.  After  all,  since  what 
is  at  stake  is  a  causal  connection,  how  can  someone  be  blamed  if  such  a 
connection  does  not  obtain.  Nor  does  this  meet  our  intuition  that  there  is 
something  cognitively  deficient  in  the  affectless.  So,  while  it  is  correct  to  insist 
that  feelings  are  appropriate  and  inappropriate,  I  think  we  cannot  escape  the 
fact  that  the  importance  of  emotions  must  ultimately  be  explained  in 
cognitive  terms,  if  at  all. 
The  arguments  above  do  not  claim  to  establish  strong  cognitivism;  they 
merely  attempt  to  show  that  our  intuitions  about  emotions  cannot  be  satisfied 
by  weak  cognitivism  alone.  And  here  a  second  objection  might  be  raised.  It 
may  be  said  that  even  if  we  allow  that  for  a  range  of  emotions  (perhaps  those 
13  This  is  because  on  the  Humean  picture,  the  non-cognitive  disposition  to  be  pained,  and  so 
the  affect  itself,  are  "original  existences";  they  exist,  where  they  do,  underived  from  rational 
or  cognitive  grounds.  See  below. 
70 most  obviously  within  the  "ethical"  realm,  however  that  is  to  be  defined) 
strong  cognitivism  is  required,  that  is  only  so  for  a  small  proportion  of 
emotions.  As  far  as  the  rest  are  concerned,  we  do  not  regard  the  absence  of 
emotion  as  something  to  be  criticised;  in  fact  we  allow  considerable  latitude 
in  emotional  responses. 
Gabriele  Taylor,  in  her  discussion  of  the  Joyce  story  which  I  quoted  in  the 
previous  chapter,  makes  a  point  like  this.  One  reason  why  we  should  doubt 
Davidson's  picture  of  Gabriel's  shame  as  underwritten  by  a  universal  belief, 
she  claims,  is  that  Gabriel  might  not  be  prepared  to  commit  himself  to  such  a 
universal  proposition.  The  universal  in  question,  remember  is  of  the  form,  "If 
one's...  then  one  should  feel  shame".  In  other  words  it  is  prescriptive-  it  sets 
out,  amongst  other  things,  how  others  should  -  rationally  speaking-  react  in 
such  cases.  But  Taylor  replies  that  Gabriel  might  not  want  to  commit  himself 
to  this  prescription.  Nor  does  this  need  to  involve  any  inconsistency. 
Universalisability  as  discussed  by  Hare,  for  example,  is  the  result  of 
consistency;  if  a  given  action  is  wrong  due  to  features  A,  B,  and  C,  then  all 
things  being  equal  any  other  case  possessing  those  same  features  must  also  be 
wrong14.  So  I  am  committed  to  universalising  for  myself  and  others  on  pain  of 
contradiction.  But  the  case  of  shame  is  not  like  this,  says  Taylor.  Gabriel 
might  understand  that  it  is  only  due  to  the  combination  of  the  features  of  the 
situation  and  his  conception  of  himself  that  he  feels  shame.  He  might  feel  that 
a  different  person  in  the  same  situation  would  legitimately  react  differently, 
and  so  for  a  case  like  this,  weak  cognitivism  would  be  sufficient  and  strong 
cognitivism  too  strong. 
Suppose  I  judge  that  an  object  in  front  of  me  is  a  triangle,  or  that  the  sum  of 
two  given  numbers  is  nine;  am  I  committed  to  the  thought  that  if  you  do  not 
give  the  same  answers  in  these  cases  you  are  wrong?  It  would  seem  that  I  am; 
how  could  I  believe  that  the  shape  I  see  is  a  triangle  but  also  accept  that  you 
may  quite  legitimately  reach  a  different  answer?  In  this  way  judgements 
14  Things  are  more  complicated  than  this,  of  course,  since  those  same  features  might  be 
present  in  another  case,  but  in  company  with  new  features,  not  present  in  the  first  case  which 
legitimately  alter  what  we  say  about  it. 
71 about  matters  of  fact  seem  to  commit  the  person  making  them  to 
universalisability. 
We  accept  something  similar  in  aesthetic  contexts  also;  if  I  think  Proust  is 
really  a  better  writer  than  Harold  Robbins,  how  can  I  accept  your  contrary 
judgement?  Here  again  then,  making  a  putatively  factual  judgement  commits 
the  person  making  it  to  ruling  out  rival  judgements.  The  same  will  no  doubt 
be  true  in  ethical  cases.  If  I  think  betraying  a  friend  is  wrong  in  a  given 
situation,  I  cannot,  it  appears,  in  consistency  accept  your  opinion  to  the 
contraryi5.  But  if  this  is  the  case,  and  emotions  involve  "seeing  things  right", 
and  I,  for  example  am  angered  by  a  given  situation,  how  can  I  allow  your 
quite  contrary  emotion  to  be  equally  legitimate.  If  it  is,  the  question  cannot  be 
a  factual  or  cognitive  one.  So  it  seems  that  if  strong  cognitivism  is  true  we  are 
committed  to  universalisability,  and  this  is  unacceptable  given  the  latitude 
we  allow  for  differences  in  emotional  reaction.  Therefore  strong  cognitivism 
cannot  be  true. 
In  replying  to  this  objection  there  are  several  points  which  need  to  be  made. 
First  of  all,  let  us  admit  that  there  is  a  range  of  emotional  states  regarding 
which  we  do  allow  legitimate  disagreement,  and  Taylor  seems  to  be  right  in 
thinking  that  pride  is  one  of  them.  Now,  if  Taylor  is  right  in  thinking  that  we 
give  latitude  for  disagreement  in  our  emotional  reactions,  how  widespread  is 
this?  The  answer  is,  I  think,  not  very  widespread.  Consider;  if  a  friend  reacts 
furiously  to  a  casual  remark,  do  we  assume  that  there  is  no  question  of  seeing 
things  appropriately  here?  Surely  not-  we  may  rightly  protest  that  the  remark 
was  an  innocent  one,  and  that  the  friend  is  being  "unreasonable".  Similarly  it 
seems  that  people  can  be  proud,  jealous,  frightened,  or  envious 
inappropriately.  So  here  we  do  not  think  that  "anything  goes".  And  this  is 
really  just  the  point  that  was  made  in  the  first  chapter,  that  emotions  can  be 
assessed  rationally.  And  this  is  because  they  involve  a  cognitive  element, 
some  representation  of  how  things  are  (call  it  for  the  moment  a  thought).  The 
15  Although  here,  too,  there  may  be  exceptions;  Peter  Winch  argues  that  we  are  not  committed 
to  universalisability  in  all  ethical  cases  in  his  "Universalisability  of  Moral  Judgement"  in 
Ethics  and  Action. 
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or  inappropriate,  rational  or  irrational.  In  some  situations  it  is  irrational  to 
think  you  have  been  slighted,  or  that  what  you  have  achieved  is  very 
worthwhile,  and  so  on. 
When  an  emotion  rests  on  cognitive  assessments  which  are  inappropriate, 
we  criticise  them.  And  this  seems  to  be  a  possibility  that  extends  throughout 
the  range  of  emotional  experience.  And  given  all  this,  we  can  make  a  second 
point.  The  possibility  of  this  kind  of  rational  assessment  of  emotions-  the  idea 
that  some  responses  are  "wrong",  for  example-  does  not  require  strong 
cognitivism.  Weak  cognitivism  can  also  allow  for  this  kind  of  critical 
assessment,  because  it  allows  that  the  cognitive  element  can  be  assessed. 
Although  weak  cognitivism  can  allow  this,  there  is  another  kind  of  criticism 
it  cannot  engage  in,  as  we  have  already  seen.  Faced  with  someone  who  has 
the  appropriate  cognitions,  but  no  emotion,  weak  cognitivism  must  remain 
silent.  Such  a  person  cannot  be  said  to  be  irrational  or  inappropriate,  since 
their  cognitive  states  are  not  misguided.  Consequently,  if  I  am,  say,  angered 
by  an  insult  and  you  are  not,  weak  cognitivism  cannot  support  the  claim  by 
either  one  of  us  that  the  other  is  mistaken  in  his  reaction's.  Weak  cognitivism 
can  criticise  emotions  based  on  inappropriate  cognitions,  but  can  say  nothing 
about  affectless  cognitions.  It  is  the  possibility  of  this  kind  of  criticism  which 
requires  strong  cognitivism.  But  this  kind  of  disagreement  is  only  one  kind  of 
disagreement  over  emotional  reactions.  So  the  objection  considered  above  is 
really  an  objection  to  rational  assessment  as  such,  and  not  really  strong 
cognitivism. 
However,  if  there  is  a  wide  range  of  cases  in  which  we  do  tolerate  the  kinds 
of  disagreement  mentioned,  then  the  objection  may  still  have  some  force.  But 
I  think  it  is  already  clear  that  we  do  not  think  this.  We  do  not  think  that  in 
most,  or  even  many,  cases,  emotional  responses  are  beyond  rational 
assessment.  What,  then,  about  cases  where  the  disagreement  is  between 
16  Assuming,  of  course,  that  we  both  have  the  same,  correct  cognitions. 
73 those  who  have  an  emotion  and  those  who  do  not,  but  who  share  the  same 
cognitions17?  Is  there  not  room  for  legitimate  disagreement  here? 
Well,  in  some  cases  at  least  the  case  for  a  negative  answer  is  a  strong  one.  If 
we  return  to  the  example  of  Agamemnon,  we  do  think  there  is  some  point  to 
the  criticism  that  an  unemotional  reaction  is  a  deficient  one.  There  are 
however,  other  cases  where,  although  an  unemotional  reaction  may  be 
thought  deficient,  there  may  not  be  agreement  on  which  emotional  reaction  is 
fitting. 
If  I  and  a  friend  both  have  personal  items  stolen,  say,  I  may  react  with 
sadness  at  the  loss  of  a  treasured  possession,  while  he  reacts  with  anger.  This 
difference  in  reaction  also  represents  a  difference  in  focus.  The  focus  of  my 
emotion  is  the  object  I  have  lost  and  its  significance,  his  focus  is  the  thief  and 
the  injustice  of  the  act.  In  such  a  case  we  may  want  to  say  that  both  emotions 
would  be  appropriate,  and  so  my  friend  and  I  cannot  reasonably  criticise  each 
other's  reaction.  However,  I  think  that  while  it  is  true  that  both  reactions  may 
be  appropriate,  this  in  itself  may  not  however,  preclude  criticism.  This  may  be 
more  obvious  if  we  imagine  an  alteration  to  the  case;  imagine  now  that  my 
friend  and  I  return  home  to  find  our  families  massacred,  and  we  produce  the 
same  pattern  of  reaction  as  above.  Here  there  may  be  room  for  criticism  on 
both  sides.  On  his  side,  he  may  criticise  my  lack  of  anger  and  resolve  to  seek 
justice;  for  my  part,  I  may  find  that  his  reaction  inappropriately  rushes  over 
the  deaths  of  his  family  to  the  killers.  Perhaps  ideally  we  should  each  feel 
both  emotions  (however,  the  value  of  anger  in  particular  has,  at  various 
points  in  history,  been  contested  by  different  groups  and  creeds-  for  example, 
the  Buddhist,  the  Christian.  ) 
I  think  there  is,  then,  enough  here  to  make  it  plausible  that  even  in  these 
cases  where  we  do  feel  different  emotions,  we  do  not  accept  that  "anything 
goes".  If  we  compare  my  friend's  reaction  in  the  two  cases  to  the  reactions  of  a 
Mr.  Spock,  we  would  regard  Spock  with  suspicion.  The  loss  of  a  prized 
possession  should  provoke  some  reaction,  whether  it  is  anger  or  sadness. 
When  it  produces  no  reaction  we  think  something  is  missing  in  his  attitude. 
17  1  assume  this  so  as  not  to  beg  any  questions  in  favour  of  strong  cognitivism. 
74 The  objection  we  began  with  then,  now  looks  misguided.  But  what  about  the 
cases  such  as  pride,  cited  by  Taylor,  in  which  we  do  accept  differences  in 
reaction?  Taylor  is  right  about  these  cases,  but  it  does  not  support  the  general 
objection  we  have  been  considering.  First  of  all,  there  is  the  obvious  point  that 
we  do  not  all  experience  pride,  say,  at  the  same  things.  This  may  be  because 
something  that  means  a  lot  to  me  means  nothing  to  you.  Alternatively, 
something  may  be  an  achievement  for  you,  but  something  which  I  take  for 
granted.  This  is  true  of  other  emotions  of  self-assessment  also,  such  as  shame 
and  regret.  The  important  point  is  that  these  emotions  also  involve  an 
assessment,  not  just  of  the  action  or  situation,  but  of  ourselves.  In  the 
example  from  "The  Dead",  Gabriel's  shame  is  the  product  of  his  grasp  of  the 
situation  in  conjunction  with  his  picture  of  himself.  His  assessment  of  the 
situation,  in  fact  reflects  his  grasp  of  himself.  He  sees  himself  as  the  sort  of 
person  who  "orates  to  vulgarians";  but  this  is  not  simply  an  assessment  of  his 
audience,  but  of  himself  too.  Taylor  is  right  in  claiming  that  we  allow  that 
such  factors  help  determine  our  emotional  reactions  in  these  cases.  But  this  is 
because  we  think  such  differences  legitimately  enter  as  factors,  and  not 
because  we  think  these  emotions  beyond  criticism. 
Having,  I  hope,  met  the  objection  to  strong  cognitivism  which  we  have  been 
considering,  I  conclude  that  at  least  in  a  range  of  cases,  our  ideas  about 
emotions  will  require  strong  cognitivism.  Weak  cognitivism  can  satisfy  the 
demand  that  emotions  be  subject  to  rational  scrutiny,  which  amounts  to 
saying  that  the  beliefs  or  cognitive  elements  of  emotions  are  subject  to  rational 
scrutiny.  If,  on  the  other  hand  we  also  think  there  is  something  inappropriate 
about  an  absence  of  emotion,  weak  cognitivism  cannot  help.  For  the  weak 
cognitivist  there  is  nothing  the  matter  with  Mr.  Spock.  In  the  next  section  I 
will  set  out  briefly  the  Humean  challenge  to  cognitivism. 
75 Humean  Psychology. 
Humean  psychology  is  best  brought  out  in  the  context  of  our  moral  thought 
since  it  is  here  that  it  is  most  controversial.  According  to  our  everyday, 
common  sense  ideas  about  morality,  two  things  are  true.  First  of  all,  there  are 
moral  facts.  When  I  say  that  torturing  children  is  wrong  we  generally  take 
statements  of  this  sort  to  describe  something  true,  something  factual. 
Ordinarily,  we  do  not  think  this  sort  of  thing  is  just  a  matter  of  opinion. 
Secondly,  we  also  think  that  understanding'such  facts  motivates.  If  we 
interviewed  a  child  torturer  who  protested  vociferously  that  he  believed  the 
torture  of  children  to  be  morally  wrong,  we  would  feel  compelled  to  ask  him 
how  he  squared  his  beliefs  with  his  actions.  This  is  because  we  generally 
suppose  that  moral  understanding  is  not  adrift  from  motivation  and  action. 
It  is  a  consequence  of  these  two  facts  about  our  moral  ideas  that  we  also 
think  that  moral  facts  provide  reasons  for  action.  The  fact  that  torturing 
children  is  wrong,  and  the  fact  that  such  moral  truths  impinge  on  action 
means  that  the  torturer  has  a  reason  not  to  torture  -  namely,  that  it  is  wrong. 
Furthermore,  we  would  not  be  impressed  if  the  torturer  tried  to  defend 
himself  by  claiming  that  he  just  wasn't  disposed  to  stop  torturing,  and  that  in 
fact  he  enjoyed  it.  We  would  still  insist  that  despite  his  dispositions  he  had  a 
reason  not  to  torture. 
According  to  Humean  psychology,  however,  there  are  two  general  sorts  of 
mental  entities;  cognitive  ones  such  as  beliefs,  and  non-cognitive  ones  such  as 
desires.  Action  and  motivation  are  the  result  of  a  pair  of  items,  a  belief  and  a 
desire.  For  any  such  pair  it  is  always  possible  to  imagine  the  belief  without 
the  desire.  I  may,  for  example  believe  there  is  a  glass  of  water  on  the  table, 
without  being  motivated  to  do  anything.  If  I  want  a  drink,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  combination  of  the  belief  and  the  desire  now  motivate  me.  The  important 
point  about  this  picture  is  that  the  desire  is  what  Hume  terms  an  "original 
existence";  you  either  have  them  or  you  don't.  In  particular,  they  are  not 
76 brought  about  by  the  other  sort  of  states,  the  cognitive  ones.  Consequently, 
desires  are  not  rationally  assessable  at  all18. 
But  this  picture  clashes  with  the  common-sense  picture  of  value,  above. 
According  to  that  picture,  the  torturer  has  a  reason  not  to  torture  children, 
whatever  his  desires  and  inclinations  happen  to  be.  But  on  the  Humean  view, 
some  fact  only  constitutes  a  reason  if  it  does  connect  with  a  suitable  desire  or 
disposition.  That  the  torturer  is  not  disposed  to  stop  torturing  means  he 
doesn't  have  a  reason  to  stop. 
Essentially  this  is  the  problem  we  have  already  been  looking  at  in  relation 
to  emotions.  Since  cognitions  are  separable  from  desires  and  other  non- 
cognitive  elements,  and  since  those  non-cognitive  elements  are  original 
existences,  an  absence  of  the  non-cognitive  elements  cannot  be  criticised.  This 
is  a  version  of  the  problem  we  encountered  with  Spock;  if  he  isn't  pained  by 
his  cognitions  then  that  is  something  beyond  criticism. 
The  only  way  to  reject  the  Humean  picture  in  the  context  of  the  general 
issue  of  value  is  to  insist  that  there  are  in  fact  cognitions  which  motivate 
without  the  aid  of  original  existences19.  This  view  means  that  correct 
understanding  is  not  separable  from  motivation20;  to  be  motivated  is  to  see 
18  With  one  caveat;  some  desires  may  be  irrational  if  they  are  based  on  another  pair  of  belief 
and  desire,  and  the  belief  is  false.  For  example,  I  might  want  to  avoid  spiders  because  of  their 
unpleasant  smell,  and  this  will  be  based  on  a  desire  to  avoid  unpleasant  smells  and  a  belief 
that  spiders  smell  unpleasantly.  My  desire  is  here,  in  a  sense  "irrational"  because  it  is  based 
on  a  false  belief.  The  example  is  taken  from  Michael  Smith,  "The  Moral  Problem",  (p.  8) 
19  There  are  many  defenders  of  cognitivism  about  value  and  they  do  not  all  share  the  same 
views.  Among  them  are  John  McDowell  (Op.  cit.  ),  Jonathan  Dancy  (Op.  Cit.  ),  and  Michael 
Smith  (Op.  Cit.  ).  They  all  share  the  rejection  of  Humean  psychology,  of  course. 
20  This  may  seem  unreasonably  strong;  maybe  on  an  off-colour  day  I'm  not  so  struck  by  what 
would  normally  motivate  me  (a  friend's  plight),  or  in  the  analogous  emotional  case,  I  listen  to 
a  piece  of  music  that  normally  I  find  very  moving,  and  am  not  moved.  Is  it  plausible  that  what 
I  lack  here  is  cognitive?  But  I  think  this  is  only  implausible  if  we  are  still  thinking  of  cognition 
in  terms  of  belief;  certainly  those  are  not  impaired.  But  do  I  really  hear  the  music  in  the  same 
way  I  do  when  it  moves  me;  do  I  focus  on  the  aspects  of  my  friend's  plight  as  I  might 
normally?  It  therefore  remains  plausible  I  think  that  it  is  a  cognitive  difference  which  is 
important  in  these  cases. 
77 correctly.  In  the  case  of  emotions,  it  means  that  cognitions  relevant  to 
emotions  are  not  separable  from  them.  To  lack  emotions,  therefore,  is  to  lack 
understanding,  and  that  is  what  is  wrong  with  Mr.  Spock. 
In  the  next  section  I  consider  the  response  of  some  philosophers  to  these 
issues.  But  first,  let  us  consider  what  has  been  established.  I  noted  above  that 
it  might  be  said  that  all  that  has  been  shown  is  that  for  a  restricted  type  of 
emotion  our  intuitions  require  strong  cognitivism.  But  this,  it  may  be  said, 
amounts  to  no  more  than  the  claim  that  cognitivism  about  moral  values  must 
be  true.  In  other  words,  the  question  of  strong  cognitivism  is  really  about  the 
nature  of  moral  value  and  not  about  the  nature  of  emotion;  we  may  admit 
that  some  emotions  are  based  on  moral  values,  but  the  majority  are  not. 
I  have  already  suggested  that  we  have  some  reason  to  deny  this  for  the 
other  cases  of  emotion.  But  in  addition  to  this  there  is  a  further  point  to  be 
made  regarding  the  term  "moral".  The  objection  just  made  assumes  there  is  a 
distinct  class  of  facts  which  are  sui  generis;  the  class  of  moral  facts.  It  is 
cognitive  appreciation  of  these  facts  that  is  motivating.  Other,  everyday  facts 
are  not  of  this  sort.  They  require  the  addition  of  an  "original  existence"  to 
motivate.  If  this  picture  were  correct,  it  would  indeed  seem  to  limit  in  a  fairly 
precise  way  the  scope  of  strong  cognitivism.  But  is  it  correct? 
It  has  not  been  thought  obviously  correct  by  some  philosophers  who  support 
cognitivism.  According  to  Jonathan  Dancy21,  for  example,  the  features  of  a 
situation  which  motivate  are  the  ordinary,  "natural"  features  of  it22.  There 
need  be  no  appeal  to  a  distinct  kind  of  moral  fact.  However,  Dancy  does  allow 
that  the  cognitive  content  of  the  perceptions  of  the  motivated  and  the 
unmotivated  person  are  not  the  same.  Although  the  "natural  facts"  are  at 
some  level  open  to  all,  our  cognitive  grasp  of  a  situation  is  more  finely  tuned 
than  this.  The  motivated,  or  virtuous  person  sees  certain  features  as  "salient", 
and  perceives  a  "shape"  in  the  situation.  Discussing  the  so-called  "thin"  moral 
properties  of  "rightness"  and  "wrongness"  he  continues, 
21  Dancy,  (Op.  Cit.  P.  115). 
22  This  is  only  half  true;  see  below. 
78 "Instead  of  taking  the  thin  properties  as  the  final  level  of  the  resultance23 
tree,  we  are  to  see  an  action's  being  right  or  one  which  ought  to  be  done  as 
identical  with  the  shape  of  the  circumstances-  what  it  is  about  them  that  calls 
for  just  action.  To  see  the  action  as  required  by  the  circumstances  is  to  see  the 
situation  as  having  a  certain  shape...  Here  we  are  trying  to  tread  a  difficult 
path  between  saying  that  the  thin  property  is  distinct  from  the  thicker  ones 
from  which  it  results,  and  saying  that  it  is  somehow  identical  with  them  (a 
non-naturalistic  form  of  reductionism).  "24 
This  kind  of  account,  according  to  which  the  motivating  feature  of  a  situation 
is  not  a  special  kind  of  fact  but  rather  a  cognitive  reorganisation  of 
understanding  is  strikingly  similar  to  the  notion  of  aspect  perception,  to  be 
discussed  in  the  next  chapter.  It  also  echoes  the  things  we  said  about  emotion 
generally  at  the  end  of  the  first  chapter,  that  the  person  in  the  emotional 
state  sees  the  situation  differently.  I  cannot  settle  the  issue  of  whether  this 
kind  of  theory  is  correct.  However  it  has  at  least  prima  facie  plausibility.  One 
reason  is  this;  the  assumption  that  seems  most  of  all  to  motivate  the  Humean 
picture  of  psychology  is  the  idea  that  the  "facts"  are  the  normal  empirical 
facts  of  sensory  experience,  and  as  such  are  open  to  all.  This  is  explicit  in  the 
account  of  emotional  states  given  by  William  James,  above.  Consequently, 
when  those  facts  motivate  me  but  not  you,  we  must  look  for  some 
psychological  difference  between  us  to  explain  my  motivation.  And  since  the 
difference  cannot  be  a  cognitive  one,  it  must  be  a  difference  in  motivation. 
But  if  the  empiricist  account  of  "the  facts"  is  not  credible25,  we  will  not  be 
driven  to  seek  our  explanation  in  non-cognitive  differences.  This  does  not  of 
course  show  that  strong  cognitivism  is  true,  but  it  does  remove  one  of  the 
pressures  which  seemed  to  make  it  inevitably  false.  In  addition,  if  Dancy's 
account,  or  something  like  it,  is  correct  then  strong  cognitivism  will  not  be 
restricted  to  a  narrow  range  of  emotions-  those  based  on  moral  facts.  In  any 
23  Dancy's  concept  of  "resultance"  is  discussed  in  the  next  chapter. 
24  (Op.  Cit.  p.  115-116) 
25  This  point  is  argued  in  the  next  chapter. 
79 case,  the  range  of  emotions  for  which  we  might  want  strong  cognitivism  to  be 
true  may  be  wider  than  the  narrow  sphere  of  the  moral.  On  Aristotle's 
account,  to  be  discussed  later,  this  is  the  case.  To  give  just  one  example,  we 
might  think  it  a  good  thing  that  a  parent  take  joy  in  playing  with  their 
children,  and  we  might  think  it  a  kind  of  defect  if  they  don't26.  This  case, 
though,  does  not  obviously  fall  within  the  domain  of  the  "moral'  as 
conventionally  conceived. 
To  some,  no  doubt,  the  idea  that  emotions  of  this  sort  should  be  thought 
open  to  rational  criticism  will  seem  unappealing  and  invasive.  And  if  we 
recall  the  strong  notion  of  universalisabilty  discussed  by  Taylor,  and  the  idea 
we  met  in  Davidson's  account,  that  an  emotion  could  be  rationally  required  by 
other  beliefs  the  agent  has,  we  may  begin  to  share  this  unease.  It  can, 
however,  be  mitigated  to  some  extent,  I  think,  by  contrasting  Dancy's  account 
with  Davidson's. 
For  Dancy,  when  we  say  that  someone  is  not  seeing  the  situation  in  the 
right  way,  that  they  are  blind  to  facts  which  should  motivate  them,  and 
would  motivate  them  if  only  they  could  grasp  them,  there  is  indeed  a  sense  of 
criticism  available.  We  can  still  say  that  Agamemnon  should  see  things 
differently.  But  there  are  no  "neutral  facts"  outwith  the  perspective  of  his 
seeing  things  correctly  that  we  can  adduce  to  persuade,  or  rationally  compel 
him  to  accept  the  rationality  of  the  action  or  emotion.  On  this  picture,  the 
traditional  idea  of  an  argument  is  not  effective.  According  to  that  picture,  we 
begin  with  premises  that  every  rational  person  accepts  and  then  lead  our 
interlocutor  to  a  conclusion  that  he  cannot,  without  inconsistency,  deny.  But 
on  Dancy's  picture  there  is  no  such  argument27. 
This  makes  an  important  difference.  For  Dancy,  the  rationality  of  the  value, 
action  or  emotion  is  internal  to  the  perspective  from  which  it  is  seen  to  be 
correct.  Consequently,  its  rationality  is  not  inferred  in  any  way.  It  is  not 
28  The  example  is  from  Peter  Winch,  "Moral  Integrity",  in  Ethics  and  Action. 
27  Dancy's  account  here  draws  heavily  on  Wittgenstein's  ideas  about  the  rationality  of  rule- 
following.  This  issue  is  picked  up  in  the  next  chapter.  The  same  point  is  made  by  John 
McDowell  in  "Virtue  and  Reason". 
80 inferred  from  premises  he  is  forced  to  accept  or  other  beliefs  he  anyway  holds. 
It  is  the  aspect  of  inference  (about  which  more  will  be  said  later)  which  helps 
fuel  the  unease  noted  above.  It  yields  a  picture  according  to  which  we  insist 
that  someone  is  compelled,  by  force  of  argument  to  accept  a  certain 
conclusion.  This  is  Davidson's  picture.  But  we  feel  that  forcing  someone  to 
accept  a  conclusion,  is  first  of  all  missing  the  point  as  far  as  feeling  emotion  is 
concerned.  And  in  addition,  on  Dancy's  model,  persuasion  by  assisting  the 
person  to  see  things  in  a  given  way  is  the  only  kind  of  argument  that  can 
work.  And  this  looks  less  like  logical  arm-twisting. 
It  is  also  worth  pausing  at  this  point  for  a  second  to  signpost  a  more 
general  issue.  We  find  in  the  Davidsonian  account  of  rationality  a  very 
familiar  picture.  According  to  that  picture,  rationality  and  understanding  are 
the  result  of  inference,  achieved  by  means  of  a  procedure.  These  are  features 
of  a  dominant  view  of  what  understanding  is  which  will  be  challenged  both  in 
the  following  chapter  and  throughout.  Against  this,  I  argue,  following 
Wittgenstein,  that  understanding  does  not  involve  a  procedure  and  is  not  the 
result  of  inference. 
So,  having  set  out  the  case  for  the  possibility  and  desirability  of  cognitivism, 
I  will  briefly  consider  one  reaction  to  the  idea28. 
28  There  is  an  additional  argument  in  favour  of  cognitivism,  derived  from  John  McDowell, 
which  relies  on  the  uncodifiable  nature  of  moral  understanding.  I  leave  discussion  of  that 
argument  until  the  next  chapter,  where  the  issue  of  codifiability  is  discussed. 
81 A  "Moderate"  Cognitivism? 
Some  philosophers29  have  wanted  to  accept  the  intuitions  about  emotions 
which  we  have  discussed  but  tried  to  do  so  without  embracing  strong 
cognitivism.  That  is,  they  have  attempted  to  argue  both  that  emotions  are 
necessary  for  correct  understanding  and  also  that  Humean  psychology  is 
broadly  correct.  This  is  what  I  have  claimed  cannot  be  done.  So  it  is  worth 
seeing  how  such  an  account  would  go.  I  will  call  this  kind  of  view  "moderate" 
cognitivism  to  distinguish  it  from  the  other  two  types. 
Michael  Stocker  argues  that  we  should  not  think  of  the  importance  of 
emotion  as  located  in  its  cognitive  component,  because  this  is  affectless,  or 
"dry"  as  he  calls  it.  He  focuses  his  attack  on  writers  like  Pitcher,  Bedford  and 
Solomon,  30  who  do  emphasise  the  cognitive  elements.  Just  as  he  is  at  pains  to 
emphasise  that  the  affect  of  an  emotion  is  not  reducible  to  other  elements  of 
it,  so  the  value  of  an  emotion  is  not  simply  in  its  cognitive  elements. 
Yet  Stocker  also  claims  that  emotion  is  crucial  for  correct  understanding. 
Citing  the  work  of  psychologists  and  psychiatrists  he  argues  that  those  who 
suffer  serious  emotional  disorders  also  suffer  serious  cognitive  disorders.  So 
emotional  disorders  are  closely  connected  with  cognitive  disorders.  But 
Stocker  does  not  want  to  say  that  emotional  disorders  are  just  cognitive 
disorders,  for  the  reasons  already  given.  Since  cognitions  are  separable  from 
affects,  it  can  be  at  best  a  contingent  fact  that  certain  cognitions  and  affects 
tend  to  go  hand  in  hand,  "as  a  package"  (p.  124).  And  the  contingency  is 
ultimately  that  for  the  most  part  we  happen  to  have  the  relevant  dispositions 
to  be  affected  by  certain  cognitions. 
29  1  will  discuss  Michael  Stocker,  Valuing  Emotions  and  Justin  Oakley,  Morality  and  the 
Emotions. 
30  Pitcher,  "Emotions",  Mind  1965;  Bedford,  "Emotion",  Proceedings  of  The  Aristotelian 
Society1956;  Solomon,  The  Passions. 
82 His  main  claim  about  emotions  is  that  they  help  us  to  focus  on  what  is 
valuable,  to  notice  it  and  act  on  it.  For  example,  he  argues-  on  the  basis  of 
psychiatric  sources  -  that  schizoid  patients,  due  to  a  lack  of  affect,  can  become 
cynical  and  callous,  insensitive  to  the  hurt  they  do  to  others,  and  in  his 
discussion  of  anti-Semitism  he  argues  that  the  perceptions  of  the  anti-Semite 
are  skewed  because  of  the  underlying  emotion.  This  last  point  he  claims, 
shows  that  emotion  interacts  with  cognition  not  simply  through  its  cognitive 
element,  but  through  its  affective  element.  It  is  this  element  that  frames  the 
perceptions  of  the  anti-Semite. 
These  conclusions  are  no  doubt  correct.  In  chapter  one  I  quoted  Aristotle's 
remark  that  the  frightened  person,  as  a  result  of  his  fear,  is  more  than 
normally  sensitive  to  what  he  may  take  for  danger.  A  more  general 
neurological  argument  to  this  effect  has  been  offered  by  Antonio  Damasio31. 
Patients  suffering  localised  lesions  to  certain  parts  of  the  brain  have  been 
found  to  suffer  specific  kinds  of  inabilities.  Although  they  could  perform  well 
across  a  range  of  cognitive  tests,  they  found  it  extremely  difficult  to  make 
mundane  decisions,  such  as  fixing  a  time  for  an  appointment.  On  further 
investigation  it  appeared  that  their  ability  to  engage  in  imaginative  moral 
deliberation  was  also  impaired.  Damasio's  hypothesis  (The  "Somatic  Marker" 
Hypothesis)  was  that  these  patients  had  suffered  damage  to  the  area  of  the 
brain  associated  with  emotional  functioning.  The  function  of  emotions,  he 
hypothesised,  was  to  "tag"  significant  items  for  attention.  In  deliberation,  the 
"tagged"  items  would  stand  out.  In  the  absence  of  this  tagging  the  subject  was 
literally  unable  to  make  decisions  which  required  some  ordering  of  value. 
This  problem  is  related  to  another,  this  time  in  Artificial  Intelligence, 
known  as  the  "Frame  Problem"32.  In  programming  a  computer  or  robot  to 
31  In  his  book,  Descartes'Error.  The  title  is  slightly  ironic,  since  Descartes  seems  to  have  held 
a  similar  view  to  Damasio's  about  the  function  of  emotion.  But  the  error  which  the  title  refers 
to  is  Dualism. 
32  The  connection  between  the  Frame  Problem  and  emotion  is  noticed  by  Ronald  De  Sousa, 
The  Rationality  of  Emotion.  The  "Frame  Problem"  itself  is  discussed  in  Daniel  Dennett, 
"Cognitive  Wheels;  The  Frame  Problem  of  AI".  In  Boden  (ed)  The  Philosophy  of  Artificial 
Intelligence. 
83 make  the  right  decisions  in  the  right  contexts,  programmers  have  somehow  to 
enable  the  robot  to  work  through  a  check  list  of  factors,  generated  by  the  rules 
programmed  into  it,  and  decide  which  ones  are  relevant  and  which  not.  But 
since  the  multiplicity  of  varying  factors  is  enormous,  the  number  of 
deliberative  computations  the  robot  would  have  to  go  through  is  for  practical 
purposes  endless.  What  is  required  is  for  the  robot  to  know  which 
deliberations  are  irrelevant,  and  leave  those  aside.  But  the  puzzle  is  that  it 
needs  to  know  this  without  going  through  the  deliberation  first.  If  it  concludes 
the  deliberation  is  irrelevant,  that  won't  do,  since  that  will  involve  going 
through  it.  So  how  can  the  robot  know  what  is  relevant  without  having  to 
work  it  out?  And  this  is  the  link  with  Damasio's  patients.  Perhaps  what  the 
computer  lacks  is  something  like  a  "tagging"  system  will  puts  the  important 
features  into  relief. 
The  reason  for  elaborating  Stocker's  point  and  relating  it  to  Damasio  is  that 
it  may  show  that,  contrary  to  what  I  have  suggested  so  far,  there  is  strong 
empirical  case  for  thinking  that  a  life  without  emotion  or  affect  would  be 
different,  and  cognitively  different.  We  would  be  unable  to  think  properly. 
This  is  an  interesting  result,  of  course.  However  there  are  some  questions  we 
might  ask.  First,  does  the  "tagging"  system  work  merely  at  the 
"computational'  or  neural  level,  or  does  it  affect  our  experience  of  things.  I 
think  it  is  supposed  to  do  the  latter-  things  are  supposed  to  seem  important, 
appealing,  motivating  in  deliberation. 
If  so,  this  now  sounds  not  unlike  Dancy's  version  of  the  experience  of  value, 
quoted  above;  that  our  experience  of  things  is  subtly  altered;  features  are 
salient,  the  whole  has  a  "shape".  Tagging  might  amount  to  giving  a  feature 
salience.  But  in  Dancy's  version  this  amounts  to  altering  the  aspect  of  the 
situation,  it  is  a  cognitive  difference33.  In  this  respect  at  least,  the  "marker" 
33  One  thought  which  may  arise  in  view  of  the  "tagging"  construal  is  this;  if  it  is  the  case  that 
the  affective  element  of  a  cognition  makes  a  difference,  that  it  does  produce  a  distinct 
cognition,  then  it  follows  that  we  have  shown  how  the  cognitions  of  those  in  emotional  states 
are  distinct  from  those  who  have  "mere"  cognitions  without  affects.  And,  more  importantly, 
we  have  done  so  without  having  to  embrace  anti-Humean  cognitivism,  for  on  this  view  it  is 
84 hypothesis  is  compatible  with  the  idea  that  emotion  involves  a  distinct  kind  of 
cognition.  And  this  view  has  been  expressed  by  other  writers.  Oliver  Sacks34 
describes  an  autistic  patient  who  was  cognitively  unimpaired  across  a  wide 
range  of  abilities  but  who  did  not  have  the  normal  range  of  emotional 
experience.  She  could  empathise  with  cattle,  but  not  with  most  human 
emotion.  She  had  never  really  experienced  beauty  and  felt  that  her  relations 
with  other  humans  were  severely  impaired  by  her  deficit;  not  merely  because 
the  lack  of  shared  feeling  made  trust  difficult,  but  because  she  could  not 
understand  a  range  of  gestures  and  communication  normal  humans  could. 
Recalling  her  childhood  relations  with  other  children  she  said, 
"  "I  could  never  figure  out  why  I  didn't  fit  in".  [Sacks  continues]  Something 
was  going  on  between  the  other  kids,  something  swift,  subtle,  constantly 
changing-  an  exchange  of  meanings,  a  negotiation,  a  swiftness  of 
understanding  so  remarkable  that  sometimes  she  wondered  if  they  were  all 
the  affect  which  alters  the  cognition,  not  vice  versa.  I  agree  that  this  is  an  alternative  way  of 
defending  the  claim  that  emotions  involve  distinct  cognitions.  However,  there  are  several 
reasons,  I  think,  for  still  preferring  the  cognitivist  account.  The  first  is  that  we  still  want  it  to 
be  the  case  that  emotional  education  is  a  possibility;  that  we  can  get  ourselves  to  see  things 
correctly.  But  the  concept  of  emotional  education  presupposes  cognitivism.  The  alternative 
just  outlined  does  not  allow  for  this  view  of  education  since  it  still  relies  on  the  (contingent) 
presence  of  the  affect  to  shape  the  cognition  in  the  desired  way.  But  acquiring  the  affect  is  not 
something  we  can  learn.  It  is  still,  in  Hume's  sense,  an  "original  existence".  Secondly,  a 
question  arises  over  the  content  of  the  affect.  Since  it  must  have  some  cognitive  content,  its 
content  must  be  the  same  as  the  cognition;  that  is,  it  must  be  a  disposition  to  be  affected  by 
things  of  a  certain  sort,  and  exactly  what  sort  will  be  the  content  of  the  affect.  But  then  it 
seems  that  the  cognitive  element  is  already  pre-figured  in  the  affect.  This  objection  is  taken 
up  in  the  next  chapter  in  the  discussion  of  John  McDowell's  work. 
34  Sacks,  An  Anthropologist  on  Mars.  Noel  Carroll  also  discusses  what  he  calls  the  "criterial 
prefocussing"  function  of  emotion,  in  relation  to  narrative  works  of  art,  in  A  Philosophy  of 
Mass  Art,  ch.  4. 
85 telepathic.  She  is  now  aware  of  the  existence  of  these  social  signals.  She  can 
infer  them,  she  says,  but  she  herself  cannot  perceive  them.  °38 
Here,  the  absence  of  emotion  makes  understanding  of  a  certain  kind 
impossible.  It  is  not  that  she  cannot  interpret  things,  but  that  she  can't  see 
them  correctly36.  Here  too,  it  seems,  emotion  does  give  rise  to  unique 
cognitions.  This  kind  of  account  is  therefore  distinct  from  Stocker's. 
His  view,  recall,  was  that  emotion  is  essential  for  full  understanding- 
emotional  deficits  result  in  cognitive  deficits-  but  that  the  cognitive  elements 
of  emotions  are  separable  from  and  insufficient  for  the  emotion.  So  if  emotions 
are  essential  for  right  understanding  it  can't  be  because  they  provide  an 
extra,  and  unique,  cognitive  element.  But  then  how  could  they  be  essential  for 
understanding?  There  is  only  one  alternative;  if  emotions  are  not  necessary 
for  correct  understanding  because  they  constitute  a  unique  grasp  of  things,  it 
could  only  be  because  they  are  in  some  way  instrumentally  necessary  if  the 
person  is  to  reach  correct  understanding.  And  this  would  require  some 
explanation  of  why  the  affectless  can't  reach  correct  understanding. 
Stocker  himself,  in  fact,  provides  a  fair  analogy.  Mathematicians,  he  says37, 
will  need  to  be  emotionally  engaged  with  their  subject  if  they  are  to  wrestle 
with  technical  problems  and  persist  in  spite  of  difficulties  until  they  get 
results.  So  emotions  of  certain  sorts  will  be  essential  to  mathematics,  says 
Stocker,  and  something  like  this  is  true  of  emotion  and  understanding 
generally.  38 
In  a  sense,  this  is  correct.  But  what  it  means  is  simply  that  if 
mathematicians  are  to  have  enough  energy  and  persistence  to  carry  on,  then 
35  Sacks  (p.  259).  Notice  also  the  reference  to  inference;  she  acknowledges  that  there  is 
something  she  can't  perceive. 
36  Another  example  of  this  kind  of  account  is  given  by  Daniel  Goleman  in  Emotional 
Intelligence.  Child  psychologists  claim,  he  says,  that  many  of  those  children  who  become 
bullies  are  prone  to  consistent  mis-perception;  they  see  slights  and  aggression  where  there  are 
none.  This  cognitive  problem  has  affective  roots. 
37  Stocker  (p.  134) 
38  Similar  explanations  of  the  importance  of  emotion  are  offered  by  Oakley  (Op.  Cit.  P.  51) 
86 they  must  be  interested.  The  role  of  emotion  here  is  not  too  unlike  the  role 
which  sleep  and  glucose  tablets  might  play  in  the  pursuit  of  mathematical 
knowledge.  Above  all,  it  sits  ill  with  Stocker's  explicit  denial  that  emotions 
are  not  merely  of  instrumental  importance  for  understanding.  Stocker  is 
aware  of  the  difficulty,  and  phrases  it  as  the  objection  that  emotion  might  be 
essential  to  mathematicians  but  not  mathematics.  His  reply  however  is  less 
than  convincing.  The  objection,  in  the  context  of  our  understanding  of  value, 
would  be  that  emotion  is  important  for  valuers  but  not  for  value.  Stocker  says 
that  he  is,  "dubious  about  the  strength  or  extent  of  the  distinction"  (p.  135). 
So  while  he  is  prepared  to  acknowledge  that  there  are  mathematical  facts 
on  the  one  hand  and  mathematicians  on  the  other,  and  the  former  can  exist 
unknown,  a  similar  distinction  is  not  available,  he  says,  between  value-facts 
and  those  who  become  aware  of  them.  But  I  can  see  no  reason  for  accepting 
this,  and  Stocker  certainly  offers  none.  I  conclude  then  that  Stocker  has  not 
shown  how  emotion  is  essential  to  understanding  in  the  way  he  claims. 
The  tagging  hypothesis  as  I  have  interpreted  it  shows  how  it  could  be, 
because  it  also  shows  how  emotion  generates  new  cognitive  experience.  What 
Stocker  wants  to  deny  is  that  emotion  aids  cognition  simply  by  offering  more 
cognition.  For  him,  this  emphasis  leaves  out  the  fact  that  we  are  affected,  and 
it  is  by  its  affective  element  that  emotion  works  to  produce  understanding. 
The  example  of  the  anti-Semite  was  an  attempt  to  show  how  that  might  be  so. 
Even  there,  however,  it  seems  that  the  emotion  produces  cognitive  changes; 
the  anti-Semite  always  sees  things  a  certain  way  rather  than  another,  some 
features  are  salient  and  others  not.  39  Damasio's  account  as  I  interpret  it 
shows  how  emotion  does  generate  unique  kinds  of  cognitive  experience. 
39  A  good  example  of  salience  in  the  context  of  the  phenomenology  of  experience  occurs  in 
Sartre's  discussion  of  the  impersonator  Franconay  imitating  Maurice  Chevalier  (The 
Psychology  of  the  Imagination).  In  terms  of  appearance,  she  is  not  like  Chevalier,  but  these 
details  do  not  affect  the  success  of  the  impersonation.  Sartre  says  they  are  "overridden". 
Alternatively,  we  might  say,  they  are  not  salient.  And  here  salience  would  affect  the  overall 
aspect. 
87 Emotion  does,  therefore  have  intrinsic  connections  with  understanding.  On 
Stocker's  view,  I  claim,  it  does  not40. 
Equally,  since  Stocker  accepts  the  Humean  picture  of  psychology41,  it  is  a 
contingent  fact  that  a  certain  cognition  gives  rise  to  an  affect.  But  his  brand  of 
cognitivism  is  stronger  than  the  weak  form  in  one  crucial  respect;  he  adds  the 
empirical  claim  that,  as  it  happens,  most  of  us  tend  to  have  the  relevant 
dispositions  required  to  produce  affects  given  the  relevant  cognitions.  In 
short,  although  it  is  false  to  claim  -  as  strong  cognitivism  does  -  that 
cognitions  are  sufficient  to  produce  affects  it  is  true  that  for  practical  purposes 
they  usually  are.  And  so  we  needn't  really  get  worked  up  about  the  issue  of 
separating  cognitions  and  affects42.  I  shall  label  Stocker's  view  "moderate 
cognitivism";  we  can  set  it  out  as  follows; 
Moderate  Cognitivism. 
a)  Cognitive  elements  and  affects  are  causally  related. 
b)  Cognitive  elements  and  affects  are  conceptually/logically  distinct 
c)  Cognitions  are  not  sufficient  to  produce  affects;  happily,  however,  we  tend 
to  have  the  dispositions  additionally  required  forproducing  them. 
Stocker's  position  is  different  from  strong  cognitivism  in  that  he  thinks  that 
cognitions  aren't  sufficient  for  affects.  This  also  means,  first,  that  many 
people  do  have  the  same  cognitive  states  as  those  who  have  emotions  without 
themselves  having  emotions.  Secondly,  when  somone  does  have  an  emotion, 
they  do  so  only  because  they  also,  and  fortuitously,  have  the  relevant 
40  Stocker  insists  that  he  is  ascribing  intrinsic  value  to  emotions,  but  his  defence  of  this  is 
rather  vague  (Cf.  P  134-135).  Another  writer  who  lauds  the  value  of  emotion  but  provides 
instrumental  explanations  of  its  value  is  Daniel  Goleman,  in  Emotional  Intelligence.  Goleman 
however  does  emphasise  the  role  of  emotion  in  altering  cognitive  experience.  (Cf.  Ch.  15) 
41  Cf.  Stocker(p.  48-50). 
42  He  says  (p.  132)  that  although  they  are  logically  distinct,  separating  them  even  in  theory  - 
when  doing  philosophical  psychology-  is  "carrying  philosophical  analysis  too  far".  But  if  they 
are  separable,  then  there  are  questions  which  I  think  his  theory  leaves  unanswered. 
88 (Humean)disposition43.  Consequently,  an  absence  of  emotion  cannot  be 
criticised,  for  reasons  already  given. 
We  can  contrast  this  with  strong  cognitivism.  According  to  that  view,  the 
cognitive  states  associated  with  emotions  only  exist  as  part  of  those  emotional 
states,  because  the  cognitive  state  is  sufficient  for  the  emotion44.  Secondly, 
absence  of  emotion  is  a  cognitive  deficiency  since  it  means  that  the  individual 
is  not  in  the  correct  cognitive  state.  An  important  point  to  make  clear  here  is 
that  strong  cognitivism  itself  still  relies  on  a  causal  connection  between 
cognition  and  affect,  and  maintains  that  that  connection  is  not  one  that  can  be 
learned.  In  other  words,  the  claim  that  cognitions  are  sufficient  for  affects 
rests  on  the  claim  that  there  is  a  causal  relation  between  these  two  which 
always  obtains.  If  Mr.  Spock  and  Agamemnon  could  get  into  the  right 
cognitive  state  then  they  would  also  have  the  emotion45.  But  their  failure  to 
get  into  that  state  is  a  cognitive  failure.  Weak  cognitivism,  by  contrast,  allows 
that  they  could  be  in  the  right  cognitive  state  and  not  have  the  emotion. 
Once  we  make  the  assumption  that  an  emotion  is  a  cognition  and  an  affect 
produced  by  that  cognition,  there  is  no  way  to  argue  that  the  affect  adds 
anything  cognitive  to  the  emotion.  What  strong  cognitivism  does  is  accept  this 
and  still  try  to  show  why  there  is  a  cognitive  difference  between  the  affectless 
and  those  in  emotional  states;  namely  that  only  those  with  emotions  have 
those  cognitions.  If,  however,  we  want  more  from  our  account  of  emotional 
states,  we  have  really  only  two  alternatives.  First  we  can  try  to  argue  that  the 
affective  element  does  make  a  cognitive  difference,  or  second  we  can  try  to 
argue  that  the  deficiency  of  the  affectless  is  not  a  cognitive  deficiency;  that  the 
affect  itself  is  valuable.  The  second  of  these  was  considered  briefly  above,  and 
4$  Although  it  may  not  be  entirely  fortuitous;  there  are  likely  to  be  evolutionary 
considerations,  for  instance,  which  will  favour  the  acquisition  of  some  dispositions  rather  than 
others.  This  does  not  however  effect  the  point  at  issue. 
44  This,  to  repeat,  is  because  the  emotion  does  not  require  a  Humean  disposition  which  is  an 
original  existence. 
45  Although  even  on  this  view,  it  might  seem  there  is  no  cognitive  difference  between  the  right 
cognitive  state  with  the  emotion  and  the  right  cognitive  state  without  the  emotion.  But  on 
this  view  there  are  no  cases  of  the  right  cognition  without  the  emotion.  Although  we  can 
logically  separate  them,  in  practise  they  never  occur  separately. 
89 the  conclusion  drawn  was  that  it  could  not  support  our  intuitions  about 
emotions.  The  first,  for  reasons  already  considered,  is  not  plausible.  Martha 
Nussbaum  has  recently  argued  -  as  above-  that  emotion  is  a  kind  of  seeing. 
Strong  cognitivism  tries  to  accommodate  this  intuition,  in  the  teeth  of  the 
stubborn  fact  that  the  cognitive  and  the  affective  are  separable.  It  succeeds, 
but  no  doubt  not  in  a  way  that  would  satisfy  Nussbaum,  I  think.  In  support  of 
her  own  view,  she  argues  along  Stoic  lines  that  an  emotion  just  is  a  cognitive 
state.  But  this  view  simply  flies  in  the  face  of  the  facts;  nor  does  it 
acknowledge  the  apparent  difference  between  cognitive  and  affective 
components  or  attempt  in  any  way  to  show  how,  despite  appearances,  the 
distinction  is  an  error. 
It  may  of  course  be  that  our  folk  psychological  distinction  between  cognition 
and  affect  is  merely  a  theoretical  approximation  to  reality.  It  may  be  that 
while  adequate  for  a  range  of  issues,  it  breaks  down  in  the  case  of  emotions;  it 
threatens  strong  intuitions  we  have  about  our  emotional  lives  and  drives  us, 
in  search  of  the  necessary  support,  to  theoretical  improvisations  like  strong 
cognitivism.  If  this  picture  is  correct  and  our  crude  taxonomy  of  the  mental 
only  leads  us  astray,  then  it  may  be  that  our  intuitions  about  our  emotions  do 
not  require  us  to  resort  to  theories  such  as  strong  cognitivism.  This  is  a 
possibility.  However,  while  we  still  think  of  our  mental  lives  in  terms  of 
distinct  categories  such  as  affect  and  cognition,  strong  cognitivism,  I  think,  is 
the  best  we  can  do  in  support  our  intuitions.  My  conclusion  then  is  that 
Stocker's  "moderate"  cognitivism  still  leaves  our  intuitions  about  emotions 
unfulfilled  because  his  view  does  not  explain  how  we  can  criticise  emotional 
failure. 
This  concludes  the  present  chapter  which  has  attempted  to  lay  out  the  issue 
of  cognitivism.  Several  of  the  issues  raised  in  this  chapter  will  be  developed  in 
the  next;  the  nature  of  understanding,  the  role  of  inference  and  procedure  and 
the  codifiability  of  knowledge.  I  start  though,  by  attempting  to  provide  the 
account  of  aspect-perception  which  will  complete  the  account  of  emotional 
states  given  in  chapter  one. 
90 Chapter  Three; 
Aspects  and  Understanding. 
I  ended  chapter  one  with  the  suggestion  that  emotions  are  best  thought  of  as  involving  a 
form  of  cognition  in  some  ways  like  seeing.  In  the  present  chapter  I  will  offer  a  more 
detailed  description  of  the  kind  of  cognitive  state  involved.  Additionally  I  aim  to  show 
how  such  states  are  related  to  understanding  more  generally.  To  do  this  I  consider 
Wittgenstein's  discussion  of  three  facets  of  understanding;  "seeing-as";  rule-following; 
and  "secondary  sense".  The  picture  of  understanding  which  emerges  from 
Wittgenstein's  discussion  is  worth  spelling  out  because  it  is  opposed  in  clear  ways  to 
many  elements  of  our  common  sense  picture  of  understanding.  Our  common-sense 
views  carry  a  lot  of  historical/philosophical  baggage,  and  this  can  bar  the  way  to  clearer 
understanding.  I  would  claim  that  some  of  the  views  we  have  already  encountered,  for 
example  in  Davidson's  account  of  emotion,  are  the  product  of  more  basic  assumptions 
about  understanding  and  rationality.  Wittgenstein's  account,  I  claim  helps  us  to  make 
clearer  the  basic  errors  involved  in  such  views. 
Understanding;  "Seeing-As". 
Wittgenstein's  interest  in  aspect  perception  or  "seeing-as"  in  the  Philosophical 
Investigations  and  other  writings  is  not  restricted  to  the  phenomena  of  visual  perception, 
although  many  of  the  examples  he  develops  and  discusses  are  visual.  His  wider  interest 
is  in  the  nature  of  understanding  generally  and  the  understanding  of  meaning  in 
particular'.  I  will  return  to  these  wider  connections  later. 
First  though,  what  is  meant  by  seeing  an  aspect,  and  how,  if  at  all,  is  it  distinct  from 
ordinary  seeing?  It  is  clear  that  in  his  discussion  of  aspects  Wittgenstein  has  in  his 
sights  a  particular  conception  of  what  perception  is 
. 
This  conception  is  the  "common- 
I  My  account  of  aspect  perception  draws  especially  on  Stephen  Muthall,  Wittgenstein  and  Heidegger  on 
Seeing  Aspects  ch.  1,  and  Malcolm  Budd,  Wittgenstein's  Philosophy  of  Psychology  pt.  Four.  Also  helpful 
was,  Paul  Johnson,  Wittgenstein  on  Re-Thinking  the  Inner. 
91 sense"  model  we  might  have  of  perception.  It  also  might  be  labelled  the  "Empiricist" 
conception  of  perception. 
What  happens  when  I  see  a  picture-  say  the  duck/rabbit  drawing  by  Jastrow?  The 
"common-sense"  conception  might  describe  what  happens  in  these  terms;  when  I  see  the 
picture,  or  anything  else,  in  my  mind  there  is  an  internal  reproduction  of  the  picture  or 
object-  an  "inner  object"  which  resembles,  in  terms  of  shape  and  colour,  the  original 
thing  seen.  Now,  regarding  the  Jastrow  figure,  how  can  we  account  for  the  ambiguity 
of  our  perpetual  experience?  I  can  experience  the  drawing  as  a  duck  and  then  as  a  rabbit. 
How  is  this  to  be  explained?  The  first  thing  to  note  is  that  the  object  perceived,  the 
drawing,  is  itself  unchanged.  What  appears  to  change  is  my  experience  of  it.  So  it  is 
tempting  to  say,  on  the  common  sense  model,  that  it  is  the  "internal  object",  my  mental 
copy  of  the  original,  that  has  altered.  But  how  could  this  be?  If  the  inner  copy  is  really  a 
copy  of  what  is  there  in  terms  of  shape  and  colour,  what  is  it  about  it  that  changes?  The 
reply  Wittgenstein  suggests  is  that  it  is  the  organisation  of  the  internal  image  that  has 
altered.  (P.  I.  196e) 
Wittgenstein  argues,  against  this  picture,  first;  that  it  misleadingly  conceives  all  our 
perceptual  experience  of  the  world  as  necessarily  mediated  by  internal  "copies".  This  is 
part  of  his  more  general  attack  on  the  Cartesian  inspired  conception  of  the  inner. 
Second;  that  the  account  given  of  aspect  perception  fails.  This  is  because  the  claim  that 
the  "organisation'  'of  the  internal  copy  changes  is  mysterious.  On  the  common  sense 
account,  what  is  there  to  be  seen  is  shape,  line  and  colour.  It  is  these  features  which  our 
"internal  copy"  is  a  copy  of.  So  the  question  is 
, 
in  what  way  could  the  organisation  of 
these  change?  If  someone  who  experiences  the  Gestalt  switch  from  duck  to  rabbit  is 
asked  to  draw  what  he  sees  in  each  case,  the  drawings  will  be  exactly  the  same.  In  what 
way  then  has  the  "organisation"  of  shape  and  colour  altered?  If  all  there  is  to  be  seen  is 
2  Ample  empirical  support  for  the  falsehood  of  this  picture  of  perception  is  provided  by  case  studies  of 
those  people  who  have  been  blind  from  birth  but  become  sighted  through  surgery.  On  the 
empiricist/common-sense  model  we  would  not  anticipate  difficulties  for  these  patients.  However,  this  was 
not  the  outcome,  and  many  such  patients,  apart  from  the  emotional  problems  they  suffered,  found  that 
they  could  not  learn  to  see.  See,  R.  L.  Gregory,  "Recovery  from  Blindness;  A  Case  Study"  in  Concepts 
and  Mechanisms  of  Perception,  and  Oliver  Sacks,  "To  See  and  Not  to  See"  in  An  Anthropologist  on  Mars. 
Another  critical  account  of  the  common-sense  view,  from  the  perspective  of  the  art  historian,  is  E.  H. 
Gombrich,  Art  and  Illusion. 
92 shape  and  colour,  the  suggestion  of  an  altered  organisation  makes  no  sense  since  these 
very  features  seem  to  be  organised  in  the  same  way  between  the  two  visual  experiences. 
Wittgenstein  now  considers  a  second  reply  that  might  be  made  in  face  of  these 
difficulties.  It  might  be  said  that  the  internal  copy  does  not  change  in  any  obvious  way. 
Shape  and  colour  remain  unaltered.  What  changes  is  how  I  interpret  my  inner  picture. 
On  this  view,  the  Gestalt  switch  is  explained  in  terms  of  two  distinct  interpretations  of 
what  is  seen,  rather  than  in  terms  of  a  change  in  what  is  seen  itself  either  in  the  object 
itself  or  in  my  internal  copy  of  it. 
At  this  point  Wittgenstein  claims  that  his  opponent's  account  cannot  do  justice  to  the 
experience  of  aspect  perception,  for  the  following  reason.  On  that  account  I  perceive  the 
drawing  as,  let's  say,  a  duck.  Or  rather,  I  perceive  a  certain  arrangement  of  shape  and 
colour  which  I  then  interpret  as  being  a  duck.  There  is  then  a  two  stage  movement;  first 
what  is  seen;  second,  an  interpretation  of  what  is  seen.  Then  when  I  experience  it  as  a 
rabbit,  I  see  the  same  arrangement  of  shape  and  colour  and  this  time  interpret  that 
arrangement  differently.  Wittgenstein's  objection  to  this  analysis  of  aspect  perception 
rests  on  the  fact  that  such  a  process  places  the  interpretation  at  one  remove  from  the 
visual  experience.  The  importance  of  this  fact  comes  out  in  the  following  way;  the 
suggested  account  seems  to  allow  for  the  following  possibility,  that  I  might,  while 
seeing  the  drawing  as  a  duck  also  notice  that  it  could  be  interpreted  as  a  rabbit.  Since  on 
this  account  seeing  it  as  a  rabbit  just  is  to  interpret  what  is  given  in  perception,  I  can 
therefore  see  it  as  a  duck  and  as  a  rabbit  at  the  same  time.  But  this  is  precisely  what  I 
cannot  do  in  the  case  of  aspect  perception,  so  the  account  must  be  wrong. 
The  key  component  of  this  erroneous  picture  is  that  of  interpretation.  The  account  goes 
wrong  because  it  separates  the  "seeing"  element  of  aspect  perception  from  the 
"thinking"  element  which  arrives  at  a  characterisation  of  what  is  seen.  It  is  because  of 
this  separation  that  the  account  allows  for  simultaneous  aspect  perception.  If  seeing  an 
aspect  is  just  interpreting  something  in  a  given  way,  as  we  might  interpret  a  blueprint  of 
a  building,  or  a  roadmap,  then  I  can  notice  rival  interpretations  at  the  same  time.  But  the 
entire  thrust  of  Wittgenstein's  discussion  of  aspect  perception  is  to  insist  that  the  sharp 
dichotomy  between  thinking  and  seeing  is  itself  one  major  source  of  confusion,  an 
erroneous  categorisation  of  the  mental; 
"...  is  it  a  special  sort  of  seeing?  Is  it  a  case  of  both  seeing  and  thinking?  Or  an 
amalgam  of  the  two,  as  I  should  almost  like  to  say?  The  question  is;  why  does  one  want 
to  say  this?  "  (P.  I.  197e) 
93 With  the  rejection  of  the  suggested  "common  -sense"  model,  where  are  we?  The 
conclusion  Wittgenstein  argues  for  is  that  we  have  to  enlarge  our  conception  of  what 
can  be  literally  "seen".  One  fault  of  the  common-sense  model  was  that  it  restricted  the 
scope  of  what  could  be  seen  to  shape  and  colour,  and  then  got  into  difficulties  over 
explaining  what  it  is  to  see  an  aspect.  Instead  we  should  accept  that  we  can  literally  see 
more  than  this  model  allows.  Aspects  are  not  extrapolations  from  what  is  seen  but  are 
themselves  literally  seen.  Similarly,  when  I  recognise  a  face,  notice  a  resemblance 
between  faces,  or  see  a  smile  as  happy,  these  are  not  conclusions  I  arrive  at  about  what  I 
see  but  features  of  what  I  see.  I  see  the  happiness,  I  see  the  resemblance,  and  so  on.  In 
other  cases  of  aspect  perception  such  as  listening  to  music,  when  I  hear  a  sequence  of 
notes  as  a  melody,  as  a  restatement  of  a  theme  or  hear  it  as  sad  or  as  plaintive,  I  hear 
these  qualities  in  the  music.  This  account  has  a  direct  bearing  on  language  also.  It  is  part 
of  Wittgenstein's  project  to  show  that  grasping  the  meaning  of  a  term  is  not  a  question 
of  interpreting  bare  sounds3. 
When  we  hear  someone  utter  a  sentence,  we  do  not  hear  a  sequence  of  sounds  that  we 
then  set  to  work  to  interpret;  instead,  the  experience  of  the  meaning  of  a  word  is  part  of 
what  is  heard.  In  this  respect,  seeing  and  grasping  meaning,  as  Wittgenstein  develops 
those  ideas  involve  rejecting  a  common  picture  of  our  relation  to  the  world.  On  what  we 
might  term  this  "Empiricist"  picture,  we  have  access  to  the  "empirical"  features  of  the 
world  which  our  senses  deliver  to  us;  bare  sound  and  visual  sensation  (The  "given"  as 
Wilfred  Sellars  calls  it),  which  the  intellect  then  acts  upon.  The  products  of  this 
intellectual  activity  can  only  incorrectly  be  ascribed  to,  or  "spread"  onto  the  world,  and 
thought  of  as  properties  of  something  "out  there.  "  This  whole  picture  of  our  standing  in 
relation  to  the  world  has  been  challenged  both  within  the  existentialist  tradition, 
particularly  by  Heidegger,  and  more  recently  within  the  analytic  tradition  itself  by 
writers  such  as  John  McDowell.  I  will  return  to  these  issues  later.  4 
Let  us  then  try  to  draw  out  more  clearly  the  key  features  of  aspect  perception.  First,  we 
can  sum  up  much  of  what  we  have  been  saying  so  far  in  the  claim  that  the  perception  of 
an  aspect  is  not  an  inference  from  what  is  seen  but  is  itself  what  is  seen.  This  leads  to  a 
3  Another  feature  of  Davidson's  philosophy  crops  up  here,  since  he  thinks  understanding  is  a  question  of 
the  interpretation  of  bare  sounds.  I  return  to  this  topic  in  the  final  chapter. 
4  In  the  final  chapter. 
94 second  point;  seeing-as  is  not  simply  a  "belief  that".  If  it  were  an  inference,  seeing-as 
would  be  plausibly  thought  of  as  a  belief5.  But  it  is  not.  There  is  no  problem  in 
entertaining  different  beliefs  simultaneously,  but  there  is  an  impossibility  attached  to 
seeing  the  duck  aspect  and  the  rabbit  aspect  simultaneously.  We  can  sum  up  this  point 
by  saying  that  seeing-as  is  non-epistemic.  This  comes  out  very  clearly  for  example  in 
the  Muller-Lyer  illusion.  In  this  illusion  we  see  two  equidistant  lines  with  arrowheads  at 
each  end,  but  with  the  arrows  pointing  inward  on  the  first  line  and  outward  on  the 
second.  The  effect  is  to  make  one  line  appear  longer  than  the  other.  Now  although  we 
can  see  one  line  as  longer  than  the  other,  we  need  not  believe  that  this  is  the  case.  We 
may  indeed  believe  the  opposite.  But  if  I  do  believe  they  are  the  same  length,  this  belief 
may  have  no  tendency  at  all  to  make  them  look  the  same  length. 
Both  of  the  above  points  are  made  about  perception  by  David  Hamlyn  in  a  discussion  of 
Helmholtz'  theory  of  perception.  Helmholtz  tried  to  develop  a  theory  that  would 
explain  how  the  perceived  colour  of  a  surface  would  alter  depending  on  the  colour  of 
the  surface  it  was  placed  next  to.  He  attempted  to  show  that  there  was  an  unconscious 
inference  made  by  the  subject,  the  conclusion  of  which  was  a  belief  about  the  colour  of 
the  surface.  But  how,  asks  Hamlyn,  could  a  belief  change  the  way  things  look?  It  is  in 
any  case  clear  that  the  content  of  the  visual  experience  goes  beyond  belief.  A  blind 
person  may  have  some  inferential  procedure  for  arriving  at  the  correct  beliefs  about  the 
colour  of  surfaces,  but  this  is  compatible  with  their  having  no  acquaintance  with  colour, 
with  their  not  really  knowing  what  colour  is. 
In  the  Muller-Lyer  illusion,  I  see  things  in  a  certain  way.  It  is  clear  that  here  and  no 
doubt  quite  generally,  there  is  some  explanation  to  be  given  of  how  this  happens  in 
terms  of  processes  in  the  brain,  nervous  system  and  visual  cortex.  Indeed,  it  would 
mysterious  if  there  were  not.  But  the  two  points  made  so  far  still  stand.  Even  if  there 
were  something  we  might  call  an  unconscious  inference  at  the  level  of  neural  networks, 
it  could  not  merely  be  an  inference  to  a  belief,  as  noted  above.  If  it  were  instead  an 
inference  to  the  perception  of  an  aspect,  say,  it  would  still  be  the  case  that  the  perceptual 
experience  cannot  be  characterised  as  an  inference  from  what  is  seen.  In  this  respect 
S  We  may  think  of  Sack's  anthropologist  (previous  chapter)  as  an  illustration.  Her  problem  was not  that 
she  didn't  believe  the  right  things  -  she  explicitly  says  she  can  infer  and  interpret  the  meaning  of  gestures 
correctly-  but  that  there  was  something  she  couldn't  see. 
6  David  Hamlyn,  "  Unconscious  Inference  and  Judgement  in  Perception",  in  Learning,  Perception  and  the 
Self. 
95 Wittgenstein  can  perfectly  well  allow  inferences  at  the  level  of  computational  processes 
and  the  mechanisms  of  perception.  That  does  not  upset  his  denial  of  an  inference  from 
what  is  seen.  For  what  the  person  sees  is  the  aspect  itself.  He  does  not  "see"  a  bare 
empirical  entity  from  which  he  then  infers  a  detached  interpretation.  And  equally  it  is 
clear  enough  that  the  visual  experience  is  something  apart  from  a  belief. 
But  is  there  no  connection  between  aspect  perception  and  belief?  When  I  see  the 
duck/rabbit  is  there  nothing  I  believe  about  it?  It  is  one  of  the  main  claims  made  by 
Roger  Scruton  in  his  discussion  of  aspect  perception  that  it  does  not  involve  belief.  In  a 
review  of  the  book  William  Charlton  objected  to  Scruton's  insistence  that  aesthetic 
judgement,  because  it  involves  aspect  perception,  is  "unasserted".  He  agrees  with 
Scruton  that  seeing  the  duck/rabbit  as  a  duck  or  as  a  rabbit  does  not  involve  believing 
that  it  is  a  duck  or  a  rabbit.  But,  he  says,  that  is  beside  the  point,  because  what  I  believe 
is  not  that  it  is  a  duck  or  a  rabbit,  which  would  be  obviously  false,  but  that  it  is  a  picture 
of  a  duck  or  a  rabbit.  And  so  there  is  after  all  a  belief. 
While  this  is  correct,  it  does  not  affect  the  main  thrust  of  the  account  of  aspect 
perception;  we  can  accept  that  there  may  be  beliefs  which  we  form  on  the  basis  of  what 
we  see  while  denying  that  we  can  characterise  the  visual  experience  itself  in  terms  of 
belief.  9  Scruton's  point  that  aesthetic  judgement  is  "unasserted"  because  it  involves 
aspects  is  complicated  by  the  fact  that  the  aspects  relevant  to  aesthetic  experience  are 
examples  of  what  Wittgenstein  called  "secondary  sense".  When  I  hear  the  music  as  sad, 
it  is  not  literally  sad  since  the  properties  of  music  have  nothing  in  common  with  the 
usual,  literal  objects  we  describe  as  sad.  Aesthetic  description  therefore  involves 
"secondary  senses"  of  these  terms. 
7  This  raises  the  question:  at  which  level  is  there  understanding?  -  at  the  "computational"  level  or  the  level 
of  experience?  There  is  a  common  assumption,  traceable  to  Plato,  that  understanding  must  lie  at  the  level 
of  the  underlying  principles,  rules  or  computations.  But  even  if  we  assume  that  there  are  such  rules  at  that 
("subdoxastic")  level,  known  "tacitly",  it  is  in  experience  that  understanding  is  realised.  In  following  a 
rule  (see  below)  there  is  no  procedure  which  the  subject  is  using,  no  rule  he  is  actively  following.  His 
judgements  might  be  generated  by  some  subdoxastic  computational  process,  but  it  is  at  the  level  of 
experience  that  he  "sees"  what  the  correct  judgement  is. 
a  Scruton,  Art  and  Imagination. 
To  make  the  point  concrete  in  the  case  of  emotions,  we  may  add  that  although  an  emotion  involves 
seeing  things  a  certain  way,  and  not  just  beliefs,  we  may  of  course  believe  things  on  the  basis  of  how  the 
seem.  If  something  appears  to  be  humiliating  I  may  believe  that  it  is.  Equally,  though,  in  the  case  of 
phobias,  say,  I  may  not  have  a  belief  based  on  appearances. 
96 A  third  point  has  been  implicit  in  much  of  the  above.  What  we  grasp  when  we  see  an 
aspect  is  only  to  be  grasped  through  that  experience.  Since  seeing-as  is  better  thought  of 
as  an  ability,  when  we  put  this  point  together  with  the  point  just  made  about  what  is 
grasped  in  the  experience  of  aspects,  it  seems  that  those  who  are  unable  to  see  aspects 
are  missing  out  on  some  kind  of  cognitive  grasp  of  something.  Wittgenstein  himself 
coined  the  term  "aspect  blind"10  to  describe  such  people.  He  imagined  people  who  were 
oblivious  to  aspects  of  meaning,  who  heard  words  without  hearing  them  with  the  aspects 
of  their  meaning. 
But  such  cases  are  not  merely  fictional.  The  neurologist  Oliver  Sacks''  records  the 
misfortunes  of  Dr.  P.  who  suffered  from  a  form  of  visual  agnosia.  Dr.  P.  was  regularly 
unable  to  recognise  everyday  objects  and  people,  even  members  of  his  close  family.  He 
could  describe  well  enough  their  features,  the  elements  of  their  faces,  but  seemed 
incapable  of  grasping  the  face  as  a  whole.  Equally,  when  given  a  glove  to  identify  he 
was  unable  to  do  so,  although  he  could  describe  its  shape,  texture  and  component  parts, 
even  offering  educated  guesses  as  to  its  possible  use.  Although  his  vision  was  in  these 
ways  unimpaired  there  was  something  he  was  not  seeing.  Dr.  P.  is  uncannily  like 
Wittgenstein's  "aspect-blind". 
The  case  of  Dr.  P.  also  raises  another  question;  is  the  perception  of  aspects  involved  in 
all  our  visual  experience,  or  only  in  certain  areas?  And  if  the  latter,  can  we  say  in  a 
general  way  which  things  involve  seeing-as  and  which  don't?  In  Dr.  P's  case,  although 
he  was  unable  to  see  some  aspects,  he  could  easily  recognise  features  and  elements  of 
objects.  This  question  has  provoked  some  debate.  Before  turning  to  this  question,  let  us 
briefly  connect  what  we  have  said  about  aspect  perception  so  far  with  what  we  said 
about  emotions  in  the  previous  chapter. 
We  have  made  the  following  three  claims  so  far; 
(a)  that  seeing-as  does  not  involve  an  inference. 
(b)  that  it  is  not  reducible  to  belief. 
(c  )that  it  offers  a  grasp  of  something  not  accessible  by  other  means. 
These  claims  fit  very  neatly  with  what  we  concluded  about  emotions;  that  they  do  not 
require  beliefs  and  that  the  nature  of  emotional  experience  is  given  quite  apart  from 
belief.  Further,  we  mentioned  the  possibility  that  emotional  experience  might  offer  a 
10  Philosophical  Investigations  (213-214) 
11  Sacks,  The  Man  Who  Mistook  His  Wife  For  a  Hat.. 
97 grasp  of  something  which  is  denied  to  those  incapable  of  the  emotion.  It  is  worth  noting 
at  this  point  that  Wittgenstein's  notion  of  seeing-as  is  very  similar  to  Aristotle's 
treatment  of  "phantasia"12.  Both  describe  the  intentional  content  of  experience  which  is 
distinct  from  belief  and  which  is  related  to  the  imagination.  Furthermore,  Aristotle's 
conception  of  emotioni3  makes  use  of  the  notion  ofphantasia  to  describe  the  cognitive 
content  of  the  emotion.  The  account  of  emotion  I  am  suggesting  using  the  notion  of 
seeing-as  is  prefigured  then  in  Aristotle'4.  I  return  to  the  notion  of  phantasia  in  the  final 
chapter. 
12  On  the  comparison,  see  Martha  Nussbaum,  Aristotle's  De  Motu  Animalium,  Essay  Five.  On  the  concept 
of  Phantasia  ,  see  M.  Schofield,  "Aristotle  on  the  Imagination"  and  Dorothea  Frede,  "The  Cognitive  Role 
of  Phantasia  in  Aristotle",  both  in  Rorty,  (ed),  Essays  on  Aristotle's  De  Anima. 
13  In  De  Anima. 
14  The  issue  of  Aristotle's  view  of  emotion  and  that  of  the  Stoics  is  discussed  later.  Although  the 
substance  of  the  account  of  emotion  suggested  here  can  be  found  in  Aristotle,  his  treatment  of  emotion  in 
particular  amounts  to  some  scattered  remarks.  De  Anima  offers  no  detailed  analysis,  while  the  Rhetoric 
does  not  mention  the  connection  with  phantasia,  but,  as  might  be  expected  from  a  manual  concentrates  on 
more  practical  issues  concerning  emotion.  As  the  secondary  literature  makes  clear  (see  n.  10  for 
references)  the  concept  of  phantasia  itself  has  been  given  a  variety  of  different  interpretations. 
98 Is  All  Seeing  "Seeing-as"? 
In  Wittgenstein's  examples,  he  discusses  seeing  the  duck  rabbit  picture  as  a  duck  or  as  a 
rabbit,  hearing  a  musical  sequence  as  the  statement  or  reworking  of  a  theme,  hearing  it 
as  plaintive,  seeing  a  Maltese  cross  as  a  white  cross  on  a  black  background  or  vice 
versa,  seeing  a  line  drawing  of  a  cube  as  a  three  dimensional  object  facing  in  different 
directions,  and  so  on.  The  question  arises  whether  all  our  perception  is  a  matter  of 
aspect  perception.  Why  could  Sack's  Dr.  P.  see  some  features  of  an  object  without 
difficulty  but  not  others?  When  I  see  the  Maltese  cross  as  a  cross,  am  I  perceiving  an 
aspect?  Equally,  when  I  see  everyday  objects,  does  my  perception  involve  aspects? 
Some  of  the  things  Wittgenstein  himself  says  about  this  suggest  that  his  answer  is  that 
they  do  not.  He  writes  for  example, 
"It  would  have  made  as  little  sense  for  me  to  say  "Now  I  am  seeing  it  as....  "  as  to  say  at 
the  sight  of  a  knife  and  fork  "Now  I  am  seeing  this  as  a  knife  and  fork".  This  expression 
would  not  be  understood.  -  Any  more  than:  "Now  it's  a  fork"  or  "It  can  be  a  fork  too". 
One  doesn't  "take"  what  one  knows  as  the  cutlery  at  a  meal  for  cutlery;  any  more  than 
one  ordinarily  tries  to  move  one's  mouth  as  one  eats,  or  aims  at  moving  it.  " 
(P.  I.  Pt.  2,195e) 
This  seems  to  imply  that  in  everyday  perceptions  there  is  no  aspect  perception  involved. 
But  why?  Certainly,  we  do  not  make  the  kind  of  statements  Wittgenstein  imagines,  and 
if  we  did,  as  he  remarks,  they  would  not  be  understood.  But  that  in  itself  doesn't  seem  to 
show  that  seeing-as  is  not  involved.  Or  is  Wittgenstein  driving  at  a  slightly  different 
point  in  the  remarks  above?  In  his  discussion  of  aspects  he  sharply  distinguishes 
between  "continuous"  aspect  perception  and  the  "dawning"  of  an  aspect; 
"And  I  must  distinguish  between  the  "continuous  seeing"  of  an  aspect  and  the 
"dawning"  of  an  aspect. 
The  picture  might  have  been  shewn  me,  and  I  never  have  seen  anything  but  a  rabbit  in 
it.  "  (P.  I.  Pt.  2,194e) 
99 So,  the  suggestion  here  may  be  that  if  an  aspect  is  perceived  continuously  -  as  it  may  be 
in  the  case  of  everyday  objects-  and  does  not  "dawn",  but  is  my  "natural"  mode  of 
perception  of  it,  this  in  some  way  does  not  involve  an  aspect.  But  why  should  the 
"dawning"  of  an  aspect  be  necessary  if  there  is  to  be  an  aspect  at  all?  Couldn't  there  be 
aspects  involved,  without  a  shift  in  aspects?  After  all,  it  seems  that  what  the  "Gestalt 
switch"  reveals  is  that  there  was  the  perception  of  an  aspect  going  on  all  the  time,  but 
we  were  just  unaware  of  it. 
But  there  is  an  alternative  way  to  construe  Wittgenstein's  remarks  here.  Instead  of 
making  the  point  so  far  suggested,  he  may  be  making  a  "grammatical'  remark  about  the 
concept  of  seeing  an  aspect.  In  other  words,  the  notion  of  "seeing  an  aspect"  is  that  of  an 
experience.  But  what  are  the  "grammatical"  features  (in  Wittgenstein's  sense)  of  the 
concept  of  an  experience?  For  one  thing,  it  has  duration.  If  I  am  in  pain,  say,  I  can  say 
roughly  when  the  pain  began  and  how  long  it  lasted.  Similarly,  when  I  notice  an  aspect, 
I  can  say  when  this  occurred  and  perhaps  roughly  how  long  the  vivid  novelty  of  the 
perception  lasted.  Continuous  aspect  perception  is  not  an  experience  in  this  sense.  The 
question  "when  did  you  first  see  the  fork  as  a  fork"?  in  normal  circumstances  is 
senseless.  There  is  no  noticeable  experience.  The  point  then  would  not  be  that 
perception  does  not  involve  aspects,  but  that  it  would  make  no  sense  in  these  contexts  to 
say  that  it  does.  If  this  is  Wittgenstein's  point,  it  is  still  compatible  with  the  thought  that 
the  perception  of  normal  objects  does  involve  aspects.  There  is  no  difficulty,  for 
example,  in  contriving  imaginary  circumstances  in  which  I  cannot  make  out  the  identity 
of  some  object,  in  which  only  after  some  effort  does  its  identity  dawn  on  me.  "Now  I 
see",  I  exclaim,  "It's  a  fork!  ". 
If  Wittgenstein  himself  does  not  restrict  the  role  of  seeing-as  in  perception,  are  there 
other  good  reasons  for  doing  so?  It  might  be  thought  that  little  hangs  on  this  question. 
However  it  has  been  the  subject  of  disagreement  between  at  least  two  writers  ;  Peter 
Strawson  and  Roger  Scrutoni5  The  issue  that  divides  them  is  the  role  of  seeing-as  in 
perception  and  its  relation  to  the  imagination  and  the  will.  These  topics  are  of 
importance  when  we  come  to  emotions.  If  "seeing-as"  involves  imagination  and  is  to 
is  Peter  Strawson,  "Imagination  and  Perception",  in  Freedom  and  Resentment,  and  Scruton,  (Op.  Cit.  ). 
Also  relevant  are  Hide  Ishiguro,  "Imagination",  Mary  Warnock,  Imagination,  and  David  Hamlyn, 
"Imagination"  in  A  Companion  to  the  Philosophy  of  Mind 
, 
S.  Guttenplan  (ed.  ). 
100 some  extent  open  to  the  will,  then  these  will  be  important  facts  for  any  account  of  the 
education  of  the  emotions  to  bear  in  mind.  Below  I  will  describe  first  Strawson's  point 
of  view  and  then  Scruton's. 
Imagination. 
Strawson  argues  that  all  perception  involves  "seeing-as"  while  Scruton  wishes  to 
restrict  the  perception  of  aspects  to  a  smaller  subset  of  perceptual  experiences.  Strawson 
argues  first  of  all  that  all  perception  involves  bringing  experience  under  concepts.  This 
was,  for  example,  Kant's  view.  Next,  he  argues  that  this  feat  is  achieved  by  the  mental 
faculty  we  call  imagination.  This  view  of  the  function  of  imagination  is  not  new  ;  it  is 
adhered  to  by  both  Hume  and  Kant,  who  elaborate  theories  of  this  mechanism  by  which 
experience  is brought  under  concepts.  Lastly,  Strawson  claims  that  "seeing-as"  is  simply 
a  striking  illustration  of  these  facts  about  perceptual  experience.  Since,  therefore,  all 
perception  involves  the  bringing  to  bear  of  concepts,  all  perception  involves  seeing-as. 
. 
For  Kant,  in  the  First  Critique,  sensory  perception  of  the  world  alone  would  lack 
order;  it  must  be  organised  -  and  thereby  transformed-  by  being  brought  under  concepts, 
and  this  unification  is  achieved  through  the  imagination.  Now  in  both  Kant  and  Hume 
imagination  is  involved  in  bringing  particular  sensations  under  concepts.  This  is  the 
main  point  of  similarity  with  "seeing-as".  That  phenomenon  also  involves  shaping  or 
organising  visual  experience  according  to  concepts-  seeing  x  as  y  where  y  is  a  general 
concept,  such  as  car,  table,  tree,  fork.  One  potential  source  of  difficulty  in  the  claim  that 
seeing-as  involves  bringing  experience  under  concepts  is  that  there  remains  a  lack  of 
clarity  about  what  a  concept  isi6.  It  seems  clear  that  "table",  "face",  "tree"  are  all 
16  There  are  several  possible  sources  of  anxiety  about  concepts;  first,  there  is  scepticism  regarding  what  it 
is  to  grasp  a  concept  and  whether  we  can  legitimately  speak  of  concepts  organising  our  experience  at  all. 
This  kind  of  scepticism  is  found  in  Kripke's  work  on  rule-following,  to  be  discussed  in  a  later  section. 
Secondly,  there  is  the  question  being  raised  here,  whether  all  concepts  are  universals  or  whether  there  can 
be  concepts  which  are  particular.  Kant's  aesthetic  theory  involves  the  claim  that  a  correct  grasp  of 
aesthetic  objects  is  not  mediated  by  concepts.  One  way  of  making  sense  of  this  claim  would  be  to  show 
how  aesthetic  understanding  does  not  employ  universal  concepts;  this  would  allow  room  for  the 
101 concepts,  and  that  they  shape  and  inform  our  experience.  But  what  about  perceiving  a 
familiar  face?  The  concept  "face"  is  only  one  part  of  my  experience,  here.  In  addition 
there  is  the  particular  face  that  I  recognise.  Is  that  also  the  exercise  of  a  concept?  If  so, 
concepts  need  not  be  general  17 
. 
This  point  is  related  to  a  second  usage  that  Kant  makes  of  the  concept  of  imagination, 
this  time  in  the  Critique  of  Judgement.  There  Kant  argues  that  aesthetic  appreciation  is 
distinct  from  other  forms  of  understanding  in  that  it  is  freed  from  the  tyranny  of 
concepts.  Yet,  he  claims,  when  we  experience  works  of  art,  they  are  nevertheless 
understood  and  we  grasp  the  identity  of  the  work  without  concepts.  This  is  achieved 
through  the  imagination.  This  claim  drives  him  towards  a  formalism  about  the 
appreciation  of  artworks  according  to  which  we  are  most  involved  in  their  appreciation 
when  we  focus  on  formal  patterns. 
So  far  then,  we  have  seen  that  Hume  and  Kant  believe  that  imagination  is  involved  in 
bringing  visual  sensations  under  concepts,  and  that  a  similar  role  can  be  made  out  in  the 
case  of  seeing-as.  But  is  it  informative  to  claim  that  this  process  is  performed  by  a 
faculty  called  imagination?  Does  the  claim,  in  other  words,  make  it  any  more 
perspicuous  what  actually  occurs?  Why  introduce  a  vague  and  itself  mysterious  concept 
to  do  the  work?  In  part  the  answer  to  this  question  is  that  it  is  rather  mysterious  how  the 
process  of  bringing  something  under  a  concept  works.  A  natural  suggestion  might  be 
that  we  note  resemblances  between  objects  and  thus  naturally  "abstract"  concepts  from 
experience.  However,  this  account  of  concept  acquisition  is  notoriously  flawed18.  Since 
there  are  always  resemblances  between  objects,  including  ones  which  do  not  fall  under 
the  same  concept,  application  of  the  concept  requires  a  grasp  of  which  resemblances  are 
relevant.  This  mistaken  empiricist  view  of  concept-  acquisition  is  a  product  of  the 
general  empiricist  account  of  perception  which  we  have  seen  Wittgenstein  attack  above. 
But  it  generates  an  equally  mistaken  view  of  imagination  also.  It  is  the  view  that 
imagination  always  involves  a  mental  image. 
For  Hume,  when  I  imagine  something,  I  have  an  inner  image  (an  "idea")  which  is  a 
faint  copy  of  some  original  visual  impression.  Hume  assumes  then,  that  to  imagine 
something  is  to  have  a  kind  of  internal  image  or  picture.  This  kind  of  account  of  what  it 
deployment  of  particular  concepts,  while  distancing  aesthetic  interest  from  other  kinds  of  understanding 
in  the  way  that  Kant  required. 
17  This  issue  is  explored  further  in  the  final  chapter. 
'$  Cf.  Peter  Geach,  Mental  Acts  for  criticism  of  this  "abstractionist"  view. 
102 is  to  imagine  something  has  been  attacked  on  many  counts,  most  famously  perhaps  by 
Gilbert  Ry1e19.  Is  it  true,  for  example,  that  imagining  differs  from  original  perception  of 
something  only  by  being  less  vivid?  Ryle's  example  of  smell  illustrates  the  difficulties 
of  this  idea.  When  I  imagine  a  smell-say,  of  coffee-  I  am  not  smelling  anything-  not 
even  less  vividly-  in  the  usual  way.  Whatever  it  is  that  I  do,  the  smell  I  imagine  is  not  in 
the  same  medium  as  normal  smells.  Ryle  goes  further,  however,  by  claiming  that  when  I 
imagine  something-  a  building,  or  a  person's  face,  or  a  tune-  there  is  no  internal  image 
at  all.  Ryle  claims  that  imagining  is  a  kind  of  pretending.  However  this  account  barely 
makes  sense.  When  I  imagine  a  person's  face,  or  a  smell,  or  a  tune,  there  need  be  no 
behaviour  involved.  But  if  that  is  so,  in  what  sense  am  I  pretending?  The  notion  of  a 
pretence  seems  to  require  something  public.  In  the  absence  of  behaviour,  as  Hide 
Ishiguro20  asked  in  response  to  Ryle,  aren't  we  driven  inward  to  some  mental 
occurrence? 
But  we  needn't  go  as  far  as  Ryle  in  order  to  reject  the  "Mental  Image"  theory  of 
Imagination.  According  to  that  view,  when  I  imagine,  say,  my  home  town,  what  makes 
the  mental  images  I  have  images  of  my  home  town,  is  that  they  resemble  it.  But  we  saw 
above  that  resemblance  was  an  inadequate  basis  for  the  derivation  of  concepts.  It  is  also 
an  inadequate  basis  for  any  account  of  representation21.  That  a  picture  or  an  image 
represents  something  else  cannot  be  a  matter  of  its  resembling  it,  for  reasons  we  have 
already  considered.  And  in  just  the  same  way,  imagining  my  home  town  is  not  just  a 
question  of  having  mental  pictures  that  resemble  it. 
According  to  Wittgenstein,  what  is  left  out  of  all  these  accounts  is  the  role  of  intention 
and  the  perspective  of  the  person  imagining  or  representing.  If  I  imagine  certain  images 
under  the  description,  "My  Home  Town",  then  this  gives  them  a  reference.  In  short, 
imagination,  where  it  does  involve  mental  images,  must  involve  those  images  being 
brought  under  a  certain  concept  or  aspect.  So  there  is  a  common  thread  which  runs 
through  the  empiricist  concept  of  seeing  to  the  account  of  imagination.  Wittgenstein 
writes; 
19  Ryle,  The  Concept  of  Mind. 
20  Ishiguro,  (Op.  Cit.  ). 
21  A  famous  discussion  of  this  issue  is  Nelson  Goodman,  Languages  of  Art. 
103 "The  concept  of  an  aspect  is  akin  to  the  concept  of  an  image.  In  other  words:  the 
concept  "I  am  now  seeing  it  as....  "  is  akin  to  "I  am  now  having  this  image.  " 
Doesn't  it  take  imagination  to  hear  something  as  a  variation  on  a  particular  theme?  And 
yet  one  is  perceiving  something  in  so  hearing  it". 
(P.  I.  pt.  2.213e) 
In  both  the  case  of  imagining  something  and  hearing  the  music  there  is  something 
perceived,  but  it  is  perceived  as  something.  The  second  reason  why  aspect  perception  is 
akin  to  the  imagination  is  given  immediately  after  this; 
"Seeing  an  aspect  and  imagining  are  subject  to  the  will.  There  is  such  an  order  as 
"Imagine  this",  and  also:  "Now  see  the  figure  like  this";  but  not:  "Now  see  this  leaf 
green.  "" 
(P.  I.  pt.  2.213e.  ) 
The  point,  then,  is  that  both  the  act  of  imagining  something  and  the  perception  of  an 
aspect  are  under  the  control  of  the  will.  But  is  this  always  true  of  aspects?  I  can  certainly 
try  to  see  the  duck  aspect  but  perhaps  I  will  not  succeed.  But  Wittgenstein's  point  seems 
to  be  that  it  at  least  makes  sense  to  try,  and  to  that  extent  it  is  subject  to  the  will.  And 
further,  not  all  seeing  is  like  this.  Nobody  could  try  to  see  a  leaf  as  green,  it  just  is  green. 
This  is  Scruton's  basic  argument  against  Strawson;  only  if  something  is  under  the 
control  of  the  will  in  this  sense  can  it  be  called  an  aspect.  And  so  by  this  criterion  ,  not 
all  perception  involves  aspects,  since  it  makes  no  sense  to  say,  for  example,  "Now  see 
this  as  green!  ".  Is  this  argument  conclusive?  First,  we  should  note  that  what  it  makes 
sense  to  try  to  see  something  as,  is  not  fixed.  Does  it  make  sense  to  try  to  see  a  glove  as 
a  glove?  Perhaps  not  much  more  than  trying  to  see  a  leaf  as  green.  But  while  this  is  so 
for  most  people,  it  is  not  so  for  Sacks'  patient  Dr.  P.  He  could  not  see  a  glove  as  a  glove, 
a  flower  as  a  flower,  his  foot  as  his  foot,  or  his  wife's  head  as  his  wife's  head.  Since 
Scruton's  and  Wittgenstein's  point  is  that  to  involve  seeing-as  it  must  make  sense  to  try 
to  see  x  as  y,  what  it  makes  sense  for  most  people  to  try  to  see  is  merely  an 
anthropological  fact.  But  why  should  any  fact  of  this  sort  indicate  whether  or  not  aspects 
are  involved? 
But  what  does  seem  to  be  true  is  that  what  for  some  people  can  require  effort  and 
imagination,  can  for  others  be  natural  and  effortless.  This  seems  to  be  true  also  between 
104 generations  and  from  place  to  place  and  culture  to  culture22.  What  in  one  culture  or 
generation  may  require  imagination  in  another  may  be  automatic  or  obvious. 
But  even  granting  the  above,  doesn't  Wittgenstein  have  a  point;  surely  it  doesn't  make 
sense  to  try  to  see  something  as  green  or  hear  something  as  loud  or  feel  something  as 
hard?  Surely  at  this  level,  aspects  are  not  involved  ?  Even  Dr.  P  could  cope  with  things 
at  this  level.  Even  here  though  our  perceptions  are  perhaps  not  brute,  but  are 
conceptualised.  This  at  least  is  the  argument  of  John  McDowell.  23 
It  would  also  be  misleading  to  think  of  seeing-as  as  somehow  just  a  product  of  the 
will.  In  one  sense  it  is  quite  the  opposite,  as  Wittgenstein  himself  notes, 
"Think  for  example  of  certain  involuntary  interpretations  that  we  may  give  to  one  or 
another  passage  in  a  piece  of  music.  We  say;  This  interpretation  forces  itself  upon  us.  " 
(R.  P.  P.  vol  1.22) 
And  it  is  equally  true  that  when  I  succeed  in  seeing  the  rabbit  aspect  something  "clicks" 
and  the  aspect  forces  itself  upon  me24.  But  at  the  same  time  Wittgenstein  was  convinced 
that  the  connection  between  aspects  and  the  will  meant  that  what  we  learn  from  them 
does  not  teach  us  anything  about  the  world; 
"It  is  essential  that  one  can  say  "Now  see  it  like  this"  and  "Form  an  image  of...  ".  For  this 
hangs  together  with  the  aspect's  not  teaching  us  anything  about  the  external  world.  " 
(R.  P.  P.  vol  1.899) 
The  point  here  seems  to  be  that  since  aspects  can  be  seen  at  will  they  cannot  "really" 
be  part  of  the  external  world.  But  this  argument  is  not  persuasive.  Because  we  can  learn 
to  perceive  some  feature  of  the  world  and  our  perception  is  in  certain  ways  subject  to 
our  control,  why  should  it  follow  that  the  feature  is  not  real?  25 
Up  to  now  then,  I  have  tried  mainly  to  focus  on  criticisms  of  the  empiricist  account  of 
imagination.  But  if  imagination  is  not  what  that  account  implies,  what  then  is  it? 
Certainly,  if  imagination  is  involved  in  seeing  an  aspect,  as  I  have  claimed,  it  does  not 
involve  just  having  an  internal  image/copy.  Nor  does  it  involve  simply  noting 
resemblances.  The  range  of  phenomena  that  involve  imagination  would  include,  for 
22  For  example,  perhaps  old  silent  or  black  and  white  films  now  have  an  appearance  to  most  young  people 
which  they  have  to  overcome  through  imagination. 
23  Cf.  McDowell,  Mind  and  World.  McDowell's  argument  is  Kantian  in  inspiration,  like  Strawson's. 
24  In  this  respect  it  is  like  belief;  belief  cannot  be  a  product  of  the  will,  as  Descartes'  mistaken  arguments 
to  the  contrary  (in  The  Meditations)  reveal. 
25  1  return  to  this  question  in  the  final  chapter. 
105 example,  recognising  a  caricature  of  a  face,  hearing  a  melody  as  plaintive,  seeing  an 
action  as  selfish,  coming  to  take  pride  in  something  and  grasping  arithmetic  functions 
such  as  addition.  All  these  are  examples  of  understanding  and  all  involve  coming  to  see 
something  as  something.  This  imaginative  ability  might  be  characterised  as  a  kind  of 
"leap",  since  it  is  precisely  not  the  result  of  following  a  rule  or  procedure. 
Unfortunately,  it  is  difficult  to  offer  any  more  precise  description  of  this  ability,  but  we 
may  take  some  comfort  from  the  fact  that  philosophers  without  exception  continue  to 
.  find  the  imagination  difficult  to  characterise,  beyond  saying  what  it  is  no  t26 
There  is  also  another  feature  implicit  in  the  account  given  so  far  of  aspect  perception 
which  needs  to  be  brought  out,  to  which  I  now  turn.  This  is  what  I  will  term-  following 
other  writers-  the  "particularism"  of  understanding  27.  This  will  provide  us  with  a  further 
criticism  of  Davidson's  account  of  emotions  (in  chapter  one). 
Particularism. 
Consider  the  experience  of  listening  to  a  piece  of  music.  We  may  hear  it  as  exuberant  or 
as  melancholy,  as  anguished  or  as  expressing  longing.  In  one  way,  what  we  hear  is 
simply  a  sequence  of  notes  or  chords  each  of  which  can  be  given  a  musical  description 
such  as  "C  Major",  "Diminished  seventh"  and  so  on.  In  musical  terms  each  of  these 
units  has  the  same  value  wherever  it  occurs:  C  Major  is  always  C  Major.  But  what  we 
hear  is  not  invariable  in  this  way.  How  we  hear  a  note  or  a  chord  depends  in  large  part 
on  the  other  notes  and  chords  which  surround  it.  Although  for  the  purposes  of  musical 
analysis  we  can  break  down  what  is  heard  into  a  sequence  of  notes,  the  unit  of  musical 
understanding  tends  to  be  more  than  single  notes.  This familiar  fact  reveals  something 
26  For  example,  a  recent  attempt  is  David  Hamlyn's  helpful  discussion  in  Guttenplan  (ed.  )  A  Companion 
to  The  Philosophy  of  Mind. 
27  Among  writers  who  describe  themselves  as  "Particularists"  or  who  hold  views  of  this  sort  are,  Jonathan 
Dancy,  Moral  Reasons;  Lawerence  Blum,  Moral  Perception  and  Particularity,  and  Martha  Nussbaum, 
The  Fragility  of  Goodness  and  Love's  Knowledge.  These  writers  focus  on  ethical  understanding,  while  I 
apply  the  account  to  understanding  in  general.  However  the  seeds  of  this  extension  are  already  present  in 
their  accounts.  See  especially  Dancy's  account  of  "resultance",  discussed  below. 
106 about  the  relationship  between  aspects  and  the  lower-level  elements  of  which  they 
consist. 
Take  again  the  example  we  briefly  considered  in  the  previous  section,  that  of 
recognising  a  face.  A  face  is  composed  of  various  elements;  single  features  such  as 
nose,  lips,  cheek  bones  and  so  on.  In  the  perception  of  a  face,  these  elements  unite  to 
form  a  whole,  just  as  the  musical  elements  combine  to  make  a  melody,  and  the  same 
point  can  be  made  about  the  "value"  of  each  of  the  elements.  The  same  single  element 
may  have  a  different  value  in  a  different  context,  combined  with  different  elements. 
Wittgenstein  makes  the  same  point  in  his  discussion  of  an  "arbitrary"  cipher; 
"I  can  imagine  some  arbitrary  cipher..  .  to  be  a  strictly  correct  letter  of  some  foreign 
alphabet.  Or  again,  to  be  a  faultily  written  one..  or  typical  childish  awkwardness,  or  like 
the  flourishes  in  a  legal  document...  And  I  can  see  it  in  various  aspects  according  to  the 
fiction  I  surround  it  with.  And  here  there  is  a  close  kinship  with  "experiencing  the 
meaning  of  a  word.  "  (P.  I.  Pt.  2.210e  my  italics) 
Here  the  context  is  an  imaginary  one,  but  the  fictional  background  alters  the  aspect 
under  which  we  see  the  cipher.  And  in  the  context  of  understanding  language,  we 
experience  the  meaning  of  a  word-  for  example,  "bank"-  differently  depending  on  the 
context  in  which  we  find  it  28  Wittgenstein  gives  further  examples.  If  I  see  a  familiar 
piece  of  furniture  out  of  its  customary  environment,  it  takes  on  a  new  appearance 
(R.  P.  P.  1.339).  If  I  see  a  lion,  not  at  the  zoo,  but  in  the  middle  of  the  road,  the  lion  does 
not  "look"  the  same  in  both  cases29.  If  these  points  are  granted  then  we  can  say  the 
following.  First,  that  the  relationship  between  an  aspect  and  the  elements  which 
compose  it  is  not  invariable.  An  element  does  not  have  a  fixed  value,  but  its  value 
depends  on  the  other  elements  with  which  it  interacts  in  a  given  context.  Second,  the 
28  In  ways  such  as  these,  the  experience  of  meaning  is  like  seeing-as. 
29  This  may  seem  to  go  beyond  even  what  has  been  claimed  so  far.  Until  now  I  have  claimed  that  the  joy 
of  a  smile,  say,  is  actually  perceived  rather  than  inferred  or  interpreted.  But  while  it  is  one  thing  to  claim 
that  such  a  quality  is  seen,  it  is  another  to  say  that  the  context  itself  alters  what  is  seen.  After  all,  there  is 
not  obviously  a  new  quality  here  at  all.  But  this  is  no  stranger  than  the  musical  example  in  which  how  we 
hear  a  note  or  chord  alters.  In  any  case  the  general  point  is  that  the  meaning  or  content  of  the  whole  is  not 
reducible  to  the  meaning  of  its  elements.  In  the  lion  example,  the  context  is  certainly  an  element  and  so 
can  influence  the  whole. 
107 perceiver  need  know  nothing  of  the  elements  underlying  an  aspect.  I  can  recognise  a 
face  without  being  able  to  say  which  features  give  me  this  impression,  and  I  can  hear 
music  as  melancholy  without  being  able  to  account  for  the  features  of  the  music  which 
account  for  this  perception.  In  a  different  context  Jonathan  Dancy  makes  a  similar  point. 
He  is  discussing  a  relationship  between  a  property  and  the  features  which  give  rise  to  it, 
which  he  describes  as  "resultance".  He  writes; 
"Sometimes  there  is  only  one  way  for  an  object  to  get  a  resultant  property,  as  in  the  case 
of  squareness.  Squareness  results  from  the  same  packet  of  properties  every  time.  But 
there  are  different  ways  of  getting  to  be  dangerous,  and  different  tables  are  tables  in 
virtue  of  different  properties..  . 
As  a  relationship  resultance  occurs  at  many  levels;  the 
properties  in  virtue  of  which  this  action  is  wrong  may  include  its  unkindness,  which 
itself  results  from  further  properties.  So  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  resultance  tree.  But  it 
should  be  clear  that  this  tree  is  restricted  in  its  application  to  the  particular  case....  But  it 
is  important  to  notice  that  the  epistemology  of  resultance  need  not  follow  the 
metaphysics.  We  might  take  it  that  if  one  property  results  from  others,  we  cannot 
discern  that  property  directly,  but  must  work  to  it  through  a  recognition  of  the  presence 
of  the  properties  from  which  it  here  results.  But  the  epistemological  direction  has  in  fact 
no  need  to  follow  the  metaphysical  one...  one  can  certainly  notice  that  something  is  a 
table  first,  before  one  takes  in  the  particular  features  that  its  tableness  results  from.  " 
(Moral  Reasons  pp-73-4) 
Dancy's  point  that  we  can  be  aware  of  the  "higher"  level  property  before  or  without 
being  directly  aware  of  the  properties  it  derives  from,  fits  the  case  of  aspects  very  well. 
We  see  x  as  y  without  necessarily  being  able  to  give  an  account  of  the  features  which 
are  responsible.  The  real  importance  of  this  point  is  the  following.  We  tend  to  assume 
that  understanding  involves  applying  terms,  concepts  and  rules.  And  equally,  it  is  part  of 
our  common  sense  picture  that  these  terms  are  applied  from  the  ground  "up".  This  is  the 
notion  of  the  "procedure"  of  bringing  things  under  concepts  and  rules  which  we 
mentioned  above.  So,  we  assume  there  are  criteria  for  the  application  of  these  concepts- 
criteria  which  we  use.  The  upshot  of  this  picture  is  that  first,  we  assume  that 
understanding  is  general  in  nature.  That  is,  it  involves  the  application  of  general  rules 
from  case  to  case.  If  an  action  is  judged  wrong  or  selfish,  for  example,  that  is  because  it 
satisfies  some  general  criterion  for  wrong  or  selfish  actions.  This  is  precisely  the  picture 
108 that  we  met  in  chapter  one  in  the  form  of  Davidson's  account  of  emotion;  that  there 
must  be  a  universal  proposition  from  which  particular  judgements  can  be  inferred. 
But  Dancy's  point  is  that  the  properties  underlying  the  wrongness  or selfishness  are 
not  always  the  same.  The  "Generalist"  picture  can  be  traced  back  to  Plato30,  who  argues 
that  real  understanding  is  episteme,  general  in  nature,  while  the  opposing  view  can  be 
found  in  Aristotle31  who  claims  that  rules  hold  at  best  only  in  most  cases,  and  that  what 
virtue  requires  is  not  the  grasp  of  rules  but  the  refinement  of  perception  (see  next 
chapter).  What  such  perception  involves  is  salience-  this  is  common  to  both 
Wittgenstein's  account  of  aspect  perception  and  the  account  of  emotional  seeing 
outlined  in  chapter  two.  This  account  of  seeing  also  provides  us  with  a  reply  to  another 
charge-  that  of  intuitionism. 
Intuitionism  as  an  ethical  doctrine  is  associated  with  the  work  of  Ross  and  Moore  32 
but  the  accusation  has  also  been  levelled  at  Aristotle.  One  of  the  main  objections  to 
intuitionism  is  that  it  posits  the  existence  of  mysterious  non-natural  properties,  which 
are  then  equally  mysteriously  "perceived"  by  some  unspecified  faculty-  though 
certainly  not  by  the  ordinary  senses.  The  present  account  shows  how  we  can  avoid  the 
obscurities  of  such  a  view  while  remaining  able  to  explain  why  there  can  be  "features" 
which  not  everyone  sees. 
At  this  point  the  Generalist  may  make  the  following  reply;  he  may  admit  that 
individuals  need  have  no  explicit  or  conscious  grasp  of  rules  or  general  principles,  and 
certainly  need  not  be  actively  following  any  rule  or  procedure  to  generate  particular 
judgements.  This  much  of  the  particularist  claim,  he  may  concede,  is  correct. 
Nevertheless,  he  may  insist,  this  does  not  show  that  such  formulations  or  rules  do  not 
30  That  is,  to  Plato's  insistence  that  his  interlocutors  tell  him  what  justice,  or  virtue  as  such  are,  rather  than 
offer  examples.  The  assumption  is  that  real  knowledge  consists  in  the  grasp  of  general  principles.  Plato 
generally  thinks  that  any  discipline  that  amounts  to  a  body  of  knowledge  is  a  techne,  and  a  key  feature  of 
a  techne  is  that  it  is  based  on  a  body  of  principles  and  rules.  Philosophy  is  a  techne  in  this  sense,  and  so 
amounts  to  knowledge  (episteme),  while  rhetoric  and  the  arts  are  not.  I  return  to  these  issues  in  the  final 
chapter. 
31  Cf.  N.  E.  1142a  23-30.  For  interpretations  of  Aristotle  along  these  lines,  see  for  example,  Martha 
Nussbaum,  The  Fragility  of  Goodness,  and  "The  Discernment  of  Perception;  an  Aristotelian  Conception 
of  Rationality",  in  Love's  Knowledge;  also  Nancy  Sherman,  The  Fabric  of  Character  ch.  2,  and  Making  a 
Necessity  of  Virtue  Ch.  6.  As  Sherman  emphasises,  for  Aristotle,  correct  perception  is  emotional,  not  cool 
and  intellectual. 
32  W.  D.  Ross,  The  Right  and  The  Good  and  G.  E.  Moore,  Principia  Ethica. 
109 exist,  and  it  does  not  show  that  they  are  not  present  and  operative  in  the  individual, 
although  at  a  subdoxastic  level.  An  obvious  analogy  might  be  with  linguistic 
competence.  We  can  all  make  judgements  about  what  is  grammatical  and  what  is  not; 
we  are  capable,  for  instance,  of  embedding  question-forms  in  assertive  sentences,  and  of 
spotting  mistaken  attempts  to  do  so.  Yet  few  of  us  know  the  complicated  linguistic  rules 
which  govern  these  procedures.  Chomsky,  the  most  famous  exponent  of  this  view, 
claims  that  despite  our  ignorance  of  these  rules  at  the  conscious  level,  they  must 
nevertheless  be  present  and  operating,  known  "tacitly"  and  generated  by  our  universal 
grammar. 
By  analogy  then,  when  I  experience  something  as  something,  I  do  not  need  to  know 
the  rules  describing  the  way  a  concept  "results"  from  lower  level  elements.  When 
Gabriel  judges  something  to  be  shameful,  he  need  not  be  able  to  state  explicitly  what  the 
general  proposition  is  on  which  his  judgement  is  based.  But  that  doesn't  mean  that  at  a 
lower  level  he  isn't  "using"  one.  In  short  -  so  this  reply  goes-  particularism  is  only 
superficially  true.  Real  understanding,  however,  must  be  general  in  nature. 
In  replying  to  this  objection,  we  can  make  several  points.  First,  we  should  accept  that 
there  are  always  neural  processes  at  work  when  I  have  perceptual  and  auditory 
experience,  when  I  see  the  Muller-Lyer  illusion,  when  I  catch  the  ball  as  it  bounces  off 
the  wall,  when  I  see  the  duck/rabbit  and  when  I  speak  in  my  native  tongue.  But  we  can 
question  the  claim  that  these  computations  amount  to  rules  which  are  being  followed. 
This  is  to  attribute  intentionality  to  a  level  where  there  isn't  any33. 
Furthermore,  the  point  of  referring  to  the  lower  level  computations  is  supposed  to  be 
that  it  removes  the  puzzle  left  by  the  absence  of  explicit  conscious  understanding,  and 
does  so  by  locating  understanding  at  this  lower,  computational,  level.  But  why  should 
we  accept  that  there  is  a  puzzle  at  the  higher  level?  After  all,  only  if  we  already  accept 
that  understanding  must  be  of  a  certain  form,  namely  that  of  general  principles  or  rules, 
explicitly  held,  will  their  absence  at  the  higher  level  leave  a  puzzle  which  has  to  be 
explained.  But  what  argument  has  been  offered  in  support  of  that  assumption?  So  far, 
none.  Rather  it  is  being  supposed  that  there  must  be  such  rules  or  computations,  since 
what  else  could  account  for  understanding?  34But  this  is  a  big  assumption.  And  it  begins 
33  Searle  (in  The  Rediscovery  of  the  Mind)  refers  to  this  as  the  "Homunculus  Fallacy". 
3'  Here  cognitive  science  is  taken  to  provide  a  model  for  the  generalist.  Those  investigating  say,  the  visual 
system,  aim  to  show  how  our  experience  is  underwritten  by  a  computational  System  in  some  neural 
medium.  A  general  model  of  this  sort  is  Fodor's  Language  of  Thought.  But  these  assumptions-  even  for 
110 to  look  an  unreasonably  strong  one  when  we  focus,  for  example,  on  our  experience  of 
music.  Does  it  really  look  plausible  that  what  goes  on  when  I  learn  to  understand  music 
is  that  my  neural/cognitive  systems  codify  my  experience  in  some  way35?  We  have 
already  admitted  that  there  will  be  neural  processes  involved  in  my  experience.  The 
second  question  we  can  raise  -  conceding  for  the  moment  that  there  is  a  puzzle  which 
needs  explaining-  is  whether  such  appeals  to  neural  processes  in  fact  provide  the 
necessary  explanations;  do  they  remove  the  puzzle  that  we  were  allegedly  faced  with? 
Here  I  think  the  answer  is  "no".  For  if  the  claim  is  that  my  understanding  of  music, 
say,  just  is  the  neural  computations  involved,  then  this  account  is  open  to  Searle's  well 
known  "Chinese  Room"  argument,  according  to  which  no  amount  of  syntactic  encoding 
or  computation  is  sufficient  for  understanding  or  semantics.  We  might  put  the  point  by 
saying  that  understanding  always  has  aphenomenology.  In  a  sense  then,  when  we  ask 
where  my  understanding  is  located,  the  computational  model  encourages  us  to  think  of 
it  as  lying  at  the  lower,  neural  level.  But  if  Searle  is  right,  there  is  no  understanding 
there,  and  we  are  thrown  back  to  the  higher  level.  It  is  at  that  level-  the  level  of 
experience-  that  I  have  understanding.  So,  for  example,  even  if  there  is  a  neural  process 
underlying  my  recognition  of  a  face  as  a  caricature  of  someone  I  know36,  the  content  of 
my  understanding  seems  ineliminably  tied  to  the  experience  of  seeing  it  that  way;  the 
understanding,  we  might  say,  is  in  the  experience.  So  even  if  we  have  to  posit  general 
computations  (a  la  Davidson)  the  real  understanding  consists  in  my  (conscious) 
experience  of  this  particular  situation.  Therefore,  since  the  experience  is  particular,  so  is 
understanding. 
These  replies,  I  think  are  effective  against  both  the  supposition  that  generalism  is  the 
only  adequate  explanation  there  could  be  (i.  e.,  that  without  resort  to  it,  we  are  left  with 
an  insoluble  puzzle),  and  the  claim  that  it  is  in  fact  explanatory  (i.  e.  that  it  removes  the 
puzzle).  If  these  points  are  correct,  then  generalism  is  simply  a  misguided  assumption 
these  cognitive  systems-  have  been  disputed  (For  example,  by  John  Searle,  The  Rediscovery  of  The  Mind). 
Generally,  even  in  these  cases,  it  is  far  from  clear  that  underlying  rules  and  computations  is  the  only  or 
even  the  best  explanation  we  can  offer.  (see  Searle,  Ch.  10). 
35  And  what  are  they  supposed  to  be  encoding?  When  I  hear  the  second  movement  of  the  Eroica 
symphony  as  brooding  in  tone,  is  this  to  be  seen  as  the  result  of  some  neural  encoding  which  is  equivalent 
to  the  (aural)  judgement  that  the  music  is  brooding  in  tone?  But  how  could  a  neural  encoding  be 
equivalent  to  that  experience? 
36  Which,  let  us  concede,  there  must  be. 
111 about  the  nature  of  understanding.  The  present  section  then,  has  attempted  to  show  how 
we  can  see  in  Wittgenstein's  account  of  seeing-as  the  seeds  of  a  particularist  account  of 
understanding.  In  the  next  section,  we  can  see  this  view  further  embodied  in  his  views 
about  rule-following,  which  is  also  a  critique  of  various  aspects  of  generalism. 
Understanding  (b);  Rule-Following. 
What  is  the  problem  of  rule-following?  "Rule-following"  refers  to  the  consistent 
application  of  a  rule  or  concept.  Wittgenstein's  discussion  concentrates  on  arithmetical 
rules  such  as  "add  2",  but  it  is  relevant  to  a  much  wider  range  of  phenomena.  Correct 
and  consistent  application  of  a  term  or  rule  is  a  necessary  feature  of  language  since  any 
language  embodies  a  notion  of  normativity  or  correctness,  enabling  us  to  distinguish 
correct  from  incorrect  applications  of  a  term.  Without  such  a  notion  language  would  be 
impossible.  The  problem  of  rule-following  is  to  account  for  this  normativity. 
The  problem  is  not  primarily  the  problem  of  how  I  know  that  somebody  is  following  a 
rule  in  the  way  I  am37,  but  is  rather  the  "constitutive"  problem  of  what  consistent 
application  of  the  rule  consists  in. 
We  may  be  tempted,  in  trying  to  explain  this,  to  assume  that  when  I  grasp  a  rule  I  grasp 
"in  a  flash"  its  essential  application;  that  is,  I  somehow  grasp  how  it  is  to  be  applied 
here  and  in  all  other  hypothetical  cases.  But  how  is  this  possible?  Wittgenstein  offers 
the  analogy  of  remembering  a  tune; 
"I  want  to  remember  a  tune  and  it  escapes  me;  suddenly  I  say  "Now  I  know  it"  and  I 
sing  it.  What  was  it  like  to  suddenly  know  it?  Surely  it  can't  have  occurred  to  me  in  its 
entirety  at  that  moment!  -  Perhaps  you  will  say:  "It's  a  particular  feeling,  as  if  it  were 
there.  "-  but  is  it  there?  "  (P.  I.  Pt.  1,184) 
Again,  the  problem  Wittgenstein  perceives  here  is  that  we  fall  naturally  into  a 
misleading  picture  of  what  understanding  consists  in,  just  as  his  discussion  of  seeing-as 
is  directed  at  a  misleading  picture  of  seeing.  In  the  background  of  these  discussions  is  an 
equally  misleading  picture  of  meaning  and  understanding  meaning.  One  thing  they  seem 
11  Which  would  make  it  a  version  of  the  problem  of  Other  Minds. 
112 to  share  is  the  error  of  assuming  that  what  is  crucial  is  some  inner  entity  or  process 
which  is  available  to  introspection.  In  the  case  just  quoted  he  is  arguing  that  "knowing 
the  tune"  does  not  consist  in  some  internal  copy  of  the  tune. 
But  the  same  error  crops  up  when  we  try  to  explain  what  grasping  the  meaning  of  a  term 
or  the  application  of  a  rule  consists  in; 
"It's  as  if  we  could  grasp  the  whole  use  of  a  word  in  a  flash.  "-  And  that  is  just  what  we 
say  we  do.  That  is  to  say:  we  sometimes  describe  what  we  do  in  these  words.  But  there 
is  nothing  astonishing,  nothing  queer,  about  what  happens.  It  becomes  queer  when  we 
are  led  to  think  that  the  future  development  must  in  some  way  already  be  present  in  the 
act  of  grasping  the  use  and  yet  isn't  present.  "  (P.  I.  Pt.  1,197) 
Equally  when  I  say,  "Let's  play  a  game  of  chess"  I  don't  need  to  have  all  the  rules  of 
chess  passing  through  my  mind.  The  error  Wittgenstein  argues  against  is  not  the 
assumption  that  we  do  know  how  to  correctly  apply  a  term  or  rule,  or  that  somehow  I 
grasp  this  in  a  flash,  but  the  explanation  of  this  in  terms  of  some  inner  occurrence,  such 
as  the  coming  before  my  mind  of  all  possible  applications  (an  impossibility  in  any  case, 
with  arithmetic  rules,  whose  applications  are  infinite). 
Instead  of  the  picture  of  all  possible  occurrences  coming  before  my  mind  when  I 
grasp  a  rule,  can  we  not  say  that  what  I  grasp  is  an  interpretation  of  the  rule  or concept? 
This  is  an  intuitively  plausible  idea  perhaps,  but  Wittgenstein  rejects  it.  The  reason  is 
that  (P.  I.  198)  whatever  I  do  can  be  made  to  accord  with  the  rule  on  some  interpretation. 
Interpretations  do  not  fix  the  application,  since  an  interpretation  is  itself  like  a  sign 
whose  meaning  is  not  fixed.  We  then  face  a  regress.  But  if  this  is  right,  how  do  we  know 
how  to  apply  terms? 
Saul  Kripke's  well-known  treatment  of  Wittgenstein's  discussion38  concludes  with  a 
sceptical  paradox  and  a  sceptical  solution  to  the  paradox.  The  paradox  arises  from  the 
kinds  of  points  just  made;  that  any  proposed  explanation  of  rule-following  fails.  We 
seem  then  to  have  no  account'to  give  of  the  supposed  normativity  of  language  use. 
Kripke's  solution  relies  on  an  interpretation  of  some  arguments  of  Wittgenstein's 
38  Saul  Kripke,  On  Rules  and  Private  Language.  Kripke's  account  is  discussed  and  criticised  in  Colin 
McGinn,  Wittgenstein  on  Meaning,  Paul  Boghossian,  "The  Rule-Following  Considerations",  Mind  1990; 
Malcolm  Budd,  "Wittgenstein  on  Meaning,  Interpretation  and  Rules"  Synthese  1984;  Crispin  Wright, 
"Kripke's  Account  of  the  Argument  Against  Private  Language"  Journal  of  Philosophy  1984. 
113 concerning  the  role  of  the  community  and  its  practices.  Kripke  suggests  that  since  we 
can  offer  no  account  of  the  truth  conditions  for  the  applications  of  terms,  we  should  shift 
to  the  weaker  notion  of  assertability-conditions.  In  this  way,  what  the  community  says  is 
a  correct  application  is  a  correct  application.  But  there  can  be  no  appeal  to  anything 
beyond  the  "way  we  go  on".  It  is  generally  agreed,  and  was  suspected  by  Kripke 
himself,  that  his  conclusion  may  not  be  Wittgenstein's.  It  is  worth  briefly  going  over 
Kripke's  arguments  and  seeing  where  his  conclusions  might  differ  from  Wittgenstein's. 
Kripke. 
Take  the  rule  "add  2".  What  might  following  such  a  rule  might  consist  in?  Kripke 
considers  three  possible  answers  to  this  question,  which  he  thinks  taken  together  exhaust 
the  possibilities,  and  finds  all  three  unacceptable.  The  three  possible  accounts  of  what 
my  correctly  applying  the  rule  might  consist  in  are  as  follows;  (a)  my  actual 
computations,  (b)  my  past  inner  experiences,  (c)  my  dispositions  to  use  the  sign.  Let  us 
take  each  of  these  in  turn. 
Could  it  be  that  correctly  following  the  rule  consists  in  simply  getting  the  answers  right? 
No.  This  answer  follows  from  the  point  made  by  Wittgenstein  that  a  given  set  of 
(apparently  correct)  results  is  compatible  with  a  range  of  different  rules.  In  other  words, 
the  results  I  reach  underdetermine  the  rule  I'm  following.  Two  people  could  arrive  at 
the  same  results  over  a  large  range  of  examples,  but  this  offers  no  guarantee  that  they 
will  not  subsequently  diverge  at  some  unforeseen  point.  This  consideration,  as 
Wittgenstein  perceived,  rules  out  alternative  (a),  and  Kripke  agrees. 
What  then  about  my  inner  experiences  in  the  past  when  I  have  performed  the  "add  2" 
calculation?  If  there  is  a  continuity  of  inner  experience,  then  this  may  constitute  my 
grounds  for  thinking  I  am  applying  the  rule  in  the  same  way.  Kripke  makes  two 
connected  points  about  this  alternative.  First,  any  given  instance  of  meaning  something 
by  "add  2"  may  be  accompanied  by  an  inner  experience,  but  then  again  it  may  not.  This 
is  a  point  Wittgenstein  also  makes.  For  example  I  may  be  waiting  for  something  or 
someone  while  absorbed  in  some  activity.  My  waiting  or  expecting  is  not  an  internal 
mental  occurrence.  Similarly  we  may  perform  calculations  without  any  distinctive 
internal  occurrence.  The  second  point  is  this;  even  if  there  were  an  internal  experience 
114 which  I  had  had  on  previous  occasions  of  following  the  rule,  what  guarantee  could  I 
have  that  I  have  correctly  re-identified  it?  Wittgenstein  himself  insists  that  there  could 
be  no  such  guarantee.  And,  as  we  noted  above,  if  the  internal  experience  is  the 
experience  of  an  "interpretation"  of  the  rule,  that  interpretation  is  itself  like  another  sign, 
itself  requiring  interpretation.  These  points  mean  that  the  second  alternative  is  also 
inadequate.  What  about  the  third? 
According  to  this  alternative  my  grasp  of  the  rule  is  to  be  explained  in  terms  of  my 
dispositions  to  perform  calculations.  The  first  point  Kripke  makes  against  this  is  that  a 
rule  like  "add  2"  has  an  infinite  number  of  applications,  but  however  I  am  disposed  to 
calculate,  I  can  only  perform  a  finite  number  of  calculations,  and  will  therefore  always 
fall  short  of  the  kind  of  (infinite)  grasp  understanding  seems  to  require.  And  in  any  case, 
my  actual  future  calculations  fail  to  determine  the  rule  I'm  following,  as  we  saw  above 
in  connection  with  alternative  (a).  Kripke's  second  point  is  that  if  we  do  explain  my 
grasp  of  the  rule  in  terms  of  how  I  am  disposed  to  use  it  in  the  future,  what  if  I  don't  go 
on  to  apply  my  grasp  of  the  rule  correctly?  After  all,  it's  possible  that  through  lack  of 
attention,  error  or  tiredness  I  may  misapply  the  rule  I  have  grasped.  But  according  to  (c) 
as  it  stands,  we  would  have  no  way  of  excluding  these  faulty  applications.  But  this 
amounts  to  the  admission  that  we  cannot  meet  the  standard  of  normativity  which 
language  requires,  and  so  the  third  alternative  must  also  be  rejected.  This  concludes 
Kripke's  main  argument.  As  noted  above,  at  this  point  he  concludes  that  rule-following 
cannot  be  what  we  take  it  to  be  and  urges  us  to  modify  our  conception,  replacing  truth 
conditions  by  assertability  conditions. 
The  sceptical  implications  of  Kripke's  account  are  of  course  troubling.  In  addition,  the 
implications  of  Kripke's  argument  against  dispositions  (alternative  (c  ))are 
independently  serious.  When  we  describe  someone's  character,  for  example,  we  may 
attribute  dispositions  to  him  or  her.  But  if  Kripke  is  correct,  the  same  problem  occurs 
with  these  attributions  too.  Colin  McGinn  39writes, 
"It  is  not  only  meaning  and  concepts  that  resist  the  kind  of  reductionism  Kripke  is 
tacitly  presupposing;  there  are  other  psychological  concepts  which  seem  not  to  be 
capturable  by  any  fact  on  Kripke's  list  of  candidate  constitutive  facts.  And  this  being  so 
we  have  independent  confirmation  that  (psychological)  factuality  does  not  require  the 
39  McGinn,  (Op.  Cit). 
115 sorts  of  grounding  Kripke  considers;  that  is  we  need  to  adopt  an  irreducibility  thesis 
with  respect  to  these  other  concepts  too....  Is  it  to  be  supposed  that  such  traits  [character 
traits]  can  be  explained  in  terms  of  facts  from  Kripke's  three  categories?  Well,  that  does 
appear  rather  unlikely;  certainly  actual  behaviour  will  underdetermine  the  ascription  of 
character  traits,  as  can  be  seen  by  contriving  rival  sceptical  hypotheses...  the  point  here 
is  that  character  traits,  like  meaning,  have  consequences  that  go  beyond  their  actual 
manifestations,  so  that  we  cannot  hope  to  define  them  by  reference  to  their  actual 
manifestations.  "  (McGinn.  p.  155) 
And  McGinn  points  out  that  similar  sceptical  problems  arise  about  our  concepts.  As  his 
remarks  quoted  above  suggest,  he  favours  openly  rejecting  the  assumption  of 
reductionism  about  these  notions.  There  is  no  reduction  available  into  other  terms; 
"..  What  makes  true  an  ascription  to  someone  of  the  thought  that  that  5  added  to  7  equals 
12  is  precisely  the  thought  that  5  added  to  7  equals  12.  These  truistic  replies  give 
expression  to  the  conviction  that  there  is  no  reduction  to  be  had  of  the  concept  of 
concept  or  that  of  a  thought  having  a  content;  hence  the  factuality  of  concept  ascription 
must  rest  upon  nothing  other  than  the  existence  of  irreducibly  conceptual  facts-  facts 
specified  using  frankly  intentional  notions.  Why  after  all  should  we  expect  that  the 
notion  of  a  propositional  attitude  with  a  specific  conceptual  content  should  be  explicable 
in  terms  of  such  notions  as  actual  application,  state  of  consciousness  or  disposition?  i40 
So,  even  if  Kripke's  arguments  demolish  the  alternatives,  why  should  we  suppose  that 
this  casts  doubt  on  the  phenomena  under  scrutiny?  McGinn  is  surely  right  in  thinking 
that  it  is  a  plausible  alternative-  at  least  in  advance  of  some  explanation  why  not-  that 
these  intentional  notions  are  not  susceptible  to  reduction.  Crispin  Wright  4'  also  raises 
another  objection  to  Kripke;  he  points  out  that  the  alternatives  Kripke  offers  tacitly 
assume  that  my  knowledge  of  how  I  understand  a  concept  or  rule  must  be  a  matter  of 
inference  from  some  other  facts.  That  is;  the  problem,  as  Kripke  sees  it,  is  how  I  am 
justified  in  thinking  that  I  understand  the  same  thing  by  a  term  or  concept  as  I  did  in  the 
past.  His  sceptical  arguments  then  show  that  none  of  the  kinds  of  facts  considered  could 
provide  justification  for  thinking  this. 
40  McGinn,  (OP.  Cit) 
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all,  we  do  not  worry  about  the  fact  that  in  acting  I  do  not  infer  my  intentions  from  some 
other  kind  of  fact.  This  is  a  particular  instance  of  the  point  made  several  times  in  chapter 
one.  I  do  not  know  my  intentions  by  inference.  So  perhaps  the  same  is  true  for  my 
knowledge  of  what  I  mean  or  understand.  It  is  clear  also  that  Wittgenstein  himself  did 
not  draw  the  same  sceptical  lesson  as  Kripke.  He  says, 
"  What  this[  the  arguments  against  interpretations  etc.  ]  shows  is  that  there  is  a  way  of 
grasping  a  rule  which  is  not  an  interpretation,  but  which  is  exhibited  in  what  we  call 
"obeying  the  rule"..  " 
(P.  I.  201) 
So  he  sees  himself  as  removing  misconceptions  about  the  nature  of  rule-following  rather 
than  arguing  against  its  existence.  He  seems  content  that  we  do  grasp  rules,  but  offers  no 
more  detailed  characterisation  of  it  than  to  say  it  doesn't  involve  interpretation.  If 
Wittgenstein's  arguemnts  about  rule-  following  do  not  entail  Kripke's  sceptical 
conclusion,  what  conclusion  can  we  derive  from  them? 
We  can,  it  seems,  draw  a  couple  of  conclusions  unifying  seeing-as  and  rule-following. 
The  understanding  in  both  of  these  is  best  thought  of  as  an  ability  ("Now  I  know  how  to 
go  on",  "Now  I  can  see  it")-  which  of  course,  need  not  imply  behaviourism.  Further,  in 
both  cases  the  understanding  involved  is  not  the  product  of  inference.  Where  there  are 
inferences  there  are  hypotheses,  and  we  saw  earlier  that  this  cannot  be  a  characterisation 
of  seeing-as.  We  have  also  seen  that  following  rules,  or  applying  concepts  cannot  be  a 
process  of  inferring  from  criteria  or  "interpretations"  of  rules.  As  Wittgenstein  says,  in 
following  a  rule  we  act  without  reason,  there  are  no  "grounds"  as  such  for  our 
judgement.  It  is  natural  to  talk  about  "perspective"  in  both  cases,  and  to  use  the 
metaphors  of  perception  ("You're  just  not  seeing  it...  ").  In  these  respects,  both 
phenomena  constitute  a  unified  objection  to  a  "common-sense"  picture  of  what 
understanding  is.  As  a  way  of  summing  up  the  points  I  have  been  making,  we  can  set 
against  the  Davidsonian/Platonic  conception  of  understanding  underwritten  by  general 
propositions  and  rules,  the  quotation  from  Goethe  cited  by  Wittgenstein; 
41  Wright  (Op.  Cit). 
117 "Don't  look  for  anything  behind  the  phenomena;  they  themselves  are  the  theoryi42 
We  can  also  see  what  this  account  implies  about  the  concept  of  rationality.  To  be 
correctly  following  a  rule,  to  be  seeing  something  correctly  or  appropriately  ultimately 
involve  being  able  to  adopt  a  certain  perspective.  The  idea  that  here  rationality  is 
something  that  can  be  inferred  by  deductive  means,  is  a  mistake43.  This  allows,  as  I  have 
claimed,  that  emotions  can  be  rational  and  irrational.  But  unlike  Davidson,  I  do  not 
think  this  is  because  they  can  be  shown  to  be  consistent  or  inconsistent  with  a  range  of 
beliefs  that  the  agent  has44.  If  what  is  required,  then,  in  certain  areas  is  correct  seeing, 
and  not  correct  believing,  then  it  follows  that  various  styles  of  "argument"  may  be 
relevant  to  this  end  which  are  not  driven  by  logical  deduction.  Wittgenstein  gives  an 
indication  of  what  might  be  involved; 
"Can  one  learn  this  knowledge?  Yes;  some  can.  Not,  however,  by  taking  a  course  in  it, 
but  through  "experience".  -  Can  someone  else  be  a  man's  teacher  in  this?  Certainly. 
From  time  to  time  he  gives  him  the  right  tip.  -  This  is  what  "learning"  and  teaching  are 
like  here.  -  What  one  acquires  here  is  not  a  technique;  one  learns  correct  judgements. 
There  are  also  rules,  but  they  do  not  form  a  system,  and  only  experienced  people  can 
apply  them  right.  Unlike  calculating  rules.  s45 
Giving  the  right  tip  involves  a  style  of  teaching  very  different  from  argument,  it  is  more 
the  sort  of  thing  people  do  when  they  try  to  get  people  to  share  their  perception  -  of  a 
work  of  art,  say-  but  it  will  be  more  widespread  if  the  account  of  understanding  given 
above  is  correct.  This  central  insight,  which  echoes  Aristotle's  theory  of  correct 
42  RP.  P.  vol.  1889.  There  is  also  an  explicit  discussion  of  generality  in  the  Blue  and  Brown  Books; 
"Instead  of  "craving  for  generality"  I  could  have  said  "the  contemptuous  attitude  towards  the  particular 
case".  He  goes  on  to  argue  that  it  is  the  image  of  science  and  scientific  understanding  which  drives  the 
philosopher  to  seek  generality,  and  is  "the  real  source  of  metaphysics,  and  leads  the  philosopher  into 
complete  darkness".  The  Blue  Book  (p.  18). 
43  Which  is  not  to  say  that  the  idea  of  deduction,  contradiction  etc.  are  a  mistake.  Nor  does  it  mean  that 
there  are  arguments  which  will  convince  by  deductive  means.  It  simply  means  that,  as  Wittgenstein 
famously  put  it,  "arguments  come  to  an  end  somewhere",  and  in  these  cases,  their  terminus  is  in  a  kind  of 
seeing. 
44  The  role  of  the  concept  of  belief  in  a  Davidsonian  account  of  rationality  is  explored  in  the  final  chapter. 
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118 perception,  implies  first  of  all  that  the  Platonic  lauding  of  techne  involves  a  fundamental 
mistake,  and  similarly  that  the  Platonic  disparagement  of  rhetoric  and  the  arts  as  falling 
short  of  such  techne,  as  not  embodying  or  fostering  knowledge  and  understanding,  is 
also  a  mistake.  In  the  final  chapter  I  will  return  to  this  issue  and  try  to  show  how 
rhetoric  and  the  arts  can  promote  understanding.  For  the  moment,  however,  it  has  been  a 
necessary  preparatory  step  to  lay  bare  the  assumptions  underlying  the  contrary  view  and 
see  why  they  are  mistaken.  I  turn  now  turn,  briefly,  to  the  third  facet  of  Wittgenstein's 
treatment  of  misunderstanding-  secondary  sense. 
119 Secondary  Sense. 
We  have  seen  that  in  the  context  of  applying  concepts  and  following  rules-  say,  ethical 
concepts  and  mathematical  or  moral  rules-  it  is  tempting  to  suppose  that  there  are  rules 
or  criteria  which  provide  a  procedure  of  adjudication  in  any  given  instance.  And  we 
have  seen  that  this  picture  is  false.  In  addition  to  these  points  about  the  procedure-less 
nature  of  understanding,  Wittgenstein  argues  that  there  is  a  kind  of  analogical 
understanding  which  involves  important  discontinuities  in  the  use  of  terms.  For 
example,  when  we  listen  to  a  theme  in  a  passage  of  music,  he  says, 
"  [it]  makes  an  impression  on  me  which  is  connected  with  things  in  its  surroundings-  eg. 
With  our  language  and  its  intonations;  and  hence  with  the  whole  field  of  our  language 
games. 
If  I  say  for  example:  Here  it's  as  if  a  conclusion  were  being  drawn,  here  as  if 
something  were  being  confirmed,  this  is  like  an  answer  to  what  was  said  before,  -  then 
my  understanding  presupposes  a  familiarity  with  inferences,  with  confirmation,  with 
answers.  "  (Zettel  175) 
In  this  kind  of  case  we  describe  what  we  grasp  by  describing  the  music  in  other  terms, 
"here  a  conclusion  is  drawn,  here  an  answer  restated".  Of  course  a  conclusion  is  not 
really  drawn,  and  an  answer  isn't  really  restated.  Equally,  when  we  describe  music  as 
"sad"  or  "brooding",  it  is  hard  to  see  any  real  similarity  between  the  music  and  the  range 
of  things  that  we  normally  call  sad-  personal  loss,  suffering,  poverty,  and  so  on.  These 
latter  uses  -  the  "primary"  sense  of  the  word  form  more  of  a  family.  Describing  music  as 
sad,  however  seems  to  involve  a  use  of  the  term  which  is  different  from,  yet  somehow 
connected  to,  the  primary  sense. 
These  are  examples  of  what  Wittgenstein  describes  as  secondary  sense46.  We  do  not 
find  it  ridiculous,  he  says,  to  describe  days  of  the  week  as  being  "fat"  or  "thin",  or  to 
ascribe  colours  to  different  vowels.  It  might  seem  that  these  descriptions  are  merely 
metaphors.  However  there  is  a  difference;  although  both  metaphors  and  examples  of 
secondary  sense  are  literally  false,  in  the  case  of  a  metaphor  there  is  some  paraphrase 
'Philosophical  Investigations  p.  216. 
120 available  which  can  sum  up  the  meaning  of  the  metaphor.  This  is  not  the  case  with 
secondary  sense.  Whatever  is  meant  by  saying  that  the  music  is  sad  or  that  Tuesday  is 
fat,  there  is  no  paraphrase  available.  47 
How  should  we  explain  what  is  understood  by  those  who  agree  in  the  use  of  a  term  in 
its  secondary  sense?  As  already  established,  they  cannot  be  using  some  procedure  for 
the  term's  application  and  merely  extending  it  to  a  new  range  of  cases.  One  possibility  is 
that  what  we  have  in  the  case  of  the  primary  use  of  a  term  what  we  might  call  a 
"feeling"  for  it.  Here  "feeling"  refers  to  the  intimacy  we  have  with  words;  that  their 
sense  forces  itself  upon  us  immediately.  That  feeling  is  connected  with  the  word.  When 
we  use  the  word  in  a  secondary  sense  we  have  the  same  kind  of  "feeling".  Wittgenstein 
gives  the  example  of  the  feeling  that  one's  surroundings  are  unreal: 
"The  feeling  of  the  unreality  of  one's  surroundings.  This  feeling  I  have  had  once,  and 
many  have  it  before  the  onset  of  mental  illness.  Everything  seems  somehow  not  real; 
but  not  as  if  one  saw  things  unclear  or  blurred;  everything  looks  quite  as  usual.  And  how 
do  I  know  that  another  has  felt  what  I  have?  Because  he  uses  the  same  words  as  I  find 
appropriate.  But  why  do  I  choose  the  word  "unreality"  to  express  it  ?...  I  choose  it 
because  of  its  meaning.  But  I  surely  did  not  learn  to  use  the  word  to  mean;  a  feeling.  No; 
but  I  learned  to  use  it  with  a  particular  meaning  and  now  I  use  it  spontaneously  like  this. 
One  might  say-  though  it  may  mislead-  When  I  have  learnt  the  word  in  its  ordinary 
meaning,  then  I  choose  that  meaning  as  a  simile  for  my  feeling.  " 
(R.  P.  P.  1.125) 
The  case  of  secondary  sense  offers  an  even  clearer  example,  then,  of  the  way  in  which 
understanding  involves  imagination  and  perception.  In  these  cases,  the  secondary  sense 
is  seen  as  an  appropriate  extension  of  the  primary  sense,  but  it  is  impossible  to  explain 
the  sense  in  which  it  is  appropriate.  Those  who  feel  that  "unreal"  is  the  correct 
description  of  their  experience,  for  example,  appear  to  understand  something,  but  our 
attempts  to  say  what  they  understand,  or  how  they  understand  it,  are  quickly  frustrated. 
However  we  should  not  allow  the  apparent  mystery  of  secondary  sense  to  cast  doubt  on 
its  existence.  If  we  find  it  vague  in  comparison  with  primary  sense,  this  is  almost 
47  On  Secondary  Sense,  see  Cora  Diamond,  "Secondary  Sense",  in  The  Realistic  Spirit.  Also  Scruton,  Art 
and  Imagination. 
121 certainly  because  we  have  mistaken  conceptions  about  that  too.  The  considerations 
presented  earlier  in  this  chapter  hopefully  reveal  primary  sense  to  be  in  large  part 
mysterious  itself.  At  the  very  least,  it  is  clearly  not  a  question  of  grasping  definitions  or 
applying  procedures.  This  concludes  my  discussion  of  Wittgenstein's  picture  of 
understanding.  It  will  hopefully  now  be  clear  how  such  a  picture  supports  the  account  of 
emotion  in  chapter  one,  and  also  criticisms  made  there  of  some  rival  pictures,  such  as 
Davidson's.  In  the  next  section  I  turn  to  the  account  of  ethical  understanding  offered  by 
John  McDowell,  which  builds  on  the  insight  of  uncodiflability  of  understanding  which 
we  have  been  looking  at.  This  account  will  also  generate  an  argument  in  favour  of 
cognitivism.  This,  at  least,  is  McDowell's  aim. 
Uncodifiability. 
I  noted  in  the  previous  chapter  that  there  is  an  argument  in  favour  of  cognitivism  in  the 
writings  of  John  McDowell4ß.  We  are  now  in  a  better  position  to  consider  that  argument 
now,  as  it  is  based  on  the  uncodifiability  of  ethical  understanding  and  explicitly  draws 
on  Wittgensteinian  arguments  like  those  we  have  been  looking  at. 
The  Humean  picture  which  we  considered  in  the  previous  chapter  may  seem  seductive, 
indeed  unavoidable,  especially  if,  as  noted,  we  take  a  certain  view  of  "  the  facts".  If  the 
facts  are  simply  the  everyday  "empirical"  facts  available  to  everyone,  then  what  else 
could  explain  the  difference  between  those  motivated  to  act  and  those  not  so  motivated, 
but  the  presence-or  absence  of  a  desire?  However,  if  the  facts  are  not  restricted  to  this 
sort  but  are  instead  the  sort  of  facts  which  we  have  to  learn  to  perceive,  we  have  at  least 
the  beginnings  of  an  alternative  picture.  On  this  alternative  picture,  there  is  room  for  the 
difference  to  be  explained  by  a  cognitive  factor. 
In  several  papers  John  McDowell  has  proposed  this  kind  of  alternative.  In  essence  it 
exploits  the  insights  of  Wittgenstein's  discussion  of  rule-following  which  we  considered 
above.  McDowell  attacks  both  the  claim  that  the  cognitive  element  of  moral 
understanding  involves  the  grasp  of  rules,  as  we  ordinarily  think  of  them,  and  the  non- 
cognitivism  of  Hume.  For  McDowell  the  objection  to  both  these  is  the  same.  On  the 
48  Especially,  "Virtue  and  Reason"  reproduced  in  Crisp,  (ed),  Virtue  Ethics. 
122 rule  based,  non-cognitive  view,  the  picture  of  moral  deliberation  is  roughly  this;  my 
deliberation  takes  the  form  of  a  syllogism  with  the  major  premise  being  a  desire  to  do  or 
avoid  actions  of  a  given  type,  and  the  minor  premise  the  perception  that  this  is  an  action 
of  that  sort.  So  in  a  case  where  I  help  a  friend  who  is  in  need  the  syllogism  might  be 
something  like  this; 
A)  I  desire  to  help  my  friends.  (General,  major  premise  with  non-cognitive  element.  ) 
B)  My  friend  is  in  need.  (Particular,  minor  premise,  with  cognitive  content.  ) 
The  upshot  of  this  syllogism-  barring  weakness  of  the  will,  and  assuming  there  are  no 
competing  factors  of  comparable  significance,  and  so  on  -  will  be  that  I  help  my  friend. 
On  this  picture,  the  particular  perception  motivates  because  it  connects  with  the  content 
of  the  major  premise.  But  according  to  McDowell,  in  order  for  this  schema  to  be 
explanatory  we  need  to  be  able  to  specify  the  content  of  the  major  premise,  and  this  is 
what  he  claims  cannot  be  done.  Citing  Wittgenstein's  arguments  concerning  rule- 
following,  he  argues  that  moral  understanding  should  be  thought  of  as  uncodifiable49. 
Consequently,  the  action  cannot  be  rendered  intelligible,  or  analysed,  he  says,  into  a 
perception  and  a  major  premise  of  the  required  sort.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  the 
perception  involved  will  have  to  be  something  neutral,  in  order  to  satisfy  the  non- 
cognitivist,  as  in  premise,  (B)  above.  But  if  the  major  premise  cannot  be  spelled  out,  this 
creates  a  difficulty.  As  stated  above,  premise  (A)  is  too  restricted  to  figure  as  the 
relevant  cognitive  background.  It  involves  merely  a  "desire  to  help  friends".  But  clearly 
there  might  be  many  cases  in  which  other  considerations  take  priority,  or  whether  other 
49  He  also  suggests,  following  Iris  Murdoch,  that  the  Platonic  theory  of  the  Forms  is  itself  a  response  to 
the  uncodifiability  of  understanding.  Faced  with  a  moral  reality  which  cannot  be  captured  in  rules  and 
generalisations,  it  is  natural  to  talk,  as  Plato  does,  of  the  Form  of  the  Good,  in  terms  of  something  seen. 
Plato's  metaphor,  he  argues,  also  captures  the  difficulty  involved  in  correct  perception.  Plato's  choice  of 
the  perceptual  metaphor  of  perception  of  the  Sun  -  as  both  McDowell  and  Murdoch  argue  -  indicates  that 
Plato  accepts  that  the  process  of  philosophical  understanding  cannot  wholly  be  characterised  by  the 
operation  of  the  dialectical  process.  In  particular,  it  suggests  a  limit  to  which  knowledge  is  simply  a 
matter  of  the  apprehension  of  true  propositions.  This  is  an  important  qualification  on  Plato's  insistence 
elsewhere  that  episteme  can  be  arrived  at  only  through  philosophical  method,  and  that  therefore  practices 
such  as  rhetoric  and  art  cannot  deliver  true  understanding  precisely  because  they  do  not  proceed  by 
dialectical  method.  This  issue  will  be  taken  up  again  in  chapter  eight,  where  I  will  consider  in  more  detail 
Plato's  insistence  that  dialectic  is  the  only  route  to  understanding. 
123 considerations  make  helping  a  bad  idea.  But  exactly  what  this  network  of  features  might 
be  and  how  they  would  be  related  or  ranked  is  not  stateable.  But  without  it,  the  idea  of 
the  syllogism  is  not  explanatory. 
Part  of  the  reason  for  this  is  that  the  syllogism  is  the  rational  paradigm,  a  point  which 
we  have  already  discussed  above.  We  are  inclined  to  think,  says  McDowell, 
...  that  there  ought  to  be  a  neutral  external  standpoint  from  which  the  rationality  of 
.  any  genuine  exercise  of  reason  could  be  demonstrated"  so 
Now  certainly  McDowell  is  right  that  if  understanding  is  uncodifiable,  the  syllogism 
cannot  serve  this  function.  It  cannot  show  the  rational  person's  action  to  be  rational  to 
someone  who  does  not  share  the  perspective  required  to  provide  the  uncodifiable  major 
premise.  But  that  does  not  show  that  non-cognitivism  is  false.  The  non-cognitivist 
claims  that  even  the  actions  of  the  virtuous  man  himself  can  be  analysed  into  the  schema 
of  major  and  minor  premise  as  above.  McDowell  doesn't  seem  to  have  shown  that  this 
cannot  be  done.  Roger  Crisp  suggests  that  the  non-cognitivist  can  simply  admit  that  the 
full  content  of  the  desire  in  the  major  premise  cannot  be  spelled  out  , 
but  it  is  still  a 
desire; 
"It  is  not  clear  however,  why  the  non-cognitivist  could  not  accept  uncodifiability  and 
yet  claim  that  the  major  premise  is  a  mere  desire.  The  "seeing"  required  will  be  that  of 
understanding  the  content  of  the  desire  itself.  The  virtuous  person  just  desires  to  live 
like  this,  while  the  vicious  person  just  desires  to  live  like  that.  "(Crisp  p.  15) 
This  does  seem  a  possible  reply.  But  it  may  raise  another  worry,  but  not  one  McDowell 
himself  raises;  does  it  allow  enough  room  for  learning  and  discovery?  After  all,  there 
are  cases  in  which  the  perception  that  something  is  selfish  or  that  the  music  is  beautiful 
is  a  genuine  discovery.  However,  on  the  present  non-cognitivist  picture,  nothing 
motivates  me  which  is  not  already  captured  in  the  intentional  component  of  my  desire. 
So  how  could  the  perception  be  a  novelty? 
If,  for  example,  after  some  effort,  I  manage  to  enjoy  some  Wagner,  or  finally  see  why 
my  action  was  thoughtless,  the  normal  explanation  we  would  give  is  that  my  newly 
so  McDowell,  (p.  159). 
124 achieved  understanding  has  affected  me;  for  example,  it  is  what  I  grasp  in  listening  that 
makes  me  enjoy  it.  But  the  non-cognitivist  must  deny  that  cognitions  -  new  or  old  -  can 
give  rise  to  motivations.  He  must  claim  that  to  enjoy  the  music  or  be  motivated  by  the 
action,  there  must  already  be  some  desire  with  which  it  connects.  But  then  novel 
perceptions  never  motivate  by  creating  new  desires;  they  can  only  do  so  when  they 
instantiate  desires  that  already  exist.  But  it  seems  plausible  to  claim  that  these 
"discovery"  experiences  do  add  something  to  my  overall  understanding-  to  the  full,  but 
uncodifiable  view  implicit  in  the  major  premise  of  the  syllogism.  But  new  cognitions 
could  only  motivate  by  being  brought  under  existing  motivations.  The  non-cognitivist  is 
then  forced  to  find  some  description  of  the  major  premise  that  covers  the  new  insights. 
So  for  example,  the  major  premise  might  be  a  desire  to  live  "The  Good  Life".  The 
perception  in  the  minor  premise  would  then  have  to  be  that  this  kind  of  thing  (listening 
to  Wagner,  not  being  thoughtless)  is  part  of  the  good  lifest. 
Against  this  non-cognitivist  account,  we  might  feel  that  the  following  picture  was 
truer  to  experience;  that  as  we  develop,  new  kinds  of  experiences  provide  us  with  new 
kinds  of  motivations;  discovering  music  of  a  certain  sort,  we  might  feel,  provides  us 
with  new  motivations,  not  by  revealing  itself  as  an  instance  of  an  existing  desire,  but  by 
its  own  nature.  If  this  is  a  plausible  picture,  it  offers  some  support  for  strong 
cognitivism. 
si  Since  the  cognition  in  the  minor  premise  must  be  neutral  on  this  picture,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  it  could 
be  the  experience  of  discovering  that  Wagner  is  beautiful,  or  part  of  the  good  life,  since  the  experience  of 
beauty  is  not  neutral.  The  appeal  of  cognitivism  in  this  respect  is  that  it  allows  that  the  perception  of  the 
qualities  of  a  particular  object  can  affect  us,  without  first  having  their  credentials  validated  via  the  major 
premise. 
125 Responsibility. 
Up  to  this  point  I  have  been  arguing  that  the  importance  of  emotions  lies  in  the 
contribution  they  make  to  our  understanding.  In  the  next  chapter  I  will  consider  in  more 
detail  what  this  contribution  is  and  how  it  embodies  concerns  that  can  be  called  ethical. 
"Strong"  cognitivism,  I  have  maintained,  makes  legitimate  our  critical  stance  towards 
those  who  lack  appropriate  emotions.  Even  if  not  all  our  emotions  fall  within  the  sphere 
of  the  ethical,  many  of  them  do,  and  it  would  seem  to  be  a  pre-requisite  of  a  any 
criticism  of  such  emotions  that  we  are  in  a  position  to  change  our  emotional 
dispositions.  In  other  words,  we  must  be  responsible  for  our  emotions.  So  the  question 
arises  whether  this  is  a  legitimate  assumption.  At  least  one  well  known  philosophical 
view-  Kant's  -  has  it  that  we  are  not  responsible  for  our  emotions,  and  that  this  is  the 
primary  reason  why  emotions  are  not  relevant  to  ethics.  On  another  view  -  Sartre's-  we 
are  entirely  responsible  for  our  emotions,  since  they  are  held  to  be  a  kind  of  action. 
Sartre's  view  will  be  discussd  in  the  next  and  final  chapters.  For  the  moment,  I  will 
consider  whether  we  should  accept  the  Kantian  view. 
The  objection  Kant  had  to  the  importance  of  the  emotions  is  not  unlike  Plato's;  both  see 
the  human  subject  as  divided  between  his  rational  nature  and  his  nature  as  a  physical 
object  in  the  world  of  nature,  driven  by  natural  forces  and  subject  to  the  laws  of  cause 
and  effect.  In  order  to  explain  free  will  Kant  fmds  it  necessary  to  isolate  a  "space"  free 
from  causal  determination.  But  this  in  turn  involves  separating  our  "empirical"  self  from 
our  "rational"  self,  and  since  our  emotional  life  falls  on  the  "empirical"  side  it  is  part  of 
the  world  of  cause  and  effect,  and  so  cannot,  for  Kant,  be  a  source  of  moral  value.  Nor 
can  emotions  be  things  for  which  we  are  responsible. 
However  the  question  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  is  to  be  solved,  it  may  seem  true  that 
there  are  very  few-  if  any-  instances  where  my  emotional  reaction  can  be  held  in  check 
by  the  will.  If  we  hold  people  responsible  for  their  emotions,  then  must  they  not  have 
control  over  them,  as  they  seem  to  do  over  their  actions?  However,  emotional  responses 
are  immediate,  and  more  importantly,  passive.  Unlike  actions,  they  are  not  things  we  do, 
126 but  things  that  happen  to  us52.  The  point  is  not  that  all  emotional  reactions  are  extreme 
like  rage,  say,  during  which  the  subject  may  be  "out  of  control".  Even  moderate 
emotional  reactions  are,  in  the  relevant  sense,  not  our  responsibility. 
On  reflection,  however,  we  may  wonder  whether  our  emotions  really  are  beyond  our 
control  in  this  way.  We  might  legitimately  question,  for  instance,  the  claim  that  we  have 
no  active  role  in  the  formation  of  our  emotional  dispositions.  However  that  may  be,  we 
have  seen  that  there  is  also  a  second  consideration  which  is  held  to  show  that  we  are  not 
responsible  for  our  emotions.  This  is  the  considerations  that  we  are  frequently  powerless 
to  control  our  emotional  responses.  How  then  can  we  be  held  responsible  for  what  we 
cannot  control?  However  persuasive  this  argument  appears,  it  rests  on  a  dubious 
assumption-  the  assumption  is  that  if  something  that  happens  now  is  not  subject  to  my 
will  now,  then  I  cannot  be  held  responsible  for  it.  That  is;  the  objection  says,  in  effect; 
my  emotional  response  is  something  that  I  cannot  now  control  and  so  I  cannot  be  held 
responsible  for  it.  But  is  this  correct?  If  we  move  beyond  the  sphere  of  the  emotions  for 
a  moment,  we  have  no  difficulty  in  finding  examples  which  falsify  this  assumption.  If  I 
poisoned  your  food  this  morning,  it  may  now  be  out  of  my  control  to  alter  the  outcome; 
even  if  I  wanted  to  stop  you  eating  the  food  perhaps  I  would  now  be  unable  to.  Yet 
surely  I  am  responsible  for  your  death.  What  explains  my  responsibility  is  not  my  ability 
to  control  (now)  what  happens  now,  but  the  decisions  I  made  earlier,  and  whether  I  am 
responsible  for  those. 
The  situation  in  the  case  of  emotions,  then,  may  be  parallel.  Even  if  I  can't  help  my 
response  when  it  comes,  it  doesn't  follow  that  I  could  not  have  acted  at  some  time  in  the 
past  to  effect  a  different  response  now;  by  for  example  trying  to  alter  my  emotional 
dispositions.  And  this  is  surely  what  we  think  we  do  do.  Many-  perhaps  most-  of  us 
hope  that  our  character  is  something  we  have  a  hand  in  forming.  Exactly  what  goes  on 
when  we  succeed  in  exerting  this  kind  of  control  is  difficult  to  say,  as  it  is  difficult  to 
say  what  learning  generally  involves.  The  question  of  character  is  one  that  I  will  deal 
with  in  the  next  chapter.  This  brief  discussion  should  hopefully  serve  to  dispense  with 
one  frequently  employed  objection  to  the  ethical  significance  of  emotion.  In  the 
following  chapter  I  turn  to  a  variety  of  other  such  objections  and  argue  that  they  are  all 
similarly  mistaken. 
52  Even  so,  beliefs  also  share  this  kind  of  passivity,  but  it  is  not  implausible  that  we  are  responsible  for  our 
beliefs. 
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Emotion  and  Value. 
In  chapter  two  I  considered  why  we  might  think  emotions  are  valuable.  The  answer 
offered  there  was  that  they  afford  us  a  distinct  kind  of  understanding.  That  answer  can 
now  serve  as  a  basis  in  approaching  further  questions  about  the  value  of  emotions.  For 
instance,  what  are  the  connections  between  emotional  responses  and  ethical 
understanding?  On  one  view,  to  be  discussed  shortly,  correct  evaluative  understanding 
requires  emotion-although  it  remains  a  further  question  whether  such  ethical  connections 
exhaust  the  value  of  emotions.  Or,  on  the  other  hand,  should  we  think  of  emotions  as 
forces  antagonistic  in  some  way  to  the  proper  requirements  of  ethical  thought-  perhaps  as 
conflicting  with  the  demands  of  impartiality  or  objectivity  These  are  the  questions  I  shall 
be  considering  in  this  chapter. 
The  theory  which  offers  the  most  developed  picture  of  the  way  in  which  emotions  are 
involved  in  ethics  is  Aristotle's,  for  whom  the  good  life  involves  "activity  in  accordance 
with  virtue".  Both  of  these  components  are  necessary  since  virtue  which  issues  in  neither 
action  nor  response  is  unrealised  and  incomplete.  Furthermore,  virtue  involves  not  merely 
right  action  but  action  done  from  the  right  motive  and  with  the  right  emotion';  that  springs 
from  the  correct  sort  of  character.  I  noted  in  the  previous  chapter  that  some  philosophers 
have  objected  that  emotional  responses,  unlike  actions,  are  not  subject  to  the  will,  and 
therefore  we  can  attach  no  moral  significance  to  them.  And  I  offered  reasons  for  thinking 
that  that  objection  is  not  a  good  one.  Aristotle,  while  recognising  that  emotions  are  not 
subject  to  the  immediate  will,  believes  however  that  the  development  of  character  is. 
Since  character  dispositions  can  be  educated  and  developed,  our  resulting  emotional 
responses  do  reveal  how  virtuous  we  are. 
One  advantage  of  Aristotle's  view  of  the  significance  of  emotions,  and  of  his  ethical 
theory  generally,  is  that  his  conception  of  what  is  valuable  is  considerably  wider  than  the 
narrower  focus  on  the  category  of  the  "moral".  The  category  of  the  "ethical"  which  he 
focuses  on  includes  all  the  virtues  and  goods  required  for  the  Good  life.  This  encompasses 
a  much  larger  terrain  than  the  narrowly  moral,  and  enables  us  to  see  why  a  much  bigger 
1  See  L.  A.  Kosmau,  "Being  Properly  Affected",  in  Rorty  (ed.  )  Essays  on  Aristotle. 
128 part  of  our  emotional  lives  might  be  valuable.  Emotions  like  generosity  and  some  cases  of 
guilt,  say,  might  be  relevant  to  a  narrowly  "moral"  focus  on  the  value  of  emotions,  but 
Aristotle's  account  takes  in  shame,  pride,  anger,  grief  and  others,  and  sees  an  importance 
in  them  even  in  contexts  which  are  not  recognisably  `moral".  The  parent  who  plays  with 
their  children  out  of  joy  is  quite  different  from  the  parent  who  does  so  out  of  a  sense  of 
duty,  and  Aristotle  offers  an  explanation  of  the  importance  we  ascribe  to  differences  of 
this  sort. 
This  view,  or  something  very  like  it,  might  seem  intuitively  appealing,  perhaps  even 
uncontroversial.  However,  before  going  any  further  into  the  details  of  Aristotle's  theory, 
there  are  three  objections  to  it  which  need  to  be  considered.  The  first  objection  comes 
from  certain  "impartialist"  moral  theories  which  regard  the  involvement  of  emotions  in 
moral  judgement  as  pernicious  for  the  simple  reason  that  moral  thinking  imposes  a  strict 
requirement  of  equality  or  impartiality,  and  acting  out  of  our  emotional  commitments 
interferes  with  this  requirement. 
Second,  there  is  an  objection  to  the  whole  conception  of  character  as  what  Aristotle 
refers  to  as  "second  nature".  In  the  brief  sketch  above  I  referred  to  Aristotle's  claim  that 
character  is  essential  to  virtue.  He  also  claimed,  as  we  shall  see  later,  that  the 
fundamentals  of  the  cultivation  of  character  must  take  place  early  in  life  and  that  if 
someone  has  the  wrong  kind  of  upbringing  he  will  be  incapable  of  virtue  or  of  learning 
anything  from  lectures  like  Aristotle's.  Against  this  picture,  there  is  what  we  might  refer 
to  as  the  "Existentialist"  objection.  Sartre,  for  instance,  often  seems  to  be  claiming  a 
certain  sort  of  "radical"  freedom  for  human  choice  and  agency  which  would  be  quite 
incompatible  with  the  Aristotelian  conception  of  character.  When  Aristotle  talks  of 
someone  acting  from  character,  we  can  think  of  this  as  him  acting  out  of  a  settled  way  of 
seeing  the  world.  Such  settled  perceptions,  if  they  are  to  constitute  character  at  all  must 
seriously  circumscribe  the  possibilities  of  choice.  And  on  this  account,  where  choice  is 
appropriate,  it  is  certainly  not  "radical"  in  the  way  Sartre  seems  to  suggest. 
A  third  kind  of  objection  comes  for  the  writings  of  the  Stoic  philosophers,  both  Greek 
and  later  Roman.  They  argue  against  Aristotle  firstly;  that  emotional  attachments  are  a 
source  of  misery  and  distress,  and  therefore,  far  from  being  a  necessary  constituent  of 
human  flourishing,  they  make  human  contentment  impossible.  Secondly,  they  claim  that 
virtue  alone  is  sufficient  for  happiness  or  eudaimonia.  Valuing  "external"  goods  (which  is 
what  our  emotions  involve)  is  consequently  a  mistake.  Third,  they  claim  that  the  practice 
of  valuing  external  goods  is  socially  inculcated.  The  harmful  effects  of  society's  teachings 
129 can  only  be  reversed  by  withdrawal  from  society  and  the  undertaking  of  a  course  of  Stoic 
therapy. 
We  must,  then,  answer  these  objections  if  the  Aristotelian  account  of  the  value  of  emotion 
is  to  be  upheld.  In  addition  to  these  objections,  however,  there  has  also  been  a  general 
presumption  against  emotion  in  ethical  matters,  a  presumption  which  flows  from  the 
thought  that  ethical  questions  must  be  decided  by  reason.  In  the  next  section  I  will 
consider  the  first  two  of  the  objections  listed  above,  and  the  Stoic  objections  later  in  the 
chapter. 
Emotions  and  Impartiality. 
We  can  start  by  describing  a  possible  view  about  ethics  which  I  will  call,  following  John 
Cottingham2  the  Impartiality  Thesis.  The  Impartiality  Thesis  says  that  when  deliberating 
and  making  moral  decisions  we  ought  not  to  give  any  special  moral  weight  to  our  own 
interests,  concerns,  desires  etc.  Rather  than  giving  special  weight  to  our  own  interests,  or 
preference  to  those  of  our  own  social  group  or  species,  we  should  adopt  an  impartial 
standpoint. 
Since  we  assume  that  moral  thought  and  action  is  opposed  to  what  is  selfish,  this  thesis 
might  seem  acceptable,  indeed  undeniable.  However,  on  reflection,  if  it  implies  not  only 
that  all  se  fish  action  is  opposed  to  morality,  but  that  all  self-interested  action  is  morally 
wrong  too,  then  this  is  not  so  clear.  Many  actions  I  perform  are  certainly  self  -interested;  I 
go  for  a  swim  in  the  interests  of  my  health,  I  eat  a  piece  of  chocolate  for  the  pleasure  it 
gives  me,  and  so  on.  But  as  long  as  this  does  not  adversely  affect  the  interests  of  others  it 
will  be  allowable.  And  in  these  cases  the  fact  that  the  chocolate  will  give  me  pleasure  is  a 
legitimate  basis  for  action.  And  most  of  us  do  in  any  case  take  account  of  the  interests  of 
others.  But,  as  Cottingham  notes,  to  say  that  moral  thought  must  do  this  falls  short  of  the 
Impartiality  thesis;  for  it  claims,  not  merely  that  I  must  take  into  account  the  interests  of 
others,  but  that  I  must  give  them  the  same  weight  as  I  do  my  own  interests.  As  Peter 
2  John  Cottingham,  "Ethics  and  Impartiality",  Philosophical  Studies,  1983. 
130 Singer  puts  it,  "..  my  own  interests  cannot,  simply  because  they  are  my  interests,  count 
more  than  the  interests  of  anyone  else.  ,3 
But  in  contrast  to  the  weaker  claim  about  considering  the  interests  of  others,  this  is 
certainly  not  obviously  true.  Two  reasons  we  might  offer  against  it  are  these;  first,  it 
would  seem  to  prohibit  me,  in  any  of  my  deliberations,  from  taking  seriously  the  fact  that 
a  given  course  of  action  (say,  the  one  that  would  produce  the  best  overall  outcome)  goes 
against  my  most  deeply  held  attitudes  -  those  with  which  I  most  closely  identify  myself. 
To  make  this  fact  the  basis  of  my  deliberation  and  allow  it  to  override  the  possible 
beneficial  consequences  to  others  would  seem  to  involve  favouring  my  own  interests  over 
-say-  the  suffering  of  others.  Secondly,  and  more  generally,  according  to  the  Impartiality 
Thesis,  the  fact  that  someone  is  my  wife,  son,  lover  and  so  on,  does  not  give  me  -morally 
speaking-  any  reason  for  saving  them  rather  than  anyone  else.  Here,  then,  apparently,  is 
one  area  where  emotional  commitments  would  conflict  with  morality  rather  than  form  a 
part  of  it. 
Before  considering  this  argument,  we  should  note  that  it  is  no  reply  to  the  objection  just 
made,  to  claim  that  the  Impartiality  Thesis  can  legitimate  the  choice  to  save  one's  loved 
ones  since  such  a  choice  could  be  regarded  as  an  instance  of  the  application  of  some 
general  rule  such  as  the  rule  that  "everyone  may  save  their  wife,  son,  lover  etc.  "  In  this 
way  the  defender  of  the  Thesis  might  attempt  to  avert  the  counter-intuitive  implications  it 
threatens  by  claiming  that  what  at  first  blush  seem  examples  of  favouritism  can  in  fact  be 
derived  from  universal  principles.  However,  this  would  allow  something  that  the  Thesis 
rules  out.  Namely,  it  would  allow  that  I  have  a  reason  to  save  my  son,  but  not  yours. 
Furthermore,  there  are  real  doubts  -which  we  shall  consider  in  a  later  section-  whether 
someone  deliberating  in  this  way  is  deliberating  in  a  way  we  think  virtuous5.  But  some  of 
our  emotional  commitments  to  those  close  to  us  do  seem  to  provide  us  with  moral  reasons 
for  action  that  go  against  the  Impartiality  Thesis.  In  these  cases  we  do  not  think  that 
favouring  those  close  to  us  is  a  form  of  egoism.  On  the  contrary,  we  would  regard 
9  Peter  Singer,  Practical  Ethics  (p.  12).  ' 
a  Examples  of  this  sort  are  familiar  from  discussions  of  utilitarianism.  See  for  instance,  Bernard  Williams,  "Utilitarianism 
and  Self-  Indulgence"  in  Moral  Luck. 
s  An  argument  of  this  sort  is  offered  by  Bernard  Williams  in his  "Persons,  Character  and  Morality",  where  he  argues  that 
in  cases  where  emotional  ties  are  involved,  such  as  the  case  of  a  man  saving  his  wife,  moral  theory  typically  gives  the 
man  "one  thought  too  many".  Thoughts  of  conforming  to  rules  and  duties,  Williams  argues,  should  not  feature  in  the 
man's  deliberation.  The  thought  he  should  have,  ideally,  is  simply  "this  is  my  wife". 
131 someone  who  failed  to  have  or  act  on  such  motives  morally  deficient.  To  this  extent  it 
seems  that  some  emotional  commitments  do  legitimately  militate  against  strict 
impartiality  in  ethics.  But  the  conclusion  we  should  reach  then  is,  perhaps,  that  it  was  a 
mistake  to  identify  ethics  with  impartiality  in  the  first  place.  Saying  this  though  is  not  yet 
to  fully  explain  how  such  emotional  commitments  do  fit  in  to  a  general  picture  of  ethics. 
Providing  such  an  account  will  be  one  of  the  eventual  aims  of  the  rest  of  the  chapter. 
A  more  general  point  associated  with  the  kind  of  argument  I  quoted  Peter  Singer  as 
giving  is  also  worth  mentioning.  Singer's  impartiality  is  linked  to  his  utilitarianism.  In 
various  places  for  example,  he  has  put  forward  the  case  for  vegetarianism.  He  argues  that 
animals  feel  pain,  and  that,  morally  speaking,  their  pain  is  no  less  important  than  ours. 
The  details  of  this  particular  argument  do  not  concern  us  here,  but  there  is  a  picture  of  the 
role  emotions  play,  which  is  associated  with  it,  which  does  concern  us.  The  reason  we  fail 
to  be  concerned  by  the  suffering  of  others,  Singer  says,  is  that  we  are  afflicted  by 
"speciesism",  a  partiality  in  favour  of  what  we  see  as  "our  own".  The  abolition  of  slavery, 
for  example,  universal  suffrage  and  the  growth  in  sexual  equality,  have  been  achieved  by 
fighting  against  deeply  held  prejudices,  and  these  prejudices  have  been  largely  emotional 
in  nature.  The  same,  says  Singer,  is  now  true  of  our  attitude  to  animals6.  In  general,  we 
might  imagine  Singer's  point  to  be  that  emotions  are  nothing  more  than  indicators  of  the 
current  state  of  cultural  prejudice.  At  best  they  can  be  overcome,  at  worst  they  actively 
mislead  us.  But  they  are  certainly  no  basis  for  morality  or  ethics. 
The  most  important  point  to  emphasise  in  responding  to  this  argument  is  that  even  if 
some  emotions  are  mistaken  or  inappropriate,  that  does  not  show  that  they  all  are.  And  if 
the  argument  were  intended  to  show  that  conclusion,  there  are  at  least  as  many  examples 
of  emotional  involvement  in  judgement  which  tell  against  it.  Often,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  an  absence  of  emotion  is  legitimately  regarded  as  a  failure.  Secondly,  suppose 
Singer  convinced  us,  by  highlighting  the  parallels  between  humans  and  animals,  that  we 
were  wrong  to  ignore  animal  suffering.  The  argument  could  only  succeed  if  we  cared 
about  suffering-  at  least  in  some  cases-  in  the  first  place.  And  that  does  seem  to  be  based 
on  the  fact  that  suffering  affects  us.  Thirdly,  if  our  emotional  reactions  did  not  embody 
appropriate  evaluative  judgements,  that  would  only  be  a  lamentable  consequence  if  we 
eI  do  not  know  that  Singer  does  in  fact  hold  this  general  view  of  our  emotions,  and  certainly  there  is  nothing  in  his 
writings  that  commits  him  to  it.  I  claim  merely  that  it  is  a  view  which  is  consistent  with  some  of  what  he  says.  It  is,  in 
any  case,  a  view  fairly  frequently  heard,  which  makes  it  worth  considering. 
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what  is  really  valuable.  We  can  conclude  then  that  the  general  argument  about  emotions 
that  I  have  imputed  to  Singer  above  is  unsuccessful  and  therefore  no  threat  to  the  kind  of 
general  picture  of  the  significance  of  emotions  with  which  I  began. 
Before  moving  on,  there  is  another  familiar  objection  to  the  ethical  significance  of 
emotions,  which  can  be  found  both  in  authors  such  as  Kant  and  in  modem  writers  on 
ethics.  The  argument  is  that  as  a  basis  for  ethical  motivation  the  emotions  are  simply  too 
unreliable.  At  best,  emotion  can  be  educated  not  to  conflict  with  reason,  but  it  can  never 
be  the  basis  of  ethical  understanding  itself;  emotions  are  simply  too  susceptible  to  whim. 
In  replying  to  this  we  can  begin  by  noting  that  since  emotion  can  be  educated,  as  the 
objection  itself  concedes,  there  is  reason  to  suppose  that  our  emotional  reactions  may  in 
fact  achieve  a  high  level  of  consistency.  And  indeed  why  should  my  emotional  reaction  to 
suffering,  say,  be  any  less  consistent  than  my  "rational"  perception  of  duty? 
Even  if  we  concede  that  our  emotional  capacities  are  not  infallible,  which  is  clearly  true, 
what  argument  shows  that  "reason"  itself  fares  any  better?  In  any  case,  I  have  already 
argued  against  the  mythical  divorce  between  reason  and  emotion,  and  we  can  supplement 
this  defence  by  insisting  that  often  an  un-emotional  reaction  would  be  deficient,  even 
unreasonable.  I  conclude  then  that  this  objection  is  empty.  However,  it  is  worth  giving  a 
little  more  attention  to  the  objection  that  ethical  questions  must  be  decided  by  reason 
alone,  and  it  is  to  this  claim  that  I  now  turn. 
7  Cf.  Kant,  Groundwork;  425 
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The  role  of  imagination  in  our  ethical  thought  is  often  obscured  in  discussions  of  morality. 
One  reason  for  this  is  the  preoccupation  with  principle  and  rules,  which  we  have  already 
looked  at  (in  chapter  three).  The  same  tradition  which  emphasises  reason  and  principles  of 
duty  also  emphasises  particular  features  of  our  psychology  at  the  expense  of  others.  As 
Iris  Murdoch,  for  example,  has  argued,  on  such  a  view  the  only  important  psychological 
feature  is  taken  to  be  the  will  and  its  products-  decisions  and  choices8.  As  a  result, 
emotion  is  taken  to  be  irrelevant,  as  is  the  rest  of  the  "inner  life".  The  inadequacies  of  this 
picture  come  out  in  a  number  of  ways.  One  way  to  approach  them  is  through  the  subject 
of  moral  dilemmas. 
Two  moral  dilemmas  drawn  from  fiction  which  have  attracted  the  attention  of 
philosophers  are  the  cases  of  Twain's  Huckleberry  Finn9  and  Melville's  Billy  Budd.  '° 
Jonathan  Bennett  has  discussed  the  case  of  Huckleberry  Finn;  Huck's  dilemma  is  that  he 
is  tom  between  his  conscience  which  tells  him  to  turn  in  the  runaway  slave  Jim,  and  his 
emotions  which,  urge  him  not  to.  For  Bennett,  what  Huck's  dilemma  shows  is  the 
distinction  between  emotional  "pulls"  and  rational  rules  and  principles.  Bennett  takes  it 
that  this  shows  that  emotions  are  merely  something  which  make  him  fail  to  do  what  he 
has  decided  (on  the  basis  of  his  "principles")  to  do.  Emotions  are,  in  short,  merely  the 
disruptive  factors  they  are  so  often  thought  to  be.  In  Huck's  case  the  result  of  their 
influence,  according  to  Bennett,  is  incontinence; 
8  Iris  Murdoch,  The  Sovereignty  of  Good.  Murdoch  is  thinking  principally  about  the  existentialists,  but  the  emphasis  on 
will  and  choice,  she  notes,  is  already  present  in  Kant. 
9  Jonathan  Bennett,  "The  Conscience  of  Huckleberry  Finn.  ",  Philosophy,  1974. 
10  Peter  Winch,  "The  Universalisability  of  Moral  Judgement"  in  Ethics  and  Action. 
134 "The  crucial  point  concerns  reasons,  which  all  occur  on  one  side  of  the  conflict.  On  the 
side  of  conscience  we  have  principles,  arguments,  considerations,  ways  of  looking  at 
things....  On  the  other  side,  the  side  of  feeling,  we  get  nothing  like  that-he  simply  fails  to 
do  what  he  believes  to  be  right,  he  isn't  strong  enough.  " 
In  short,  the  example  reveals,  "the  difference  between  general  moral  principles  and 
particular  unreasoned  emotional  pulls".  This  view  of  the  case  has  not  been  universally 
accepted.  In  her  response  to  Bennett's  analysis  Jenny  Teichman  pointed  out  that  from  the 
fact  that  an  emotion  is  not  the  same  thing  as  a  moral  judgement  it  does  not  follow  that 
feelings  may  not  involve  judgements.  And  indeed  this  is  precisely  what  was  argued  about 
the  nature  of  emotion  in  chapter  one.  Additionally,  Phillip  Montague  has  argued  that 
Bennett's  view  of  the  case  assumes  that  conscientious  principle  is  always  better  than 
unprincipled  emotional  response.  But  is  it?  We  can  find  grounds  for  thinking  it  is  not  in 
another  of  Bennett's  examples;  that  of  Himmler. 
Himmler  appears  to  have  been  convinced  that  what  he  and  those  like  him  were  doing 
was  right;  it  was  for  him  a  matter  of  moral  or  conscientious  principle.  He  experienced 
great  difficulty  however,  in  carrying  out  what  he  felt  was  his  duty,  and,  according  to 
Bennett,  he  anticipated  the  emotional  difficulties  he  would  have  in  carrying  out  his  task, 
but  was  resolved  to  overcome  them.  He  decided  that  his  feelings  of  revulsion  would  have 
to  be  subordinated  to  the  greater  moral  purpose  in  which  he  was  engaged.  So  Himmler 
managed  to  act  continently  and  on  conscientious  principle,  precisely  what  Bennett 
commends.  But  his  principle  was  a  morally  bad  one.  In  his  case  the  presence  of  emotional 
reactions  such  as  sympathy  was  surely  a  good  thing,  an  indicator  of  how  he  should  have 
acted  -  his  tragedy  was  that  he  managed  to  overcome  them.  This  strongly  suggests  that 
Bennett  is  wrong  in  thinking  that  the  "moral"  considerations  are  all  on  the  side  of 
"reason". 
In  any  case  Bennett's  argument  simply  assumes  that  reason  and  emotion  are  distinct 
and  separate.  If  the  arguments  presented  in  chapter  one  are  correct,  this  assumption  is 
also  mistaken.  A  consequence  of  these  views  is  that  Bennett  does  not  even  consider  it  a 
possible  option  that  Huck's  sympathy  could  be  an  expression  of  his  moral  identity.  But  if 
we  allow  that  emotions  do  embody  cognitive  elements,  this  becomes  a  possibility. 
Emotions  are  relevant  in  just  this  way  to  Peter  Winch's  discussion  of  Melville's  Billy 
Budd.  In  Melville's  story  Captain  Vere  faces  a  dilemma;  whether  or  not  to  have  Budd 
shot  as  an  example  and  thereby  maintain  discipline.  Winch's  main  point  is  that  in  these 
135 cases  it  is legitimate  to  allow  that  we  will  not  all  reach  the  same  conclusion  about  what  to 
do.  But  the  conclusions  we  do  reach  reveal  something  about  our  identity.  Moreover,  the 
conclusion  that  a  course  of  action  is  either  not  one  we  could  adopt  or  the  one  we  must 
follow,  is  not  reached  through  deduction,  but  is  rather  an  outcome  which,  perhaps  with  the 
help  of  imagination,  we  find  forced  upon  us.  But  this  kind  of  capacity  or  incapacity  is 
affective;,  we  only  discover  that  we  are  incapable  through  our  emotional  reactions.  This 
topic  has  been  more  recently  discussed  by  Bernard  Williams  under  the  heading  of 
"Practical  Necessitys11,  and  I  will  return  to  it  below.  The  conclusion  we  have  reached  so 
far  however,  is  that  there  are  no  obvious  arguments  which  succeed  in  showing  emotions  to 
be  irrelevant  to  ethics,  and  a  variety  of  cases  which  strongly  suggest  the  reverse.  I  will  end 
this  section  by  considering  one  example  of  such  an  emotion-  regret. 
Regret  has  attracted  the  attention  of  several  philosophers  12  interested  in  ethical  theory. 
Bernard  Williams  considers  the  following  kinds  of  case.  It  is  a  feature  of  non-utilitarian 
moral  thought  that  even  when  we  act  rightly,  there  may  be  what  Williams  calls  a  "moral 
remainder".  For  example,  in  a  situation  where  there  are  conflicting  ethical  considerations 
which  cannot  both  be  satisfied,  one  of  these  will  have  to  be  sacrificed.  If  I  think  it  would 
be  right  to  keep  a  promise,  but  also  right  to  help  someone  in  distress,  it  may  be  that  I 
cannot  do  both.  But  although  I  can  be  satisfied  that  I  have  done  the  right  thing,  I  may  still 
feel  regret.  This  is  because  the  defeated  consideration,  is  not  simply  erased,  as  it  is  (and 
must  be)  for  the  utilitarian;  it  remains,  and  continues  to  exert  moral  force.  In  some  cases  it 
may  even  give  rise  to  a  need  for  reparation.  In  such  cases,  the  person  who  did  not  feel 
regret,  ("agent-regret"  as  Williams  calls  it)  is  ethically  deficient. 
A  second  kind  of  case  is  illustrated  by  the  fate  of  Oedipus  who  unwittingly  kills  his 
I 
father  and  marries  his  mother.  A  non-fiction  case  which  makes  the  same  point  is  that  of 
the  driver  who  runs  down  and  kills  someone  who  steps  in  front  of  his  car.  Let  us  assume 
the  driver  has  not  been  drinking,  was  not  speeding  or  driving  recklessly-  was  in  fact 
blameless.  As  Williams  remarks,  bystanders  will  attempt  to  reassure  the  driver  by  telling 
him  it  was  not  his  fault,  that  he  is  not  responsible,  that  he  should  not  blame  himself.  But 
the  driver  certainly  will  feel  "ägent-regret";  he  will  be  racked  by  a  sense  of  having  "done" 
something  terrible.  Moreover  the  bystanders  themselves,  while  trying  to  assuage  such 
11  See  Bernard  Williams,  "Practical  Necessity",  in  Moral  Luck,  and  "Moral  Incapacity"  in  Making  Sense  ofHumanity. 
12  Principally,  Williams,  "Moral  Luck",  in  Moral  Luck,  M.  Baron,  "Remorse  and  Agent  Regret"  in  Midwest  Studies  in 
Philosophy  vol.  13;  Gabriele  Taylor,  Pride,  Shame  and  Guilt. 
136 feelings,  would  be  surprised  and  -  more  importantly  -  suspicious  of  a  driver  who  did  not 
have  them.  In  both  these  kinds  of  case,  there  is  no  question  of  blame,  yet  regret  is  felt  to 
be  appropriate. 
It  is  an  interesting  question  what  cognitive  attitudes  towards  our  own  actions  (including 
what  we  are  merely  causally  responsible  for)  and  towards  others  underpin  the  sense  that 
regret  is  required.  For  my  purposes  it  is  sufficient  to  note  that  the  regret  in  these  cases  is  a 
product  of  character  in  some  way,  and  we  regard  the  presence  or  absence  of  such 
responses  as  revealing  the  agent's  character.  Moreover,  looked  at  in  one  way  -  in  terms  of 
what  it  is  rational  (on  one  construal  of  `rational")  to  feel  -  there  is  no  reason  to  feel  regret 
in  these  cases.  Why  then  do  we  take  the  absence  of  these  emotions  as  a  kind  of  moral 
failure?  In  chapter  eight  I  offer  a  tentative  answer  to  this  question  -  that  the 
appropriateness  of  emotional  responses  cannot  be  judged  by  the  usual  criteria  by  which 
we  judge  the  rationality  of  other  things  such  as  beliefs,  actions  or  desires.  For  the  moment, 
however,  the  point  of  the  preceding  discussion  of  regret  is  to  provide  an  ilustration  of  the 
ways  in  which  specifically  emotional  responses  are  regarded  as  indicators  of  virtue  and 
character. 
Second  Nature  and  Existentialism. 
The  second  objection  I  raised  at  the  start  of  the  chapter  was  what  I  labelled  the 
"existentialist"  objection.  This  argument  focuses  on  the  nature  of  character,  or  rather  it 
objects  to  a  certain  picture  of  character  and  deliberation.  What  it  emphasises  instead  is 
the-  unavoidable,  in  some  sense-  freedom  of  human  choice.  We  are  unconstrained,  it  is 
said,  in  our  choices,  and  to  think  we  are  not  is  to  refuse  to  confront  the  reality  of  our 
situation.  An  apparently  clear  example  of  this  view  of  things  is  Sartre's  famous 
description13  of  the  young  man  who  comes  to  him  seeking  advice  about  how  he  should 
resolve  the  dilemma  between  going  off  to  fight  for  the  Resistance  movement  and  staying 
to  look  after  his  ailing  mother.  Sartre  insists  that  the  young  man  is  free  and  so  must 
therefore  choose.  On  one  view  of  what  Sartre  is  claiming,  choice  is  supposed  to  be 
"radical"  in  the  sense  that  the  young  man  is  not  constrained  by  reasons  of  one  sort  or 
another.  He  cannot  hope  to  look  to  reasons  or  considerations  of  any  sort  to  settle  the 
13  In  Existentialism  and  Humanism. 
137 matter  and  so  avoid  choice.  Were  he  to  claim  that  one  consideration  rather  than  another 
was  decisive,  he  would  be  in  bad  faith,  for  the  relevant  considerations  settle  nothing-  only 
choice  can  do  that. 
However  this  raises  the  question  of  whether  we  act  for  reasons  at  all.  Sartre's  insistence 
that  choice  is  radical  suggests  that  the  agent  must  either  decide  to  give  one  consideration 
unequal  weight  (rather  than  discover  that  it  is  weightier),  or,  after  surveying  the  facts  that 
count  for  him,  he  must  simply  choose  (by  tossing  a  coin,  for  example)  in  favour  of  one 
rather  than  the  other.  But,  to  return  to  Iris  Murdoch's  point,  noted  above,  what  both  these 
scenarios  have  in  common  is  that  the  dilemma  is  resolved  finally,  not  by  weighing  up  and 
scrutinising  reasons,  since  ex  hypothesi  they  are  inconclusive,  but  by  a  brute  act  of  will. 
Radical  choice  therefore  threatens  to  be  rather  disappointing,  even  empty.  If  reasons  do 
not  influence  choice  at  all,  the  choice  is  random.  If,  on  the  other  hand  it  is  conceded  that 
they  do  influence  choice,  and  the  claim  is  merely  that  they  do  not  settle  matters,  then 
Sartre's  thesis  is  much  less  radical.  If  reasons  are  allowed  to  influence  choice,  it  is  surely 
an  empirical  question  whether  they  can  be  conclusive.  Sartre  at  any  rate  presents  no 
general  argument  to  the  effect  that  they  cannot  be.  In  any  case,  the  large  claims  Sartre 
makes  about  freedom  do  not  seem  compatible  with  the  concession  that  choice  is 
constrained  by  reasons.  The  more  we  reflect  on  the  picture  of  ethical  deliberation  which 
Sartre's  remarks  suggest,  the  more  puzzling  it  becomes.  For  one  thing  it  becomes  hard  to 
see  how  there  is  any  room  in  his  account  for  the  notion  of  character,  since  what  that  notion 
implies  is  precisely  habits  of  thought  and  response  which  guide  and  give  content  to 
choice.  The  Radically  Free  agent  seems  also  rather  shallow.  It  is  on  precisely  this  point  of 
course,  that  Sartre  is  in  clearest  opposition  to  Aristotle,  who,  as  already  remarked,  insists 
on  the  importance  of  character  and  the  role  played  by  emotional  response  in  constituting 
it.  To  see  in  detail  why  this  is  so,  whether  Sartre's  view  can  be  sustained  and  which  view 
is  more  credible,  we  must  begin  by  asking  what  character  is. 
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What  is  "character  "?  Is  it  the  same  as  "  personality",  or  different?  And,  how  is  it  related 
to  other  concepts  like  that  of  the  "self'?  One  way  to  describe  our  use  of  the  term 
"Personality"  would  be  to  say  that  it  is  concerned  with  aesthetic  features,  broadly 
construed,  of  the  person;  whether  they  are  charming  and  witty  or  dour  and  introverted. 
But  we  distinguish  this  from  character,  our  usage  allows  for  someone  with  an  unappealing 
personality  to  have  a  good  character.  Attila  the  Hun  may,  for  all  we  know,  have  had  a 
marvellous  personality,  but  we  feel  sure  from  what  we  know  that  he  did  not  have  a  good 
character. 
Character,  unlike  personality,  seems  to  refer  to  what  a  person  values.  To  be  someone  of 
good  character  involves  being  someone  who  values  the  right  things  and  whose  actions 
bear  out  that  fact.  Having  character  in  this  sense  is  distinct  from  "being  a  character". 
Having  character  is  revealed  by  such  things  as  not  giving  in  to  temptation,  by  adhering  to 
what  is  held  to  be  important  in  the  face  of  other  considerations.  The  novels  of  Jane  Austen 
provide  many  illustrations  of  character  in  this  sense.  In  Sense  and  Sensibility,  for  example, 
Elinor  Dashwood  is  portrayed  as  someone  of  resolute  character.  Even  when  disappointed 
in  love,  she  does  not  disclose  confidences  which  might  relieve  her  predicament  or 
reproach  the  man  who  disappointed  her.  Instead,  she  resolves  to  keep  her  promises,  and  to 
respect  Edward  Ferrars,  her  lover,  for  doing  so  also,  although  it  is  his  keeping  the  promise 
that  results  in  her  disappointment.  Furthermore,  she  does  not  resent  or  seek  revenge  on  her 
rival,  Lucy,  but  instead  endures  her  unchosen  role  as  Lucy's  confidante.  Finally,  when 
Edward  Ferrars  is  to  be  married  to  Lucy,  she  agrees,  selflessly,  to  carry  out  a  commission 
to  offer  him  employment.  Throughout,  Elinor  approaches  everything  with  an 
irreproachable  sense  of  what  is  fitting  and  appropriate  and  is  never  self-indulgent  or  mean. 
She  can  serve  as  an  example  of  someone  of  character. 
From  what  we  have  said  so  far  it  is  clear  that  character  is  a  matter  of  integrity,  and  we 
can  see  more  clearly  why  this  is  so  if  we  consider  what  is  involved  in  acting  upon  our 
evaluations.  If  we  deliberate  about  how  to  act,  given  various  alternatives,  and  there  is  one 
alternative  which  is  the  one  we  value  most,  but  there  is  also  another  which  involves  a 
139 greater  yield  of  pleasure,  the  person  of  character  must  be  able  to  resist  the  temptation  of 
the  second  option  if  he  is  to  be  able  to  act  on  his  truly  held  evaluations. 
A  person  who  has  evaluations  but  regularly  fails  to  act  on  them  because  he  cannot  resist 
temptation  is  weak-willed.  Temptation  comes  in  different  forms,  of  course;  had  Elinor 
Dashwood  not  been  a  person  of  integrity  she  might  have  given  in  to  the  temptation  to  hate 
her  rival  or  to  reveal  her  confidences.  14 
Character  development  involves  at  least  two  related  processes;  first,  making  deeper  and 
firmer  our  sense  of  the  value  of  things,  and  second,  being  able  to  resist  the  attraction  of 
things  that  we  do  not  value  so  much,  but  which  are  pleasant.  These  processes  go  hand  in 
hand.  To  truly  do  the  first  of  these  involves  doing  the  second  15.  The  person  who  does  the 
first  but  not  the  second  has  grasped  what  is  valuable  only  in  an  attenuated  sense.  Not  only 
has  he  failed  to  make  his  grasp  of  value  a  part  of  his  dispositions,  but  he  has  only  grasped 
it  at  all  in  a  weaker  sense. 
In  Aristotle's  view  character  is  in  this  sense  on  a  continuum.  At  one  end  we  have  those 
who  have  no  real  values  and  are  driven  by  whatever  desires  happen  to  seize  them,  and  at 
the  other  the  fully  virtuous  man.  In  between  we  have  the  weak-willed  or  incontinent  man 
and  the  continent  man.  Integrity  also  involves  something  else,  however.  According  to 
Aristotle,  the  judgements  of  the  person  of  integrity  flow  from  his  practical  understanding 
(Phronesis).  This  means  that  his  sense  of  the  value  of  one  good  in  a  specific  context  comes 
from  a  wider  understanding  which  relates  the  values  of  different  goods  in  different 
situations.  The  person  of  integrity  therefore  has  a  sense  of  the  place  and  importance  which 
different  goods  have  in  the  good  life  16.  We  can  now  compare  the  idea  of  character  which 
we  have  elaborated,  with  an  account  offered  by  Harry  Frankfurt. 
14  There  is  a  relevant  distinction  to  be  made  here  between  the  person  who  is  tempted  in  these  ways  but  resists  -  the 
continent  person  -  and  the  person  who  ceases  to  feel  temptation.  No  doubt,  however,  these  are  points  on  a  spectrum. 
Both  of  them,  however,  would  count  as  examples  of  integrity. 
is  One  of  Martha  Nussbaum's  suggestions  about  incontinence  is  that  the  person  who  merely  believes  that  something  is 
valuable  will  be  prone  to  temptation  in  a  way  that  those  who  have  a  firmer  grasp  of  its  value  will  not.  Having  a  "real" 
sense  of  the  value  of  something  involves  not  merely  beliefs  but  a  cognitive  experience  which  is  itself  motivating;  such 
a  grasp  involves  not  giving  in  to  temptation.  Of  the  akratic  she  writes;  "She  is  however.. 
.  not  full  confronting  or 
acknowledging  the  situation  to  herself...  so  her  intellectual  grasp  doesn't  amount  to  perception,  or  to  a  real 
grasp..  . 
Even  though  she  has  the  facts  right,  there  is  a  perfectly  good,  though  quite  non-Socratic  sense  in  which  she 
doesn't  know  what  she  is  doing".  (Love's  Knowledge,  p.  80). 
16  One  source  of  dispute  at  this  point  is  whether  this  sense  of  the  good  life,  and  of  the  value  of  different  goods  needs  to  be 
articulated.  Charles  Talyor,  in  various  writings  (for  example,  "Self  Interpreting  Animals")  argues  that  it  does,  while 
140 Frankfurt's  "Wanton". 
Character  is  formed  through  time.  It  is  not  something  that  children  usually  possess.  To  see 
in  a  little  more  detail  what  is  involved  in  acquiring  character,  it  will  be  useful  to  compare 
the  person  who  possesses  it  with  a  fictional  creation  of  Harry  Frankfurt's,  '?  the  `wanton". 
The  "wanton",  as  Frankfurt  describes  him,  is  someone  who  acts  simply  on  the  basis  of  his 
first-order  desires.  Whichever  desire  is  stronger  at  any  given  time  is  the  one  that  he  will 
act  upon.  According  to  Frankfurt,  what  distinguishes  the  wanton  from  most  of  us  is  that 
we  are  not  in  the  same  way  at  the  mercy  of  our  first  order  desires.  We  are  not  simply 
blown  about  by  whatever  happens  to  be  our  strongest  desire.  We  evaluate  our  first  order 
desires;  we  have  desires  which  we  think  important  and  those  which  we  would  prefer  not 
to  have  or  act  upon.  In  this  way,  we  have  second  order  desires  about  first  order  desires. 
We  want  to  have  some  desires  and  not  others,  in  other  words.  What  makes  us  agents  with 
control  over  our  lives,  according  to  Frankfurt,  is  that  we  "identify"  with  our  second  order 
desires  and  make  them  our  own.  Frankfurt's  intention  in  sketching  the  wanton  is  to  isolate 
what  it  is  that  the  wanton  lacks.  The  rival  picture  which  he  builds  up  is  that  of  a  person 
with  a  developed  character.  So  to  be  a  person  is,  for  Frankfurt,  to  exercise  a  kind  of  self- 
mastery;  it  is  not  merely  to  have  desires  but  to  evaluate  those  desires,  and  this  involves  us 
somehow  "identifying"  ourselves  with  some  of  them.  So  far,  then,  this  account  seems 
very  similar  to  the  one  we  have  already  sketched  of  the  person  of  integrity. 
So  let  us  inquire,  then  first,  if  the  positive  picture  that  Frankfurt  offers  us  is  sufficient  for 
the  description  of  someone  as  having  character  -  in  particular,  how  should  we  understand 
the  notion  of  "identification"  as  Frankfurt  describes  it?  Second,  if  his  account  is  not 
adequate  but  can  be  supplemented,  to  what  extent  does  the  resulting  picture  of  character 
conflict  with  the  Sartrean  picture  of  choice  that  we  considered,  above?  So,  let  us  ask  in 
what  sense  the  person  who  possesses  integrated  character  is  "identified"  with  his  values  or 
projects.  Frankfurt  says  simply, 
others  have  denied  it.  For  discussion  see  Owen  Flanagan,  "Identity  and  Strong  and  Weak  Evaluation",  in  Flanagan 
(ed)  Identity,  Character  and  Morality. 
17  Harry  Frankfurt,  "Freedom  of  the  Will  and  the  Concept  of  the  Person",  in  Watson  ed.  Free  Will. 
141 "Someone  has  a  desire  of  the  second  order  either  when  he  wants  simply  to  have  a  certain 
desire  or  when  he  wants  a  certain  desire  to  be  his  will".  (p.  86) 
The  identification  that  Frankfurt  focuses  on  is  the  agent's  identification  with  his  will.  He 
or  she  wants  one  of  his  or  her  desires  to  be  the  one  they  act  on.  But  why  do  they  want  this? 
What  is  it  about  that  desire  that  gives  rise  to  this  identification?  Could  it  be,  for  example 
that  they  simply  choose  that  one  desire  rather  than  another  will  be  the  one  they  identify 
with?  This  suggestion  is  reminiscent  of  the  Sartrean  account  of  deliberation;  the  basis  in 
both  cases  is  radical  choice.  A  similar  picture  is  suggested  by  Fingarette's  account  of 
"identification"  in  his  book  on  self-deception".  He  writes, 
"  The  phrase,  "he  identifies  himself  as",  certainly  has  some  reference  to  discoveries  the 
individual  makes;  but  it  refers  as  well  to  options  adopted.  "  (p.  68) 
So  we  might  think  of  identification  in  terms  of  "discovery"  or  in  terms  of  an  act  of  will. 
But  what  would  this  latter  option  be  like?  It  might  be  for  example,  that  I  am  faced  with 
two  courses  of  action,  one  of  which  represents  something  I  value,  while  the  other  will 
bring  more  pleasure  but  is  not  something  I  value.  Here  perhaps  I  may  choose  to  "identify" 
myself  with  the  first  alternative.  But  in  what  sense  is  this  really a  choice?  Clearly  there  is 
a  choice,  but  it  is  a  choice  based  on  something.  More  specifically,  it  is  based  on  the  fact 
that  I  already  face  these  two  alternatives  as  distinct.  The  first  is  one  with  which  I  am 
already  in  a  sense  identified  with-  it  is  the  one  I  value.  This,  though  it  issues  in  a  choice, 
involves  a  discovery.  If  there  were  nothing  my  choice  was  based  on,  no  already  present 
way  things  present  themselves  to  me,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  the  choice  could  amount  to 
much  since  it  would  be  truly  random,  and  so  meaningless.  This  point  was  made  in  a 
previous  section,  and  strongly  suggests  that  what  is  involved  in  valuing  something-  what 
we  might  call  the  "phenomenology"  of  value-  is  incompatible  with  choice.  I  cannot 
choose  to  find  something  valuable.  This  is  the  same  sort  of  incompatibility  as  we  find 
between  decision  and  belief;  I  cannot  decide  what  to  believe  because  the  notion  of  belief 
involves  being  guided  by  how  the  world  is19.  And  that  is  incompatible  with  simply 
'$  H.  Fingarette,  SelfDeception. 
19  Cf.  Bernard  Williams,  "Deciding  to  Believe",  in  Problems  of  the  Self. 
142 deciding  how  things  are.  Such  a  decision  could  carry  no  conviction,  and  the  same  is  true 
of  any  attempt  to  settle  questions  of  value  by  acts  of  will. 
We  can  now  make  a  general  point.  When  someone  is  identified  with  a  value  or  a  course 
of  action  this  cannot  be  explained  simply  be  acts  of  choice20.  What  is  missing  from  any 
such  an  account  is  the  acknowledgement  that  the  person  must,  in  order  to  make  a  real 
choice,  already  see  things  in  a  certain  way.  He  must  for  example  see  one  alternative  as 
more  valuable  than  another.  This  point  does  not  simply  involve  assuming  the  falsity  of 
subjectivism  about  value.  Even  on  a  Humean  account,  there  is  still  a  problem  with  the 
claim  that  values  are  chosen.  The  problem  is  that  the  emphasis  on  radical  choice  makes 
moral  experience  active,  but  the  phenomenology  of  moral  experience,  as  of  belief,  is 
passive.  And  this  feature  ofpassivity  is  the  result  of  the  fact  that  the  various  alternatives  in 
a  given  situation  strike  us  with  their  own  force.  In  other  words,  there  is  a  way  we  perceive 
the  situation. 
When  we  speak  of  someone  being  identified  with  a  value  or  course  of  action  we  can, 
then,  only  explain  this  by  referring  to  how  he  perceives  the  situation;  but  that  could  not  be 
a  matter  of  choice.  Returning  now  to  Frankfurt's  picture  of  second  order  identification, 
what  implications  does  the  conclusion  we  have  just  reached  have  for  it?  First,  as  we  have 
seen,  since  he  merely  says  that  the  agent  identifies  with  a  second  order  desire  this  will 
either  involve  a  simple  act  of  will-  in  which  case  it  will  not  have  the  necessary 
phenomenology  -  or  it  will  be  more  than  a  simple  decision  because  it  will  be  supported  by 
or  based  on  the  way  things  seem  to  the  agent.  But  in  that  case  the  important  stage  of 
identification  will  already  be  assumed.  It  will  be  what  explains  the  decision,  not  the  other 
way  around.  We  can  see,  therefore,  that  both  Frankfurt  and  Sartre  make  a  mistake  in 
claiming  that  character  can  be  grounded  in  this  kind  of  choice  21 
But  in  any  case,  there  are  other  reasons  why  Frankfurt's  analysis  falls  short  of  character. 
For  one  thing,  he  is  quite  explicit  that  the  second  order  evaluations  need  not  be  consistent 
over  time.  The  identifier  can  be  capricious22; 
20  This  is  also  argued,  also  against  the  Sartrean  Position,  by  Charles  Taylor,  "Responsibility  for  Self',  in  Watson  ed. 
Free  Will. 
21  In  one  sense  of  course  -  one  with  which  Aristotle  would  agree  -  character  is  founded  in  choice;  we  make  decisions  that 
affect  the  ways  our  characters  develop.  But  this  process,  which  is  the  process  of  educating  character,  involves 
educating  our  grasp  of  things.  Choices  are  required  but  they  function  in  a  different  way  to  Sartre's  account. 
22  This  objection  to  Frankfurt's  account  is  made  by  Gabriele  Taylor  in  Pride,  Shame  and  Guilt. 
143 "a  person  may  be  capricious  and  irresponsible  in  forming  his  second  order 
volitions....  second  order  volitions  express  evaluations  only  in  the  sense  that  they  are 
preferences.  There  is  no  essential  restriction  on  the  kind  of  basis,  if  any,  upon  which  they 
are  formed.  " 
(p.  13  n.  6) 
The  difference  between  this  view  and  the  picture  of  the  person  of  integrity,  is  that  the 
latter's  evaluations  are  based  not  merely  on  what  he  really-  at  that  time  -  prefers  but  on 
what  he  sees  as  valuable  or  good.  Making  those  kinds  of  judgements  involves  a 
commitment  to  the  realism  of  the  values  ascribed,  23  and  the  demands  of  consistency. 
Preference,  on  the  other  hand,  is  notoriously  fickle,  and  involves  no  commitment  to 
consistency  -  either  synchronically  or  diachronically.  Frankfurt's  identifier  in  fact  lacks 
integrity,  since  he  is-  and  sees  himself  as  being-  totally  unconstrained  by  present 
preferences.  Such  an  agent  need  not  be  inconsistent;  he  may  in  fact  be  consistently 
inconsistent.  But  he  does  not  possess  integrity. 
Caprice  of  this  sort  is  tolerable  with  respect  to  a  large  class  of  desires  and  preferences, 
and  may  even  be  desirable  in  the  case  of  some  of  them.  But  with  respect  to  values  such  as 
those  involved  in  promises,  obligations,  emotional  commitments  to  family,  friends  and 
lovers,  such  caprice  is  a  failing.  Frankfurt's  capricious  identifier  is,  however,  still  - 
minimally-  an  identifier.  But  it  is  equally  clear  that  his  identification  is  shallow,  precisely 
because  it  could  be  based  on  an  act  of  will.  Does  such  a  person  possess  character?  Since 
there  is  nothing  for  him  to  be  consistent  about,  except  perhaps  letting  things  be 
determined  by  his  strongest  preference,  he  cannot  have  integrity  or  character.  And  when 
an  action  is  the  product  of  integrated  character,  this  seems  to  allow  a  deeper  sense  in 
which  the  action  is  "mine"  than  the  capricious  identifier,  or  wanton,  can  claim24. 
23  Some  philosophers  deny  this;  J.  L.  Mackie's  well-known  "error  theory"  about  value  was  one  he  thought  we  could  all 
come  to  embrace  without  seriously  disturbing  our  moral  practices.  However,  I  do  not  think  this  view  can  be  defended. 
24  This  was  in  fact  Frankfurt's  aim;  to  show  how  a  compatibilist  defence  of  free  will  can  fend  off  various  counter 
examples  by  revealing  the  mechanism  by  which  some  desires,  preferences  and  so  on  are  "mine".  Thus,  the 
kleptomaniac's  desire,  for  example,  is  not  really  "his".  The  same  strategy,  Frankfurt  hoped,  could  show  which 
emotional  responses  are  really  mine. 
144 When  Are  My  Emotions  Mine? 
The  points  I  have  just  been  making  about  character  and  integrity  can  be  thought  of  as 
offering  one  account  of  when  it  is  that  an  action  or  desire  is  mine  in  a  non-superficial 
sense.  An  akratic  action  is  still  of  course  the  agent's  action;  it  was  still  him  who  performed 
it.  But  it  does  not  express  the  values  he  takes  himself  to  hold,  and  so  in  a  deeper  sense  is 
not  "his".  Equally,  the  drug  addict  or  the  alcoholic  may  wish  to  give  up  their  addictions, 
but  be  unable  to.  Here  again,  we  might  say,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  their  course  of  action 
is  not  the  result  of  a  choice  based  on  their  evaluations,  and  so  not  really  "theirs". 
Compatibilist  accounts  of  free  will  must  make  room  for  this  fact,  since  their  credibility 
rests  on  their  ability  to  explain  why  certain  causal  antecedents  of  action  and  not  others  are 
consistent  with  free  choice.  Acting  under  coercion,  for  example,  is  the  kind  of  case 
compatibilists  typically  rule  out,  but  they  must  also  accommodate  the  intuition  that  the 
alcoholic,  the  drug  addict  and  the  hypnotist's  victim  and  other  stock  counter-examples  are 
similarly  not  acting  freely.  Frankfurt's  account  of  evaluative  choice  is  an  attempt  to  do 
this.  His  theory  attempts  to  replace  the  traditional  compatibilist  criteria  of  "external"  and 
"internal"  antecedents  of  action  with  an  account  based  on  second-order  evaluation.  The 
promise  of  such  an  account  is  that  it  shows  that  an  action's  being  mine  is  not  simply  a 
matter  of  it's  being  a  product  of  my  will  or  desire. 
The  connection  between  this  issue  and  the  subject  of  emotion  is  this;  we  need  some 
account  of  when  an  emotional  response  is  "mine"  and  when  not.  For  just  as  there  are  cases 
of  action  which  an  agent  can  legitimately  disclaim,  so  there  are  emotional  responses  of 
which  the  same  is  true.  If,  despite  my  avowed  views  to  the  contrary,  I  find  myself 
laughing  at  a  racist  joke,  or  find  myself  horrified  by  the  disclosure  of  your  homosexuality, 
how  should  we  describe  my  response?  One  option  would  be  to  take  my  responses  as 
casting  doubt  on  the  sincerity  of  my  avowed  views.  In  this  respect,  the  situation  is  similar 
to  the  case  of  recalcitrance,  considered  in  chapter  one.  There,  we  concluded  that  the 
recalcitrant  reaction  need  not  cast  doubt  on  the  sincerity  of  my  beliefs.  That  really  is  what 
145 I  believe,  the  difficulty  is  that  my  beliefs  are  not  fully  integrated  with  my  emotions25. 
Another  type  of  case  are  those  in  which  my  emotional  responses  are  chemically  induced, 
for  example  by  alcohol,  or  more  exotically  perhaps,  the  example  of  drug-induced  love  in 
the  story  of  Tristan  and  Isolde. 
The  account  we  have  developed  so  far  allows  us  to  see  how  we  might  respond  to  such 
cases.  Since  they  are  not  the  product  of  my  deepest  evaluations,  they  are  reactions  that 
have  somehow  "escaped"  me,  and  are  not  wholly  mine.  The  two  senses  distinguished  here 
in  which  an  action  or  response  can  be  mine  -  the  sense  in  which  it  expresses  my 
conception  of  myself,  and  the  minimal  sense  in  which  it  was  me  who  acted  or  responded  - 
find  analogues  in  the  case  of  shame  and  guilt.  In  a  case  of  shame  like  Gabriel's  in  chapter 
one,  the  agent  identifies  with  his  perception  of  himself  and  his  situation.  The  object  of  his 
shame  is  himself,  "  something  about  his  true  self  has  been  revealed  or  discovered.  In  effect 
his  shame  is  a  recognition  of  failing  by  the  standards  of  what  he  thinks  truly  importantly. 
In  cases  of  guilt  however,  the  agent  has  done  something  which  he  regards  as  in  some 
sense  alien  to  him.  His  true  self  has  not  been  revealed. 
On  the  account  we  have  given,  then,  it  is  possible  to  see  why  a  variety  of  different 
emotional  responses  are  felt  to  be  "external"  or  not  wholly  mine.  Phobics,  for  example, 
may  experience  various  kinds  of  inability  as  a  result  of  their  fears-  an  inability  to  go  near 
the  edges  of  tall  buildings,  to  walk  in  open  spaces,  or  to  go  near  a  certain  kind  of  animal- 
but  the  inability  will  be  experienced  as  something  external  to  them,  as  something  they 
may  wish  to  overcome.  In  short  they  do  not  see  themselves  expressed  in  their  emotions. 
Things  are  importantly  different,  however,  in  cases  of  another  kind  of  inability  or 
incapacity.  These  are  the  cases  of  "  practical  necessity"  which  were  mentioned  above,  and 
to  which  I  now  turn. 
zs  This  is  reminiscent  of  Nussbaum's  point  (see  n.  11  above)  that  complete  integration  requires  more  than  just  beliefs. 
This  point  is  of  importance  for  any  account  of  emotional  education. 
26  This  point  is  made  by  Gabrielle  Taylor  in  Pride,  Shame  and  Guilt. 
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1 
The  term  "practical  necessity"  refers  to  cases  in  which,  when  faced  with  a  choice,  the 
agent  experiences  one  alternative  as  the  one  he  must  choose,  or,  alternatively,  as  one  he 
cannot  possibly  perform.  Bernard  Williams  offers  as  examples27  the  case  of  Luther 
refusing  to  renounce  his  views  in  front  of  the  emperor  Charles  the  Fifth,  and  the 
eponymous  Ajax  in  Sophocles'  tragedy,  resolving  that  he  must  take  his  own  life.  The 
experience  of  practical  necessity,  however  is  not  merely  the  recognition  of  what,  all  things 
considered,  we  ought  (morally  speaking)  to  do  or  refrain  from  doing,  such  as  that  I  ought 
to  give  money  to  famine  relief.  It  is  consistent  with  that  conclusion  that  the  other 
alternatives  remain  viable  alternatives  (giving  the  money  instead  to  cancer  research,  for 
example)  . 
In  cases  of  practical  necessity,  on  the  other  hand,  the  other  alternatives  become 
things  the  agent  simply  cannot  do.  It  is  also  noteworthy  that  while  practical  necessity  is  a 
recognition  of  what  one  must  do,  rather  than  what  one  must  feel  (feelings,  after  all,  are  not 
actions)  it  is  not  a  "cool"  intellectual  judgement.  Rather,  it  is  essentially  affective,  we  are 
aware  of  it  through  our  emotional  responses. 
One  crucial  point  about  this  sense  of  necessity  or  incapacity,  which  bears  on  the 
discussion  in  the  previous  section,  is  that  the  agent  feels  constrained;  he  experiences  a 
necessity  or  incapacity,  but  he  does  not  feel  it  as  a  constraint  externally  imposed.  By 
contrast,  the  cases  of  phobias  are  felt  as  "external".  An  indication  of  this  is  that  in  the 
latter  cases  the  person  may  try  to  overcome  his  inability  and  wish  that  he  could  succeed. 
But  this  wish  is  typically  absent  in  cases  of  moral  incapacity;  the  agent  does  not  wish  to 
be  able  to  do  what  he  finds  he  cannot.  The  distinction  between  moral  incapacity  and  other 
incapacities  such  as  phobias,  is  the  difference  between  incapacities  we  are  merely  subject 
to  (such  as  phobias)  and  incapacities  which  are  essential  to  our  moral  character.  Moral 
character,  as  already  discussed,  is  something  which  I  have  chosen,  insofar  as  my  choices 
and  decisions  helped  form  it  through  time.  And  it  is  this  factor  which  makes  it  distinct 
27  In  "practical  Necessity"  and  "Moral  Incapacity"  (Op.  Cit). 
147 from  merely  psychological  incapacities,  and  explains  why  I  do  not  wish  to  become 
capable  in  these  respects.  To  want  to  overcome  a  moral  incapacity  is  in  a  sense  already  to 
have  lost  it  28 
Williams  is  clear  that  practical  necessity  at  least  (unlike  moral  incapacity)  is  not 
concerned  with  narrowly  "moral"  concerns  such  as  obligations; 
"One  point...  is  that  there  is  nothing  special  about  moral  necessity,  in  any  of  the 
narrower  senses  of  that  expression  which  relates  specially  to  such  things  as  obligation; 
though  there  may  be  a  broader  sense-  an  ultimately  broad  sense,  relating  to  character  and 
action-  in  which  all  really  serious  examples  of  such  necessities  are  moral  necessities.  s29 
So  practical  necessity  need  not  be  about  narrowly  moral  demands.  It  may  be  of  course;  I 
may  feel  I  must  save  the  drowning  child.  In  such  moral  cases  there  seems  to  be  a  quite 
clear  source  for  the  agent's  sense  that  he  would  not  attempt  to  overcome  the  sense  of 
necessity;  for  instance  the  thought  that  not  to  feel  that  he  must  save  the  child  would  be 
wrong.  In  that  case  to  imagine  overcoming  the  disposition  is  to  imagine  being  the  kind  of 
person  who  was  disposed  to  do  what  was  morally  wrong,  and  this  is  a  possibility  the 
moral  agent  cannot  endorse.  Part  of  what  it  is  to  think  that  an  action  is  morally  right,  then, 
is  just  this  kind  of  identification  with  it.  But  the  wider  sense  of  "moral"  suggested  by 
Williams  -  which  is  closer  to  Aristotle's  sense  of  the  ethical-  covers  all  "serious" 
examples  of  practical  necessity  :  which  is  just  to  say  that  all  cases  of  practical  necessity 
are  the  result  of  character  and  are  therefore  based  on  the  kind  of  settled  perceptions 
considered  previously. 
What,  then,  if  anything,  do  the  experiences  of  practical  necessity  and  moral  incapacity 
imply  about  our  emotional  life?  What,  first,  of  the  connection  between  these  experiences 
and  the  possession  of  character?  Can  we  claim  that  the  experience  of  Practical  Necessity 
is  a  necessary  condition  of  character?  This  conclusion,  however,  would  be  too  strong. 
Character  requires  that  the  agent  values  a  range  of  goods,  and  that  he  is  faithful  to  these 
evaluations  in  the  face  of  other,  less  valued  though  attractive,  goods.  So  it  requires  not 
"giving  in",  a  firm  sense  of  what  is  important,  and  so  on.  But  this  is  compatible  with  the 
agent's  deliberation  being  made  up  exclusively  of  deliberation  about  what  the  agent 
28  This  point  is  made  by  Craig  Taylor  in  his  helpful  discussion,  "Moral  Incapacity"  Philosophy  1995. 
29  practical  Necessity  p.  127. 
148 "ought"  to  do.  Respecting  and  being  faithful  to  what  he  values,  then,  does  not  require  an 
additional  sense  that  some  things  are  simply  not  options,  things  the  agent  couldn't  do. 
Is  the  experience  of  practical  necessity  then  merely  an  optional  extra,  something  tacked 
on  to  our  moral  psychology  once  the  important  work  has  all  been  done?  We  can  answer 
this  question  by  imagining  what  it  would  be  like  to  lack  the  experience  of  practical 
necessity.  Fortunately  there  is  a  figure,  familiar  from  moral  philosophy,  who  can  serve  as 
a  model  in  this  thought  experiment-  the  utilitarian.  To  begin  with,  it  is  clear  that  the 
utilitarian  can  have  character  in  the  sense  discussed  so  far.  He  is  committed  to  the  pursuit 
of  the  general  happiness,  and  so  long  as  he  is  faithful  to  this  goal  in  ways  already 
discussed,  that  is  sufficient  for  the  possession  of  character.  But  would  the  utilitarian 
experience  practical  necessity?  With  one  possible  exception,  (to  be  discussed  below)  the 
answer  must  be  that  he  would  not.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  utilitarian  is  committed  to 
the  maximisation  of  general  utility  and  therefore  approaches  any  situation  with  that  as  his 
moral  goal30.  Ideally,  therefore,  when  he  surveys  his  options,  he  is  drawn  to  the  course  of 
action  that  maximises  utility.  But  since  it  is  an  entirely  contingent  and  variable  matter 
which  option  that  will  turn  out  to  be,  his  other  allegiances,  emotional  and  otherwise,  can 
only  be  provisional.  Should  he  be  called  upon,  in  the  name  of  utility-maximisation,  to 
sacrifice  a  friendship,  or  save  an  important  scientist  rather  than  his  wife,  say,  then  this  is 
what  he  will  do.  The  theory  can  permit  him  some  regret  about  the  sacrifices  which  the 
demands  of  morality  force  upon  him,  but  these  are  merely  cosmetic  so  far  as  the  theory  is 
concerned31.  What  the  theory  cannot  allow  him  is  any  sense  that  some  options  are 
unconditionally  "off  limits",  and  this  amounts  to  a  ruling  that  the  experience  of  practical 
necessity  is  mistaken,  even  self-indulgent32. 
The  one  possible  exception  to  this  picture  is  that  of  general  utility  itself,  since  it  is  the 
one  thing  which  is  unconditionally  good  as  far  as  the  utilitarian  is  concerned.  Perhaps  the 
utilitarian  could  feel  he  must  maximise  utility,  and  thus  would  at  least  experience  practical 
necessity  about  something.  Whether  this  is  so  or  not,  in  all  other  respects  the  utilitarian's 
experience  must  lack  practical  necessity  and  moral  incapacity,  because  the  utilitarian 
theory  demands  that  agents  perceive  the  quantity  of  utility  produced  by  a  course  of  action 
as  the  most  salient  feature  of  any  situation.  And  that  precludes  the  unconditional  nature  of 
30  This  is  true  only  of  act  utilitarians.  Rule  utilitarianism  may  make  different  psychological  allowances. 
31  Exactly  what  they  are  as  far  as  the  agent  is  concerned  is  less  clear. 
32  Wiliams  discusses  this  charge  in  "Utilitarianism  and  Self-indulgence"  in  Moral  Luck. 
149 moral  incapacity.  But  this  raises  the  question  of  what  sort  of  emotional  attachments  a 
utilitarian  can  have.  Since,  for  most  of  us,  the  feature  of  unconditionality  is  one  that 
characterises  our  most  intimate  emotional  relationships.  The  person  who  did  not  feel  that 
he  "must"  save  his  wife,  whatever  the  other  options,  as  in  Williams'  example,  would,  we 
feel,  be  in  a  different  sort  of  relationship  to  most  of  us.  And  similar  points  apply  to 
friendships  and  other  family  relations. 
It  is  difficult  to  imagine  what  such  relationships  would  be  like,  and  no  doubt  the  nature 
of  human  relationships  varies  through  place  and  time.  Eighteeenth  century  people,  for 
example,  frequently  gave  several  of  their  children  the  same  name,  aware  that  high  rates  of 
infant  mortality  would  mean  that  many  of  them  would  perish33.  And  in  the  same  period 
marriages  for  different  sorts  of  convenience,  rather  than  love,  seem  to  have  been  more 
prevalent  than  today.  Given  such  facts,  it  may  be  that  the  meaning  of  emotional  ties  was 
different.  Perhaps  it  is  only  with  the  rise  of  the  concept  of  the  "Individual",  with  its 
various  metaphysical  and  moral/political  associations,  that  emotional  ties  as  we  know 
them  really  begin.  That  is  debatable,  but  the  point  we  can  make  with  confidence  is  that 
such  ideas  are  part  of  our  sense  of  the  meaning  of  emotional  ties. 
Let  me  then  try  to  sum  up  this  discussion  of  character  and  practical  necessity.  I  will 
single  out  five  points. 
1)  First  of  all,  we  have  established  a  claim  about  character;  that  it  cannot  be  explained 
simply  as  a  product  of  will,  although  it  is  true  that  we  make  decisions  which  influence  the 
development  of  our  character.  These  decisions  involve  what  I  attempt  to  learn,  to  be  open 
to,  and  become.  Character,  in  short,  concerns  the  education  of  perception.  It  follows  from 
this  that  the  Sartrean  objection  to  Aristotle  is  mistaken. 
2)  Secondly,  character  itself  involves  integrity  and  an  interconnected  sense  of  the  value  of 
different  goods.  Character  therefore  involves  the  education  of  our  emotional  responses  in 
line  with  our  evaluations.  This  fact  allows  us  to  begin  to  distinguish  emotional  responses 
which  are  mine  merely  in  the'sense  that  I  have  them,  and  those  that  are  mine  in  a  more 
substantial  sense.  This  distinction  involves  the  sense  that  I  am  identified  in  a  substantial 
sense  with  my  responses  and  actions. 
33  These  and  other  facts  are  recounted  by  Lawrence  Stone  in  Sex  and  Marriage  in  Eighteenth  Century  England". 
150 3)  A  third  conclusion  we  have  reached  in  this  section  has  been  that  a  range  of  necessities 
and  incapacities  involve  just  this  sense  of  identification.  Practical  necessity  and  moral 
incapacity  therefore  presuppose  character.  Moral  incapacity,  furthermore  is  an  incapacity 
which  is  mine  in  a  sense  in  which  other  incapacities  -  such  as  those  which  result  from 
phobias-  are  not. 
4)  Fourthly,  these  incapacities  are  a  consequence  of  the  nature  of  a  wide  range  of  our 
emotional  ties;  in  fact  they  are  a  necessary  feature  of  them. 
5)  To  these  points  we  can  add  a  fifth;  that  while  character  is  not  sufficient  for  a  sense  of 
the  importance  of  emotional  ties  which  gives  rise  to  moral  incapacity,  the  process  through 
which  this  sense  is  acquired,  is  a  cognitive  one.  This  conclusion  follows  naturally  from  the 
claim  that  the  emotional  ties  of  utilitarians,  say,  are  constitutively  different  ;  they  do  not 
regard  their  friends,  loved-ones  and  so  on,  in  the  same  way.  34  This  point  is  consistent  with 
the  strong  cognitivism  outlined  in  chapter  two;  those  who  lack  the  emotional  affects 
which  are  constitutive  of  personal  relations  cannot  have  the  same  cognitive  attitude 
towards  others  as  those  who  do  not  lack  them. 
Reflection  and  Justification. 
One  question  we  might  ask  in  the  face  of  these  claims  is  how  exactly  the  notion  of 
justification  fits  in.  I  cited  earlier  Williams'  example  of  the  man  who  saves  his  wife.  His 
thought  here  is  not,  as  Williams  says,  about  what  he  would  be  justified  in  doing  in  that 
case; 
"...  surely  this  is  a  justification  on  behalf  of  the  rescuer,  that  the  person  he  chose  to 
rescue  was  his  wife?  It  depends  how  much  weight  is  carried  by  "justification"  ;  the 
34  Exactly  how  they  are  different  is  another  question.  Is  it  the  idea  of  "uniqueness"  that  they  lack,  the  sense  of  being 
irreplaceable?  Plato,  for  example,  argues  in  the  Symposium,  that  we  should  regard  loved-ones  and  lovers  as  merely 
poor  reflections  of  something  else,  the  Form.  They  become  then,  mere  universals  and  dispensable.  This  is  one  way  to 
understand  what  is  lacking,  but  not  the  only  one. 
151 consideration  that  it  was  his  wife  is  certainly,  for  instance,  an  explanation  which  should 
silence  comment.  But  something  more  ambitious  than  this  is  usually  intended,  essentially 
involving  the  idea  that  moral  principle  can  legitimate  his  preference,  yielding  the 
conclusion  that  in  situations  of  this  kind  it  is  at  least  all  right..  .  to  save  one's  wife..  .  But 
this  construction  provides  the  agent  with  one  thought  too  many;  it  might  have  been  hoped 
by  some  (for  instance,  by  his  wife)  that  his  motivating  thought,  fully  spelled  out,  would  be 
the  thought  that  it  was  his  wife,  not  that  it  was  his  wife  and  in  situations  of  this  kind  it  is 
permissible  to  save  one's  wife.  , 35 
Williams  seems  to  be  right  here  that  the  simplified  thought  is  morally  preferable.  But  how 
can  we  combine  this  with  the  thought  that,  as  Aristotle  puts  it,  the  good  man  does  what  is 
good  because  it  is  good.  The  would  seem  to  involve  exactly  the  kind  of  construction  that 
Williams'  case  rules  out.  To  act  out  of  love  or  friendship  is  essentially  to  be  moved 
because  it  is  that  particular  person,  and  not  that  person  as  an  instance  of  something  more 
general.  But  how  do  we  get  from  this  thought  to  a  justification?  Once  we  start  introducing 
general  considerations  of  whatever  sort  which  connect  with  the  particular  thought,  then 
my  deliberation  starts  to  take  on  the  morally  suspect  form.  But  the  problem  is  that 
justification  is  essentially  general.  If  I  am  justified  in  saving  my  friend  it  can  only  be 
because  "people  are  justified  in  saving  their  friends"  (all  things  being  equal.  ).  But 
reference  to  that  justifying  thought  disqualifies  my  action  from  being  one  motivated  by 
friendship.  Philip  Pettit36  puts  the  point  as  follows, 
"The  need  for  a  rigidly  individualised  reason  connects  with  the  fact  that  to  act  out  of  a 
commitment  to  love-  to  act  out  of  a  recognition  of  the  consideration  that  justifies  the 
action;  that  this  is  someone  I  love-  is  not  to  act  out  of  a  lover's  commitment,  a 
commitment  to  the  beloved.  For  justification  always  abstracts  away  from  particularity  and 
when  I  say  that  I  love  someone  in  justifying  what  I  did,  the  identity  of  the  particular 
individual  in  question  is  not  relevant;  all  that  is  essential  to  the  justification  is  that  it  is  an 
act  of  love.  To  act  out  of  a  recognition  of  that  justifying  consideration  then,  would  not  be 
to  act  on  the  basis  of  a  reason  that  is  rigidly  individualised  in  favour  of  the  beloved.  It 
would  be  to  fail  to  register  the  sort  of  thing  that  is  part  and  parcel  of  thinking  as  a  lover.  " 
35"  Persons,  Character  and  Morality",  p.  18. 
36  Philip  Pettit,  "Love  and  its  Place  in  Moral  Discourse:  In  Lamb  (ed.  )  Love  Analysed.  1997. 
152 In  fact  the  problem  we  are  faced  with  here  is  one  we  have  met  before,  in  chapter  one  and 
again  in  chapter  three.  In  chapter  one  we  considered  Davidson's  view  of  emotions  as  a 
syllogism  with  minor  and  major  premises,  and  ultimately  rejected  it.  I  followed  Gabriele 
Taylor  in  denying  the  need  for  a  universal  general  premise.  Instead  there  was  an 
understanding  of  the  particular.  The  general  syllogistic  picture  of  understanding  was 
attacked  again  in  chapter  three,  where  an  alternative  account  was  offered  in  the  form  of 
Dancy's  "particularism".  Here  we  now  find  that  the  syllogistic  model  also  faces  acute 
difficulties  when  it  attempts  to  capture  some  forms  of  ethical  reflection.  In  Williams's 
example,  the  rescuer's  experience  has  intentional  content,  but  the  focus  of  that  content  is 
his  wife.  It  is  his  experience  of  her  that  generates  the  sense  of  necessity,  not  his  appeal  to 
moral  rules.  As  for  Aristotle,  what  Aristotle  was  right  to  emphasise  is  that  the  good  person 
is  educated  to  be  motivated  by  the  right  sorts  of  concerns.  Seeing  things  in  the  correct 
way,  he  is  moved  to  act  by  the  right  things.  In  that  sense  he  does  what  is  good  because  it 
is  good.  But  that  it  is  good,  is  revealed  to  him  in  his  experience  of  it,  just  as  the  rescuer's 
grasp  of  what  is  important  is  present  in  his  experience  of  the  situation.  Neither  the  rescuer 
nor  the  virtuous  man  need  appeal  to  rules,  principles,  or  other  considerations  outside  their 
experience  of  the  situation  for  them  to  be  motivated  by  what  is  good. 
We  have  now  completed  our  reply  to  the  attack  on  the  notion  of  character  and  its 
relation  to  emotion  which  was  the  basis  of  the  Aristotelian  account  of  the  value  of 
emotion.  I  shall  now  return  to  that  account  and  attempt  to  add  a  little  more  detail  to  it.  We 
have  already  seen  that  a  feature  of  Aristotle's  picture  of  integrity  is  that  the  agent  has  an 
integrated  sense_of  the  value  of  different  goods.  This  faculty  of  practical  wisdom  Aristotle 
calls  phronesis.  One  question  I  will  address  shortly  is  whether  it  is  correct  to  think  of  this 
as  a  purely  "intellectual"  faculty.  A  second  issue  is  the  role  of  learning  and  education  in 
Aristotle's  theory.  If,  as  he  believed,  education  is  essential  to  virtue,  and  that  emotion  can 
be  educated,  what  is  involved  in  this  process?  This  is  the  question  I  turn  to  next. 
153 Learning  to  be  Good 
So  far  I  have  argued  that  establishing  habits  of  emotional  response,  perception  and  action 
are  what  constitute  character.  In  this  way  character  is  the  expression  of  ethical 
understanding.  So  the  question  arises  how  we  acquire  this  understanding;  what  is  the 
learning  process  through  which  character  is  achieved?  Aristotle  claims  that  a  crucial 
component  of  this  process  is  practice-  we  only  learn  to  be  just  by  doing  just  acts;  we 
learn  what  is  kind  by  doing  what  is  kind.  He  suggests  that  the  acquisition  of  virtue  can  be 
understood  by  analogy  with  the  development  of  the  skills  required  for  a  craft; 
"We  acquire  the  virtues  by  first  acting  just  as  we  do  in  the  case  of  acquiring  crafts.  For 
we  learn  a  craft  by  making  the  products  which  we  must  make  once  we  have  learned  the 
craft  ...  so  too  we  become  just  by  doing  just  actions,  and  temperate  by  doing  temperate 
actions...  and,  in  a  word,  states  of  character  are  formed  out  of  corresponding  acts.  ,  37 
However  this  claim  is  not  unproblematic.  Why,  for  example,  does  moral  knowledge 
have  to  be  acquired  in  this  way?  It  is  important  to  emphasise  that  Aristotle  does  not  see 
the  aim  of  activity  as  merely  that  of  putting  into  practice  knowledge  already  grasped  by 
other  means.  On  such  a  view,  the  practice  would  not  itself  be  a  learning  process.  It  could 
at  best  be  a  learning  how  to,  process;  the  process  of  learning  how  to  put  the  knowledge 
already  possessed  into  effect.  This  might  involve  subduing  unruly  desires  and  passions 
and  generally  facilitating  the  role,  within  our  psychology,  of  the  intellectual  element  of  the 
psyche. 
But  this  is  not  Aristotle's  view.  In  the  first  place,  it  construes  the  process  of  habituation 
as  what  Rosalind  Hursthouse38  dubs  "horse-breaking".  The  subjugation  and  alteration  of 
existing  desires  and  passions  proceeds  simply  by  force,  on  this  view;  there  is  no  re- 
education,  no  learning  in  the  activity.  But  as  Hursthouse  points  out,  such  a  process  could 
never  amount  to  what  Aristotle  calls  virtue,  since  the  virtuous  person  takes  pleasure  in  his 
37  N.  E.  1103a31-b21. 
38  Hursthouse,  "Moral  Habituation",  Oxford  Studies  in  Ancient  Philosophy  1988. 
154 actions.  At  best  this  process  would  produce  the  enkratic  agent,  but  no  process  of  enforced 
practice  alone  could  result  in  the  virtuous  person's  perception  that  just  acts  are  truly 
pleasant.  But  secondly,  this  account  implies  that  what  must  be  properly  learned,  as 
opposed  to  what  must  be  enforced,  can  be  learned  by  other  means  and  that  activity  itself 
contributes  nothing  essential  to  such  a  process.  But  Aristotle  insists  that  this  is  not  the 
case; 
"Now  each  man  judges  well  the  things  he  knows,  and  of  these  he  is  a  good  judge.  And  so 
the  man  who  has  been  educated  in  a  subject  is  a  good  judge  of  that  subject.  -Hence  a 
young  man  is  not  a  proper  hearer  of  lectures  on  political  science  for  he  is  inexperienced  in 
the  actions  that  occur  in  life  but  its  discussions  start  from  these  and  are  about  these;  and 
further,  since  he  tends  to  follow  his  passions,  his  study  will  be  vain  and 
unprofitable....  Hence  anyone  who  is  to  listen  to  lectures  about  what  is  noble  and  just,  and 
generally  about  the  subjects  of  political  science,  must  have  been  brought  up  in  good 
habits.  For  "The  that!  Is  the  starting  point,  and  if  this  is  sufficiently  apparent,  he  will  not 
need  "The  because"  as  well;  and  the  man  who  has  been  well  brought  up  has,  or  can  easily 
get  starting  points.  "  (N.  E.  1094b28-1095b8) 
Not  only  is  mere  propositional  understanding  insufficient  for  virtue,  but  argument  and 
what  can  be  learned  from  books  and  lectures  will  all  be  quite  useless  unless  the  person  has 
been  brought  up  with  the  correct  habits.  The  point  is  not  that  without  correct  training  what 
is  learned  will  not  be  effective,  but  that  without  a  correct  training,  what  is  learnt  will  - 
from  the  student's  perspective  -  lack  any  point.  And  this  means  that  the  process  of 
habituation  must  be  a  learning  process39  in  the  full  sense  that  it  provides  a  necessary  basis 
for  seeing  the  point  of  lectures  such  as  Aristotle's.  Furthermore,  Aristotle  thinks  that  if  the 
training  is  not  carried  out  when  young  the  opportunity  is  lost.  Aristotle  is  much  more 
sceptical  about  the  education  or  re-education  of  adults  than  were,  say,  the  Stoics  (see 
below). 
If  then  it  is  Aristotle's  view  that  we  learn  through  doing,  we  must  explain  how  this  is  so. 
The  claim  is  at  least  initially  surprising,  for,  as  Burnyeat  40  remarks,  is  it  not  one  thing  to 
learn  to  do  what  is  noble  and  just  but  quite  another  to  learn  that  it  is  just?  In  response 
39  The  point  is  also  made  by  Myles  Bumyeat,  "On  Learning  to  be  Good"  (  p.  73),  in  Rorty  ed.  Essays  on  Aristotle. 
40  Burnyeat  (Op.  Cit.  ) 
155 Bumyeat  suggests41  that  the  key  to  understanding  Aristotle's  idea  is  the  role  of  pleasure. 
As  already  noted,  the  virtuous  person  is  distinguished  from  the  enkratic  by  taking 
pleasure  in  virtuous  acts,  and  taking  pleasure  in  an  action  requires  doing  the  action.  There 
is  a  weak  sense  of  "learn"  in  which  I  can  learn 
, 
for  example,  that  very  hot  things  can  be 
painful  or  that  skiing  is  enjoyable  or  that  temperance  is  pleasant  where  this  means  simply 
that  I  have  acquired  the  information,  regardless  of  my  personal  experience  of  these  things. 
In  a  stronger  sense,  however,  I  only  learn  these  things  by  experiencing  the  pain  of  very  hot 
things  and  the  pleasure  of  skiing  and  temperate  action.  We  might  wonder  whether  this 
counts  as  real  learning;  but  we  have  already  seen  that  there  is  a  comparable  difference 
between  the  blind  and  sighted  person  as  regards  their  knowledge  of  colour.  Were  the  blind 
man  to  see  the  colour  green,  he  would  have  learned  something  new  about  that  colour,  but 
not  something  propositional. 
Someone  may  learn-  in  the  weak  sense-  that  an  action  is  just,  but  this  will  mean  simply 
that  they  have  acquired  that  information.  But  learning  that  an  action  is  just  in  the  stronger 
sense  will  require  performing  just  actions  and  coming  to  take  the  appropriate  kind  of 
pleasure  in  them.  In  short  then,  learning  in  this  sense,  involves  time  and  practice,  so  the 
initial  oddity  of  Aristotle's  claim,  with  which  we  started,  disappears. 
There  are  nevertheless  still  legitimate  questions  we  might  raise  about  the  details  of  the 
process;  how  does  a  parent  break  the  hold  of  an  undesirable  passion  or  a  stubborn  desire 
in  a  child?  If  the  goal  is  that  the  child  will  take  pleasure  in  selfless  or  generous  action,  say, 
a  first  step  will  involve  displacing  the  unpleasant  nature  of  generous  action  as  the  child 
now  experiences  it.  One  way  to  achieve  this  is  to  enable  the  child  to  conceive  the  situation 
in  other  terms.  Sarah  Broadie  writes; 
"The  human  ability  to  see  things  in  other  and  wider  terms  is  such  that  a  child's  interest 
in  a  mundane  objective  like  finishing  the  food  on  his  plate  or  getting  dressed  or  helping  a 
younger  child  to  dress  can  easily  at  the  same  time  be  an  interest  in  doing  something 
neatly,  doing  something  right,  getting  something  right  oneself,  not  disgracing  the  family, 
being  responsible  for  someone  else,  preparing  now  for  the  future,  respecting  others  by 
s42  using  properly  what  they  have  made... 
41  And  following  hire,  Nancy  Sherman  in  "The  Fabric  of  Character"  Ch.  5. 
42  Broadie,  Ethics  with  Aristotle,  (p.  108). 
156 Broadie  comments  that  here  there  is  the  potential  for  a  variety  of  virtues,  depending 
which  construction  of  the  situation  is  emphasised.  It  is  the  imaginative  capacity  for  the  re- 
organisation  of  perception  and  experience  which  makes  this  possible.  In  Broadie's  view  it 
teaches  children  two  valuable  lessons.  First,  that  what  it  is  appropriate  to  do  is  not  always 
or  usually  what  we  feel  like  doing.  Second,  that  given  the  variety  of  features  which  can  be 
made  salient,  what  it  is  appropriate  to  do  may  not  be  what  we  think  obvious,  even  with  a 
cultivated  eye.  This,  she  says,  "contains  seeds  of  the  general  openness  that  should  save 
one  from  mechanical  adherence  even  to  higher  values".  The  general  point  is  that  one  way 
to  displace  an  unpleasant  experience  of  an  action  is  to  offer  an  alternative  construal  of  it, 
under  which  the  experience  is  transformed.  It  may  yet  be  enkratically  performed,  but  it  is 
a  first  step. 
157 Phronesis  and  Emotion. 
Moving  on  then  from  the  general  methodological  claim  that  learning  essentially 
involves  activity,  we  might  ask  what  the  content  of  ethical  education  is  and  when  it 
begins.  Richard  Sorabji's43  answer  is  that  it  may  begin  with  the  father  saying  to  the  young 
man,  "this  is  what  courage  (or,  more  generally,  what  virtue  and  to  kalon  )  requires  of  us 
now".  This  however  implies  a  narrow  understanding  of  the  ethical.  Hursthouse 
comments; 
"Sorabji  here  falls  prey  to  the  common  tendency  to  think  of  moral  or  ethical  education 
as  the  teaching  of  the  moral  or  "ethical"  in  our  sense.  But  ethical  education  in  Aristotle  is 
education  and  formation  of  character,  the  training  of  the  passions;  it  does  not  exclusively 
involve  the  teaching  of  what  is  good  or  bad  or  morally  pleasant  or  unpleasant,  but  the 
teaching  of  the  truly  good  and  the  truly  pleasant  simpliciter.  " 
Since  education-of  character  does  not  involve  the  inculcation  of  principles  or  rules  but 
resistance  to  certain  forms  of  pleasure  and  the  indulgence  of  the  emotions,  does  it  not 
proceed  in  a  haphazard  fashion?  Most  importantly,  perhaps,  what  guarantees  the  end 
result  will  be  coherent?  Aristotle  at  this  point  calls  upon  the  virtuous  person's  possession 
of  practical  wisdom  (phronesis)  to  ensure  that  the  resulting  complex  issues  in  appropriate 
action  in  the  right  situation.  It  is  through  his  possession  of  phronesis  that  the  virtuous  man 
knows  what  is  appropriate  (N.  E.  1141b14-16).  But  what  is  phronesis  really?  We  have 
43  Richard  Sorabji,  "Aristotle  on  the  Role  of  Intellect'  in  Rorty  ed  (OP.  Cit.  ),  quoted  in  Hursthouse. 
44  Hursthouse,  (Op.  Cit.  p  212).  The  same  point  is  made  by  Bernard  Wiliams,  in  "Morality  and  the  Emotions"  (p.  225)  in 
Problems  of  the  Sell. 
158 already  seen  that  it  is  not  taught  separately-  it  is  not  the  grasp  of  rules  or  principles  of 
ranking,  say,  of  the  various  goods.  It  involves  perhaps  an  implicit  grasp  of  the  relative 
values  of  different  goods.  This  is  certainly  a  part  of  what  Aristotle  has  in  mind,  but  it  is 
not  all.  Amelie  Rorty  writes, 
"...  phronesis  is  an  umbrella  term  for  a  wide  range  of  independent  traits  that  enable  a 
person  to  see  and  to  actualise  the  goods  that  can  best  be  realised  in  extremely  varied, 
particular  contexts...  Since  phronesis  combines  a  range  of  independent  intellectual  and 
character  traits-  ingenuity,  insight,  perceptual  sensitivity,  acuity  in  inference,  a  sound 
sense  of  relevance,  an  active  understanding  of  the  relative  importance  of  heterogeneous 
and  sometimes  incommensurable  ends,  allocating  different  priorities  to  the  various 
components  ...  could  sometimes  lead  to  different  action  outcomes"45 
Exactly  how  this  problem  might  be  solved  is  a  difficult  question,  but  not  one  I  shall,  or 
need  to,  answer  here.  I  wish  merely  to  focus  on  a  narrower  point  concerning  phronesis, 
namely  that  -  as  Rorty's  remarks  show  -  it  is  not  merely  an  intellectual  capacity.  Some  of 
the  abilities  Rorty  lists  can  be  classed  as  "intellectual",  such  as  insight  and  acuity  in 
inference.  But  one  in  particular  cannot;  that  is  a  sense  of  what  emotional  reaction  is 
appropriate  to  a  given  situation.  It  seems  clear  that  a  Mr.  Spock  would  at  best  be  able  to 
infer  from  the  practices  of  others  what  they  thought  was  appropriate.  But  is  this  not  too 
presumptuous?  In  a  case  of  grief,  say,  might  Spock  not  reason  that  the  loss  of  a  loved  one 
is  the  loss  of  someone  held  to  be  of  great  importance  and  who  is,  for  practical  purposes, 
unique  and  irreplaceable.  Given  this,  mild  emotion  would  be  inappropriate.  So  he  could 
after  all  reach  a  judgement  about  what  the  correct  response  was. 
First  of  all,  it  is  clear  that  the  "conclusion"  that  mild  emotion  would  be  inappropriate, 
does  not  follow  deductively  from  what  precedes  it.  That  is  not  surprising.  But  then  what 
sense  could  Spock  have  that  it  is  inappropriate?  It  seems  the  only  basis  there  could  be  for 
such  a  supposition  is  that  those  who  respond  in  that  way  seem  to  think  it  is  appropriate? 
Even  if  someone  who  did  not  feel  grief  went  through  the  steps  attributed  to  Mr.  Spock, 
and  reached  the  conclusion  that  grief  was  appropriate,  what  would  still  be  missing  would 
presumably  be  -  although  there  might  be  other  explanations-  that  his  experience  of  the 
person  who  has  died  was  not  of  the  right  sort.  And  "right  sort"  here  must  mean,  of  the 
45  Rorty,  "Virtues  and  their  Vicissitudes"  (p.  140),  in  Midwest  Studies  in  Philosophy  vo1.13. 
159 right  emotional  sort.  We  grieve  for  those  with  whom  we  have  emotional  ties,  and  it  is 
those  ties  that  make  sense  of  grief.  This  perfectly  obvious  fact  means  that  for  Mr.  Spock 
there  could  not  be  a  sense  in  which  grief  was  appropriate.  The  derivative  inference  above 
can  only  track  the  experience  of  others,  but  not  his  own. 
We  can  also  bring  out  a  further  point;  the  appropriateness  of  emotional  responses 
depends  on  a  grasp  of  the  value  of  the  good  in  question.  But  grasping  the  value  of 
friendship,  say,  requires  experience  of  that  emotional  relationship.  Or,  to  take  another 
example,  the  value  of  love  as  a  good  is  not  something  that  Mr.  Spock  could  readily  grasp. 
But  could  he  not  have  some  sense  of  its  value?  After  all,  many  of  us  have  some  idea  of  the 
value  of  various  forms  of  love  -  romantic  love,  for  example-  before  actually  experiencing 
them.  As  La  Rochefoucauld  quipped,  nobody  would  place  such  a  premium  on  love  who 
had  not  first  read  about  it  in  the  pages  of  novels.  But  the  experience  acquired  in  this  way, 
albeit  in  advance  of  experiencing  the  emotion  oneself  for  a  particular  individual,  is  not  an 
affectless  experience.  It  remains  unclear,  then,  how  Mr.  Spock  would  rank  the  claims  of 
friendship,  the  demands  of  a  promise  and  a  concern  for  the  feelings  of  others.  Is  it  credible 
that  anyone  could  rank  these  in  any  appropriate  order  who  had  no  sense  of  the  emotional 
significance  of  each?  46  This  conclusion  is  consonant  with  Aristotle's  insistence  upon  the 
importance  of  emotional  response  for  virtuous  character,  and  also  with  the  claim  made  in 
chapter  two  that  emotions  offer  a  distinct  cognitive  grasp  of  things. 
The  points  made  so  far  have  a  bearing  on  another  question  which  arises  in  connection 
with  the  relation  between  phronesis  and  the  virtues;  the  claim  that  the  virtues  are  unified- 
to  have  one  virtue  is  to  have  all  of  them.  If  we  take  the  virtue  of  courage  as  an  example, 
we  can  see  that  an  action  only  counts  as  the  exercise  of  that  virtue  if  the  person  is  correct 
in  judging  that  what  he  is  engaged  in  is  sufficiently  valuable  to  be  worth  risking  the 
danger.  If  this  is  not  so,  then  he  is foolhardy  rather  than  brave.  Sorabji,  47  who  presents  the 
46  A  side  issue  which  arises  at  this  point  is;  how  explicit,  or  articulated  does  the  agent's  conception  of  the  good  need  to 
be?  Annas,  in  The  Morality  of  Happiness  (p.  73)  suggests  that  the  phronimos  has  a  sense  of  the  role  of  a  given  good  in 
the  good  life.  A  similar  picture  of  the  virtuous  agent  is  found  in  Charles  Taylor's  "Self-Interpreting  Animals",  where 
Taylor  argues  that  what  he  calls  "strong  evaluation"  is  a  necessary  condition  of  living  the  good  life.  Strong  evaluation 
however,  involves,  a  fairly  high  degree  of  articulation  and  self-awareness;  as  Taylor  puts  it,  it  involves  "drawing  a 
moral  map".  Owen  Flanagan  is  critical  of  this  account  of  virtue.  Using  the  example  of  Tolstoy's  "simple  peasants",  he 
argues  that  such  people  usually  have  not  evaluated  their  lives  contrastively  in  Taylor's  sense,  and  may  be  incapable  of 
doing  so.  Yet  they  possess  moral  goodness.  (Cf.  Flanagan,  "Identity  and  Strong  and  Weak  Evaluation".  In  Flanagan 
and  Rorty,  Identity,  Character  and  Morality. 
47  SOrabJl, 
(OP-  C1L) 
160 example  of  courage,  concludes;  "So  we  cannot  know  what  courage  requires  of  us  now 
without  knowing  what  the  good  life  in  general  requires.  "  Sorabji  suggests  that  this 
consideration  is  sufficient  to  establish  the  thesis  of  the  unity  of  the  virtues.  However,  as 
several  writers48  have  pointed  out,  the  thesis  of  the  unity  of  the  virtues  involves  not  just 
the  claim  that  possessing  one  virtue  requires  phronesis  (and  therefore  that  the  person 
concerned  will  have  a  correct  estimation  about  the  value  of  all  goods  );  the  claim  about 
the  unity  of  the  virtues  goes  beyond  this  and  claims  in  addition  that  the  person  with  one 
virtue  has  all  the  virtues.  But  possessing  phronesis  is  not  yet  to  possess  all  the  virtues.  So 
Sorabji's  point  can  be  granted  without  that  entailing  the  unity  of  the  virtues.  Objecting  to 
the  thesis  that  the  virtues  are  unified,  Julia  Annas  says, 
"The  thought  is  that  if  I  really  have  the  virtue  of  good-temperedness,  then  I  have  a  correct 
understanding  of  the  contribution  this  virtue  makes  to  my  overall  good;  but  I  cannot  have 
this  without  also  understanding  the  contribution  that  any  virtue  makes  to  my  good.  But 
should  it  follow  from  this  that  if  I  have  one  virtue  I  have  them  all?  Could  I  not  have  the 
intellectual  basis  of  the  other  virtues-  the  grasp  of  what  they  contribute  to  the  agent's 
good,  which  enables  the  agent  to  make  correct  judgements  in  their  case-  but  not  have  the 
appropriate  emotions  and  feelings?  "  (Annas,  p.  77) 
Annas  is  right  that  Sorabji's  point  does  not  establish  the  unity  of  the  virtues.  But  her 
reason  for  thinking  so  is  that  phronesis  is  an  intellectual  capacity,  and  so  you  can  have  all 
the  relevant  knowledge  but  simply  not  have  the  relevant  emotions49.  A  similar  kind  of 
point  is  made  by  Elizabeth  Telfer50,  who  argues  that  the  only  way  to  defend  the 
Aristotelian  distinction  between  the  phronimos  and  the  continent  man  while  maintaining 
that  the  practically  wise  man  must  have  all  the  virtues  is  to  show  how  the  distinction 
48  CL  Elizabeth  Telfer,  "The  Unity  of  the  Moral  Virtues",  Proceedings  of  The  Aristotelian  Society  1989.  And  Julia 
Annas,  The  Morality  ofHappiness. 
49  As  this  suggests,  Annas  (Op.  Cit.  p.  63-5)  finds  the  importance  ascribed  by  Aristotle  to  the  emotions  a  little  puzzling. 
Her  conclusion  is  that  they  serve  only  as  spurs  to  action,  and  that  the  truly  virtuous  person  should  not  really  need  them 
Annas  therefore  assumes  an  account  of  emotions-  according  to  which  they  offer  no  unique  cognitive  grasp-  which  I 
have  already  rejected.  Given  such  an  account  it  would  be  puzzling  what  contribution  they  make.  This  point  is  also 
made  by  Nancy  Sherman  in  her  review  article  on  Annas  in  Philosophy  and  Phenomenological  Reasearch  1994. 
Sherman  also  rejects  Annas'  account  of  the  emotions. 
so  . Telfer  (Op.  Cit)  p.  39. 
161 between  them  in  terms  of  pleasure  taken  in  their  activity  is  also  a  difference  in  what  they 
know.  For  if  the  continent  man  knows  what  the  virtuous  man  knows,  then  those  who 
possess  phronesis  may  not  possess  all  the  virtues  (as  the  continent  man  does  not).  And  if 
that  is  so,  the  argument  for  the  unity  of  the  virtues  collapses.  But  the  problem  she 
perceives  for  such  a  strategy  lies  in  showing  how  the  knowledge  of  the  continent  man  falls 
short  of  that  of  the  virtuous  man.  The  obvious  candidate  here  is  that  the  continent  man 
lacks  the  cognitive  grasp  of  the  virtuous  man,  and  this  grasp  comes  out  simply  in  their 
cognitive  construals  of  the  actions  as  pleasant  and  unpleasant.  Indeed  this  is  precisely 
Burnyeat's  argument,  considered  above.  But  Telfer  writes, 
"To  think  mistakenly  that  temperate  actions  are  unpleasant  might  be  to  fail  to  realise  that 
in  Aristotle's  objective  sense  of  pleasant...  temperate  actions  are  truly  pleasant  and  the 
self-controlled  person's  delight  in  excess  is  an  aberration.  This  mistake  would  be  a  false 
belief,  the  kind  of  mistake  which  might  appropriately  be  attributed  to  a  limitation  of  moral 
knowledge  amounting  to  a  lack  of  practical  wisdom.  But  it  is  not  a  mistake  which  the  self- 
controlled  person  necessarily  makes.  "  (p.  41) 
It  is  correct  that  this  is  a  belief  that  the  continent  man  may  have.  And  it  is  equally  right 
that  possession  of  such  a  belief  does  not  make  him  virtuous.  However  Telfer  concludes 
that  this  discredits  the  option  of  showing  the  continent  man  to  lack  knowledge.  But  the 
questionable  assumption  is  the  one  made  in  the  quotation  above,  that  the  deficiency  must 
be  a  missing  belief.  It  will  not  be  necessary  to  rehearse  here  the  arguments  from  previous 
chapters  against  the  assumption  that  what  is  cognitive  must  be  a  belief;  what  the  blind 
man  lacks  is  not  beliefs  about  colour.  And  if  this  assumption  is  rejected  we  can  see  how, 
as  has  already  been  argued,  coming  to  experience  something  as  pleasant  is  learning. 
The  point  of  considering  the  arguments  of  Annas  and  Telfer  has  not  been  to  claim  that 
the  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  the  virtues  is  in  fact  correct.  I  have  not  been  trying  to  settle  that 
issue.  Rather  my  aim  has  been  to  illustrate  ways  in  which  we  can  think  of  phronesis  in 
Aristotle's  account.  Contrary  to  what  both  Annas  and  Telfer  suggest,  I  am  claiming  that 
we  should  think  of  it  -  at  least  in  part-  as  an  emotional  faculty,  and  not  merely  an 
intellectual  one.  Furthermore,  although  Sorabji's  point  does  not  establish  the  doctrine  of 
the  unity  of  the  virtues,  it  does  show  that  phronesis  involves  the  ability  to  perceive  when  a 
given  value  -  such  as  risking  danger  -  is  worthwhile  and  when  not.  In  other  words, 
phronesis  involves  the  ability  to  perceive  the  salient  features  of  any  particular  situation;  it 
162 is  understanding  focused  on  particular  cases  in  the  way  I  have  argued  for  in  previous 
chapters. 
The  arguments  of  this  chapter  have  so  far  been  aimed  at  defending  the  claim  that  the 
emotions  are  of  ethical  importance.  Various  attacks  have  been  repelled-  in  the  form  of 
arguments  concerning  impartiality,  the  capriciousness  of  our  emotions,  the  freedom  of 
human  choice,  and  the  intellectual  nature  of  practical  wisdom.  If  the  defence  has  been 
successful,  however,  there  still  remains  the  question  of  whether  all  our  ethical  values  are 
rooted  in  emotional  responses.  So  far  I  have  claimed  merely  that  some  or  many  of  them 
are.  Are  there  then,  values  which  do  not  require  an  emotional  basis? 
163 Emotion-Free  Values? 
I  have  so  far  argued  that  grasping  the  value  of  relationships  such  as  friendship  and  love 
requires  experience  of  the  relevant  emotional  states.  Agamemnon's  failure  to  grasp  the 
nature  of  his  deeds  and  the  true  nature  of  his  loss  is  rooted  in  his  lack  of  emotional 
experience.  This  involves  the  claim  that  emotion  provides  a  distinct  cognitive  grasp  of 
things.  But  this  is  true  not  only  of  these  relationships,  but  of  other  things  we  value  as  well. 
Just  as  our  empathy  for  someone  who  is  grieving  requires  some  understanding  of  what 
grief  is,  so  our  desire  to  help  usually  springs  from  our  being  affected  by  their  suffering. 
The  idea  that  we  should  want  to  help  out  of  a  sense  of  duty  has  been  accepted  within  the 
S 
Kantian  tradition  as  a  desirable  ideal.  But  as  Peter  Winch51  and  others  have  argued,  this 
picture  of  moral  agency  has  an  inhuman  face. 
No  doubt  people  often  do  act  morally,  not  out  of  passionate  conviction  or  fellow  feeling, 
but  out  of  a  conventional  sense  of  what  is  required.  In  Aristotle's  terms,  however,  this  is 
not  virtuous  action  precisely  because  it  lacks  the  correct  motivation.  I  assume,  then,  that  in 
addition  to  the  cases  of  love  and  friendship  it  is  plausible  to  claim  for  these  cases  too  that 
an  emotional  response  is  the  appropriate  motivational  basis.  Nevertheless,  it  is  surely  too 
strict  a  demand  that  every  "moral"  action  spring  from  emotion.  Sometimes  emotions  are 
fickle,  and  we  may  on  occasion  do  what  we  think  we  ought  to,  aware  and  even  uneasy  at 
our  absence  of  any  accompanying  emotional  motivation.  But  this  need  not  make  the 
action  morally  worthless.  In  other  cases,  such  as  giving  money  to  charity,  the  absence  of 
an  immediate  object  helps  to  explain  why  we  may  fall  back  on  a  sense  that  we  should  act, 
rather  than  from  any  occurent  emotion.  In  these  cases,  we  should  be  prepared  to  recognise 
the  possibility  of  engaging  in  moral  reflection  without  emotion.  This  much  was  implicit  in 
Rorty's  list  of  the  various  capacities  of  phronesis;  acuity  in  making  inferences,  for 
example,  is  not  an  emotional  capacity.  And  someone  deciding  whether  to  give  money  to  a 
charity  might  deliberate  well  without  being  in  an  affected  state. 
s"  peter  Winch.  "Moral  Integrity".  As  an  example  of  the  Kantian  moral  agent,  Winch  offers  the  example  of  Mrs.  Solness 
from  Ibsen's  The  Master  Builder,  "I'll  do  my  best  for  you.  That's  no  more  than  my  duty".  Winch  is  generally 
suspicious  of  the  idea  that  we  should  help  others  and  promote  what  is  valuable  because  we  see  it  as  our  duty. 
164 Michael  Stocker52  argues  that  there  are  cases  of  deliberation  about  the  demands  of 
justice  which  do  not  require  emotional  engagement  either.  Notoriously,  issues  of  justice, 
whether  legal,  political  or  moral,  generally  do  arouse  strong  emotional  responses.  But 
Stocker  offers  the  example  of  whether  I  should  pay  my  taxes.  Surely,  Stocker  asks,  I  can 
deliberate  about  this  effectively  and  correctly  while  remaining  emotionally  neutral?  This 
is  no  doubt  correct,  but  in  admitting  it  are  we  thereby  forced  to  concede  that  there  are 
important  values  which  are  not  based  on  emotional  responses?  I  don't  think,  however,  that 
these  examples  show  that.  In  the  example  of  giving  money  to  charity,  what  requires 
deliberation  is  perhaps  whether  to  give,  or  which  charity  to  give  to.  But  what  underlies 
this  deliberation  is  a  concern  to  alleviate  suffering.  Now  we  can  allow  that  I  can  deliberate 
about  how  best  to  achieve  this  end  in  the  absence  of  emotion.  But  what  about  the  suffering 
itself?  Can  I  be  unaffected  by  that?  Or  in  the  tax  example,  I  can  work  out  dispassionately 
what  justice  demands  as  regards  paying  for  social  services  and  amenities.  But  is  our 
concern  with  this  issue  dispassionate  all  the  way  down?  It  is  reasonable  to  think  that  here, 
as  in  the  charity  example,  there  is  some  ground  level  value  with  which  we  are  emotionally 
engaged.  If  it  turns  out  that,  confronted  with  the  suffering  which  I  regard  it  as  my  duty  to 
alleviate,  I  remain  unmoved,  it  will  begin  to  be  mysterious  what  my  sense  of  duty 
amounts  to.  The  idea  that  we  abstractly  and  by  reason  alone  discern  what  duty  requires  is 
extremely  opaque,  and  Kant's  own  attempts  to  elucidate  it  are,  by  common  agreement,  a 
failure.  In  addition  to  his  unworkable  picture  of  the  moral  self,  the  Kantian  account 
conceives  the  moral  agent  trying  to  "  track  "  duty  by  means  of  a  rational  procedure,  and 
this  inferential  relation  to  the  situation  itself  results  in  an  unappealing  double-vision. 
I  conclude  then  that  the  role  I  have  claimed  for  emotion  is  not  affected  by  counter- 
examples  of  the  sort  Stocker  offers.  We  should  not  expect  that  every  action  or  every  piece 
of  moral  reflection  springs  from  emotion.  But  this  does  not  effect  the  claim  that  what  we 
think  intrinsically  valuable  has  a  basis  in  emotional  responses.  This  concludes  my 
presentation  and  defence  of  the  Aristotelian  account  of  the  role  and  value  of  emotion.  I 
now  turn  to  the  first  of  two  theories  which  embody  views  very  different,  and  indeed 
opposed  to  Aristotle's.  The  first  of  these,  which  I  will  consider  in  the  next  section,  is 
Stoicism,  and  the  second,  which  I  consider  in  the  next  chapter  is  Romanticism. 
52  Stocker,  Valuing  Emotions. 
165 Stoicism 
We  have  now  built  up  a  picture  of  what  -at  least  for  Aristotle-  the  role  of  emotion  in 
relation  to  the  ethical  is.  Elements  of  this  picture  involve  the  connection  between  virtue 
and  character  as  manifested  through  consistent  emotional  reactions;  the  relationship 
between  the  unified  grasp  of  what  is  valuable  (phronesis)  and  the  emotions  themselves; 
and  the  process  of  refinement  of  the  emotions  through  practice  or  habituation.  On  this 
view,  having  the  right  sort  of  emotional  response  is  necessary  for  virtue,  and  this  because 
virtue  requires  activity,  and  activity  undertaken  in  the  right  affective  spirit.  It  is  time  now 
to  turn  to  the  rival  account  of  the  significance  of  the  emotions  offered  by  the  Stoics. 
The  popular  sense  of  the  term  "Stoic"  is  of  someone  who  faces  what  befalls  him 
unflinchingly  and  without  complaint.  But  it  is  not  so  well  known  perhaps  that  this  state  of 
equanimity  is  to  be  achieved,  according  to  the  Stoics,  by  the  extirpation  of  the  emotions. 
That  is  to  say,  we  must  renounce  our  emotional  attachments  to  things  in  the  world-  to 
people,  to  wealth,  pleasure,  to  everything  in  fact  with  the  exception  of  virtue,  in  order  to 
achieve  the  desired  peace  of  mind.  For  the  Stoics,  it  is  through  our  emotional  attachments 
that  we  become  disturbed  by  loss,  frustrated,  vulnerable  and  ultimately  unhappy53. 
Stoicism  then  stands  for  a  withdrawal  of  sorts,  a  contraction  of  the  sphere  of  what  is 
valuable,  and  the  Stoics  believed  that  if  we  are  to  accomplish  this  we  must  engage  in 
philosophical  therapy.  This  ethical  theory  takes  a  very  different  view  of  emotion  to  the 
53  The  Stoics  attempt  to  mitigate  the  counter-intuitive  nature  of  these  claims  by  allowing  that  although  of  no  real  value  - 
these  goods  are  classed  as  "Indifferents"-  they  may  legitimately  be  preferred.  Exactly  how  coherent  this  doctrine  of 
the  preferred  Indifferents  can  be  made  is  not  obvious.  If  the  goods  really  are  without  value,  why  is  it  legitimate  to 
prefer  them?  Terence  Irwin  discusses  the  issue  in  "Stoic  and  Aristotelian  Conceptions  of  Happiness"  in  Schofield  and 
Striker  (eds.  )  The  Norms  of  Nature.  The  contrast  with  Aristotle  is  particularly  marked  in  the  case  of  love  and 
friendship,  since  there  is  evidence  that  Aristotle  regarded  relationships  with  others  not  merely as  one  good  among 
many,  but  the  supreme  good;  "For  without  friends  no  one  would  choose  to  live  though  he  had  all  other  goods.  "(N.  E. 
1155a4-5).  Though  the  other  goods  may  have  intrinsic  value,  if  they  are  not  shared,  they  become  worthless.  See  Nancy 
Sherman's  discussion,  in  Making  a  Necessity  of  Virtue,  ch.  5. 
166 one  we  find  in  Aristotle,  and  it  has  had  considerable  influence  on  some  subsequent 
theories,  most  notably  Kant's  54 
In  addition  to  their  view  of  the  value  of  emotion,  they  also  held  important  views  on  the 
nature  of  emotions,  and  lying  behind  both  these  claims  is  a  general  psychological  theory 
which  describes  the  psyche,  not  as  divided  into  warring  factions,  as  it  is  in  Plato's 
Republic,  but  as  unified  by  reason.  At  least  one  modem  philosopher  has  tried  to  defend 
the  Stoic  account  of  the  nature  of  emotions55,  but  their  view  of  the  nature  of  human 
happiness  and  the  place  in  it  of  emotion  continues  to  be  regarded  as  mistaken.  I  shall  try  to 
show  that  the  Stoic  view  is  mistaken  in  all  three  of  the  claims  listed  above. 
I  will  begin  with  the  point  upon  which  the  whole  Stoic  theory  appears  to  hang;  the  value 
of  self-sufficiency.  Aristotle  claimed  that  emotional  commitment  to  various  goods  was  an 
essential  ingredient  of  the  good  life.  And  he  acknowledged  that  this  makes  people 
vulnerable  to  the  contingencies  of  the  world,  above  all  to  the  loss  of  family  and  loved 
ones.  A  vivid  illustration  of  this  is  the  case  of  Priam.  Aristotle  comments; 
"For  there  is  required,  as  we  said,  not  only  complete  virtue  but  also  a  complete  life, 
since  many  changes  occur  in  life,  and  all  manner  of  chances,  and  the  most  prosperous  may 
fall  into  great  misfortunes  in  old  age,  as  is  told  of  Priam  in  the  Trojan  cycle;  and  one  who 
has  experienced  such  chances  and  has  ended  wretchedly  no  one  calls  happy". 
(N.  E.  1  1099b32) 
Such  misfortune  is  not  deserved;  it  is  not  a  reward  for  virtue  or  a  punishment  for  vice.  It  is 
a  matter  of  luck  whether  it  befalls  you  or  not.  But  it  effects  whether  you  can  be  happy  or 
not.  In  this  respect  Aristotle  recognises  that  the  good  man,  by  finding  things  emotionally 
valuable,  makes  himself  vulnerable  to  their  loss.  Virtue,  therefore,  does  not  guarantee 
happiness,  which  is  dependent  on  factors  subject  to  luck.  In  short,  the  virtuous  man  is  not 
self-sufficient,  and  this  fact  makes  him  vulnerable  to  reversals  of  fortune. 
Plato  had  previously  and  famously  argued  that  virtue  was  a  guarantee  of  happiness.  The 
good  man,  no  matter  what  fate  befalls  him  -  whether  torture  or  even  death-  remains 
Nancy  Sherman  details  some  of  the  historical  and  theoretical  links between  Kant  and  the  Stoics  in  Making  a  Necessity 
of  Virtue. 
ss  Martha  Nussbaum.  Cf.  "The  Stoics  and  The  Extirpation  of  the  Passions",  in  The  Therapy  of  Desire.  Nussbaum  finds 
the  Stoic  account  of  what  emotions  are  attractive,  but  not  their  estimation  of  their  value. 
167 unharmed.  In  his  most  extreme  moments,  for  instance  in  the  Phaedo,  this  confidence  in 
the  power  of  virtue  springs  from  a  complete  divorce  between  the  virtuous  agent  and  his 
physical  embodiment  -  death  becomes  a  liberation  from  the  prison  of  the  physical  body 
and  its  desires.  Admitting  that  the  virtuous  man  can  be  seriously  affected  by  changes  of 
events  external  to  virtue  itself  is,  on  such  a  view,  an  admission  that  we  are  somehow  tied 
to  the  empirical  world  and  weighed  down  by  it;  that  we  are  not  purely  spiritual  beings. 
The  view  that  virtue  is  self  -sufficient  was  adopted  by  the  Stoics.  Cicero  writes; 
"...  anyone  who  fears  pain  or  death  must  inevitably  be  unhappy,  because  pain  is  a 
frequent  occurrence  and  death  is  never  far  off...  Add  exile  if  you  wish  to  the  list  of 
troubles-  and  bereavement,  and  childlessness..  . 
If  there  exists,  therefore,  any  man  who  is 
capable  of  regarding  the  hazards  and  accidents  of  fortune  and  human  life  as 
endurable...  then  there  is  every  reason  why  he  should  be  happy.  And  the  fact  that  this  can 
be  achieved  by  what  is  morally  right  leads  up  to  the  further  point  that  this  sort  of  goodness 
is  enough,  by  itself  and  without  any  additional  factor,  to  bring  happiness  to  anyone  in  the 
world.  "56 
The  aim  of  this  assertion  of  the  self-sufficiency  of  virtue  is,  in  the  end,  to  make  a  man's 
fate  -  whether  he  is  eudaimon  or  not  -a  function  of  his  virtue.  It  is  an  attempt  to  deny  the 
role  of  luck,  and  of  what  is  beyond  our  control.  Epictetus  is  quite  explicit; 
"  "So-and-so's  son  is  dead.  What  do  you  think  of  that?  "  It  lies  outside  the  sphere  of 
choice,  it  is  not  an  evil.  -  "So-and-so  has  been  disinherited  by  his  father.  What  do  you 
think  of  that?  "  It  lies  outside  the  sphere  of  choice,  it  is  not  an  evil.  9957 
We  may  be  reminded  here  of  Kant's  attempt  to  locate  moral  value  exclusively  in  the  good 
will  and  his  refusal  to  grant  moral  significance  to  what  lies  beyond  our  control.  As 
Bernard  Williams  remarks,  this  view  is  an  attempt  to  render  the  world  a  place  ordered  by 
the  principles  of  justice  and  fäirness58.  But  the  price  of  this  assurance  is  high;  the  domain 
56  Cicero,  Tusculum  Disputations  5,6,16. 
57  Epictetus,  Discourses,  Bk.  3  Ch.  8. 
58  , It  expresses  an  ideal,  presented  by  Kant,  once  again,  that  is  the  most  unqualified  and  also  one  of  the  most  moving; 
the  ideal  that  human  existence  can  be  ultimately  just.  Most  advantages  and  admired  characteristics  are  distributed  in 
168 of  virtue  becomes  internal  to  the  agent.  Virtue  is  cut  off  from  action  and  relations  with 
others,  for  these  are  beyond  the  control  of  the  agent  and  therefore  subject  to  luck.  This  is  a 
picture  of  the  virtuous  agent  Aristotle  rejected.  Virtue  as  an  inactive  disposition  is  nothing, 
or  very  little.  We  only  call  virtuous  those  who  act  virtuously;  it  is  no  achievement, 
Aristotle  implies,  to  claim  virtue  in  the  Stoic  sense.  He  offers  the  comparison  with  an 
Olympic  athlete.  We  do  not  regard  it  as  sufficient  to  be  a  great  runner  that  one  have  the 
ability  to  win  races.  The  great  runner  is  the  one  who  actually  races  and  wins.  For  Aristotle 
virtue  is  necessary  for  happiness,  but  it  is  not  sufficient.  In  addition,  the  agent  requires  the 
goods  which  are  "external"  to  virtue; 
"No  activity  is  complete  if  it  is  impeded;  but  eudaimonia  is  something  complete.  So  the 
eudaimon  person  needs  the  goods  of  the  body  and  external  goods  and  goods  of  luck,  in 
addition,  so  that  his  activities  should  not  be  impeded.  Those  who  claim  that  the  person 
who  is  being  tortured  on  the  wheel,  or  the  person  who  has  encountered  great  reversals  of 
fortune,  is  eudaimon,  so  long  as  he  is  good,  are  not  saying  anything-  whether  that  is  their 
intention  or  not" 
(EE  1153b16-21) 
For  the  Stoics,  in  contrast,  virtue  is  sufficient  for  happiness.  The  implications  of  this  view 
of  self-sufficiency  for  the  value  of  emotions  are  obvious.  Since  for  the  Stoics  virtue,  an 
internal  state,  is  sufficient  for  eudaimonia  and  since  emotional  states  are  attachments  to 
things  in  the  world  -love  for  friends  and  family,  pride  in  our  achievements,  guilt  at  what 
we  have  done  or  failed  to  do,  fear  of  death,  anger  at  insults  and  so  on  -  these  worldly 
things  are  themselves  not  genuinely  goods  at  all.  Emotion  therefore  involves  an  erroneous 
attribution  of  value  to  its  objects.  Here,  the  arguments  over  the  value  of  emotion  bring  us 
to  a  claim  about  their  nature.  If  an  emotion  involves  the  erroneous  attribution  of  value  to 
something,  that  must  be  because  an  emotion  is  or  involves  a  judgement.  There  is 
disagreement  among  the  Greek  Stoics  over  this  claim;  Chrysippus,  at  least,  seems  to  want 
to  claim  that  an  emotion  just  is  a  judgement  or  belief,  while  Posidonius  for  example  takes 
a  different  view.  Before  considering  that  claim  however,  we  should  make  our  mind  up 
ways  that,  if  not  unjust,  are  at  any  rate  not  just,  and  some  people  are  simply  luckier  than  others.  The  ideal  of  morality 
is  a  value,  a  moral  value,  that  transcends  luck.  "  Ethics  and  The  Limits  of  Philosophy  (p.  195). 
169 whether  the  Stoics  have  shown  convincingly  that  emotional  evaluations  are  erroneous. 
This  claim,  we  have  seen,  rests  upon  their  view  that  only  virtue  is  truly  valuable.  But  not 
only  is  this  claim  highly  dubious,  but  the  account  of  virtue  itself  which  they  offer  is 
insubstantial.  And  we  might  wonder  how  virtue  is  assessed  when  it  never  issues  in 
anything. 
The  Stoics  were  aware  that  their  theories  would  meet  with  strong  resistance  and  that 
acceptance  of  them  would  require  philosophical  therapy  of  the  very  sort  they  recommend. 
They  would  therefore  perhaps  not  be  surprised  by  the  sorts  of  objections  suggested  so  far. 
But  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  diagnose  resistance  to  their  views  as  mere  philosophical 
conservatism.  The  Stoics,  I  think,  fail  to  convince  us  that  the  picture  they  offer  is  ethically 
desirable,  ultimately  because  the  Platonic  aspiration,  which  they  pick  up,  to  conceive  man 
as  only  accidentally  in  the  world,  is  not  one  we  can  really  accept  as  a  basis  for  living. 
170 Stoic  Accounts  of  Emotion. 
Let  us  turn  now  to  the  account  the  Stoics  offer  of  emotional  states.  By  all  accounts59 
there  was  little  agreement  among  the  leading  Greek  Stoics  about  what,  in  detail,  an 
emotion  is.  All  are  agreed  that  emotions  are  cognitive  in  some  sense,  but  there  is 
disagreement  between  Chrysippus,  Zeno  and  Posidonius  over  whether  emotions  merely 
involve  a  cognitive  element  or  simply  are  cognitions.  They  are  all  however  in  agreement 
that  emotions  are  irrational.  This  claim  sums  up  the  arguments  considered  in  the  previous 
section,  to  the  effect  that  emotions  involve  erroneous  attributions  of  value.  However  it 
appears  at  least  to  clash  with  another  feature  of  Stoic  psychology,  the  claim  that  the 
psyche  is  unified  by  a  rational  hegemonikon.  In  this  respect,  the  Stoics  disagree  with 
Plato.  Emotion  is  not  a  "giving  in"  to  the  irrational  part  of  the  soul,  since  there  is  no 
irrational  part.  But  if  emotion  is  rational,  how  can  it  be  irrational  also? 
The  answer  to  this  puzzle  is  obviously  that  there  are  two  senses  of  "rational"  at  work. 
Modern  philosophers  also  distinguish  two  similar  senses60.  In  one  sense  "rational"  means 
roughly,  "done  for  a  reason"  and  indicates  that  a  certain  type  of  explanation-  one 
involving  reasons-  is  appropriate.  It  may  also  involve  at  least  the  possibility  of  second- 
order  evaluation. 
61  But  something  that  is  rational  in  this  sense  may  still  be  done  for  bad 
reasons.  Normatively  speaking  then,  an  action  done  for  bad  reasons  will  be  irrational,  and 
in  this  second  sense  an  action  can  be  irrational  while  nevertheless  being  done  for  reasons 
and  so  rational  in  the  first  sense.  For  the  Stoics,  emotions  are  rational  in  the  first  sense  but 
not  in  the  second. 
39  Recent  discussions,  upon  which  I  have  drawn,  include;  Julia  Annas,  Hellenistic  Philosophy  of  Mind,  Ch.  5;  Martha 
Nussbaum,  "The  Stoics  and  The  Extirpation  of  the  Passions"  and  "Stoic  Tonics"  in  The  Therapy  of  Desire;  Justin 
Gosling,  Weakness  of  the  Will  Ch.  5;  A.  C.  Lloyd,  "Emotion  and  Decision  in  Stoic  Psychology"  in  Rist  (ed.  )  The 
Stoics;  I.  G.  Kidd,  "Posidonius  on  Emotions"  in  Rist;  Christopher  Gill,  "Did  Chrysippus  Understand  Medea?  " 
Phronesis  1983;  Richard  Sorabji,  "Is  Stoic  Therapy  Helpful  As  Psychotherapy?  "  and  Bernard  Williams,  "Reply  to 
Sorabji",  both  in  Sorabji  (ed.  )  Aristotle  and  After. 
60  For  example,  Donald  Davidson,  "Actions,  Reasons  and  Causes".  See  chapter  eight  for  further  discussion.  Julia  Annas 
also  distinguishes  two  senses  (Annas  Op.  Cit.  p.  105). 
61  This  possibility  is  discussed  in  chapter  eight. 
171 We  have  already  spent  some  time  considering  the  Stoics'  reasons  for  thinking  emotions 
irrational  in  the  normative  sense.  But  why  did  they  think  they  were  rational  in  the  other 
sense?  It  might  not  seem  surprising  that  they  held  this  view,  since  the  account  of  emotions 
offered  in  chapter  one  has  already  shown  how  this  is  true.  But  Chrysippus  at  least  held  a 
much  stronger  view.  In  Stoic  psychology  the  phantasia  or  appearances  play  a  crucial 
role62.  An  emotion  can  be  broken  down  into  two  stages.  First  there  is  the  presentation  or 
phantasia.  In  the  case  of  fear,  say,  this  will  be  to  the  effect  that  such-and-such  is 
threatening  or  dangerous.  Phantasia  correspond  quite  closely  to  "seeing-as"  experiences. 
Crucially,  they  share  with  them  the  feature  of  not  being  asserted.  Thus,  the  appearance  or 
presentation  of  something's  being  harmful  may  be  something  I  deny  or  reject.  And  this  is 
the  second  stage.  For  the  Stoics,  that  I  have  the  power  to  assent  to  or  reject  the  emotional 
appearance  is  crucial.  In  Chrysippus'  view,  the  appearance  alone  is  not  an  emotion;  it  is 
the  act  of  assenting  '  to  it  which  constitutes  the  emotion63.  The  appearance  has 
propositional  content64.  But  it  is  the  judgement  involved  in  assenting  to  the  appearance 
which  is  important,  since  I  am  responsible  for  this.  As  A.  C.  Lloyd  has  pointed  out65,  this 
account  pictures  an  emotional  reaction  as  the  result  of  a  choice,  a  decision,  in  a  way  that 
anticipates  the  theory  of  Sartre.  Marthan  Nussbaum66  sees  the  Stoic  view  as  picturing 
judgements  as  actions.  However,  any  account  which  sees  emotions  as  actions  must  be 
mistaken,  I  think,  for  the  same  reason  as  any  account  which  pictures  them  as  decisions; 
namely  that  it  ignores  the  passive  element  of  judgement  (and  belief)  which  I  have 
emphasised  in  previous  chapters. 
But,  that  objection  aside,  how  is  the  judgement  related  to  the  emotion?  Here  there  is 
disagreement  among  commentators  67,  but  the  weight  of  opinion  seems  to  be  that  for 
62  On  phantasia  in  Stoic  psychology  see  Long  and  Sedley,  The  Hellenistic  Philosophers  sec.  39.  And  on  emotion  p.  420. 
Also,  Nussbaum,  "The  Stoics  and  The  Extripation  of  the  Passions"  p.  327,  and  Gosling  (Op.  Cit.  )  p.  50-55;  see  also 
chapter  eight. 
63  See  Gosling  p.  63. 
64  See  the  discussion  of  phantasia  in  chapter  eight. 
65  Lloyd  Op.  Cit. 
66  Nussbaum,  "Extirpation  of  the  Passions"  p.  367. 
67  A.  C.  Lloyd  considers  and  then  rejects  the  reduction  of  emotion  to  judgement.  He  interprets  Chrysippus  instead  as 
claiming  that  the  judgement  leads  to  emotion  (p239).  Both  Martha  Nussbaum  (Op.  Cit.  p.  373)  and  Julia  Annas  (Op. 
Cit.  p108)  reject  this  account.  Nussbaum,  in  addition  to  interpreting  Chrysippus  as  claiming  that  an  emotion  is  a 
judgement,  attempts  to  defend  and  support  his  claim 
172 Chrysippus  the  judgement  just  is  the  emotion.  Even  among  commentators  who  accept  this 
reading  of  Chrysippus,  there  is  disagreement  as  to  what  it  amounts  to.  Martha  Nussbaum 
anticipates  an  obvious  reaction;  it  is  easy  to  see  how  someone  might  think  that  a 
judgement  was  sufficient  for  emotion,  but  how  could  they  think  it  was  the  emotion? 
Surely  that  leaves  out  the  affective  element,  the  feeling,  as  well  as  physiological  factors? 
Nussbaum's  defence  of  the  identity  claim  however  in  the  end  amounts  simply  to  the 
argument  that  the  judgement  is  sufficient  for  the  emotion  (376)  and  the  idea  that  the  affect 
and  the  judgement  belong  to  the  same  part  of  the  soul  (380).  This,  however,  is  compatible 
with  their  being  distinct  things  which  belong  to  the  same  part  of  the  soul.  So  I  think  on 
the  basis  of  Nussbaum's  defence,  the  identity  claim  remains  mysterious. 
A  rather  different  view  is  offered  by  Justin  Gosling.  According  to  him,  Chrysippus  is 
not  claiming  that  the  affective  element  somehow  is  the  judgement.  Instead,  he  interprets 
Chrysippus  as  saying  that  when  we  use  the  term  "emotion"  correctly,  we  will  use  it  to 
refer  to  the  act  of  judgement,  since  that  is  the  only  element  for  which  the  agent  is  really 
responsible.  The  feeling,  or  affective  element,  then,  is  not  properly  speaking,  part  of  the 
emotion  at  all.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  an  emotion  is  a  judgement.  On  this  view,  feeling  is 
not  reduced  to  judgement,  rather  it  is  excluded  from  the  emotion  altogether.  Gosling 
however,  does  not  defend  this  stipulative  redefinition  of  "emotion".  Neither  interpretation 
therefore  makes  Chrysippus'  extreme  view  any  more  convincing.  68 
Although  the  account  so  far  presented  is  similar  to  the  one  offered  in  previous 
chapters  in  that  it  distinguishes  between  an  unasserted  appearance  and  secondly  a 
judgement  concerning  the  appearance,  there  is  an  important  difference  between  the  view 
described  there  and  the  Stoic  view.  According  to  the  account  offered  in  chapter  one,  an 
emotion  is  not  a  belief,  although  it  may  involve  belief.  On  Chrysippus'  account,  the 
68  Exactly  what  Chrysippus'  view  was  is  made  more  difficult  to  decide  by  the  fact  that  his  account  is  reported  second 
hand,  by  Galen.  Galen,  unfortunately,  subscribed  to  the  Platonic  doctrine  of  the  divided  soul,  and  so,  as  commentators 
point  out,  his  presentation  of  Chrysippus'  contrary  view  is  not  impartial.  Nevertheless,  according  to  Galen, 
Chrysippus,  sometimes  talked  of  emotions  as  intellectual  judgements,  but  at  others  included  something  like  the 
affective  elements;  "In  these  definitions  he  obviously  mentions  only  the  rational  part  of  the  soul,  omitting  the 
appetitive...  but  in  his  next  definitions  he  writes  some  things  consistent  with  ...  Zeno...  Shrinkings  and  swellings,  of 
course  and  expansions  and  contractions  ...  are  affections  of  the  irrational  faculty  that  result  from  opinions.  "  Quoted  in 
Long  and  Sedley  (p.  411.  )  Chrysippus  must  include  some  affective  element  -  "expansions  and  contractions"-  either  as 
a  consequence  of  the  emotion  proper  or  as  a  part  of  it  since  he  claims  that  another  key  feature  of  emotions  is  that  they 
are  "excessive"  and  out  of  control.  But  obviously  the  judgement,  as  far  as  he  is  concerned  is  under  our  control,  so 
there  must  be  something  else. 
173 emotion  is  the  judgement,  which  is  asserted,  and  therefore  a  belief.  69A  second  difference 
between  the  account  in  chapter  one  and  the  Stoic  account  is  over  the  possibility  of  conflict 
between  the  judgement  and  the  phantasia.  In  chapter  one  I  offered  examples  of  cases  in 
which  someone  rejects  the  judgement  connected  with  the  emotional  appearance  -  or, 
refuses  to  assent  to  it  -  but  still  has  the  emotion.  The  person  who  laughs  at  the  racist  joke, 
even  though  he  does  not  assent  to  it  still  finds  it  funny  somehow.  Recalcitrant  emotions 
too,  exhibit  the  same  pattern  of  divergence  between  belief,  or  judgement,  and  appearance. 
We  might  call  emotions  of  this  sort  akratic,  since  judgement  in  these  cases  is ineffective, 
as  it  is  in  cases  of  akratic  actions. 
The  Stoics,  however,  do  not  allow  for  this  possibility.  Emotions  embody  judgements 
that  are  mistaken,  or  irrational,  as  we  have  already  seen.  But  those  who  assent  to  these 
appearances  do  not  think  them  to  be  false.  Epictetus  writes, 
"When,  therefore,  someone  assents  to  something  false,  know  that  he  did  not  want  to 
assent  to  something  false.  For  every  soul  is  deprived  of  truth  against  its  will  ... 
it  seemed  to 
him  that  what  is  in  fact  false  was  true.  "70 
So,  someone  cannot  willingly  assent  to  what  they  know  to  be  false.  However,  this  could 
only  be  (as  for  example  is  the  case  with  belief)  if  the  assent  is  not  really  a  decision  at  all, 
but  is  a  passive  recognition  of  the  cases  in  which  assent  is demanded.  But  more  important 
than  this  is  another  point,  that  since  by  definition  the  emotion  is  the  assent  or  rejection  of 
the  appearance,  if  I  reject  the  appearance  in  judgement,  then  I  do  not  have  the  emotion. 
The  Stoics  therefore  rule  out  -  by  apparent  sleight  of  hand-  the  kinds  of  cases  which  might 
be  presented  as  counter-examples  to  their  theory.  Recalcitrant  or  akratic  emotions,  which 
appear  at  first  glance  to  be  cases  of  emotions  without  assent  to  the  relevant  judgements, 
turn  out,  after  all,  not  to  be  emotions  at  all  but  something  like  pre-emotions  (propatheiai). 
Seneca  writes; 
"They  are  not  affections  , 
but  'the  preliminaries,  the  prelude  to  affections...  None  of  these 
fortuitous  mental  impulses  deserves  to  be  called  an  emotion.  They  are  things  suffered,  so 
69  Nussbaum  (p.  374)  suggests  that  what  is  assented  to  is  a  proposition.  This  presumably  is  the  propositional  content  of 
the  phantasia. 
70  The  Discourses  (Bk.  1.27.  ) 
174 to  speak,  not  something  done  by  the  mind.  Emotion  is  not  a  matter  of  being  moved  by 
impressions  received,  but  of  surrendering  oneself  to  them  and  following  up  the  chance 
movement  "71 
Here  again  the  Stoics  anticipate  a  modem  reaction,  this  time  amongst  philosophers 
sympathetic  to  "cognitivist"  accounts  of  the  emotions  which  concentrate  on  beliefs  when 
faced  with  apparent  counter-examples;  simply  define  "emotion"  so  as  to  make  the 
counter-examples  irrelevant  72  But  what  grounds  do  the  Stoics  offer  for  accepting  the 
restriction  of  the  term  emotion  to  the  assenting  element?  We  can  accept  that  assent  or 
judgement  commits  me  to  the  emotional  response  in  a  way  that  I  am  not  committed  to, 
say,  recalcitrant  emotions.  But  that  does  not  force  acceptance  of  the  Stoic  view.  Nor  need 
the  claim  that  we  are  responsible  for  the  judgements  we  make.  In  fact  the  Stoic  picture  is 
implausible,  in  part  for  reasons  already  mentioned.  But  furthermore,  it  is  implausible 
because  it  denies  the  reality  of  conflict.  Akratic  emotions  testify  to  the  reality  of  mental 
conflict.  The  later  Platonic  account  of  akrasia,  which  we  find  suggested  in  the  Republic, 
takes  it  to  be  the  result  of  distinct  parts  of  the  soul.  The  Stoics,  however,  claim  the  soul  is 
unified  by  reason,  as  we  have  seen.  Furthermore,  on  their  account  akratic  emotions  are 
simply  things  that  happen  to  someone,  but  which  are  beyond  his  control  since  he,  let  us 
say,  properly  withheld  his  assenting  judgement.  It  cannot  be  his  fault,  then,  if  he 
nevertheless  has  an  "emotional"  response.  There  is  consequently  no  conflict  here,  because 
the  emotion  is  not  in  any  substantial  sense  "his";  only  what  is  under  his  control  counts  as 
that.  The  account  of  emotions  we  are  offered  by  the  Stoics  then,  complements  the  account 
of  virtuous  agency  in  that  both  focus  on  the  essential  idea  of  control. 
Chrysippus,  in  fact,  was  interested  in  cases  of  apparent  conflict,  the  most  famous  of 
which  is  Euripides'  Medea73.  The  case  of  Medea  is  not  easily  amenable  to  the  standard 
explanation  of  akrasia;  she  does  not  appear  to  be  overcome  by  passion  or  desire,  for 
example.  Instead  she  seems  aware  of  her  course  of  action  and  aware  equally  that  what  she 
71  Seneca,  De  Ira  2.2-3. 
72  This  point  about  the  Stoic  argument  is  made,  with  approval,  By  Julia  Annas  (Op.  Cit.  p.  116).  Kendall  Walton 
("Fearing  Fictions"  Journal  of  Philosophy  1975)  is  an  obvious  modem  case.  For  Walton,  emotional  reactions  to 
fictions  are  not  real  emotions  since  they  lack  beliefs;  rather,  they  are  quasi-emotions.  See  chapter  seven  for  further 
discussion. 
"3  For  a  discussion  of  Chrysippus'  treatment  of  Medea,  see  Christopher  Gill  (Op.  Cit.  ) 
175 is  doing  conflicts  with  other  values  she  holds.  There  is  conflict  here,  but  it  is  not  between 
rival  parts  of  the  soul.  As  Justin  Gosling  comments, 
"All  this  will  give  an  air  of  struggle..  .  and  one  set  of  consideration  can  reasonably  be 
called  those  of  reason.  But  it  is  Medea  who  is  struggling,  not  her  reason/real  self  against 
irrational  passion.  None  of  this  requires  a  split  in  her  hegemonikon,  and  nothing  in  the 
Stoic  position  precludes  this  picture.  "  (p.  59) 
However,  while  the  Stoic  account  of  Medea's  behaviour  may  be  credible,  it  does  not 
follow  that  the  same  pattern  of  explanation  will  be  equally  successful  elsewhere.  It  may  be 
that  Medea  is  not  an  example  of  akrasia  at  all.  Real  cases  of  akrasia  may  be  more 
problematic.  There  is  more  to  be  said  about  the  issue  of  conflict,  and  a  more  thorough 
consideration  of  akrasia  is  impossible  here.  However,  the  Stoic  treatment  of  it,  together 
with  their  theory  of  emotions  raises  some  important  general  points  which  are  relevant  to 
the  material  in  later  chapters.  So  I  will  return  to  this  issue  below.  Before  doing  that, 
however,  there  is  one  final  aspect  of  the  Stoic  theory  which  I  have  so  far  only  touched  on; 
their  strategy  for  reforming  the  emotions  through  therapy. 
Aristotle  was  optimistic  about  the  education  of  the  emotions.  He  seemed  to  think  that 
essential  educational  work  must  be  done  in  the  formative  years,  without  which  virtue  is 
impossible.  But  this  grounding  makes  further  education  possible  later  on.  The  Stoics 
believed  that  the  kind  of  temperance  of  the  emotions  Aristotle  favoured  was  not  possible. 
Instead,  they  argued  that  complete  extirpation  of  the  passions  was  required.  In  any  case, 
given  their  view  of  the  irrational  nature  of  emotion,  this  is  what  they  would  hope  for.  Why 
though,  did  they  think  Aristotle's  kind  of  education  impossible?  In  a  famous  image 
Chrysippus  compares  someone  in  an  emotional  state  to  someone  running; 
-  "When  someone  walks  in  accordance  with  his  impulse,  the  movement  of  his  legs  is 
not  excessive  but  commensurate  with  the  impulse,  so  that  he  can  stop  or  change  whenever 
he  wants  to.  But  when  people  run  in  accordance  with  their  impulse,  this  sort  of  thing  no 
longer  happens.  The  movement  of  their  legs  exceeds  their  impulse,  so  that  they  are  carried 
away  and  no  longer  able  to  change  obediently,  as  soon  as  they  have  started  to  do  so. 
Something  similar  I  think  takes  place  with  impulses,  owing  to  their  going  beyond  the 
176 rational  proportion.  The  result  is  that  when  someone  has  the  impulse  he  is  not  really 
obedient  to  reason.  .,  74 
So  the  picture  Chrysippus  paints  is  of  someone  who  is  not  in  control;  although  the 
assenting  judgement  is  in  the  agent's  control,  the  ensuing  "swellings"  and  "contractions" 
become  excessive  and  he  cannot  control  them.  Chrysippus  therefore  rejects  the  idea  that 
moderation  in  the  Aristotelian  sense  is  an  option.  Only  complete  extirpation  will  work. 
But  are  we  to  take  Chrysippus'  argument  quite  generally?  As  an  empirical  account  of 
most  emotional  states  it  is  false;  only  in  extreme  cases  are  people  "out  of  control". 
Furthermore,  since  the  Stoics  think  that  extirpation  is  to  be  achieved  by  education,  do  they 
not  thereby  concede  that  emotions  can  be  educated?  Only  in  the  sense  that,  since  an 
emotion  is  a  judgement,  people  can  be  educated  to  withhold  their  judgements.  It  is 
therefore  judgement,  strictly  speaking,  that  is  educated.  Epictetus  says, 
"If  you  set  these  thoughts  against  your  impression,  you  will  overpower  it...  in  the  first 
place  do  not  allow  yourself  to  be  carried  away  by  its  intensity;  but  say,  "Impression,  wait 
for  me  a  little.  Let  me  see  what  you  are,  and  what  you  represent.  Let  me  test 
you"...  next...  you  should  introduce  some  fair  and  noble  impression  to  replace  it,  and 
banish  this  base  and  sordid  one.  "75 
Here  Epictetus  in  fact  indicates  two  ways  in  which  education  of  the  emotions  can  be 
approached;  first,  by  gaining  more  control  over  our  judgements/  assents  to  appearances. 
But  in  addition  to  this  he  suggests  that  we  should  aim  to  tackle  the  phantasia  themselves; 
they  too  can  be  educated.  In  common  sense  terms,  this  is  what  we  would  expect.  Merely 
removing  the  judgement  will  not  be  sufficient  to  prevent  the  emotion,  although  we  have 
seen  that  the  Stoics  officially  deny  this.  Epictetus  is  in  any  case  not  typical  of  the  Stoics 
here,  and  the  weight  of  their  therapeutic  practice  falls  on  judgement  76  Exactly  how  we 
can  educate  phantasia  is  a  much  more  difficult  question  than  how  we  can  educate 
. 
74  From  Galen,  "On  Hippocrates  and  Plato's  Doctrines"  quoted  in  Long  and  Sedley  1987  (p.  414) 
75  Epictetus,  The  Discourses,  Bk.  2.18.24. 
76  principally  in  the  form  of  reminding  ourselves  of  truths  such  as  that  our  loved  ones  are  mortal,  and  other  propositions 
of  this  sort.  Nussbaum  (Op.  Cit.  )  also  highlights  the  role  of  literary  texts  and  the  persona  of  the  philosopher  in 
therapeutic  sessions.  She  emphasises  that  it  was  not  conceived  as  a  dry  bookish  exercise. 
177 judgement.  A  starting  point  might  be  the  suggestion  that  imagination  plays  a  greater  role 
than  in  the  education  of  judgement.  I  return  to  this  issue  in  chapter  six,  so  I  shall  not 
pursue  it  at  present. 
However,  one  important  point  can  be  made.  If  we  are  to  take  the  Stoic  view  seriously, 
then  we  must  accept  the  idea  that  becoming  convinced  of  a  range  of  philosophical 
precepts  and  arguments  will  be  sufficient  to  liberate  us  from  the  yoke  of  false  emotional 
habits.  But  this  can  have  little  to  do  with  the  real  work  of  psychotherapy  and 
psychoanalysis.  Once  more,  Stoic  definitions  make  their  claims  seem  more  substantial 
than  they  are.  Concerning  the  range  of  "emotional"  disorders  (everyday  usage),  Stoic 
therapy  will  surely  achieve  little;  not  simply  because  it  appears  to  ignore  the  role  of  the 
unconscious  and  insist  that  the  problem  consists  merely  in  bringing  judgement  under 
control,  but  also  because,  as  Bernard  Williams  points  out,  much  of  what  real  therapy  can 
achieve  is  the  result  of  factors  other  than  the  content  of  the  therapy; 
"But  seriously  dangerous  or  troubling  states  need  interpretation,  and  it  is  not  purely  a 
cognitive  point  that  the  sufferer  needs  someone  else's  help  in  that  interpretation.  The 
psychoanalytic  concept  of  transference  is  only  the  most  dramatic  and  far-going 
representation  of  something  that  is  in  general  true,  that  it  is  not  just  the  content  of  a 
helper's  help  that  does  the  work,  but  one's  relation  to  the  helper.  "77 
If  we  accept  this,  it  will  seem  a  kind  of  naivety  perhaps  in  Stoic  thought  that  it  was  hoped 
that  philosophical  argument  itself  could  effect  profound  psychological  changes.  Martha 
Nussbaum  has  argued,  however,  that  this  account  leaves  out  the  Stoic's  emphasis  on 
literary  style  and  the  rhetorical  elements  of  therapy78.  However  this  important  concession 
seems  to  lead  us  away  from  an  emphasis  on  the  reform  of  active  judgement  and  towards  a 
picture  in  which  somehow  emotional  education  and  therapy  are  affected  not  through 
direct  assault  by  philosophical  argument  but  by  more  oblique  techniques  that  "steal  little 
by  little  into  the  mind"79.  The  focus  of  the  Stoic  view  is  on  active  control  and  self- 
n  Williams  (Op.  Cit.  p.  212) 
78  Nussbaum,  "Stoic  Tonics"  (p.  330).  Cf  also  Arrian's  introduction  to  Epictetus'  Discourses,  where  he  apologises  that  in 
setting  down  only  Epictetus'  words  he  omits  the  vital  element  of  the  presence  and  voice  of  the  man  himself. 
Arguments  in  favour  of  the  effectiveness  of  poetry  are  given  in  Seneca,  letters  38  and  108. 
19  Seneca,  letter  38. 
178 sufficiency.  And  a  consequence  of  this  is  that  learning  should  proceed  by  addressing 
active  judgement.  One  of  many  Platonic  assumptions  which  the  Stoics  seem  to  have 
adopted  is  a  belief  in  the  supreme  importance  of  philosophical  argument  as  the  source  of 
understanding.  For  reasons  of  this  sort,  amongst  others,  Plato  could  not  take  seriously  the 
idea  that  the  arts,  which  did  not  proceed  by  dialectic  towards  real  knowledge  (episteme), 
could  be  a  source  of  understanding80. 
The  connection  I  would  like  to  draw  at  present  is  between  the  dominant  role  of 
argument  as  it  features  in  Plato  and  the  Stoics  and  the  implications  of  this  insistence  for 
those  philosophers'  picture  of  human  psychology.  One  convenient  way  into  this  topic, 
fortunately,  is  through  the  emotions.  Since  these  issues  will  feature  prominently  in  chapter 
eight,  I  will  end  the  present  section  by  indicating  some  general  connections. 
80  See  chapter  eight  for  further  discussion. 
179 Conclusion;  Conflict  and  Conviction. 
Since  the  general  issue  to  be  raised  in  this  section  concerns  the  economy  of  psychological 
explanation,  a  good  place  to  start  is  with  the  question  of  akrasia.  In  the  Protagoras  we 
fmd  Plato's  earlier  treatment  of  this  problem.  There  his  solution  is,  in  effect,  to  deny  the 
existence  of  the  problem.  What  we  might  be  tempted  to  describe  as  cases  in  which  people 
are  "overcome  "  by  desire  or  emotion,  contrary  to  their  judgements,  cannot  really  be  so, 
Plato  claims.  If  they  really  are  instances  of  the  agent  being  "overcome",  then  it  becomes 
questionable  that  they  really  are  intentional  actions  at  all.  But  the  whole  problem  of 
akrasia  is  how  someone  could  intentionally  perform  what  they  judge  to  be  an  undesirable 
action.  To  entitle  these  actions  to  the  description,  "intentional",  conversely,  makes  it 
implausible  that  the  agent  really  is  overcome.  Instead,  according  to  Plato,  we  should  see 
that  the  action  is  undertaken  for  deliberate  ends,  but  that  my  estimation  of  what  I  judge  to 
be  the  best  option  is  qualified  by  the  circumstances  in  which  I  find  myself.  81 
One  principle  which  is  in  operation  here  is  the  idea  that  action  must  be  explicable  in 
terms  of  beliefs  and  desires  which  the  agent  has.  82  In  relation  to  cases  of  apparent  akrasia 
this  results  in  the  assumption  that  there  must  be  some  change  of  mind  on  the  agent's  part, 
which  explains  his  action.  If  the  agent  really  does  do  what  he  thinks  to  be  the  worse 
option,  then  what  kind  of  account  of  action  could  explain  it?  In  the  Protagoras,  at  least, 
Plato  seems  to  prefer  the  economy  of  his  type  of  explanation  to  rival  accounts.  But  if  we 
are  to  reject  his  account  we  will  need  to  be  able  to  offer  an  alternative  explanation  which 
makes  sense  of  -the  apparent  division  within  the  agent  that  will  result  if  we  reject  the 
assumption  (above)  about  psychological  explanation. 
As  a  way  to  see  how  this  might  be  possible,  consider  the  following  example  of  Justin 
Gosling's; 
...  suppose  I  want  to  get  safely  over  a  deep  ravine.  Across  it  there  is  a  rope  bridge  that 
swings  alarmingly.  I  do  stringent  tests  on  the  strength  of  the  ropes  and  conclude  that  the 
"Justin  Gosling  writes,  "...  I  still  do  what  at  the  time  I  think  best.  It  maybe  that  others  think  my  initial  objective  better.  I 
may,  myself,  in  my  more  reflective  moments,  wish  that  I  could  keep  steadily  to  that  objective..  . 
It  remains  only  that  at 
the  time  I  do  what  I  think  it best  to  do.  ".  Gosling  (Op.  Cit.  p.  18) 
12  Further  critical  discussion  of  this  principle  is  contained  in  chapter  eight. 
180 bridge  could  safely  carry  three  elephants...  On  approaching  it,  however,  I  cannot,  as  I 
might  say,  bring  myself  to  believe  in  its  safety  ...  there  is  no  division  of  motivation 
here 
...  there  is,  however,  division  of  judgement.  By  one  route  to  a  sort  of  judgement,  I  am 
convinced  it  is  safe;  by  another  I  am  not.  The  admission  that  measuring  skill  removes  the 
power  of  appearances  seems  to  suggest  that  conviction  follows  immediately  on 
calculation.  s83 
This  example  raises  a  couple  of  points.  First,  as  Gosling  notes,  the  conflict  is  between 
what  we  might  call  "judgement",  rather  than  between  judgement  and  desire.  Secondly,  in 
Stoic  terms,  it  is  clear  which  "judgement'  'we  actively  assent  to;  the  judgement  that  the 
bridge  is  safe.  What  then  of  the  rival  judgement?  What  should  we  say  of  the  gap  between 
my  rejection  of  it  and  the  fact  that  it  is  effective,  nevertheless?  It  is  in  connection  with  this 
question  that  Gosling's  mention  of  the  notion  of  conviction  is  relevant.  840n  one  view  of 
the  case,  we  might  simply  conclude  that  "I  can't  help"  but  be  afraid  of  the  bridge.  But 
Gosling's  talk  of  "routes  to  judgement"  suggests  an  alternative;  that  the  appearance 
(phantasia)  of  the  bridge  being  unsafe  is  one  that  convinces  me  even  though  I  do  not 
assent  to  it.  This  account  of  the  case  means  that  a  convincing  phantasia  does  result  in 
something  like  a  judgement,  but  not  one  that  is  asserted  or  believed.  What  such 
"conviction"  might  amount  to  is  an  issue  that  will  be  discussed  at  greater  length  in  chapter 
eight,  but  at  present  we  should  note  that  such  an  account  allows,  first  of  all,  for  an 
alternative  account  of  akrasia;  that  it  is  based  on  a  kind  of  judgement,  but  it  is  not  an 
asserted  or  assented-to  judgement.  Secondly,  the  implications  for  emotions  are  also  clear. 
Recalcitrant  or  akratic  emotions  need  not  involve  assented-to  judgements.  Nevertheless, 
the  phobic's  experience  of  the  frightful  phantasia  is  convincing,  although  he  believes 
differently.  85 
For  my  purposes  I  would  like  to  suggest  two  conclusions  we  might  draw  from  this  point. 
The  first  is  a  general  one  about  psychological  explanation.  If  we  insist  on  simplicity  and 
83  Gosling  (Op.  Cit  p.  15). 
84  The  nature  and  role  of  conviction  is  discussed  in  chapter  eight. 
85  Galen  seems  to  gesture  towards  an  objection  to  Chrysippus  in  these  terms;  "  When  he  says  that  the  persuasiveness  of 
impressions,  and  conversation  are  responsible  for 
...  maladjustments...  we  should  ask  why  pleasure  projects  the 
persuasive  appearance  that  it  is  good...  Similarly,  why  are  we  readily  persuaded,  when  we  hear  victory  at 
Olympia...  praised  as  good  things  ...  %  In  Long  and  Sedley,  p.  415.  Julia  Annas,  (Op.  Cit.  p.  116)  also  mentions  that 
Chrysippus  admits  that  phantasia  are  convincing. 
181 economy  in  our  explanations  we  are  likely,  if  the  points  just  made  are  correct,  to  end  up 
over-  simplifying  things.  One  way  we  might  do  this  is  by  insisting  that  the  only  form  of 
judgement  is  belief.  This  is  Plato's  assumption  in  the  Protagoras;  however  the  tendency  to 
simplification  in  this  way  seems  to  be  a  persistent  temptation  in  philosophy.  It  also  lies 
behind  the  accounts  of  modem  writers  such  as  Donald  Davidson,  who  also  emphasise  the 
"belief/desire"  psychology. 
86  The  emphasis  on  belief  also  neatly  tends  to  eliminate  real 
conflict,  where  we  should  not  want  to  eliminate  it.  The  second  point  is  that  our  emotional 
states  are  a  good  example  of  this.  Akratic  emotions  and  phobias  involve  more  than  the 
streamlined,  belief-orientated  psychology  allows.  For  example,  Kendall  Walton's  famous 
example87  of  the  man  in  the  cinema,  "terrified"  of  the  slime  although  he  does  not  believe 
that  he  is  in  danger.  But  to  leave  things  at  that  is  to  fail  to  do  justice  to  his  experience;  he 
is  somehow  convinced,  in  direct  conflict  with  his  beliefs,  that  the  slime  is  threatening.  One 
final  suggestion  follows  from  this.  If  it  is  conviction  that  is  at  stake  in  these  cases  as  much 
as  belief,  then  it  will  not  be  as  easy  as  Plato  assumed  to  claim  that  only  dialectic  is 
important.  As  far  as  education  of  the  emotions  is  concerned,  the  goal  may  be  that  we  find 
phantasia  of  one  sort  rather  than  another  convincing,  rather  than  arrive  at  the  correct  set  of 
beliefs.  However,  to  achieve  this  end,  we  may  have  to  draw  on  techniques  beyond  those 
which  philosophy  can  offer.  This  concludes  the  present  discussion  of  Stoicism.  In  terms  of 
the  two  questions  with  which  I  began  chapter  one-  regarding  the  nature  and  the  value  of 
emotions-  the  answers  Stoicism  offers  are  unsatisfactory.  And  more  than  this,  we  have 
considered  some  reasons  for  thinking  that  its  background  assumptions  about  psychology 
are  also  unacceptable. 
One  point  linking  both  the  Stoic  and  the  Existentialist  challenge  to  the  Aristotelian 
picture  is  the  emphasis  on  choice  and  decision.  A  theme  running  throughout  this  chapter 
has  been  that  this  emphasis  is  a  mistake.  Character  and  the  ideas  of  practical  necessity  and 
moral  incapacity,  for  example,  reveal  the  importance  of  passive  judgement  for  our  ethical 
thought.  This  is  true  most  importantly,  for  present  purposes,  of  emotional  responses. 
Aristotle's  account  of  the  value  of  emotions  remains,  then,  unscathed  by  these  attacks.  But 
Stoicism  seems  a  strange  doctrine  by  modem  lights  for  another  reason.  Against  the 
contingencies  of  the  world  it  counsels  what  Isiah  Berlin  refers  to  as  "  Retreat  into  the 
86  These  points  about  Davidson  are  developed  in  chapter  eight. 
87  Walton,  "Fearing  Fictions".  The  example  is  discussed  further  in  chapter  eight. 
182 Inner  Citadel"88.  It  advises  that  we  limit  our  experience  to  that  which  is  truly  valuable,  and 
insists  that  this  does  not  include  emotional  experience.  By  sharp  contrast,  in  the  modem 
Romantic  movement,  we  find  the  antithesis  of  this  view;  a  thirst  for  experience  generally 
and  a  longing  for  emotional  experience  in  particular.  However,  there  is  also  a  deeper 
disagreement  between  the  attitudes  of  antiquity  -  whether  Stoic  or  Aristotelian-  towards 
the  emotions  and  those  of  the  Romantics,  and  it  is  with  this  difference  that  the  next 
chapter  is  concerned. 
ss  Berlin,  "Two  Concepts  of  Liberty"  p.  135. 
183 Chapter  Five  ; 
Passion  and  Emotion. 
In  the  previous  chapter  we  considered  one  account  of  the  value  of  emotions  - 
the  Aristotelian  one  -  which  focuses  on  the  relationship  between  emotion  and 
character.  The  present  chapter  attempts  to  evaluate  a  more  modern 
perspective  on  the  value  of  emotion;  Romanticism.  The  differences  between 
these  two  views  of  emotion  are  nowhere  clearer,  perhaps,  than  in  the  accounts 
they  offer  of  love.  As  a  means  of  bringing  out  these  differences,  therefore,  I 
begin  by  outlining  Aristotle's  account  of  philia.  Here  too,  it  emerges,  Aristotle 
takes  character  to  be  all-important.  The  Romantic  conception  of  love,  by 
contrast,  highlights,  not  the  relationship  between  love  and  character,  but 
between  love  and  self.  A  further  difference,  I  argue,  is  that  romantic  love  is 
more  appropriately  thought  of  as  an  aesthetic,  rather  than  an  ethical 
phenomenon.  That  Aristotle's  account  of  philia  takes  no  notice  of  this  fact  can 
be  partly  explained,  perhaps,  by  the  fact  that  the  distinction  between  the 
moral  and  the  aesthetic  is  relatively  modern,  and  not  one  available  to  either 
Aristotle  or  Plato.  But  this  can  only  be  part  of  the  explanation,  since  the 
account  of  love  offered  by  Plato  does  emphasise  that  it  is  a  response  to  beauty. 
The  conclusion  which  we  should  reach  on  the  basis  of  these  considerations,  is, 
I  contend,  that  it  is  a  mistake  to  think  of  the  value  of  all  emotion  as  deriving 
from  its  connection  with  character,  as  Aristotle's  account  suggests. 
184 Aristotle. 
In  reading  Aristotle's  account  of  philia  the  first  difficulty  we  face  is  in  saying 
what  exactly  it  is  an  account  of.  Aristotle  includes  as  examples  of  philia; 
family  relationships,  friendship,  "civic  friendship"  and  some  sorts  of  business 
relationships.  Not  all  of  these  would  count  as  instances  of  "love",  even  taken 
in  the  widest  sense.  On  the  other  hand,  the  relation  between  mother  and  child 
is  given  as  a  paradigm  of  philia,  so  it  would  seem  that  if  "love"  is  not  wide 
enough  a  translation,  "friendship"  is  also  unsatisfactory.  I  shall  use  both 
"love"  and  "friendship",  depending  on  context.  Despite  these  difficulties  in  the 
translation  of  philia,  we  can  focus  on  something  that  Aristotle  seems  to  regard 
as  central  to  all  instances  of  it;  an  interest  in  promoting  the  well-being  of  the 
other  person  . 
Aristotle  distinguishes  three  different  bases  for  friendship  1.  The  first  is 
friendship  based  on  advantage,  or  utility;  the  second  is  friendship  based  on 
pleasure  taken  in  the  friend,  and  the  last  is  friendship  based  on  a  mutual 
appreciation  of  virtuous  character.  It  is  the  third  of  these  which  Aristotle 
regards  as  true  friendship.  In  what,  then,  does  the  alleged  superiority  of  this 
form  of  friendship  lie?  Does  it,  for  instance,  lie  in  the  fact  that  it  does  not 
involve  pleasure  and  utility?  Aristotle  however  does  not  say  that  only 
pleasure-friendship 
(type  two)  involves  pleasure,  or  that  only  utility  - 
friendship  (type  one)  involves  utility.  He  recognises  that  friendship  based  on 
virtuous  character  (type  three)  can  also  be  both  pleasant  and  useful.  What 
then  are  the  grounds  of  its  superiority? 
One  difference  between  character-friendship  and  the  other  two  forms  is 
that  they  will  tend  to  have  a  shorter  life  span,  ceasing  to  exist  when  the  friend 
ceases  to  be  either  pleasant  or  useful.  Character-friendship,  by  contrast,  will, 
according  to  Aristotle,  tend  to  endure,  in  spite  of  (many  kinds  of)  change.  The 
reason  is  that  it  is  focused  on  character-  and  virtuous  character  (it  is 
'  N.  E.  1156a6-27. 
185 claimed)tends  to  endure  more  than  incidental  and  more  superficial  attributes 
of  a  person's  personality.  But  although  virtuous  character  is  the  object  of 
friendship,  Aristotle  believes  that  it  is  important  to  distinguish  this  from  love 
of  an  object.  A  wine-lover,  for  example,  may  technically  count  as  a  lover,  but 
his  love  lacks  any  mutuality2.  Not  only  is  his  attitude  not  reciprocated,  but 
the  absence  of  reciprocity  is  considered  unimportant  by  him.  This  kind  of  love 
seems,  in  Aristotle's  view,  to  be  based  just  on  pleasant  sensation,  whereas 
character-friendship  is  not; 
"Now  it  looks  as  if  love  were  a  feeling,  friendship  a  state  of  character;  for  love 
may  be  felt  just  as  much  towards  lifeless  things,  but  mutual  love  involves 
choice  and  choice  springs  from  a  state  of  character;  and  men  wish  well  to 
those  whom  they  love,  for  their  sake,  not  as  a  result  of  feeling  but  as  a  result 
of  character.  "  (N.  E.  1157b24-29) 
Aristotle  here  suggests  that  pleasure-friendship  and  utility-friendship  are 
more  like,  though  not  identical  to,  the  love  of  objects,  because  they  too  are 
one-way.  Of  course  it  would  be  incorrect  to  claim  that  pleasure  and  utility 
friendship  can  only  be  one-way;  they  too,  can  be  mutual.  The  difference, 
Aristotle  suggests,  lies  in  the  fact  that  character  friendship  involves  choice, 
whereas  the  other  types  do  not.  What  Aristotle  seems  to  have  in  mind  is  that 
in  character-friendship  the  friends  choose  to  promote  each  other's  well-being, 
and  do  so  not  on  the  basis  of  the  pleasant  feeling  each  causes  in  the  other,  but 
for  their  own  sake.  However,  if  I  do  take  pleasure,  in  the  company  of  a  friend, 
why  should  this  preclude  my  also  wishing  to  promote  his  well-being?  The 
assumption  being  made  appears  to  be  that  because  the  basis  of  the  friendship 
is  my  own  pleasure,  which  is  self-interested,  I  do  not  have  the  required 
interest  in  the  friend  for  his  own  sake.  But  this  move  from  pleasure  to  a  lack 
of  concern  is  erroneous.  The  fact  that  the  original  motivation  for  my  interest 
in  someone  is  pleasure,  does  not  rule  out  my  coming  to  care  about  his  well- 
2  It  is  not  obvious  however,  that  mutuality  is  a  necessary  condition  of  love,  and  if  this  claim  is  to  amount  to  more  than  a 
stipulative  definition,  some  further  grounds  for  accepting  it  must  be  offered. 
186 being  for  its  own  sake.  There  is  no  inconsistency  in  taking  pleasure  in 
someone's  company  and  caring  about  them  for  their  own  sake.  In  general, 
taking  pleasure  in  something  may  be  self-interested,  but  it  need  not  be  selfish.  3 
Another  of  Aristotle's  points,  which  we  have  already  alluded  to,  may 
provide  a  better  basis  for  his  claims  for  the  superiority  of  character  friendship. 
This  is  the  claim  that  pleasure  and  utility  friendship  are  based  on  properties 
of  the  person  which  are  accidental.  Character-friendship,  by  contrast,  is  based 
on  properties  of  the  person  which  are  essential  to  him.  This  seems  to  conform 
to  one  of  our  intuitions  about  love;  that  it  should  be  of  the  person  and  not 
merely  of  some  property  they  happen  to  possess4.  The  question  then  must  be, 
what  is  it  that  we  have  to  love  about  a  person  to  be  loving  them?  Aristotle's 
answer  to  this  question,  as  we  have  already  seen,  is  that  I  must  love  the 
person's  goodness-  their  virtuous  character.  Aristotle's  view  that  virtuous 
character  constitutes  someone's  essence  is  a  feature  of  his  metaphysical 
biology,  according  to  which  substances  possess  essences  and  tend  towards  a 
telos  or  purpose.  Since  it  is  of  man's  essence  to  reach  eudaimonia,  a  virtuous 
character  is  a  human  being's  essence  in  a  way  that  other  properties  he  may 
happen  to  possess  are  not.  The  alleged  superiority  of  character  friendship, 
then,  requires  the  background  assumptions  of  Aristotle's  metaphysics  for  a 
full  defence. 
It  is  also  a  noteworthy  fact  that  philia  is  non-sexual.  Aristotle's  reason  for 
excluding  erotic  love  is  that  he  claims  it  is  merely  a  subclass  of  pleasure- 
friendship  and  is  therefore  self  interested.  But  we  have  already  seen  that  this 
claim  is  mistaken.  Nevertheless,  Aristotle's  hostility  to  any  account  which 
makes  pleasure  and  feeling  crucial  elements  of  the  value  of  relationships  has 
had  enormous  influence  on  subsequent  thought.  To  this  we  can  also  add  a 
s  The  point  made  here  is  tentatively  ascribed  to  Aristotle  himself  by  John  Cooper,  in  "Aristotle  on  Friendship"  (p.  305)  in 
Rorty  ed.  Essays  on  Aristotle.  Cooper  interprets  Aristotle  as  recognising  both  that  pleasure-friendship  can  embody 
altruism  and  that  character-friendship  involves  pleasure. 
4  The  point  is  also  emphasised  by  Pascal  in  the  Pensees.  Unlike  Aristotle,  however,  Pascal  suggests  that  since  all  we  ever 
do  love  are  qualities  of  a  person,  it  is  a  fact  that  we  never  love  the  person  himself.  Pascal's  argument  is  discussed  and 
criticised  by  Roger  Scruton  in  ch.  4  of  Sexual  Desire. 
187 related,  historical  point.  Aristotle's  account  of  philia  (and  also,  before  it, 
Plato's  account  of  eros  in  the  Symposium)  pictures  friendship/love  as  a 
response  to  something  deemed  to  be  of  intrinsic  value,  and  not  undertaken  in 
the  hope  of  reward  or  benefit.  This  thought  is  picked  up  later  by  the  Christian 
tradition  in  the  form  of  the  concept  of  agape;  the  love  God  has  for  all  his 
subjects,  and  the  love  we  are  to  have  for-  amongst  others-  both  our  neighbours 
and  our  enemies.  Agape  is  selfless  and  looks  for  no  beneficial  return. 
Furthermore,  it  is  a  response  to  a  person  in  spite  of,  rather  than  because  of, 
any  particular  identifying  features  they  possess5.  In  this  sense  it  is 
unconditional.  Erotic  or  romantic  love,  by  contrast,  is  associated  in  both 
classical  and  Christian  traditions  with  self-interest,  and  is  therefore  deemed 
to  be  of  no  value.  This  hostility  is  still  prevalent  in  some  modern  writers  6.  The 
resulting  picture  of  love  and  friendship  -  in  keeping  with  the  general  account 
given  in  the  last  chapter-  is  that  love  and  friendship  are  first  and  foremost 
ethical  phenomena.  Loving  is  a  question  of  being  a  person  who  has  character7 
and  such  a  person  will  naturally  be  attracted  to  those  who  are  similarly 
virtuous.  Virtue,  then,  stands  firmly  at  the  centre  of  Aristotle's  account. 
In  this  respect  it  differs  most  obviously  from  Erotic  or  Romantic  love.  However  it  also  differs  from  philia,  which  is 
focused  on  specific  features  of  character. 
6  An  instance  of  this  attitude  is  Erich Fromm's  well  known  book  The  Art  of  Loving.  In  it  Fromm  argues  that  love  is 
mistakenly  understood  as  a  feeling-  one  of  heightened  intensity-  rather  than  as  a  capacity.  Fromm  argues  that  loving 
requires  certain  traits  of  character  -  traits  which  turn  out  to  be  very  like  virtues.  Love  is  pictured  as  an  activity  (an  art), 
not  a  passive  emotional  response.  Romantic  love  is  construed  by  Fromm  as  merely  analogous  to  a  commodity 
exchange  (p.  10/11).  The  implication  hovers  in  the  background  that  it  is  therefore  self-interested  and  unwholesome. 
Here  again,  in  true  Aristotelian  fashion,  love  is  a  question  of  character.  On  the  historical  lineage  of  these  ideas,  see 
Catherine  Osborne,  Eros  Unveiled,  and  Robert  Solomon,  `"The  Virtues  of  Love"  in  Midwest  Studies  in  Philosophy 
vol.  13.  The  assumed  self-interest  of  romantic  love  is  also  a  prominent  feature  of  the  writing  of  cynics  such  as  La 
Rochefoucauld;  "We  cannot  love  anything  except  in  terms  of  ourselves"  (Maxim  81)  and;  "The  reason  why  lovers 
never  tire  of  each  other's  company  is  that  the  conversation  is  always  about  themselves"  (Maxim  312).  However,  not 
only  should  we  question  the  mistaken  assumption  behind  such  views,  but  we  should  entertain  the  possibility  that  love 
for  another  individual  -  even  in its  romantic  form-  involves  one  of  the  steps  which  is  fundamental  to  ethics-  the  ability 
to  find  intrinsic  value  in  something/someone  beyond  oneself.  As  Bernard  Williams  notes  ("Egoism  and  Altruism")  the 
first  step  in  moral  thinking  is  not  the  one  from  myself  to  everyone  else  (as  Kant  would  have  it)  but  from  oneself  to 
another. 
7  This  is  Fromm's  view. 
188 What  should  we  make  of  Aristotle's  account  of  friendship?  First  of  all,  it  is 
certainly  false  to  think  that  a  relationship  based  in  pleasure  must  be  either 
selfish  or  exclusively  self  interested.  So  the  subsequent  use  of  this  objection  in 
opposition  to  Romantic  and  erotic  love  is  simply  mistaken.  Secondly,  is  it 
really  credible  that  love  between  parents  and  children,  for  example,  can  be 
analysed  along  the  lines  Aristotle  suggests?  It  is  not;  there  is  no  question  that 
parents  love  their  children  for  their  virtuous  character,  since  they  have  not 
yet  developed  one.  Yet  such  love  is  not  only  not  self-interested,  it  is,  as 
Aristotle  suggests,  a  paradigm  of  what  is  good  in  cases  of  love.  So  we  might 
have  legitimate  doubts  that  an  analysis  in  terms  of  respect  for  good  character 
captures  what  is  valuable  about  love.  A  third,  and  related,  worry  arises  over 
Aristotle's  determination  not  to  think  of  love  as  a  passion.  Love  between 
friends,  family  members  and  lovers,  though  distinct  in  nature,  are  all  still 
emotions  with  strong  affective  elements.  But  Aristotle's  account  of  philia 
seems  to  downplay  this  fact  and  concentrate  on  notions  such  as  respect  for  and 
valuing  of,  good  character.  We  might  even  wonder  whether  he  is  offering  an 
account  of  an  emotional  response  at  all.  His  reluctance  stems  from  the 
determination  noted  earlier  not  to  think  of  feelings  and  pleasure  as  grounding 
the  value  of  love. 
We  can  pursue  these  points  further  if  we  consider  a  familiar  distinction; 
between  loving  and  being-in-love.  The  latter  typically  has  a  shorter  duration 
than  the  former,  while  the  former  usually  develops  out  of  the  latter  as 
emotional  attachments  alter  in  nature.  Loving,  we  might  say,  is  a  settled 
disposition  and  involves  an  active  elements  which  being  in  love  need  not. 
Being  in-love,  in  contrast  with  loving,  is  characterised  by  the  intensity  of  the 
emotion.  Both,  however,  may  involve  concern  for  the  interests  of  the  loved 
"  Such  as  that  suggested  by  Fromm;  promoting  the  interests  of  the  loved  one,  tolerance,  understanding,  forgiveness,  etc. 
This  point  is  also  made  by  David  Hamlyn  ("Learning  to  Love"  in  Perception,  Learning  and  the  Self  7,  whose  account 
is  otherwise  very  different  from  Fromm's. 
189 one,  and  neither  need  be  self  interested9.  Aristotle's  account,  to  the  extent 
that  it  fits  either  of  these  phenomena,  fits  loving  rather  than  being  in  love. 
Even  here,  however,  the  lack  of  emphasis  on  the  emotional  component  is  a 
source  of  worry.  In  contrast  to  Aristotle's  account,  the  claim  I  wish  to  make  is 
that  being-in-love  is  characteristically  an  aesthetic  experience,  while  loving  - 
for  reasons  already  suggested-  is  more  readily  seen  as  falling  within  the 
ethical  realm.  '° 
If  this  is  correct,  it  may  make  the  Romantic  attitude  towards  emotion  more 
intelligible.  The  ancient  Greeks  did  not-  arguably  -  possess  the  distinction 
between  the  moral  and  the  aesthetic,  largely  because  the  concept  of  the 
"aesthetic"  itself  is  relatively  modern11.  It  is  natural  for  Aristotle,  therefore,  to 
think  of  the  value  of  love  as  residing  in  its  connections  with  good  character 
and  virtue,  since,  as  we  have  seen,  this  is  the  analysis  he  offers  for  the  value 
of  other  emotions.  In  line  with  his  treatment  of  other  emotions,  he  emphasises 
when  it  is  appropriate  and  what  it  is  an  appropriate  response  to,  rather  than 
what  it  feels  like  or  how  pleasant  it  is.  However,  the  value  of  being-  in-  love 
simply  does  seem  to  be  tied  to  the  way  the  experience  feels.  And  in  addition, 
we  do  not  possess  the  confidence  that  Aristotle  may  have  had,  that  we  know 
in  what  circumstances  love  is  appropriate.  As  far  as  romantic  love  is 
concerned,  we  are  prepared  to  allow  that  the  question  of  appropriateness  does 
Being  in  love  need  not  involve  any  desire  to  promote  the  interests  of  the  loved  one,  however.  It  seems  possible,  for 
example,  to  be  in  love  with  someone  you  dislike  or  do  not  value.  It  is  perhaps  more  difficult-  conceptually.  to  see  how 
it  is  possible  to  love  someone  under  these  conditions. 
10  How  this  distinction  -  between  the  aesthetic  and  the  ethical-  should  be  made,  and  even  whether  it  can  be  made  at  all,  is 
debatable.  For  the  moment  I  base  my  suggested  identification  of  being  in  love  as  an  aesthetic  phenomenon  on  three 
features.  First,  being  in  love  is  characterised  by  the  intensity  of  pleasure  involved.  Second,  it  is  compatible  with  a  lack 
of  concern  for  the  interests  of  the  loved  one.  Thirdly,  the  concept  of  beauty  plays  a  crucial  role,  as  it  does,  obviously, 
in  aesthetic  experience. 
Plato,  most  famously  does  not  distinguish  moral  and  aesthetic  in  the  Form  of  the  Good.  The  Greek  to  kalon  meaning 
what  is  "fine",  can  apply  to  character  but  lacks  the  overtones  of  our  "moral",  and  also  includes  the  idea  of  what  is 
beautiful.  For  discussion  of  the  rival  views  of  Collingwood  (1938)  and  Mothersill  (1984)  see  Janaway,  Images  of 
Excellence,  ch.  3.  For  the  History  of  the  concept  of  the"  Aesthetic"  see  P.  0.  Kristeller,  `"The  Modem  System  of  the 
Arts",  The  Journal  of  the  History  of  ldeas,  1951. 
190 not  arise12.  Although  Aristotle's  account  downplays  the  importance  of  feeling, 
it  does  not  ignore  it  altogether.  As  we  saw  in  the  previous  chapter,  on  his 
account,  being  pained  by  and  taking  pleasure  in  what  is  appropriate  is  of 
crucial  importance.  As  already  argued,  such  pain  and  pleasure  are  the  criteria 
of  having  a  correct  grasp  of  what  they  are  a  response  to.  But  this  is  grounded 
in  a  sense  that  such  pain  and  pleasure  are  appropriate;  in  the  absence  of  such 
a  sense,  in  Aristotle's  view,  the  feelings  float  free,  no  longer  of  any  intrinsic 
value  themselves13.  The  value  of  feeling  must  be  grounded  in  something  else. 
And  what  is  true  of  being-in-love,  is  to  a  lesser  extent  also  true  of  loving.  If 
we  lack  an  account  of  what  makes  the  former  appropriate,  then  we  lack  it  for 
the  latter  also.  Loving  may  be  less  exhaustively  characterised  by  how  it  feels, 
and  in  particular  the  intensity  of  the  feelings14,  but  feeling  is  still  obviously 
crucial.  Although  loving  may  incorporate  elements  that  make  it  more 
recognisably  an  ethical  phenomenon,  it  cannot  be  exhaustively  characterised 
in  those  terms.  We  must  conclude  then,  that  Aristotle's  account  of  philia  offers 
at  best  a  partial  account  of  some  of  the  kinds  of  human  attachment  we  class 
as  love. 
12  We  often  hear  remarks  such  as,  `what  does  she  see  in  him"?  Here,  the  response  is  felt  to  be  unintelligible.  But  we 
accept  this  kind  of  idiosyncrasy  without  criticism,  whereas  we  do  not  in  the  case  of  other  emotions.  This  empirical  fact 
suggests  that  we  do  not  apply  normative  standards  of  appropriateness  in  the  case  of  love. 
13  Writing  of  the  distinction  between  the  aesthetic  and  the  moral,  Philippa  Foot  remarks,  "The  good  of  good  art  ... 
lies  in 
such  things  as  the  pleasures  of  the  imagination,  and  in  general  in  the  interest  and  enjoyment  that  a  man  gets  from  a 
work  of  art  ... 
We  would  recognise  it  as  nonsense  to  say  "The  fact  that  a  work  of  art  is  a  good  work  of  art  is  itself  a 
reason  for  choosing  it,  and  never  mind  whether  you  will  get  anything  out  of  it  or  not".  "  "Morality  and  Art" 
Proceedings  of  the  British  Academy  1970.  This  attitude  towards  the  aesthetic  contrasts  most  sharply  of  course  with  the 
Kantian  conception  of  morality.  There  is  less  of  a  difference  between  it  and  the  Aristotelian  view  of  ethics,  precisely 
because  Aristotle  gives  the  pleasure  of  the  virtuous  man  a  role  which  is  at  least  in  some  respects  parallel  to  the  one  it 
has  in  aesthetic  experience. 
14  A  conclusion  of  this  sort  is  defended  by  Solomon  (Op.  Cit.  );  "Love  briefly  summarised,  is  a  dialectical  process  of 
mutually  received  selfhood  with  a  long  and  varied  history.  As  such,  it  is  much  more  than  a  feeling...  "  (p.  28). 
191 PLATO. 
To  some  extent,  we  find  a  philosophical  account  of  love  that  fills  some  of  the 
gaps  of  the  Aristotelian  approach  if  we  turn  to  Plato.  Plato's  account  of  love  is 
to  be  found  in  the  two  dialogues,  the  Symposium  and  the  Phaedrus.  Although 
dictionary  definitions  of  the  term  "Platonic  love"  confirm  popular  usage  by 
describing  it  as,  "purely  spiritual  love  for  one  of  the  opposite  sek"  15  or,  "love 
free  from  physical  desire"16,  it  is  not  clear  that  these  are  elements  of  the 
Platonic  picture.  If  "Platonic  love"  is  taken  to  suggest  a  purely  "intellectual" 
attitude,  or  one  which  is  unconcerned  with  physical  beauty,  then  the  popular 
conception  is  importantly  mistaken.  The  Phaedrus  in  particular  takes  a 
positive  view  of  the  passionate  element  of  love17,  and  in  addition  insists  that 
it  is  the  whole  soul  that  is  involved  in,  and  captivated  by,  what  is  loved,  and 
not  merely  the  intellectual  element. 
The  impression  that  Plato  thinks  of  love  as  a  form  of  engagement  with 
ideas  is  not,  however,  misplaced.  The  account  given  by  Diotima  in  the 
Symposium  of  the  lover's  ascent  to  knowledge,  might  be  taken  to  suggest  a 
purely  intellectualist  view  of  love.  But  this  would  be  to  ignore  the  fact  that  not 
only  each  stage  of  the  ascent  but  its  end-point  also  is  an  emotional  response  to 
beauty; 
"What  may  we  suppose  to  be  the  felicity  of  the  man  who  sees  absolute 
beauty  in  its  essence,  pure  and  unalloyed...?  "  (Symp.  212c) 
's  Oxford  Concise  Dictionary.  Quoted  in  Vlastos,  "The  Individual  as  an  Object  of  Love".  This  defmition  is  wrong  both 
with  respect  to  the  intellectual  content  of  the  love  and  to  the  gender  of  its  typical  object. 
16  Collins  Concise  Dictionary. 
In  Socrates'  second  speech,  (  from 244).  It  is  an  essential  element  of  the  account  of  eras  that  it  is  not  simply sexual 
desire  (lust),  but  is  a  response  to  beauty.  This  is  what  makes  it  necessary  to  consider  it  as  an  account  of  love.  David 
Halperin  is  therefore  wrong  when  he  writes,  "[Plato  is]  not  discussing  love  at  all,  but  rather  eros,  or passionate  sexual 
desire-  a  single  aspect  of  what  we  normally  consider  love.  "  (Halperin.  1985) 
192 According  to  Diotima's  account,  the  lover  starts  from  love  of  a  particular 
individual.  From  this  point  he  first  notices  similarities  shared  by  those  he 
finds  as  physically  beautiful; 
"It  is  great  folly  not  to  admit  that  the  beauty  exhibited  in  all  bodies  is 
one  and  the  same.  "  (Symp.  210) 
The  next  stage  is  to  notice  that  beauty  of  soul  is  more  valuable  than  beauty  of 
body  (211a).  As  a  result,  beauty  of  soul  can  more  than  compensate  for  an 
absence  of  physical  beauty.  The  next  stage  is  to  pass  from  a  contemplation  of 
what  is  shared  in  common  by  particular  individuals,  to  a  contemplation  of 
absolute  beauty  in  itself; 
"This  is  the  right  way  of  approaching  or  being  initiated  into  the 
mysteries  of  love,  to  begin  with  examples  of  beauty  in  this  world,  and 
using  them  as  steps  to  ascend  continually  with  that  absolute  beauty  as 
one's  aim,  from  one  instance  of  physical  beauty  to  two,  and  from  two  to 
all,  then  from  physical  beauty  to  moral  beauty,  and  from  moral  beauty 
to  the  beauty  of  knowledge,  until  from  knowledge  of  various  kinds  one 
arrives  at  the  supreme  knowledge  whose  sole  object  is  that  absolute 
beauty,  and  knows  at  last  what  absolute  beauty  is.  "  (211a-212c). 
The  process  of  ascent,  then,  is  from  the  particular  to  the  general  and  from  the 
general  to  the  abstract.  The  culmination  is  the  Form  of  Beauty,  which 
encompasses  moral  and  physical  beauty.  Yet  though  these  two  are  distinct, 
the  Form  is  constituted  by  what  they  share  in  common.  '8 
Difficulties  arise  with  this  account,  however,  and  we  can  group  them 
under  two  headings.  First,  objections  to  the  claim  that  love  is  not  (really)  of 
is  With  respect  to  the  question  of  whether  Plato's  Forms  involve  self-predication,  the  Form  of  beauty  seems  to  be  an 
instance  where  the  answer  must  be  that  it  does,  since  the  lover  who  has  made  the  ascent  and  contemplates  the  Form  of 
Beauty  is  moved  by  its  beauty. 
193 particulars,  but  of  a  universal;  and  second,  worries  about  the  claim  that 
beauty  and  goodness  are  in  some  way  the  same.  The  difficulty  with  Plato's 
claim  that  love  is  not  of  particulars  is  simply  that  it  is  very  difficult  to  accept. 
One  thing  that  gives  us  this  sense  is  the  thought  that  our  loved-ones  cannot 
easily  be  replaced.  There  are  certainly  difficulties  in  making  explicit  what 
this  claim  of  "uniqueness"  amounts  to19;  are  we  to  take  the  claim  as 
maintaining  that  each  of  us  is  literally  unique,  or  just  that  practically 
speaking,  we  are  as  good  as  unique?  On  the  account  of  love  offered  in  the 
Symposium,  grief  for  a  deceased  loved  one  will  no  longer  make  any  sense; 
since  love  is  ultimately  of  the  Form,  which  is  instantiated  by  many 
individuals,  what  the  lover  realises  at  the  end  of  his  ascent  is  that  the  object 
of  his  love  was  not  -  contrary  to  what  he  initially  supposed  -that  particular 
individual,  but  something  larger  which  transcends  any  given  particular,  and 
of  which  they  are  merely  imperfect  reflections; 
"  What  may  we  suppose  to  be  the  felicity  of  the  man  who  sees  absolute  beauty 
in  its  essence,  pure  and  unalloyed,  who  instead  of  a  beauty  tainted  by  human 
flesh  and  colour  and  a  mass  of  perishable  rubbish,  is  able  to  apprehend  divine 
beauty  where  it  exists  apart  and  alone?...  Do  you  not  see  that  in  that  region 
alone  where  he  sees  beauty  with  the  faculty  capable  of  seeing  it,  will  he  be 
able  to  bring  forth  not  mere  reflected  images  of  goodness  but  true  goodness, 
because  he  will  be  in  contact  not  with  a  reflection  but  with  the  truth.  " 
(Symp.  212c). 
19  A  similar  problem  arises  with  Aristotle's  account,  since  it  would  seem  that  I  could  love  anyone  with  good  character 
with  equal  appropriateness,  and  therefore  there  is  little  room  for  the  particular  individual.  Nancy  Sherman  defends 
Aristotle  against  this  objection  in  Making  a  Necessity  of  Virtue  ch.  5.  There  she  argues  that  for  Aristotle  shared  history 
can  serve  to  make  a  given  individual  non-substitutable.  The  difficulties  with  the  Platonic  version  of  this  problem  are 
discussed  in  Vlastos,  "The  Individual  as  and  object  of  Love"  in  Platonic  Studies,  and  Martha  Nussbaum,  The 
Fragility  of  Goodness  and  "Love  and  The  Individual",  in  Love's  Knowledge.  I  have  not  attempted  to  cover  the  range 
of  issues  this  topic  raises.  However,  the  topic  of  individuality  and  uniqueness  is  a  significant  feature  of  Romantic 
thought,  and  I  therefore  merely  raise  it  at  this  point. 
194 So  it  seems  that  having  reached  the  end  of  his  ascent,  the  lover's  interest  in 
the  particulars  with  which  he  began,  has  faded  or  been  transformed  by  the 
new  vision  he  has  attained.  But  the  result  clearly  seems  to  be  that  the 
particulars  themselves  cease  to  have  any  great  importance  in  their  own  right; 
any  value  they  retain  accrues  to  them  merely  in  virtue  of  being  reflections  of 
something  more  perfect.  The  overall  result  will  be  to  weaken  our  attachments 
to  particular  individuals-  a  result  which  Plato  regards  as  necessary  for  the 
smooth  functioning  of  the  Republic.  But  this  picture  is  difficult  to  accept, 
given  our  attachments  to  particulars.  Plato's  view  here  perhaps  provides  the 
inspiration  for  the  Stoic  view  of  emotions  already  considered,  since  both  imply 
that  particular  emotional  attachments  embody  an  epistemological  error. 
The  postulation  of  transcendent  metaphysical  entities  such  as  the  Forms, 
has  in  any  case  its  own  general  difficulties,  which  commentators  from 
Aristotle  onward  have  pointed  out.  In  addition  to  their  ontological  oddity,  why 
should  we  suppose  that  the  correct  account  for  the  value  we  attribute  to 
individuals  is  in  terms  of  some  abstract  entity?  Why  should  the  explanation 
be  in  that  direction?  Is  it  not  plausible,  on  the  contrary,  that  we  develop  a 
general  idea  of  beauty  only  through  our  encounters  with  particulars?  There 
may  be  universals  such  as  "beauty",  but  there  is  no  compelling  reason  to  think 
these  universals  exist  over  and  above  their  instantiations. 
I  turn  now  to  the  second  difficulty  with  Plato's  account,  concerning  the 
relation  between  the  Beautiful  and  the  Good.  Here  we  confront  the  same  issue 
we  met  in  connection  with  Aristotle;  that  a  distinction  between  the  ethical 
and  the  aesthetic  is  not  available.  In  Aristotle's  case,  the  result  was  that  love 
remained  an  ethical  phenomenon.  Plato's  quite  different  emphasis  on  the 
passionate  nature  of  love,  and  the  fact  that  he  is  concerned  with  eros,  bring  it 
closer  to  the  aesthetic  phenomenon  we  recognise.  But  Plato,  like  Aristotle, 
does  not  distinguish  the  ethical  and  the  aesthetic;  for  him,  beauty  and 
goodness  are  one. One  modern  writer  who  has  defended  Plato  on  this  point  is  Iris  Murdoch20. 
According  to  her,  one  thing  that  unites  the  ideas  of  beauty  and  goodness  is 
their  relation  to  selfish  states  of  the  self.  Murdoch  claims  that  the  value  of 
our  experience  of  Beauty  -in  nature  as  in  art-  lies  in  its  ability  to  absorb  us  in 
something  beyond  ourselves; 
"Beauty  is  the  convenient  and  traditional  name  for  something  that  art  and 
nature  share,  and  which  gives  a  fairly  clear  sense  to  the  idea  of  quality  of 
experience  and  change  of  consciousness.  I  am  looking  out  of  my  window  in  an 
anxious  and  resentful  state  of  mind,  oblivious  of  my  surroundings,  brooding 
perhaps  on  some  damage  to  my  prestige.  Then  suddenly  I  observe  a  hovering 
kestrel.  In  a  moment,  everything  is  altered.  The  brooding  self  with  its  hurt 
vanity  has  disappeared...  and  when  I  return  to  thinking  of  the  other  matter,  it 
seems  less  important.  "  (Murdoch,  p.  86) 
The  suggestion  is  that  in  perceiving  the  beauty  of  the  kestrel,  not  merely  is 
my  attention  diverted  from  my  own  concerns,  but  the  apprehension  of  the 
beauty  of  the  bird  has  a  revelatory  character.  In  grasping  the  bird's  beauty, 
my  appreciation  of  my  own  predicament  is  transformed,  and  I  come  to  see  my 
problem  in  its  true  dimensions. 
"  It  is  a  common  experience  that  we  become  absorbed  in  our  own  problems, 
and  this  often  involves  exaggerating  them.  The  failure  to  keep  things  in 
perspective  may  result  from  forgetfulness  (the  kestrel  reminds  us  of  the  scale 
of  value)  and  may  even  be  a  form  of  self-indulgence.  This  is  the  kind  of 
general  process  that  Murdoch  describes  as  "unselfing",  and  which  she  sees  as 
a  consequence  of  attending  to  beauty.  Apart  from  the  specific  role  of  beauty  in 
this  kind  of  phenomenon,  it  is  clear  that  having  certain  sorts  of 
preoccupations  can  blind  us  to  many  features  that  something  may  possess.  If 
for  example  I  am  an  extremely  competitive  tennis  player,  to  whom  winning  is 
of  the  first  importance,  my  frustration  and  annoyance  when  my  opponent 
20  In  The  Sovereignty  of  Good.  (pp  77-104) 
196 wins  a  point  may  literally  prevent  me  from  appreciating  that  his  shot  was  a 
skilful  (even  beautiful)  one.  Here,  my  emotional  state  frames  the  situation  in 
such  a  way  that  the  perception  of  a  range  of  other  features  of  the  situation  is 
precluded.  21 
According  to  Murdoch,  an  essential  component  of  virtue  (in  its  various 
dimensions-  in  its  concern  with  honesty,  justice,  courage,  and  so  on)  is 
precisely  this  capacity  to  perceive  things  as  they  are,  undistorted  by  desire, 
personal  bias  and  deceit.  The  just  perception  of  things  leads  to  compassion 
and  love  (in  something  like  the  Christian  sense).  Imagination  is  also 
necessary,  "not  in  order  to  escape  from  the  world,  but  to  join  it.  "  (p.  86).  The 
authority  of  virtue  then  derives  from  its  capacity  to  see  things  truly,  and  this 
is  also  the  function  of  art.  Bad  art  consequently  attempts  to  console  us,  but 
consolation  is  a  form  of  weakness,  an  inability.  or  an  unwillingness  to  confront 
reality.  In  this  way,  aesthetic  experience  becomes  an  important  feature  of 
moral  education; 
"Art  then  is  not  a  diversion  or  a  side  issue,  it  is  the  most  educational  of  all 
human  activities,  and  a  place  in  which  the  nature  of  morality  can  be  seen.  " 
(p.  84) 
This  then  is  how  Murdoch  pictures  the  connection  between  Beauty  and 
Goodness.  We 
. should  ask  if  her  account  is  convincing.  If  we  accept  the 
account  of  the  role  of  art  in  the  process  of  "unselfing"  and  in  facilitating 
correct  perception,  a  question  still  remains  concerning  what  it  is  that  we 
perceive.  What  is  it  that  we  perceive  in  the  works  of  Tolstoy  or  Sophocles?  For 
these  works,  it  may  be  plausible  to  answer,  as  Murdoch  does,  "the  truth", 
where  this  means  something  like,  "moral  truth".  So  great  art  is  also  morally 
good.  But  what  has  happened  to  beauty  in  this  account?  It  looks  as  if  it  has 
disappeared  altogether,  or  is  now  being  called  "just  perception".  However,  we 
21  Murdoch's  general  point  here  is  consistent  with  the  claims  I  have  made  for  the  emotions,  with  respect  to  their  role  in 
framing  how  we  see  things,  that  they  make  some  features  salient  while  others  recede  into  the  background.  In  addition, 
it  provides  further  reason  for  the  view  that  education  of  the  emotions  is  required  if  correct  cognition  is  to  be  possible. 
197 tend  to  think  that  in  addition  to  being  truthful  and  ethically  wholesome  22 
works  of  art  are  also  beautiful.  There  is  some  plausibility  in  this  identification 
of  beauty  with  moral  truthfulness  in  the  cases  of  novels  or  drama,  but  the 
idea  is  much  less  credible  when  we  think  of  the  kestrel  or  other  examples  of 
natural  beauty.  It  is  also  difficult  to  maintain  with  respect  to  works  of  art 
which  have  no  obvious  representational  content,  such  as  abstract  painting,  or 
music.  In  what  way  is  the  beauty  of  Mozart,  say,  ethical?  23 
I  suggest,  then,  that  we  can  make  some  sense  of  a  distinction  between  the 
ethical  and  the  aesthetic,  although  it  is  perhaps  only  in  certain  cases,  such  as 
the  example  of  the  kestrel,  that  they  come  clearly  apart.  Where  does  that 
leave  us  with  respect  to  Plato's  account  of  love?  If  a  distinction  is  plausible, 
then  beauty  is  not  the  same  as  goodness,  although  goodness  may  have  its  own 
beauty.  What  we  have  found  in  both  Aristotle  and  Plato  is  a  desire  to  tie  love 
very  closely  to  virtue  and  goodness;  in  short,  a  desire  to  say  that  love  is  love  of 
the  good.  The  result  of  the  foregoing  discussion  will  hopefully  be  to  cast  some 
doubt  on  this  identification.  Love  should  not  then  be  thought  of  as  an 
exhaustively  ethical  phenomenon.  This  is  the  view  of  the  Romantics,  and  it 
underpins  two  other  features  of  their  thinking  about  emotion. 
First  of  all,  as  we  have  seen,  both  Aristotle  and  Plato  retain  a  sense  of  love 
as  being  a  response  that  can  be  deemed  appropriate  or  not.  This  is  less 
explicit  in  Plato's  account,  but  since  the  ultimate  object  of  love  is 
goodness/beauty  itself,  love  is  still  an  appropriate  response  to  the  Form  of  the 
u  Although  some  may  not  even  be  that;  Nabokov's  "Lolita  ",  the  writings  of  Jean  Genet,  Riefenstahl's  film,  "The 
Triumph  of  The  Will"  are  well  known  instances  of  morally  dubious,  yet  aesthetically  satisfying  works  of  art. 
23  The  issue  is  more  complex  than  this  may  suggest,  however,  since  we  do  think  there  is  such  a  thing  as  sentimental 
music,  for  example,  although  it  remains  unclear  in  detail  what  it  means  to  say  this.  Furthermore,  it  does  not  seem 
senseless  to  say  that  there  is  an  ethical  element  to  Mozart.  Epithets  we  might  apply  to  it,  such  as  "serene"  or  "sublime" 
suggest  that  we  hear  the  music  as  embodying  character  traits  of  a  sort  not  dissimilar  to  those  Murdoch  discusses. 
Features  of  this  sort  are  at  least  part  of  what  is  involved  in  the  different  musical  experiences  of  listening  to  Mozart  on 
the  one  hand  and,  say,  Kurt  Weill  or  Phillip  Glass  on  the  other.  An  interesting  question  which  this  raises  is  how 
music  might  be  related  to  the  education  of  the  emotions,  and  what  kind  of  failure  of  character  -if  any-  a  liking  for,  say, 
sentimental  music  reveals.  These  questions  are  complicated  by  the  fact  that  character  epithets  and  emotional 
descriptions  such  as  "sad"  and  "sentimental"  are  applied  to  music  in  particular  and  art  generally  in  a  "secondary 
sense".  This  Wittgensteinian  notion  was  discussed  in  chapter  three. 
198 Good.  As  I  suggested  in  the  previous  section,  this  assumption  about  the 
appropriateness  of  love  is  not  shared  by  Romantic  thinkers,  and  has  not 
survived  in  our  own  assumptions  about  love.  The  question  of  appropriateness, 
furthermore,  is  connected  with  the  picture  of  love  as  an  ethical  phenomenon. 
As  already  argued  in  connection  with  Aristotle,  once  the  idea  of 
appropriateness  disappears,  feelings  float  free  of  any  grounding,  and  their 
(ethical)  value  becomes  unclear. 
And  this  is  precisely  what  occurs  in  Romantic  thought;  it  is  feeling,  and  in 
particular,  the  intensity  of  feeling  which  becomes  all  important,  not  whether 
the  response  is  appropriate.  In  general,  in  Romantic  thinking  the  idea  that 
the  value  of  emotion  is  to  be  analysed  in  ethical  terms,  in  terms  of  character 
and  virtue  rather  than  feeling,  is  abandoned.  With  this  abandonment  goes  the 
emphasis  on  what  emotion  is  a  response  to;  and  this  loss  is  in  part  at  least 
what  explains  our  own  tendency  to  think  of  emotions  as  subjective,  rather 
than  rational.  The  clearest  example  of  this,  once  again,  is  to  be  found  in  the 
case  of  love.  For  the  Romantics  love  is  crucially  not  a  moderate  state;  the  more 
intense  the  emotional  experience  the  better24. 
A  third  and  final  point  is  that  the  Romantic  view  of  emotion  coincides  with 
the  rise  of  the  concept  of  the  "Aesthetic"  and  its  divorce  from  the  ethical.  In 
short,  one  way  of  summing  up  the  difference  between  the  classical  and  the 
Romantic  accounts  of  the  value  of  emotion,  and  in  particular  of  love,  would  be 
that  accordingto  the  former,  the  value  of  emotion  is  ethical,  while  according 
to  the  latter,  it  is  aesthetic. 
24  Romantic  writers  exalt  the  almost  delirious  quality  of  intense  emotional  experience;  "rhe  best  of  life  is  but  an 
intoxication".  (Byron);  "The  road  of  excess  leads  to  the  palace  of  wisdom"  (Blake).  Although  intensity  is  an  affective 
feature  of  emotions,  it  cannot,  however,  be  divorced  from  the  other  cognitive  components.  Rage  certainly  differs  from 
mild  irritation,  for  example,  in  terms  of  intensity.  But  the  objects  of  these  emotions  are  also  conceived  differently. 
199 The  Romantic  Movement 
It  is  conventional  to  see  the  writings  of  Rousseau  as  providing  many  of  the 
general  concepts  of  Romantic  thought.  His  doctrine  of  the  noble  savage,  for 
instance,  encapsulates  some  of  the  movement's  key  ideas.  Man,  as  part  of 
nature,  is,  according  to  Rousseau,  naturally  good,  but  is  corrupted  by  society. 
Here  he  shares  with  the  Stoics  a  distrust  of  society  and  what  he  perceives  as 
its  false  values.  Freedom  and  strength  come  from  ridding  ourselves  of  the 
false  desires  and  needs  which  society  encourages  in  us,  and  discovering  that 
what  is  truly  valuable  is  what  is  natural  and  simple.  In  contrast  to  the  sham 
sophistication  of  social  life,  man  achieves  true  nobility,  in  Rousseau's  view, 
only  by  returning  to  nature. 
The  opposition  between  individual  and  society  enshrined  in  this  doctrine 
could  not  be  further  from  the  Aristotelian  picture.  For  Aristotle,  only  as  part 
of  a  society  with  a  shared  conception  of  the  good  life  can  man  fulfil  his  telos 
and  become  a  complete  human  being.  For  Rousseau,  on  the  other  hand,  my 
fulfilment  as  an  individual  requires  that  I  define  myself  in  contrast  with 
society.  Consequently,  education  and  even  art,  as  far  as  Rousseau  is 
concerned,  offer  no  genuine  source  of  understanding,  but  rather  merely 
embody  society's  false  values.  Rather  than  leading  towards  integrity  and 
authenticity,  education,  in  Rousseau's  view,  takes  us  further  from  it.  The 
method  for  ridding  ourselves  of  our  false  conceptions  and  moving  closer  to  the 
truth  is,  as  Charles  Taylor  puts  it25,  by  attending  to  the  "Voice  of  Nature", 
which  is  located  within  the  individual.  Here  we  can  discern  the  beginnings  of 
a  novel  conception  of  self-realisation;  the  idea  of  authenticity26  we  discover 
our  true  nature  as  individuals  by  attending  to  what  is  inner,  and  the  process 
is  Charles  Taylor,  Sources  of  the  Self,  pt.  four. 
26  The  history  of  this  concept  is  discussed  by  Lionel  Trilling,  in  Sincerity  and  Authenticity. 
200 of  discovery  is  one  of  articulation  and  expression27.  This  conception  of 
authenticity  as  the  articulation  of  the  inner  contrasts  with  Aristotle's  view 
that  fulfilment  involves  a  grasp  of  our  relation  to  a  natural  order  which  is  not 
internal  and  of  which  we  are  part.  For  the  Romantics,  this  account  no  longer 
has  the  same  grip.  One  consequence  of  this  change  is  a  different 
understanding  of  the  role  of  emotion; 
"A  central  part  of  the  good  life  [for  Rousseau]  must  consist  in  being  open  to 
the  impulse  of  nature,  being  attuned  to  it  and  not  cut  off  from  it.  But  this  is 
inseparable  from  how  I  feel,  from  my  having  sentiments  of  a  different  sort.  " 
(Taylor,  p.  372) 
In  the  previous  section  we  noted  that  the  idea  that  emotions  are  ethically 
valuable  relies  on  the  sense  of  a  natural  order,  of  what  is  appropriate.  With 
the  demise  of  this  sense,  emotion  assumes  a  new  role  and  a  new  kind  of  value; 
"The  difference  with  Aristotle  is  this;  the  "sentiments"  valued  in  the 
Aristotelian  perspective  are  defined  in  terms  of  the  mode  of  life  or  actions  they 
move  us  to,  while  for  "Nature  as  source"  we  might  just  as  well  say  that  the 
way  of  life  or  action  is  defined  by  the  sentiments.  Certain  feelings,  such  as  our 
sense  of  ... 
joy  and  reverence  at  the  spectacle  of  untamed  nature,  are  just  as,  if 
not  more,  fundamental  in  defining  the  good  life  as  any  actions.  " 
(Taylor.  p.  372) 
27  In  connection  with  the  arts,  the  rise  of  the  concept  of  "expression",  in  contrast  with  the  classical  preoccupation  with 
representation,  is  another  contribution  of  the  Romantic  movement.  This  transformation  of  our  orientation  towards  art 
works  is  a  function  of  a  wider  transformation  of  our  picture  of  ourselves  as  related  to  a  Natural  Order.  The  claim  I 
have  been  making  about  the  emotions  is  directly  related  to  this.  Given  Aristotle's  metaphysical  assumption  of  a 
Natural  order,  the  value  of  emotion  is  taken  to  consist  in its  contribution  to  the  working  out  of  our  essence,  as  part  of 
that  order.  When,  as  for  the  Romantics,  man's  essence  is individual  and  not  part  of  the  natural  order,  but  something 
inner  -  perhaps  inchoate  and  requiring  expression  -  then  emotion,  to  the  extent  that  it  performs  this  expressive 
function,  can  be  thought  of  as  having  a  different  kind  of  value.  The  value  ascribed  to  expression,  then,  is  to  be 
explained  by  the  fact  that  what  is  expressed  is  authentic  (  as  opposed  to  false).  Beauty  and  the  category  of  the 
aesthetic  are  themselves  distinguished  in  part  by  their  role  as  revelatory  of  what  is  authentic.  This  explains  the  high 
value  ascribed  to  aesthetic  emotional  responses. 
201 The  value  of  the  emotions  does  not  now  derive  from  their  place  in  the  good  life, 
and  from  their  role  in  constituting  virtue  and  character.  Rather,  the  emotions 
have  their  own  value.  The  emphasis  switches  to  the  emotion  as  feeling.  This  is 
particularly  clear  in  the  case  of  love.  The  Romantics  view  love  as  a  source  of 
self-knowledge  and  self-expression;  as  a  paradigm  experience  of  authenticity. 
And  in  this  respect,  the  Aristotelian  sense  of  what  is  "appropriate"  has  no 
application;  authenticity  of  emotional  response,  on  this  view,  is  proportional 
to  intensity. 
As  noted  in  the  introduction,  there  is  a  historical  thread  which  connects  the 
Romantics  with  the  ancient  concept  of  "intoxication"  and  its  religious 
overtones.  Writing  of  the  philosophes  of  the  Enlightenment,  Peter  Gay 
describes  their  hostility  to  the  idea  of  intoxication  thus; 
"Enthusiasm,  that  much-despised  ebullition  of  religious  sentiment  un- 
checked  by  reason  or  decorum,  was  one  fruit  of  diseased  imagination;  theology 
was  another.  The  poetic  mentality,  indeed-  with  its  logic  not  of  argument  but 
of  intoxication,  a  logic  in  which  beauty  is  taken  for  truth,  and  proof  offered 
through  images  and  metaphors  rather  than  demonstration-  was  therefore 
nothing  other  than  the  religious  mentality.  Hence  it  became  the  task  of  the 
critical  philosopher  to  keep  poetry  from  contaminating  philosophy,  to  enjoy 
pleasing  fictions  without  taking  them  for  truth".  28 
It  was  against  this  Enlightenment  hostility  to  intoxication  that  the 
Romantics  reacted.  Those  like  Blake,  for  example,  felt  that  the  exclusive 
emphasis  on  Reason  had  mistakenly  de-humanised  us29.  Romantic  thought 
involved  an  attempt  to  create  a  space  for  human  concerns,  and  for  meaning-  a 
concept  for  which  the  prevailing  empirical  philosophy  had  no  time  -  but  on  a 
secular  basis.  Nowhere  is  this  clearer,  perhaps  than  in  the  writings  of  Kant. 
29  Peter  Gay,  The  Enlightenment,  vol.  2,  p.  215. 
29  Blake,  writing  of  Enlightenment  philosophers  like  Locke,  said,  "  They  mock  Inspiration  and  Vision.. 
.  Meer 
Enthusiasm  is  the  All  in  All!  Bacon's  Philosophy  has  ruined  England...  ".  Quoted  in  Gay,  (Op.  Cit.  )  p.  208. 
202 Descartes  had  shown  how  a  limited  kind  of  certainty  can  be  derived  just  from 
the  fact  of  subjective  experience  -  in  the  form  of  the  Cogito.  However,  to  go 
beyond  the  cogito  and  establish  any  certainty  about  the  world  beyond  the 
experience  of  the  subject,  Descartes  was  forced  to  resort  to  a  conceptual  device 
whose  use  he  could  not  satisfactorily  defend-  God.  Kant,  in  his  first  Critique, 
attempted  to  go  beyond  Descartes  without  the  use  of  God.  But  more  generally, 
the  issue  that  unites  all  three  of  Kant's  Critiques  is  subjectivity30;  how  can 
there  be  subjects  whose  will  is  free,  who  obey  the  demands  of  reason  or 
morality  in  contrast  to  merely  following  their  inclinations,  and  who  are 
capable  of  experiencing  beauty?  At  bottom,  these  issues  resolve  into  the 
fundamental  puzzle  of  subjectivity;  what  is  it  to  be  a  subject  rather  than 
merely  a  part  of  the  physical  universe,  governed  by  laws  of  cause  and  effect? 
In  Kant's  third  Critique,  he  attempts  to  show  how  objectivity  is  possible  in 
aesthetic  experience  although  beauty  is  not  a  property  of  objects  in 
themselves.  Rather,  beauty  is  a  feature  of  aesthetic  experience;  it  is  a  feature  of 
subjectivity.  The  project  of  salvaging  meaning  -  free  will,  morality,  beauty- 
from  the  deterministic  world  of  science  is  something  which  Kant  and  the 
Romantics  share,  and  both  turn  to  the  subject  as  a  means  of  achieving  it.  This 
point  is  obliquely  alluded  to  in  the  quotation  from  Gay,  above.  The 
Enlightenment  philosophers  distrust  what  we  might  generally  class  as 
"appearances"31.  The  arts,  however  deal  in  appearances.  This  is  Kant's  point 
in  his  third  Critique.  The  insistence  that  truth  can  only  be  grasped  by 
transcending  limited  subjective  points  of  view  and  thereby  revealing  what 
exists  "objectively",  is,  on  this  view,  regarded  as  mistaken32.  Plato  too  shared 
a  deep  distrust  of  the  arts33  for  similar  reasons-  art  is  "mere"  (and  misleading) 
'0  This  view  is  argued  in  detail  by  Andrew  Bowie  in  Aesthetics  and  Subjectivity  Ch.  1.  Bowie  connects  the  Kantian  issues 
with  the  recent  work  of  Thomas  Nagel  on  subjectivity-  for  example,  The  New  From  Nowhere. 
31  "Appearance"  in  the  sense  of  phantasia  discussed  in  previous  chapters.  The  role  of  phantasia  in  aesthetic  experience  is 
discussed  in  more  detail  in  chapter  eight 
72  A  modem  defence  of  this  position  with  respect  to  mental  phenomena,  free  will  and  value,  is  Nagel's  work,  referred  to 
above. 
33  This  point  about  Plato  is  taken  up  again  in  chapter  eight. 
203 appearance.  It  is  no  coincidence,  surely,  that  Goethe's  remark  quoted  in 
chapter  two, 
"Don't  look  for  anything  behind  the  phenomena;  they  themselves  are  the 
theory". 
springs  from  a  Romantic  sensibility.  The  classical  order  of  priority  is  inverted; 
appearance,  what  is  available  only  from  the  subjective  perspective,  is  taken  as 
revelatory  and  valuable.  The  Platonic  drive34  to  penetrate  beneath  experience 
to  what  is  real  or  objective,  is  regarded  as  futile.  Feeling  in  particular 
becomes,  for  the  Romantics  -  though  not  generally  for  Kant  -  the  experience 
above  all  others  which  encapsulated  what  it  is  to  be  a  subject.  Its  importance 
derived  from  its  connection  with  authenticity  and  self-expression  -  in  short 
with  the  self.  And  some  emotions  were  of  more  importance  than  others  in  this 
connection.  Aesthetic  emotion,  for  instance,  was  seen  as  a  source  of  liberation 
and  transcendence.  The  aesthetics  of  both  Kant  and  the  Romantics  shared  the 
aspiration  towards  transcendence  which  is  so  notable  in  Plato35.  It  is  clear 
then  that  the  rise  to  prominence  of  the  issue  of  subjectivity  was  in  large  part 
the  same  process  which  resulted  in  the  creation  of  the  new  and  distinct 
category  of  the  Aesthetic.  Furthermore,  the  change  of  attitude  towards 
emotion  in  general  and  towards  aesthetic  emotion  and  romantic  love  in 
particular  is  part  of  the  same  process. 
34  That  is,  Soctares'  insistence  in  the  dialogues  that  knowledge,  of  the  sort  demanded  by  questions  of  the  form,  "What  is 
justice,  beauty,  friendship  etc...  ",  can  only  be  arrived  at  by  dialectic.  The  mere  ability  to  distinguish  correctly  cases  of 
justice  from  injustice  and  beauty  from  ugliness,  does  not  amount  to  knowledge.  It  is  this  insistence  that  Goethe's  quote 
may  be  taken  to  repudiate. 
3s  Karl  Popper,  in  The  Open  Society  and  its  Enemies  vol.!  notes  the  affinity  between  Plato's  theory  of  the  Forms  and 
Rousseau's  insistence  on  a  return  to  Nature.  The  importance  of  the  transcendental  in  Romantic  art  is  discussed  by 
Frank  Kermode  in  The  Romantic  Image.  It  is  interesting  that  the  three  areas  mentioned  so  far  which  emphasise 
enthusiasm-  religious  conviction,  Romantic  passion,  and  certain  kinds  of  philosophy  such  as  Platonic  metaphysics  and 
epistemology-  all  share  a  focus  on  the  Transcendental.  It  may  be  that  they  are  at  bottom  the  same  transcendental 
aspiration  in  different  guises. 
204 One  of  the  most  forceful  philosophical  statements  of  this  aestheticisation  of 
experience  can  be  found  in  the  work  of  Nietzsche-  a  writer  who  nevertheless 
sought  to  dissociate  himself  from  the  Romantic  movement36.  In  his  famous 
declaration  that, 
"...  only  as  an  aesthetic  phenomenon  is  existence  and  the  world  eternally 
justified"37, 
we  find  the  same  attitude  that  led  the  Romantics  to  extol  passion  and 
intensity  of  feeling  as  the  source  of  value;  for  Nietzsche  it  is  the  Dionysian 
ecstasy  which  is  the  source  of  value,  and  this  is  an  aesthetic  rather  than  an 
ethical  experience.  In  Nietzsche's  view,  we  even  regard  ourselves  as  aesthetic 
objects; 
"  One  thing  is  needed-  "to  give  style"  to  one's  character  -a  great  and  rare 
art"38 
This  view  of  character  as  an  aesthetic  unity,  whose  hallmark  is  a  coherent 
sense  of  style,  could  not  contrast  more  sharply  with  Aristotle's  conception  of 
character  as  unified  through  integrity  and  a  grasp  of  the  good.  This  difference 
in  turn  suggests  an  alternative  understanding  of  what  it  is  for  an  emotion  to 
be  truly  mine.  We  saw  in  the  previous  chapter  that  akratic  emotions  are  in 
one  sense  not  truly  mine,  in  that  they  do  not  represent  the  evaluations  with 
which  I  identify  myself.  And  it  need  not  merely  be  wishful  thinking  on  my 
part  that  they  are  not  mine  in  this  sense.  On  the  Romantic  conception  things 
76  Cf.  The  Case  of  Wagner,  Epilogue,  and  The  Gay  Science  370.  For  a  more  detailed  argument  that  Nietzsche's  views 
nevertheless  are  Romantic,  see  Julian  Young,  Nietzsche's  Philosophy  of  Are  p.  140-147.  Nietzsche  argues  that 
Romanticism  is  the  philosophy  of  "homesickness";  the  Romantics  are  not  at  home  in  the  world,  are  alienated  from  it 
and  seek  Transcendental  escape.  Young's  point  is  that  Nietzsche  too  is  alienated  from  the  world,  albeit  for  different 
reasons. 
37  The  Birth  of  Tragedy,  5,24. 
38  The  Gay  Science,  290. 
205 are  different.  What  it  is  for  an  emotion  to  be  truly  mine  is  for  it  to  be  a  form  of 
self-expression,  and  that  is  signalled,  as  we  have  already  noted,  by  the 
intensity  of  the  emotion.  The  more  intense,  the  more  it  is  an  expression  of  the 
authentic  self.  ss 
Love  is  taken  to  be  one  of  the  paradigm  instances  of  this.  And  it  is, 
additionally,  as  we  have  seen  -  at  least  in  its  erotic/Romantic  form  -  an 
aesthetic  experience.  When  we  compare  this  view  with  the  Aristotelian  one, 
we  find  the  central  opposition  between  these  two  senses  of  an  emotion's  being 
mine  is  between  the  ethical  conception  of  character,  and  the  aestheticised 
conception  of  the  self.  They  do  not  contradict  one  another  however,  they 
merely  emphasise  different  things. 
But  I  think  we  can  generalise  this  point,  in  a  way  that  takes  us  beyond  the 
particular  emotion  of  erotic  love.  Nietzsche  was  famously  opposed  -as  we  shall 
see  in  more  detail  in  the  next  chapter-  to  the  classical  philosophies  such  as 
Aristotle's  which  sought  to  educate  emotion.  Nietzsche  was  implacably 
opposed  to  all  such  measures  and  strategies  of  "moderation".  Precisely  why  he 
was  so  hostile  to  the  idea  of  emotional  education,  will  be  addressed  in  the  next 
chapter.  But  it  seems  that  he  prized  a  general  sense  of  passionate 
engagement  with  life40,  and  he  took  it  that  this  not  only  was  not  a  matter  of 
responding  passionately  where  such  a  response  was  appropriate,  but  that  the 
dominance  of  a  sense  of  the  "appropriate"  in  an  individual  was  itself 
damaging.  The  first  of  these  points  is  the  one  that  concerns  us  here.  We  have 
already  noted  that  love  is  one  emotion  for  which  we  possess  no  sense  of  the 
features  to  which  it  would  be  an  appropriate  response.  But  this  is  not  true 
only  of  love  -  we  are  passionate  about  an  enormous  range  of  things.  Many  of 
these  passions  are  readily  intelligible 
,  and  in  some  sense  would  be  considered 
39  Obviously  this  view  raises  problems;  principally  concerning  how  we  can  be  confident  that  an  emotion  is  an  authentic 
piece  of  self-  expression  in  this  sense.  Intensity  of  response  does  not  seem  in  itself  to  preclude  self-deception  and  even 
simple  mistaken  identification. 
40  For  example;  "...  to  attack  the  passions  at  their  roots  means  to  attack  life  at  its  roots:  the  practice  of  the  Church  is 
hostile  to  life...  "  Twilight  of  The  Idols. 
206 appropriate41.  But  many,  perhaps  the  majority,  of  the  things  about  which 
people  are  passionate  are  unintelligible  to  others,  and  even  where  intelligible, 
the  idea  that  we  should  -  or  even  could  -  share  the  response,  even  with  effort, 
is  hard  to  credit.  Human  beings  become  passionate  about  all  sorts  of  things- 
most  of  them  objectively  worthless;  golf,  stamp-collecting,  carpentry,  insects, 
motor-mechanics,  lawn  bowling,  train-spotting,  Medieval  music,  martial  arts, 
knitting  and  trigonometry,  would  be  a  fairly  random  sample  of  human 
interests.  It  is  clearly  of  great  significance  to  the  individuals  concerned  that 
they  are  passionate  about  these  things,  and  they  rightly  feel  their  lives  would 
be  the  worse  if  they  were  deprived  of  access  to  their  chosen  pursuits.  Equally, 
those  who  lack  passions  may  lead  lives  which  lack  interest,  excitement  and 
even  point. 
Although  the  point  of  a  life  consumed  by  such  passions,  however  bizarre, 
may  not  amount  to  much  objectively,  it  may  matter  considerably  subjectively. 
And  furthermore  we  may  agree  that  it  is  an  objective  matter  that  a  life 
without  such  passions  is  a  lot  worse  than  it  would  be  with  them.  But  exactly 
what  people  get  passionate  about  is  an  area  where  questions  of 
appropriateness  simply  do  not  apply.  In  this  respect,  what  we  are  passionate 
about  gives  life  at  least  part  of  its  meaning.  But  the  fact  that  normative 
"criticism"  of  private  passions  on  a  par  with  other  emotions  would  be  a 
mistake  constitutes  at  least  a  partial  vindication  of  both  the  Romantic's 
general  claims  about  subjectivity  and  their  particular  views  about  emotion. 
Given  all  this,  I  think  we  can  now  give  some  content  to  the  distinction 
between  emotion  and  passion  which  I  raised  in  the  introduction.  The  term 
41  The  term  "appropriate"  may  signal  merely  that  something  is  an  intelligible  response,  although  there  is  no  sense  that  to 
respond  differently  is  a  fault,  or  "wrong".  In  a  stronger  sense  it  may  have  this  further  normative  implication.  We  apply 
this  even  in  aesthetic  contexts-  "Harrold  Robbins  is  not  a  great  author!  ",  etc.  The  `moral"  sense  of  appropriate  is  of 
course  stronger  than  this,  and  expresses  a  demand.  The  sense  we  find  in  Aristotle's  ethical  writings  must  be  something 
more  akin  to  the  aesthetic  sense.  Emotions,  we  saw  in  ch.  1,  are  appropriate  in  this  sense.  Some  cases  of  love  also,  are 
appropriate  in  the  weaker  sense  of  being  intelligible.  Perhaps  there  is  even  in  these  cases  a  sense  that  someone  who 
cannot  share  your  judgement  is  making  a  mistake.  That  does  not  affect  the  present  point  which  is  simply  that  we  are 
prepared  to  grant  that  someone  may  be  in  love  though  the  response  is  unintelligible  to  us.  To  us,  who  cannot 
understand,  perhaps,  talk  of  an  appropriate  response  has  no  meaning. 
207 "emotion",  as  I  pointed  out  there,  in  certain  forms  implies  that  emotional 
excess  is  a  defect.  To  describe  someone  as  "  highly  emotional"  has  an 
implication  of  this  sort,  whereas  to  describe  someone  as  "very  passionate"  is  to 
say  something  positive  about  them.  It  is  consistent  with  usage  then  to  think  of 
"emotion"  as  denoting  the  range  of  our  affective  experience  within  which 
normative  criticism  and  the  idea  of  what  is  "appropriate"  have  an  application. 
"Passion",  on  the  other  hand  is  better  thought  of  as  referring  to  the  range 
where  these  notions  do  not  apply.  Returning  to  Aristotle,  we  may  conclude,  it 
seems,  that  the  Romantics  were  right  to  insist  that  the  value  of  emotion  does 
not  always  derive  from  its  relation  to  educated  character.  And  if  this  is  right, 
Aristotle's  insistence  on  what  is  appropriate,  even  in  the  area  of  friendship 
and  love,  is  therefore  exaggerated42.  Secondly,  we  might  also  think  we  have 
grounds  for  suspecting  that  Aristotle's  account  neglects  aesthetic  goods  such 
as  the  experience  of  beauty,  whether  in  art  or  in  romantic  love. 
The  issues  surrounding  subjectivity  -  in  particular  the  question  of  how  art 
can  be  a  source  of  truth  and  understanding-  will  be  explored  further  in 
chapter  eight.  Plato's  hostility  towards  art  is  towards  mere  appearances, 
which  could  not  be  a  source  of  knowledge.  Real  knowledge,  for  Plato,  is  the 
product  of  dialectic;  it  is  the  result  of  argument,  deduction  and  refutation. 
Chapter  eight  will  discuss  whether  we  should  accept  this  claim,  and  I  shall 
argue  that  we  should  not.  Art  offers  understanding  and  knowledge  by 
different  means,  and  one  of  these  is  by  the  arousal  of  emotion  and  the  use  of 
phantasia.  The  role  of  "appearance"  or  phantasia  has  recurred  at  several 
points  now-  in  its  role  in  the  account  of  aspect  perception  and  in  the  account  of 
emotion  itself.  In  addition  we  have  seen  that  it  plays  an  important  role  in 
phenomena  that  we  otherwise  would  have  difficulty  capturing  with  the 
customary  epistemic  vocabulary  of  belief.  These  issues  were  discussed  in  the 
previous  chapter.  In  the  present  chapter  we  have  considered  the  related 
Romantic  notion  of  emotions  as  features  of  subjectivity.  In  addition  to  their 
justified  opposition  to  the  Aristotelian  conception,  then,  the  Romantics' 
42  A  recent  (and  I  think  unsuccessful)  attempt  to  argue  that  romantic  love  is  open  to  normative  assessment  is by  Gabriele 
Taylor,  "Love"  in  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Society  1975. 
208 general  concerns  echo  the  general  issue  we  have  been  tracing  through  the 
concept  of  phantasia. 
209 Chapter  Six.  Educating  the  Emotions. 
Up  to  this  point  I  have  assumed  that  we  can  make  sense  of  talk  of  educating  the  emotions 
. 
This  assumption  is  crucial,  for  example,  for  Aristotle's  ethical  theory;  in  contrast,  it  is  an 
assumption  that  the  Stoics  deny.  As  they  perceived,  Aristotle's  explanation  of  the  value 
of  emotion  only  makes  sense  if  the  assumption  is  justified,  and  they  claimed  it  was  not.  In 
Chrysippus'  view,  as  we  have  seen,  emotion  can  be  eradicated  but  not  moderated  or  made 
appropriate.  However,  the  therapeutic  practice  recommended  by  the  Stoics  themselves 
attempts  to  achieve  the  goal  of  extirpation  through  education,  rather  than  by  some  other 
means,  such  as  drug  therapy,  for  instance.  It  is  time  now  to  examine  these  assumptions. 
But  hostility  to  the  idea  of  emotional  education  has  not  been  confined  to  the  Stoics.  In 
addition  to  the  view  that  emotion  cannot  be  educated,  the  claim  has  also  been  made  that 
the  emotions  should  not  be  educated.  This  may  take  various  forms,  and  some  aspects  of  it 
lie  behind  Rousseau's  critique  of  socialisation  -  although  he  was  not  opposed  to  education 
per  se.  A  more  extreme  declaration  of  this  view  can  however  be  found  in  the  writings  of 
Nietzsche;  although  even  here  there  may  be  difficulties  in  arriving  at  an  interpretation  of 
these  claims  which  can  be  squared  with  other  views  he  appears  to  hold. 
This  then  is  the  first  challenge,  to  explain  how  in  principle  the  emotions  can  be 
educated,  and  secondly,  to  meet  any  objections  to  the  view  that  they  should  be.  But  it  is 
not  the  only  challenge.  A  second  main  area  of  difficulty  focuses  on  the  connection 
between  the  emotions  and  the  arts.  Study  of  the  arts  forms  a  part  of  the  Liberal 
educational  programme  in  the  West.  But  can  the  view  that  art  educates  really  be 
defended?  What  do  we  learn  from  a  Tolstoy  novel  or  a  Mozart  symphony?  Plato, 
notoriously,  believed  the  arts  cannot  be  a  source  of  knowledge.  Others,  in  contrast,  insist 
that  art  does  educate,  and  that  one  of  the  main  ways  in  which  it  does  so  is by  educating 
our  emotional  responses. 
This  putative  connection  raises  diverse  issues;  such  as  the  familiar  question  whether  it 
is  the  function  of  art  to  arouse  or  express  emotion,  and  what  this  might  in  any  case 
involve'.  More  recently,  another  clutch  of  problems  has  been  the  object  of  philosophical 
11  leave  to  one  side  for  the  moment  the  question  of  the  connection  between  the  aesthetic  features  of  a  work 
of  art  and  its  role  in  our  ethical  education. 
210 investigation.  These  puzzles  concern  our  emotional  responses  to  fictional  characters,  and 
the  hedonic  quality  of  negative  emotions  in  response  to  fiction.  How,  for  example,  can  we 
learn  anything  about  life  by  reading  about  non-existent  characters?  And  more  importantly, 
how  can  any  emotional  responses  we  have  to  the  fate  of  such  non-existent  characters  have 
any  bearing  on  our  emotional  responses  to  the  real  world?  Are  not  our  emotional 
responses  to  art  psychologically  isolated  in  a  way  that  makes  it  impossible  to  think  of 
them  as  constituting  real  emotional  learning?  This  difficulty  is  compounded  when  we 
consider  the  fact  that  the  tragic  and  unpleasant  events  which  many  art  works  contain  are 
experienced  with  pleasure.  In  what  way  then,  could  these  responses  be  a  preparation  for 
and  a  development  of,  appropriate  responses  to  real  instances  of  tragedy  and  suffering? 
Recent  work  on  these  issues  has  also  attempted  to  bring  out  the  implications  they  have 
for  the  general  account  we  offer  of  emotional  states.  Some  of  these  issues  have  already 
been  addressed  in  chapter  one.  In  particular,  they  have  been  taken  by  some  to  suggest  an 
account  of  what  we  should  think  of  as  real  emotion.  One  possible  conclusion  which  has 
been  reached  by  some  is  that  real  emotion  requires  beliefs.  Thus  emotional  responses  to 
art  do  not  qualify.  However,  an  additional,  if  undesired,  consequence  of  such  an  account, 
-which  we  might  in  any  case  have  suspected  -  may  be  that  many  of  our  emotional 
responses,  outside  an  artistic  or  fictional  context,  also  fail  to  count  as  real  emotions;  for 
example  because  -  for  various  reasons  -  they  are  too  like  the  emotions  we  have  in  fictional 
contexts.  In  this  respect,  the  unreal  nature  of  responses  to  fictions  may  corrupt  our 
emotional  lives  and  so  have  harmful  rather  than  educational  effects. 
The  idea  that  a  study  of  the  arts  can  be  an  important  element  in  ethical  education  (  and 
hence  by  implication  in  emotional  education  has  many  defenders3.  It  rests  on  the  view 
that  the  fine  discriminations  of  judgement  and  emotional  response  involved  in  responding 
to  these  works,  and  the  articulation  of  these,  are  important  elements  in  the  development  of 
our  emotional  faculties.  That  is;  it  seems  to  take  for  granted  that  there  can  be  a  more  or 
less  straightforward  passage  from  responses  in  fictional  contexts  to  responses  in  real  life. 
Of  course,  supporters  of  this  view  will  allow  that  the  passage  need  not  be  smooth;  there 
will  be  other  factors  in  real  contexts  for  which  fictional  responses  have  not  prepared  us, 
and  which  may  inhibit  response,  or  reveal  the  scope  of  our  responses  to  be  inadequate. 
2  See  references  below. 
3  For  example;  R.  W. Beardsmore,  "Learning  from  a  Novel"  in  Philosophy  and  The  Arts;  Martha  Nussbaum, 
Love's  Knowledge  and  Poetic  Justice. 
211 But  although  fiction  may  not  do  enough  by  way  of  preparation,  still  it  does  something, 
and  what  it  does  is  important.  For  example,  Jerrold  Levinson,  in  the  course  of  a 
discussion  of  the  pleasurable  but  negative  emotional  responses  produced  by  listening  to 
music,  makes  two  claims  for  it.  First,  responses  to  music  indicate  whether  we  are  capable 
of  certain  emotional  responses;  and  second  it  reinforces  and  "exercises"  those  capacities; 
"Since  music  has  the  power  to  put  us  into  the  feeling  state  of  a  negative  emotion  without 
its  unwanted  life  consequences,  it  allows  us  to  partly  reassure  ourselves  in  a  non- 
destructive  manner  of  the  depth  and  breadth  of  our  ability  to  feel.  Having  a  negative 
emotional  response  to  music  is  like  giving  our  emotional  engines  a  "dry 
run".....  Furthermore,  in  exercising  our  feeling  capacities  on  music  we  might  be  said  to 
tone  them  up  or  get  them  into  shape,  thus  readying  ourselves  for  intenser  and  more 
focused  reactions  to  situations  in  real  life.  "5 
(Levinson.  P.  327) 
Suitably  emended,  this  is  the  kind  of  defence  which  could  be  offered  for  the  other  arts  too. 
The  representational  arts  can,  in  addition,  be  more  specific  in  the  responses  they  evoke. 
But  as  noted  above,  we  might  wonder  whether  the  transition  from  art-emotions  to  real-life 
ones  is  a  continuous  one.  6  One  difficulty  for  the  view  that  it  is,  arises  from  the  point 
already  made,  that  emotional  responses  in  fictional  contexts  may  be  importantly  unlike 
real  emotional  responses  in  various  ways.  One  of  these  is  their  relation  to  epistemic 
factors  such  as  beliefs.  For  it  may  turn  out  that  it  is  precisely  the  harmonising  of  our 
emotional  responses  with  other  epistemic  factors  -like  beliefs-  that  emotional  education 
requires.  Given  this,  fiction  would  be  ill-suited  to  the  task  of  real  education.  But  in 
addition  to  this  negative  claim,  there  is  a  more  serious  charge  which  could  be  levelled 
against  the  study  of  fiction.  Not  only  do  our  fictional  responses  lack  the  requisite 
epistemic  factors,  but  they  encourage  a  pernicious  form  of  detachment  in  our  emotional 
responses. 
4  Jerrold  Levinson,  "Music  and  Negative  Emotions",  in  Music,  Art  and  Metaphysics. 
s  Levinson  adds  the  qualification  that  it  is  usually  the  negative  emotions  which  are  concerned  in  this. 
6  An  additional,  and  familiar  objection  to  the  view  described  here  is  that  it  seems  possible  to  enjoy  art  works 
without  benefiting  from  them  morally.  There  have  been  aesthetes  who  have  been  simultaneously  moral 
monsters.  Lurking  in  the  background  to  this  point  is  the  alleged  autonomy  of  art  -  itself  a  product  of  the 
Romantic  insistence  on  the  distinct  category  of  the  Aesthetic,  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter. 
212 One  element  of  this  emotional  disengagement  is  the  way  in  which  fictional  responses, 
even  when  negative,  can  be  pleasant.?  It  can  plausibly  be  claimed  that  this  pleasure  is  only 
possible  because  our  attitude  is  in  certain  ways  detached,  and  one  of  the  factors  which 
crucially  alters  the  fictional  situation  is  that  we  do  not  believe  it  to  be  really  occurring. 
Fictional  emotions  then  lack  the  beliefs  which  their  real-life  counterparts  possess  . 
One  of  the  disagreeable  consequences  of  the  enjoyment  of  works  of  art  might  then  be  that 
someone  accustomed  to  experiencing  much  of  their  emotional  life  in  these  relatively 
detached  imaginative  contexts  may  develop  bad  emotional  habits.  In  particular,  he  may 
become  not  only  deluded  about  the  nature  of  his  emotional  responses,  taking  them  to  be 
indicative  of  the  real  thing,  but  he  may  come  to  regard  real  life  contexts  with  the  same 
degree  of  detachment  as  he  does  events  in  the  theatre.  This  possibility  is  exacerbated  by 
the  opacity  of  much  of  our  emotional  life;  emotional  states  often  appear  to  be  what  they 
are  not.  This  can  occur  in  various  ways.  With  regard  to  epistemic  components  of 
emotional  states,  for  example,  it  may  be  easy  to  suppose  that  an  emotional  response 
signals  the  presence  of  beliefs,  while  in  reality  it  does  not.  The  situation  of  the  novel- 
reader  or  theatre-goer  with  respect  to  their  emotional  responses  may  be  in  important  ways 
not  unlike  that  of  the  akratic  with  respect  to  his  values.  Or  again,  it  may  be  easy  to  fail  to 
notice  that  we  enjoy  certain  emotions  which  we  should  normally  regard  as  unpleasant.  But 
it  may  be  easier  than  we  suppose  to  fail  to  notice  that,  instead  of  finding  a  situation 
distressing  -  as  we  believe  we  do  -  we  in  fact  find  some  aspect  of  it  pleasant.  Emotional 
states  are  notoriously  ambivalent,  and  one  source  of  this  ambivalence  may  be  a  conflict 
between  the  hedonic  quality  of  the  experience  and  our  beliefs  about  it. 
The  charge  against  the  study  of  fiction  then,  amounts  to  the  claim  that  not  only  can  it  not 
achieve  what  emotional  education  requires  (because  it  does  not  turn  on  epistemic  factors) 
but  that  it  actively  promotes  the  kinds  of  emotional  confusion  which  prevent  emotional 
education-  it  encourages  us  to  mistake  false  or  "fictional"  emotion  for  the  real  thing,  and 
instils  a  form  of  "attenuated  engagement"  8  towards  the  real  world.  This  kind  of  error  in 
diagnosing  our  own  emotions  need  not  characteristically  involve  self  -deception.  That 
would  be  an  additional  complication.  But  the  present  point  does  not  require  a  defence  of 
that  idea  since  it  involves  error  rather  than  deception;  this  kind  of  error  may  be  motivated 
in  some  cases,  but  in  others  may  simply  result  from  the  kind  of  opacity  alluded  to  above. 
7  One  form  of  this  difficulty  is  the  well  known  Problem  of  Tragedy,  to  be  discussed  below. 
8  The  phrase  is  David  Pugmire's,  in  "Conflicting  Emotions  and  the  Indivisible  Heart",  Philosophy  1996. 
213 In  the  present  chapter  I  will  begin  by  raising  and  exploring  objections  to  the  idea  of 
emotional  education  in  principle.  From  there  I  move  on  -  in  chapter  seven-  to  a 
consideration  of  the  second  area  of  difficulty  discussed  above,  the  relations  between  art 
and  emotion.  Before  setting  out  the  details  of  recent  discussions,  I  provide  a  brief 
overview  of  what  the  vindicated  possibility  of  emotional  education  might  involve  in 
practice;  what  will  count  as  emotional  education,  as  opposed  to  mere  alteration  of  our 
emotional  states  by  other  means.  It  is  important  to  set  this  out,  if  only  in  general  terms, 
since  only  when  we  have  some  idea  of  the  requirements  will  we  be  able  to  assess  the 
claim  that  the  arts  satisfy  them.  Lastly,  in  the  second  half  of  chapter  eight  I  consider 
Plato's  argument  that  rhetoric  and  the  arts  have  no  real  educational  value. 
Is  Emotional  Education  a  Bad  Thing? 
Most  of  us  develop  emotionally  to  the  extent  that  we  do  through  a  mixture  of  learning  and 
teaching.  Explicit  schooling  of  the  emotions  normally  occurs  only  in  our  formative  years, 
and  thereafter  we  rely  on  our  own  abilities  to  extend,  refine  and  entrench  our  emotional 
sensibilities.  An  account  of  emotional  education  should  therefore  aim  to  offer  an  account 
of  this  latter  process  -  although  explicit  methodologies  for  the  education  of  our  emotions- 
such  as  phobia  therapy,  psychoanalysis,  Stoic  therapy  and  so  on-  may  also  be  revealing 
about  the  way  we  alter  our  emotions.  The  difficulty  that  these  therapies  raise  is  that  not  all 
emotional  change  involves  emotional  learning.  Drug  therapies  most  obviously  would  not 
in  themselves  constitute  a  form  of  emotional  education,  given  that  they  work  through  a 
purely  causal  mechanism9.  Clearly  then,  what  counts  as  learning  depends  on  the  grounds 
or  basis  of  such  change. 
In  advance  however  of  an  account  of  what  emotional  education  is,  should  we  accept 
that  it  is,  all  things  being  equal,  an  admirable  goal?  Generally  speaking,  it  would  appear 
9  We  have  already  encountered  this  problem  in  the  discussion  of  Aristotle's  account  of  habituation  in  chapter 
three.  If  habituation  is  to  be  a  form  of  ethical  learning,  it  cannot  be  a  purely  causal  matter  such  as  the  "horse- 
breaking"  model  describes. 
214 that  we  do10.  Most  parents  regard  it  as  desirable  that  at  least  some  of  their  children's 
instincts  be  educated.  We  think  children  should  gain  some  mastery  over  their  appetites 
rather  than  become  their  slave.  This,  for  instance,  would  be  a  minimal  condition  on  the 
ability  to  deliberate  effectively  about  ends.  In  a  similar  vein,  we  need  to  learn  that  restraint 
can  be  essential  if  we  are  to  enhance  our  enjoyment  of  things.  But  in  addition  to  these  self- 
management  techniques,  most  parents  also  regard  it  as  desirable  that  their  children 
develop  the  power  to  transcend  their  own  particular  viewpoint;  that  they  cultivate  "other- 
centred"  sentiments,  such  as  compassion  and  pity  and  that  they  learn  a  wide  vocabulary  of 
evaluative  concepts  -  exaggerated,  selfish,  lazy,  and  so  on  -  and  the  circumstances  in 
which  they  are  appropriate. 
In  this  respect,  a  wholesale  rejection  of  emotional  education  would  appear  to  leave  us  a 
race  of  Frankfurt's  "wanton's",  reacting  to  satisfy  any  desire  when  and  where  it  arises. 
How  could  this  seem  an  attractive  prospect  to  anyone?  Rousseau,  for  example,  does  not 
reject  the  desirability  of  education  as  such;  instead,  he  proposes  his  own  kind  of 
education,  whose  influence  he  believes  will  be  less  corrupting  of  our  natural  and  more 
10  Since  the  project  of  self-mastery  is  in  large  part  the  goal  of  controlling  desire  and  emotion,  the  putative 
value  of  emotional  education  derives  some  support  from  empirical  studies  into  the  value  of  self  mastery.  In  a 
series  of  tests,  psychologist  Walter  Mitschel  carried  out  the  "Marshmallow  Challenge"  on  a  range  of  four 
year  olds,  who  were  presented  with  a  marshmallow,  and  told  that  if  they  could  wait,  without  eating  it,  until 
after  the  experimenter  had  run  an  errand  they  could  have  a  second  marshmallow.  The  experiment  was 
designed  to  pick  out  the  children  who  tried  and  succeeded  in  controlling  their  desire  for  the  marshmallow 
before  them.  Follow-  up  studies  revealed  that  the  children  with  self  control  developed  into  adolescents,  " 
who  were  more  socially  competent,  personally  effective,  self-assertive  and  better  able  to  cope  with  the 
frustrations  of  life.  "  (Goleman  p.  81).  In  addition  they  had  higher  SAT  scores  and  greater  linguistic  abilities. 
A  child's  performance  in  the  "Marshmallow  Challenge"  at  age  four  was  four  times  better  an  indicator  of 
their  later  SAT  scores  than  the  results  of  IQ  tests  at  the  same  age.  So  the  capacity  for  self-restraint  seems  to 
have  a  bearing  on  the  development  of  potential.  So  we  do  have  reasons  for  thinking  emotional  education  has 
significant  instrumental  value.  Another  interesting  feature  of  this  experiment  is  the  methods  children  used  to 
-distract"  themselves-  "To  sustain  themselves  in  their  struggle  they  covered  their  eyes  so  they  wouldn't  have 
to  stare  at  temptation,  or  rested  their  heads  in  their  arms,  talked  to  themselves,  sang,  played  games  with  their 
hands  and  feet,  even  tried  to  go  to  sleep.  "  (Goleman  P.  81).  If  we  think  of  these  as  low-level  strategies  of 
emotional  education,  it  seems  not  only  that  these  processes  begin  very  young,  but  that  education  requires  a 
significant  degree  of  practical  intelligence;  simply  knowing  what  kinds  of  things  will  get  you  through  a 
period  of  temptation. 
215 noble  sentiments".  A  more  uncompromising  hostility  towards  education  of  the  emotions 
can  however  be  found  in  the  following  remarks  from  Nietzsche's  `Beyond  Good  and 
Evil"; 
"All  these  moralities  which  address  themselves  to  the  individual  person,  for  the 
promotion  of  his  "happiness"  as  they  say-  what  are  they  but  prescriptions  for  behaviour  in 
relation  to  the  degree  of  perilousness  in  which  the  individual  person  lives  with  himself; 
recipes  to  counter  his  passions.....  to  say  it  again  and  to  say  it  thrice,  prudence,  prudence, 
prudence,  mingled  with  stupidity,  stupidity,  stupidity-  whether  it  be  that  indifference  and 
statuesque  coldness  towards  the  passionate  folly  of  the  emotions  which  the  Stoics  advised 
and  applied;  or  that  no-more-laughing  and  no-more-weeping  of  Spinoza,  that  destruction 
of  the  emotions  through  analysis  and  vivisection  which  he  advocated  so  naively;  or  that 
depression  of  the  emotions  to  a  harmless  mean  at  which  they  may  be  satisfied,  the 
Aristotelianism  of  morals..  . 
finally  even  that  easygoing  and  roguish  surrender  to  the 
emotions  such  as  Hafiz  and  Goethe  taught,  that  bold  letting  go  of  the  reins...  " 
(B.  G.  E  199) 
There  are  several  distinct  claims  that  we  might  separate  out  here.  Before  doing  this, 
though,  we  should  note  that  the  focus  of  Nietzsche's  attack  is  not  merely  theories  which 
attempt  to  educate  the  emotions.  He  also,  in  the  final  section  quoted,  takes  issue  with  the 
renunciation  of  all  such  attempts-  a  laissez-faire  attitude  towards  the  emotions.  This  is  at 
least  initially  puzzling;  how  can  Nietzsche  reject  both  these  views?  Is  this  simply  a 
confusion?  Let  us  begin,  then,  by  asking  what  the  supposed  ill-effects  of  education,  and 
specifically  of  moral/emotional  education  are  supposed  to  be. 
One  of  Nietzsche's  key  concepts  is  "decadence"  which  for  him  involves  a  denial  of 
what  is  vital  and  life-affirming.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  he  disliked  the  Romantics,  since 
he  regarded  their  views  as  embodying  a  kind  of  "homesickness"  in  the  world.  The  history 
of  philosophy  for  Nietzsche  features  many  theories  which  have  attempted  to  persuade  us 
of  the  value  of  self-denial,  and  this  too  is  the  opposite  of  life-affirming.  Chief  among  such 
views  in  the  modem  period,  Nietzsche  thinks,  is  the  philosophy  of  Kant.  He  writes; 
1'  He  writes,  "Early  education  should  therefore  be  purely  negative.  It  consists,  not  in  teaching  virtue  or  truth, 
but  in  protecting  the  heart  from  vice  and  the  mind  from  error".  (  Emile). 
216 "To  be  attracted  by  disinterested  motives  almost  constitutes  the  formula  for 
decadence"(Twilight  p.  98). 
While  we  might  not  be  able  to  share  Nietzsche's  wholesale  hostility  towards  morality, 
we  maybe  able  to  go  some  way  in  sharing  his  attitude  towards  egoism.  In  chapter  two  we 
distinguished  between  self-interest  and  selfishness,  and  claimed  that  the  former  need  not 
be  repellent.  In  the  same  chapter,  we  looked  at  some  of  Bernard  Williams'  examples 
against  impartial  ethical  theories.  And  in  the  chapter  before  the  present  one,  we 
considered  the  Romantic  emphasis  on  a  range  of  emotion  in  which  normative  notions  do 
not  apply.  What  unites  all  these  claims  is  that  there  is  a  sphere  of  legitimate  self-concern 
which  clashes  with  moral  theories  which  are  too  impartial.  Nietzsche  has  no  sympathy 
with  any  of  the  traditional  moralists,  but  he  does  feel  a  strong  identification  with  the 
Homeric  Greeks  12.  Moses  Finley  argues13  that  the  values  of  the  Heroic  world  were  not  as 
hostile  as  is  our  own  morality  to  what  we  would  describe  as  egoism.  In  the  Iliad,  when 
Hector  decides  that  he  must  meet  Achilles  in  combat,  because  this  is  what  his  sense  of 
honour  requires,  he,  and  those  around  him,  are  aware  that  it  means  in  all  probability  not 
only  his  own  death  but  the  fall  of  the  city  and  all  the  consequences  that  will  flow  from 
that.  We  may  well  regard  this  as  self-indulgent.  But  it  is  not  simply  egoistic.  Hector's 
action  springs  from  the  values  that  he  holds  14;  it  maybe  an  example  of  the  sort  of  practical 
necessity  I  described  earlier  in  chapter  three. 
Our  own  moral  thinking  tends  to  simplify  matters  somewhat  by  drawing  too  neat  a 
distinction  between  egoistic  and  "moral".  Something  of  the  same  distinction  was 
discussed  in  the  previous  chapter  in  relation  to  love;  that  it  is  assumed  always  to  be 
egoistic.  But  commitments  can  be  expressions  of  the  self  without  being  selfish.  For 
Nietzsche,  who  looked  favourably  on  the  values  of  Heroic  society,  the  quality  Hector's 
12  "One  is  no  longer  at  home  anywhere;  at  last  one  longs  back  for  that  place  in  which  alone  one  can  be  at 
home,  because  it  is  the  only  place  in  which  one  would  want  to  be  at  home;  the  Greek  World.  "  The  Will  to 
Power. 
13  In  The  World  of  Odysseus.  (p.  116) 
14  Finley  comments;  "  The  fact  is  that  [the]  notion  of  social  obligation  is  fundamentally  non  heroic.. 
. 
in  the 
following  generations,  when  the  community  began  to  move  from  the  wings  to  the  centre  of  the  Greek  stage, 
the  hero  quickly  died  out,  for  the  honour  of  the  hero  was  purely  individual...  "  (p.  116).  By  our  standards 
heroic  values  show  an  absence  of  due  concern  for  the  interests  of  others.  But  something  of  the  same  charge 
can  be  put  against  Anna  Karenina,  and  many  other  cases  of  practical  necessity.  If  we  look  favourably  on 
those  cases,  as  I  have  argued  we  should,  we  seem  thereby  to  endorse  some  form  of  egoism. 
217 attitude  exemplifies  is  nobility,  and  it  is  tempting  to  suggest  that  this  is  at  least  one  aspect 
of  what  he  meant  in  praising  egoism;  that  the  noble  hero  is  not  intimidated  by  adherence 
to  a  moral  code  of  impersonal  duty.  15  The  Heroic  code  of  values,  while  being  not  merely 
an  expression  of  desire,  is  nevertheless  an  assertion  of  the  self,  in  a  way  that  Kantian 
morality  is  not.  Since  any  code  of  values  will  involve  a  concept  of  denial-  some  actions 
will  have  to  be  ruled  out  if  it  is  to  count  as  a  value-system  at  all,  the  Heroic  code  is  no 
exception.  And  as  noted  above,  Nietzsche  was  hostile  to  liberal  and  laissez-faire  attitudes 
towards  character  and  desire.  But  in  Nietzsche's  view  the  Heroic  world,  unlike  the 
Kantian  system,  preserves  the  individual's  engagement  with  the  world.  Principally,  it  does 
not  extinguish  the  sense  of  intoxication  with  life.  One  of  the  most  pernicious  effects  of 
"disinterestedness"  is  the  disenchantment  it  produces; 
"From  a  doctorate  exam.  -  "What  is  the  task  of  all  higher  education"?  -To  turn  man  into  a 
machine.  -  `By  what  means?  "-  He  has  to  learn  to  feel  bored.  -"How  is  that  achieved?  "- 
Through  the  concept  of  duty.  -...  "Who  is  the  perfect  man?  "-The  civil  servant.  -  `Which 
philosophy  provides  the  best  formula  for  the  civil  servant"?  -Kant's.  " 
(Twilight.  p.  95.  ) 
So  Nietzsche  is  concerned  not  merely  to  argue  against  Kantian  ethics  on  the  grounds  that 
it  is  philosophically  mistaken,  but  additionally,  and  more  importantly  on  the  grounds  that 
the  psychological  consequences  of  adopting  would  be  extremely  damaging.  Indeed  that 
psychological  damage  such  views  would  wreak  is  the  chief  philosophical  objection  to 
them,  in  Nietzsche's  view.  Returning  then  to  the  issue  of  the  education  of  the  emotions, 
the  process  of  moderation  this  involves  is  akin  for  Nietzsche,  to  the  selflessness  of 
Kantian  ethics,  and  capable  of  the  same  damage. 
Have  we  then  shown  that  Nietzsche  was  right  to  reject  the  goal  of  educating  the 
emotions?  Not  quite.  At  best  we  have  shown  that  certain  moral  theories  promote  the 
extinguishing  of  a  range  of  emotions  that  are  crucial  to  living  fully  engaged  lives.  But  not 
all  of  them  do  this,  and  those  which  do  not  (such  as  the  Heroic)  themselves  involve 
15  And  also  that  he  was  not  merely  concerned  to  produce  the  best  overall  outcome.  Nietzsche's  hostility 
towards  utilitarianism  is  motivated  by  the  sense  that  it  threatens  the  character  of  the  individual.  This  sense  of 
encroachment  is  shared  by  contemporary  opponents  of  that  theory,  perhaps  most  notably  Bernard  Williams. 
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ý education  of  the  emotions.  We  might,  then,  accept  some  of  the  points  Nietzsche  makes, 
without  being  forced  to  accept  the  general  thesis  about  education. 
The  interpretation  of  Nietzsche's  objection  offered  above,  although  the  most  obvious,  is 
not  the  only  one.  An  alternative  is  offered  by  John  Cooper  i6.  Cooper  is  tentative  in  his 
reconstruction  of  Nietzsche.  He  comments: 
"My  treatment  is  brief,  because  Nietzsche's  contentions  belong  at  a  level  of  speculative 
psychology  where  the  nature  of  the  assessment  is  obscure.  " 
(Cooper.  P.  64) 
On  Cooper's  analysis,  the  focus  of  Nietzsche's  attack  is  the  scholar.  In  the  life  of  the 
scholar,  according  to  Nietzsche,  we  can  perceive  by  analogy  what  goes  wrong  in 
emotional  education; 
"Whoever  lets  concepts,  opinions,  past  events,  books,  enter  between  himself  and 
things...  will  never  see  things  for  the  first  time". 
Knowledge  is  something  destructive  in  Nietzsche's  eyes;  learning  and  the  refinement  of 
conceptual  capacities  have  the  result  that  we  only  confront  the  world  through  the  "veil"  of 
our  classifications  and  reasons.  So  our  encounters  with  the  world  lack  immediacy  and 
directness.  In  addition  to  this  distancing,  Nietzsche  also  claims  that  the  aim  of  learning  is 
to  dissolve  the  world,  and  especially  people,  so  that  we  encounter  them  as  instances  of 
types.  In  essence,  Nietzsche's  attack  seems  to  come  to  this,  that  our  initial  encounters  with 
the  world  are  to  a  large  extent  unmediated  by  concepts.  Our  experience  is  therefore 
immediate  and  of  particulars-  people,  say,  as  unresolved  particulars  rather  than  as 
classified  instances  of  concepts.  The  real  villain  of  this  description,  then,  is  conceptual 
reduction,  something  that  Nietzsche  regards  as  vital  to  "technicist"  thought  such  as 
utilitarianism.  Cooper  writes, 
"Nietzsche's  point  is  not  that  there  is  anything  mistaken,  for  certain  purposes,  with  such 
analyses....  it  is  rather  that  immersion  in  disciplines  which  conduct  these  reductions  has  an 
irretrievable  impact  upon  emotional  attitudes  towards  the  objects  and  persons  variously 
"dissolved"  by  them.  " 
16  In  Cooper,  Nietzsche's  Philosophy  of  Education. 
219 (Cooper.  P  65) 
The  question  is,  what  is  the  "impact'  'that  it  has,  and  why  is  it  "irretrievable"?  The  answer 
to  the  first  part  of  this  question  is  presumably  that  we  will  no  longer  conceive  of  the  world 
in  terms  of  particulars,  and  this  is  in  many  respects  damaging.  Let  us  be  clear  what  is 
meant  by  talking  of  particulars.  In  chapter  two  I  offered  an  account  of  ethical  thinking 
which  I  termed  "particularist".  On  this  view,  we  encounter  a  situation  as  a  whole,  without 
attempting  to  apply  previously  conceived  rules.  I  argued,  along  Aristotelian  lines,  that  the 
person  of  educated  perception  will  perceive  the  relevant  or  salient  features  of  the  situation; 
sometimes  this  alone  will  be  sufficient  to  indicate  the  right  course  of  action,  but  not 
always.  There  may  be  cases  where  factors  of  equal  importance  make  decision  difficult. 
This  account  is  particularist  because  the  whole  situation  is  the  object  of  attention  and  not 
merely  a  pre-selected  range  of  factors;  seeing  which  factors  are  most  salient  requires  a 
grasp  of  the  whole  situation.  Also,  judgement  relies  on  the  educated  perceptions  of  the 
person  and  not  on  the  application  of  rules  or  decision-making  procedures. 
This  kind  of  particularism  however,  requires  the  application  of  concepts.  It  requires  the 
deliberator  to  be  able  to  perceive  a  selfish  act,  to  recognise  instances  of  injustice  and 
shame  and  so  on-  often  quite  refined  instances  of  them  17.  But  it  is  not  reductionist. 
Kant's  account  of  aesthetic  pleasure  in  the  third  Critique  involves  perceiving  aesthetic 
objects  as  particulars  unmediated  by  concepts.  This  seems  to  be  a  stronger  notion  of  what 
it  is  to  perceive  a  particular-  that  it  requires  the  absence  of  concepts.  Is 
Let  us  look  again  at  Nietzsche's  argument.  Education  involves  the  application  of 
concepts,  and  emotional  education  is  no  different19.  But  this  process  dissolves  our 
perception  of  particulars,  which  in  turn  dissolves  or  alters  for  the  worse  our  emotional 
engagement  with  those  particulars.  I  have  not  yet  considered  the  last  claim  in  the  previous 
sentence,  but  we  can  now  see  that  the  argument  only  works  if  a  strong,  Kantian-style 
reading  of  "grasping  particulars"  is  taken.  On  the  weaker  view,  grasping  particulars  is 
compatible  with  the  application  of  concepts.  It  is  just  that  the  concepts  do  not  exhaust  the 
"But  there  need  be  no  demand  that  they  be  able  to  produce  an  account  of  what,  for  example,  injustice  as 
such  consists  of. 
18  Although  of  course  the  object  will  have  to  be  discriminated  as  an  object  distinct  from  its  background,  and 
therefore  some  conceptual  capacities  seem  to  be  required. 
'9  Nietzsche's  argument  only  requires  that  this  be  a  necessary  and  not  a  sufficient  condition  of  emotional 
education. 
220 particular.  When  we  say  why  we  like  a  painting  or  a  novel,  or  why  we  love  someone,  we 
abstract  features  from  the  whole,  tear  them  out  of  their  particular  contexts  and  offer  them 
as  explanations.  But  it  is  the  particular,  undissolved  object  or  person  that  is  the  focus  of 
our  attention. 
Could  Nietzsche  argue  that  emotional  education  involves,  not  this  kind  of  particularism, 
but  reductionist  applications  of  concepts?  Certainly  it  may-  perhaps  utilitarianism  is  of 
this  sort.  The  completely  utilitarian  child  may  be  precisely  reductionist  in  this  way:  but 
this  is  of  course  not  an  objection  to  emotional  education  as  such.  Indeed,  the  account  of 
Aristotle  I  offered  in  chapter  three  shows  how  this  result  can  be  avoided.  What  then  about 
the  assumption  Nietzsche's  argument  would  require,  that  the  effect  of  the  dissolution  of 
particulars  on  our  emotions  will  be  negative?  Firstly,  in  what  way  is  it  negative?  If  it  is 
simply  that  it  dissolves  particulars  and  we  respond  instead  merely  to  instances  of 
universals,  then  it  is  not  clear  that  the  quality  of  our  emotional  responses  has  been  altered 
rather  than  their  objects  2°  But  if  it  is  the  quality  that  is  altered,  say  the  intensity,  we  can 
look  to  the  account  offered  by  Plato's  arguments  in  the  Symposium,  in  the  last  chapter,  to 
explain  why  this  is  so.  Perhaps  we  do  tend  to  conceive  of  education  as  a  process  of 
increasing  abstraction;  and  theories  of  learning  such  as  Piaget's  perhaps  reinforce  this 
tendenc?  Z'.  But  to  assume  that  education  is  inevitably  a  movement  away  from  particulars 
into  a  realm  of  abstract  principles  is  a  mistake.  As  David  Hamlyn  argues,  education most 
often  involves  an  increasingly  refined  ability  to  appreciate  particulars. 
The  arguments  given  above  do  not  succeed  then  in  showing  that  education  of  the 
emotions  is  inevitably  pernicious.  There  is,  however,  an  idea  latent  in  some  of  the 
considerations  we  have  been  looking  at  which  has  not  been  fully  brought  out.  This  idea 
might  be  put  this  way;  it  is  a  familiar  experience  to  many  that  education  of  their  emotions 
inevitably  blunts  or  fades  their  emotional  experience.  Michael  Stocker  remarks22  that 
20  Plato's  arguments  concerning  love,  contained  in  the  Symposium  -  considered  in  the  previous  chapter,  -  are 
an  example  of  this  kind  of  "dissolution"  of  the  particular  into  instantiations  of  universals.  He  too  regards  it  as 
an  inevitable  (and  desirable)  consequence  that  our  attitudes  towards  particulars  will  be  less  intense  as  a 
result. 
21  According  to  Piaget,  the  final  and  most  advanced  stage  in  the  education  of  the  child  is  that  at  which  they 
are  able  to  think  abstractly  and  apply  general  principles.  This  view  is  discussed  and  criticised  in  Gilligan, 
Philosophy  in  a  Different  Voice  and  Hamlyn,  Education  and  the  Growth  of  Understanding  ch.  7. 
22  Stocker,  Valuing  Emotions.  (p.  11).  He  quotes  the  writer  Roger  Angell;  "[we]  are  aware  of  a  humdrum, 
twilight  quality  to  all  our  doings  in  middle  life,  however  successful  the  may  prove  to  be.  There  is  a  loss  of 
light  and  ease  and  early  joy...  " 
221 many  of  people  look  back  wistfully  upon  their  youth  as  a  time  when  their  passions  for 
things  were  vivid  and  fresh.  In  comparison,  later  life,  however  fulfilling,  often  seems  to 
be-  in  emotional  terms-  something  of  a  disappointment.  Some  psychologists  also  note  that 
the  unselfconscious  passions  of  young  children  are  dampened  as  they  grow  older,  and  in 
particular  as  they  learn  language  and  express  themselves  in  it. 
There  is  perhaps  something  familiar  and  correct  about  this,  but  it  is  more  difficult  to  say 
precisely  what  it  is.  One  claim  might  be  that  language  acquisition  is  responsible  for  the 
dulling  effect.  This  might  be  because  of  the  fact  we  have  been  considering,  that  it  involves 
the  application  of  concepts.  The  effects  of  this  could  be  the  "Nietzschean"  ones  we  have 
looked  at  concerning  the  transition  from  particulars  to  universals,  or  perhaps  it  is  that 
through  language,  the  child  must  accept  public  criteria  for  the  application  of  concepts,  and 
that  this  kind  of  dependency  has  bad  effects  on  the  child's  emotional  state.  However,  this 
last  point  is  quite  general  in  taking  the  ill-effects  to  result  from  education  as  such,  and 
not  merely  emotional  education.  On  this  view  the  damaging  transition  is  from  a  "private" 
world  to  a  public  one,  although  perhaps  the  child  may  be  affected  most  directly  by  the 
transformation  wrought  in  its  emotional  life. 
In  addition,  an  important  element  of  the  pre-linguistic  or  "pre-dissolution"  grasp  of 
particulars  may  be  their  suggestiveness.  That  is,  our  youth  is  characterised  to  some  extent 
by  the  promise,  difficult  to  capture,  that  we  may  grasp  in  a  particular.  This  is  an  echo  of 
Kant's  point  that  our  grasp  of  the  particular  transcends  conceptual  descriptions  we  give  of 
it.  This  is  a  variation  of  Nietzsche's  objection;  here  what  is  claimed  is,  not  that  the 
application  of  concepts  commits  us  to  reductive  understanding  in  terms  of  universals,  but 
that  the  effect  of  conceptual  understanding  is  one  of  "disenchantment"-  that  the  suggestive 
qualities  of  particulars,  their  "pointing  towards"  something  which  is  not  explicit  is  eroded 
by  this  form  of  understanding.  We  might  also  think  of  this  in  terms  of  the  Stoic  idea  of 
"freshness"  mentioned  in  chapter  one;  what  is  lost  in  our  emotional  understanding  is  not  a 
belief  or  set  of  beliefs,  but  something  of  the  phenomenological  character  of  our  emotional 
experience.  The  point  about  the  suggestiveness  of  particulars  can  be  thought  of  in  terms  of 
the  Romantic  theory  of  the  symbol,  mentioned  in  the  last  chapter.  If  this  account  can  be 
defended,  then  perhaps  part  of  the  attraction  of  art  is  that  it  offers  an  opportunity  to  re- 
experience  the  sense  of  enchantment  of  childhood  experience,  the  sense  of  intimation.  The 
loss  of  this  sense  perhaps  accounts  for  the  jaded,  dulled  feeling  Stocker  refers  to. 
However,  even  if  we  accept  some  of  the  points  made  in  the  preceding  paragraphs  it  is 
not  clear  that  they  amount  to  an  objection  to  emotional  education.  In  the  first  place,  the 
222 cause  of  the  problem  does  not  seem  to  be  simply  emotional  education.  Although  the 
effects  are  felt  in  the  subject's  emotional  life,  the  cause  seems  to  be  education  generally 
and  the  acquisition  of  language.  Secondly,  it  is  not  entirely  clear  why  conceptual  thinking 
has  this  disenchanting  effect,  if  it  does.  Is  it  merely  something  that  tends  to  occur  as  an 
effect,  perhaps  even  as  an  indirect  effect?  If  so,  it  might  be  preventable.  Or  is  the 
connection  stricter?  This  is  unexplained.  Thirdly,  even  supposing  this  is  a  result,  it  does 
not  threaten  the  other  (so  far)  undeniable  benefits  of  emotional  education.  And  so  at  worst 
there  is  a  trade  off.  We  sacrifice  something  of  the  phenomenology  of  our  emotional  lives 
for  the  benefits  mentioned  at  the  outset. 
We  should  conclude  then,  that  we  have  seen  no  conclusive  reason  for  thinking  that 
emotional  education  is,  on  balance,  anything  but  a  good  thing.  Having  defended  the 
project  of  such  education  against  objections,  I  turn  now  to  consider  what  counts  as 
emotional  education. 
When  is  an  Emotion  Educated? 
As  we  saw  previously,  the  Stoics  argued  that  emotions  could  be  not  be  educated  in  such  a 
way  that  they  were  responsive  to  the  context.  They  thought  Aristotle  misguided  in 
believing  that  a  response  can  be  appropriate.  Once  aroused,  they  believed,  emotions 
rapidly  got  out  of  control.  They  could  however  be  eliminated,  and  this  was  the  task  of 
Stoic  therapy.  This  kind  of  education  of  the  emotions  used  a  variety  of  techniques 
including  the  study  of  literature  and  logic23.  Their  goal  was  to  alter  the  pupil's  beliefs,  the 
judgements  he  assents  to  and  thereby  eradicate  the  emotions.  Can  we  share  the  Stoic  view 
that  emotional  education  involves  the  education  of  beliefs? 
It  will  be  clear  from  the  account  of  the  emotions  given  in  chapter  one  and  the  discussion 
of  Stoic  theories  in  chapter  three  that  this  cannot  be  sufficient  for  emotional  education. 
From  a  consideration  of  "aberrant"  emotions  alone  we  can  see  that  this  is  not  enough. 
23  An  account  of  these  is  given  by  Martha  Nussbaum  in  "Stoic  Tonics"  in  The  Therapy  of  Desire. 
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Ad Those  who  suffer  from  recalcitrant  emotions,  for  example,  already  possess  the  relevant 
beliefs,  as  do  those  who  suffer  from  phobias.  What  was  claimed  in  chapter  one  was  that  in 
these  cases,  the  goal  of  education  must  be  to  bring  emotional  responses  into  step  with  the 
beliefs.  And  that  involves  getting  those  involved  to  see  the  situation,  and  its  salient 
features,  in  a  way  that  embodies  what  they  already  believe24.  How  can  this  be  achieved?  If 
this  question  is  understood  as  a  demand  for  an  account  of  the  mechanism  of  the  process, 
then  we  should  not  be  surprised  if  philosophy  is  unable  to  provide  such  an  account.  We 
can  see  why  if  we  compare  our  question  with  some  others  we  might  ask  about  other 
mental  phenomena,  such  as,  what  goes  on  when  I  try  to  remember  someone's  name,  and 
succeed?  What  did  I  do?  Or,  when  I  picture  someone's  face,  how  do  I  do  it?  If  we  knew 
enough  about  the  way  the  brain  works  we  might  be  able  to  understand  something  about 
the  underlying  mechanics  of  these  processes25.  The  same  goes  for  the  phenomenon  of 
"seeing  an  aspect".  Yet  I  can  obviously  accomplish  these  and  other  feats  without 
understanding  how  I  do  it.  And  there  certainly  is  something  that  I  do.  I  can  make  a 
determined  effort  to  remember  a  face,  or  a  name,  to  see  an  aspect,  even  though  I  do  not,  in 
a  sense,  know  what  I'm  doing  when  I  try.  If  asked  for  instructions  on  how  to  try,  I  would 
be  unable  to  give  any  useful  response.  But  my  inability  to  describe  the  process  need  not 
cast  doubt  on  the  existence  of  a  process  in  which  I  am  engaged. 
What,  we  might  ask,  goes  on  when  I  learn  to  see  an  aspect,  or  learn  to  hear  music  in  a 
certain  way?  If  I  am  told  that  a  drawing  can  be  seen  ambiguously  and  I  am  told  what  the 
two  aspects  are  of,  I  may  now  have  certain  beliefs  about  the  picture;  that  it  can  be  seen  as 
an  x  and  as  a  y,  say.  But  if  I  am  unable  to  see,  and  have  never  seen,  the  y  aspect,  will  the 
belief  that  it  can  be  so  seen  help  me?  Might  it  help  me  to  look  in  the  right  way  or  in  the 
right  direction?  Or  for  the  right  kind  of  thing?  It  is  difficult  to  know,  I  think,  because  the 
process  itself  is  so  opaque.  Perhaps  if  I'm  trying  to  see  the  picture  as  an  old  woman,  I  may 
run  through  in  my  mind  some  images  of  old  women.  But  when  I  succeed  in  seeing  the 
aspect  it  may  be  totally  unlike  the  images  I  visualised.  So,  did  they  help  me?  The  belief  of 
24  This  kind  of  account  of  learning  is  held  also  by  David  Hamlyn;  "It  is  clear,  however,  that  the  issues  over 
learning  to  have  a  certain  attitude  or  emotion  towards  something  turn  on  analogous  issues  over  learning  to 
see  things  in  certain  ways,  since  the  relevant  factor  in  the  emotion  is  the  seeing  of  the  thing  in  a  certain 
way...  ".  (Experience  and  the  Growth  of  Understanding.  P.  124) 
25  Whether  such  understanding  is  understanding  of  the  essence  of  these  phenomena  will  of  course  depend  on 
the  view  taken  of  the  relationship  between  the  mental  and  the  physical. 
224 course  is  not  sufficient  since  even  with  it  I  may  still  fail  to  see  the  aspect,  but  it  is  not 
necessary  either,  since  I  can  spontaneously  see  the  aspect  prior  to  having  the  belief. 
However,  in  cases  of  emotional  education,  where  we  generally  do  have  ethical  beliefs 
and  values,  the  question  is  how  those  beliefs  about  values  are  to  become  embodied  by  our 
emotional  responses.  I  said  above  that  philosophy  will  be  unable  to  say  in  detail  how  this 
comes  about,  just  as  it  cannot  explain  the  other  phenomena  I  mentioned.  All  we  can  do  is 
to  say  in  general  terms  what  education  -  whatever  the  details  of  that  process  are-  must 
involve.  So  far,  I  have  claimed  that  emotional  education  must  involve  us  learning  to  see 
the  situation  in  new  ways,  typically,  in  line  with  our  values. 
Granted  that  changes  of  the  sort  just  described  are  what  education  aims  at,  it  is  clear 
enough  that  changes  of  the  required  sort  might  simply  come  about,  by  one  means  or 
another,  through  the  passage  of  time,  because  of  drug  therapy,  divine  visitation  or 
accident.  These  would  not,  however,  necessarily  be  examples  of  emotional  learning. 
Therefore,  since  change  alone  is  not  sufficient,  what  else  is  required  for  the  new  emotions 
to  count  as  having  been  learnt?  If  a  treatment  for  a  phobia  involves  a  form  of  conditioning 
which  gradually  reduces  the  strength  of  the  emotional  reaction,  this  would  not  in  itself 
count  as  learning.  Whatever  process  is  in  operation,  it  may  occur  purely  causally.  This 
remains  so  even  if  the  eventual  result  is  that  I  see  the  object  of  my  phobia  in  a  different 
light.  Tristan  and  Isolde  come  to  see  each  other  in  a  different  light  as  a  result  of  a  potion, 
but  we  would  not  say  they  had  learnt  to  love  each  other.  26 
One  possibility  is  that  what  may  be  lacking  in  these  cases  is  activity.  Learning  is  usually 
something  that  we  do;  something  that  requires  effort.  Tristan  and  Isolde,  however,  are 
completely  passive  with  respect  to  their  new  perspectives.  However,  we  can  learn  things 
without  effort,  inadvertently.  We  can  discover,  for  example,  that  we  have  learnt  a  tune 
without  intending  to,  and  we  can  pick  up  information  without  trying.  More  importantly 
26  We  may  not  even  want  to  say  that  they  really  love  each  other.  A  literary  example  of  two  people  who  learn 
to  love  each  other  would  be  Elizabeth  Bennett  and  Mr.  Darcy,  in  Pride  and  Prejudice.  This  incidentally 
raises  another  point,  that  an  emotion  can  be  the  result  of  learning  though  there  is  no  normative  sense  of  what 
is  appropriate  which  is  being  learnt.  Elizabeth  Bennett  learns  to  love  Darcy  but  she  does  not  learn  what  love 
is  an  appropriate  response  to.  "Passions",  then,  in  the  sense  distinguished  in  the  preceding  chapter,  will 
involve  learning  -  where  they  do-  in  a  different  sense  to  the  way  in  which  "emotions"  involve  learning. 
However,  these  two  areas  of  our  lives  are  not  insulated  from  one  another.  The  education  of  emotions  may 
have  unforeseen  consequences  for  our  passions.  Some  things  about  which  we  are  passionate  may  come  to 
seem  empty,  dull  or  in  some  other  way  lose  their  allure. 
225 perhaps,  we  learn  our  first  language  passively.  So  what  is  lacking  in  the  case  of  Tristan 
and  Isolde  if  it  is  not  activity?  Evidently,  it  is  something  about  the  basis  of  the  change  in 
their  perceptions.  In  cases  of  real  learning,  the  ultimate  grounds  of  our  new  perceptions 
must  be  in  experience.  That  is;  in  cases  where  the  new  perceptions  have  some  other  basis, 
such  as  a  chemical  one  or,  more  imaginatively,  the  implanting  of  ideas  by  some  means  or 
other,  we  are  inclined  to  say  that  this  does  not  constitute  learning.  But  is  the  demand  that 
the  source  be  in  experience  a  sufficient  characterisation  of  the  circumstances  under  which 
something  has  been  learnt? 
Phobias,  for  example  typically  have  their  origin  in  some  traumatic  experience.  And 
although  we  might  be  prepared  to  allow  that  there  is  a  sense  in  which  phobics  learn  to  see 
the  objects  of  their  phobias  as  frightening,  we  may  suspect  that  the  term  is  only  extended 
to  these  cases  by  courtesy.  It  does  however  makes  sense  to  say  that  I  have  learned  to  fear 
tooth  decay  because  it  means  a  trip  to  the  dentist,  or  that  I  have  learned  to  see  my  attitude 
as  selfish.  These  are  cases  of  real  learning,  we  might  think.  It  might  be  objected, 
however,  that  in  the  case  of  tooth  decay  what  I  am  really  frightened  of  is  not  tooth  decay 
but  going  to  the  dentist  ;  and  not  even  that,  but  the  pain  I  experience  when  I  go  there.  If  I 
project  this  fear,  by  association,  making  my  teeth  its  object,  is  this  then  any  different  to 
the  phobic  cases?  Furthermore,  many  people  fear  the  dentist  even  though,  when  they  do 
go  there,  they  experience  no  pain-  thanks  to  the  advance  of  techniques  in  dentistry.  Isn't 
this  just  like  a  phobia? 
But  should  we  perhaps  simply  admit  that  phobias  do  involve  learning?  The  traumatic 
experience  that  generated  my  phobia  surely  makes  it  reasonable  to  fear  further  instances 
of  that  sort.  How  does  this  differ  from  my  non-phobic  fear  of  the  dentist?  There  are  at 
least  two  related  differences.  First,  scientists  are  now  beginning  to  understand  the  neural 
processes  behind  phenomena  like  phobias  and  traumatisation  27.  Crudely  summarised,  they 
have  found  that  neural  pathways  in  the  brain  are  conditioned,  and  this  conditioning  is 
difficult  but  not  impossible  to  reverse.  So,  in  the  phobic  cases,  there  is  a  purely  causal 
explanation  we  can  give  of  the  phenomenon.  Fearing  further  instances  like  the  traumatic 
one  would  be  rational.  But  that  level  of  response  is  rendered  superfluous  by  the  neural 
conditioning-  whether  or  not  it  would  be  rational  the  phobic  will  feel  fear  anyway.  The 
second  feature,  related  to  the  first,  is  that  rational  fears  are  revisable  on  the  basis  of  new 
27  A  good  account  of  this  work  by  one  of  its  pioneers  is  The  Emotional  Brain  by  Joseph  LeDoux.  Also, 
Daniel  Goleman,  Emotional  Intelligence,  Ch.  13 
226 information,  and  phobias  are  not.  I  noted  above  that  some  people  continue  to  fear  the 
dentist  even  though  their  recent  experience  of  it  has  not  been  painful  or  traumatic.  To  the 
extent  that  these  fears  are  not  open  to  revision  in  this  way,  we  are  justified  in  thinking  of 
them  as  phobic  responses,  the  result  of  some  kind  of  conditioning. 
Recalcitrant  emotions  are  also  -  by  definition  -  impervious  to  revision  in  this  way. 
However  in  these  cases  the  difficulty  may  not  be  (or,  not  simply)  that  there  has  been 
neural  conditioning.  Here  it  may  be  that  our  emotional  response-  say,  dislike  of  someone- 
involves  association  with  some  other  person,  perhaps  a  figure  from  childhood.  The 
process  of  unlearning  will  involve  coming  to  understand  the  process  of  association  and 
thereby  attempting  to  break  it.  In  cases  of  this  sort,  therapy  will  essentially  involve  a 
transformation  of  understanding  on  the  patient's  part.  28  For  these  reasons,  education  of 
phobic  responses  may  involve  learning.  29 
Can  we  say  anything  more  about  what  emotional  education  will  involve?  We  can  single 
out  at  least  two  features  that  seem  important.  First,  appropriateness  and  second,  range. 
Appropriateness  is  a  requirement  of  what  we  expect  from  the  idea  of  emotional 
development  and  learning.  We  want  to  bring  our  emotional  responses  in  line  with  what 
we  think  correct  or  fitting,  both  with  respect  to  context  and  to  intensity  of  response.  We 
may,  however,  have  no  clear  idea  of  how  we  achieve  this  goal,  when  we  do.  But  it  is 
reasonable  to  speculate  that  it  may  involve  techniques  similar  to  those  employed  in  cases 
of  trauma.  Here  though,  instead  of  trying  to  loosen  the  stranglehold  of  neural  conditioning 
28  Even  in  the  cases  of  traumatisation,  unlearning  the  neural  conditioning  will  also  involve  therapy  at  the 
level  of  understanding,  as  Daniel  Goleman  points  out; 
"The  first  step,  regaining  a  sense  of  safety,  presumably  translates  to  finding  ways  to  calm  the  too-fearful  too 
easily-triggered  emotional  circuits  enough  to  allow  re-learning".  (p.  210)  and, 
"The  therapist  encourages  the  patient  to  retell  the  traumatic  events  as  vividly  as  possible....  the  goal  here  is  to 
put  the  entire  memory  into  words,  which  means  capturing  parts  of  the  memory  that  may  have  been 
dissociated..  .. 
By  putting  sensory  details  and  feelings  into  words,  presumably  memories  are  brought  more 
under  control  of  the  neocortex,  where  the  reactions  they  kindle  can  be  rendered  more  understandable  and  so 
more  manageable...  "(p.  212).  Goleman  is  perhaps  understandably  unclear  how  the  two  levels  of  learning  are 
connected. 
29  Even  though  they  may  not  affect  our  beliefs  (assuming  we  already  have  the  appropriate  beliefs).  I 
therefore  disagree  with  R  S.  Peters  who  insists  that  only  when  a  process  affects  our  beliefs  does  it  count  as 
learning.  Discussing  therapy,  he  writes, 
"...  if  [the  patient]  was  treated  by  some  kind  of  reconditioning  process  it  would  be  inappropriate  to  describe 
this  as  a  process  of  education.  For  nothing  is  done  about  his  beliefs.  "  (  "rhe  Education  of  the  Emotions". 
P.  198,  in  psychological  and  Ethical  Education.  ) 
227 which  prevents  re-learning,  we  are  attempting  something  like  a  milder  version  of  the 
reverse  effect.  We  are  aiming  to  bring  about  a  disposition  which  responds  immediately  in 
the  correct  way.  This  will  involve  some  kind  of  habituating  at  some  level.  But  it  cannot 
just  be  that;  it  must  also  involve  a  re-organisation  of  our  experience  of  things.  In  this 
endeavour,  the  best  route  to  success  may  be  to  try  to  bring  it  about  that  we  feel  a  different 
emotion.  That  is;  if  I  respond  with  envy  to  something  and  I  set  out  to  re-educate  my 
responses,  I  may  have  more  success  if,  rather  than  trying  to  inhibit  the  response,  so  as  not 
to  feel  envy,  I  can  manage  to  feel  another  emotion,  say  joy.  As  R.  S.  Peters  puts  it, 
"The  development  of...  the  "self-transcending"  emotions  is  probably  the  most  effective 
way  of  loosening  the  hold  on  us  of  the  more  primitive,  self-referential  ones.  " 
(Peters.  P.  200) 
The  best  way  to  oust  a  pattern  of  emotional  response  then  may  be  to  replace  it  with  a  new 
one  -  although  it  may  still  be  obscure  how  we  can  achieve  this. 
Could  art  help  in  this  process?  One  obvious  way  it  may  help  is by  facilitating  the  process 
of  articulation  of  our  emotional  responses.  This  would  seem  to  be  a  necessary  step  if  they 
are  to  be  available  for  correction.  Learning  to  identify  our  emotional  reactions  correctly, 
to  express  and  question  them  is  a  pre-requisite  of  changing  them.  In  chapter  one,  I 
mentioned  those  patients  who  suffer  from  Alexythemia-  a  particularly  acute  lack  of 
emotional  awareness  and  articulation,  which  as  a  result  makes  them  blind  to  the  emotions 
being  experienced  by  others.  But  failures  of  identification  are  common  in  everyday 
experience.  Near  the  end  of  "Gone  with  the  Wind",  for  example,  Scarlet  has  a  moment  of 
emotional  discovery  when  she  realises  that  she  has  mistaken  her  true  feelings  for  both 
Ashley  and  Rhett  Butler.  She  discovers  she  has  never  really  loved  Ashley-  it  is  Rhett 
whom  she  has  loved  all  along  without  realising  it.  Assuming  her  diagnosis  to  be  accurate, 
it  is  clear  that  her  failure  has  been  one  of  accurately  identifying  her  emotional  attitudes. 
And  her  eventual  identification  of  them  is  also  a  transformation  of  them.  The  experience 
of  reading  a  good  book  review  or  piece  of  literary  criticism  is  often  of  this  sort;  it 
articulates  responses  that  we  have  felt  but  were  perhaps  only  dimly  aware  of,  and  through 
the  articulation  of  our  response  the  nature  of  our  response  is  transformed.  30  Clearly  then, 
30  This  point  is  argued  by  Stuart  Hampshire  in  "Sincerity  and  Singlemindedness",  in  Freedom  and  the 
Individual;  and  by  Charles  Taylor,  "Self-Interpreting  Animals"  in  Papers  on  Language  and  Agency. 
228 to  the  extent  that  articulation  and  identification  are  connected,  art  which  challenges  or 
succeeds  in  forcing  us  to  evaluate  and  articulate  our  responses  may  have  educational 
effects.  One  insight  into  our  emotions  which  literature  may  force  us  actively  to  come  to 
terms  with  may  be  the  ambiguity  of  many  of  our  responses.  Susan  Feagin31  offers  one  of 
Shaw's  stage  directions  as  an  illustration  of  this  point; 
"At  one  point  in 
... 
Shaw's  play  "Widower's  Houses",  he  gives  the  following  stage 
direction  to  a  character  named  "Lickcheese":  "surprised  into  contemptuous  amusement  in 
the  midst  of  his  anxiety'. 
As  Feagin  points  out,  the  possibility  of  this  kind  of  ambiguity  raises  the  question  of  how 
many  emotional  states  a  person  in  such  a  condition  is  actually  in.  Is  "contemptuous 
amusement"  one  emotion  or  two?  And  if  one,  is it  amusement  coloured  by  contempt  or 
contempt  coloured  by  amusement,  and  what  exactly  is  the  difference?  And  if  it  takes  place 
against  a  background  of  anxiety,  does  this  complex  constitute  a  new  whole,  or  are  there 
three  distinct  emotional  components?  Although  in  one  way  these  are  fascinating 
questions,  it  is  not  clear  what  really  hangs  on  the  answers,  or  how  we  can  set  about 
deciding  what  the  answers  are.  Folk  psychology  is  very  imprecise  in  what  it  can  tell  us  in 
answer  to  these  questions.  Most  importantly,  it  does  not  embody  a  precise  notion  of  what 
an  emotion  is-  and  as  a  result,  any  answer  we  offer  to  the  puzzles  above  may  simply  look 
stipulative. 
Merely  experiencing  works  of  art  will  not  of  course  guarantee  that  we  engage  in  this 
kind  of  self  scrutiny,  but  it  may  nevertheless  provide  an  important  stimulus.  In  any  case,  it 
does  seem  that  awareness  and  dis-ambiguation  of  our  emotions  generally  is  one  part  of  the 
process  of  emotional  education.  But  at  least  two  questions  remain  outstanding  about  this 
process.  First,  does  this  not  make  the  value  of  art  merely  instrumental?  And  second,  as 
noted  at  the  outset,  it  may  be  that  responses  to  fiction  have  little  bearing  on  the  emotions 
we  feel  in  real  life,  on  the  one  hand  simply  because  fiction  is  fiction,  and,  relatedly  on  the 
other,  because  emotional  responses  to  fiction  are  not  like  real  emotions. 
31  Susan  Feagin,  Reading  With  Feeling  p.  197. 
229 Here  there  are  several  possible  difficulties.  What  we  aim  at  through  emotional  education 
is  to  instil  stabilised  patterns  of  response,  rather  than  sporadic  emotions32.  Responses  to 
fiction,  however,  may  only  result  in  the  latter,  at  best.  Secondly,  an  important  distinction 
between  emotional  responses  to  fiction  and  to  real  situations  is  that  responses  to  fiction 
are  disengaged  from  motivation  and  action.  Responses  to  fiction  don't  incline  us  to  do 
anything.  But  it  seems  that  establishing  connections  with  action  is  precisely  what 
emotional  education  requires.  R.  S.  Peters  writes, 
"To  writhe  with  sympathy,  to  fume  with  moral  indignation,  to  squirm  with  guilt  or  shame, 
may  be  more  desirable  than  to  be  incapable  of  such  feelings.  But,  it  is  surely  more 
desirable  still  that  these  appraisals  should  also  function  as  motives  for  doing  whatever  is 
appropriate.  "  (p.  201) 
And  with  respect  to  fictional  responses,  whether  they  are  educational  will  depend  on  what 
connections  (direct  and  indirect)  they  do  have  with  the  motivational  network33.  Some 
emotions  such  as  grief  don't  typically  move  people  to  act,  but  they  are  nevertheless  part  of 
the  motivational  network.  We  can  imagine  things  such  emotions  would  incline  us  to  do- 
for  example  to  sacrifice  something  for  the  return  of  the  loved-one.  This  raises  an  area  of 
particular  concern;  unlike  real  emotion  and  action,  fictional  feeling  is  safe.  It  puts  the 
viewer  or  reader  in  no  danger  and  asks  no  selfless  action  of  him  or  her.  This  prompts  the 
question;  in  what  sense  are  fictional  emotions  real?  I  return  to  both  these  questions  later. 
The  other  dimension  of  emotional  education  is  range.  This  means  extending  the  range  of 
types  of  emotions  that  we  can  have.  Consider  the  case  of  Pip  in  Great  Expectations.  His  is 
a  good  example  of  how  someone  learns  to  see  things  in  a  different  light.  In  the  early 
chapters  of  the  book,  after  his  first  visit  to  Miss  Havisham's  he  suffers  a  humiliation  at  the 
hands  of  Estella.  At  this  moment  his  understanding  of  himself  and  of  his  humble  life  with 
Joe  is  transformed.  He  sees  his  hands  as  coarse,  his  vocabulary  and  habits  as  uneducated 
and  clumsy-  in  short,  he  comes  to  see  both  himself  and  Joe  as  shameful.  It  may  not,  of 
course,  be  the  first  time  that  he  has  felt  ashamed.  It  is  however  an  extension  of  the  range 
32  Recall  the  Kantian  objection  to  the  emotions,  considered  in  chapter  three,  that  emotional  responses  lack 
the  consistency  of  a  sense  of  duty. 
33  Writers  such  as  Kendall  Walton  have  recently  written  of  our  emotional  responses  to  fiction  as  being  run 
'off-line"  as  a  way  of  capturing  their  disengagement  from  our  network  of  motivations.  (see  Kendall, 
"Spelunking,  Simulation  and  Slime"  in  Hjort  and  Laver  eds.  Emotion  and  the  Arts.  ) 
230 of  the  emotion,  and  this  involves  the  imaginative  capacity  to  bring  new  things  under  this 
concept;  to  see  things  in  new  ways.  Most  of  us  have  capacities  for  a  wide  range  of 
emotions,  most  of  which  are  exercised  in  our  early  development,  even  if  in  more  primitive 
forms.  But  some  emotions,  at  least  in  their  more  refined  forms  are  learned  later  in  life.  It  is 
conceivable  that  a  given  adult  may  simply  not  develop  the  capacity  for  emotions  such  as 
pride  and  jealousy.  In  such  a  case  we  may  say  that  the  person  has  not  learned  to  feel  pride. 
We  talk  also  about  learning  to  love,  for  example.  La  Rochefoucauld's  famous  quip  that  no 
one  would  ever  fall  in  love  who  had  not  first  read  about  it  in  novels,  contains  a  grain  of 
truth.  But  it  is  doubtful  that  the  ability  to  love  could  be  learned  from  scratch.  And  parents 
tend  to  suppose  that  love  in  some  form,  as  a  response  to  love  given,  is  natural.  Love  in 
this  form  though  does  not  require  an  epistemic  basis;  it  is  not  a  question  of  beliefs. 
Learning  to  love  in  the  fuller  sense  however,  does  involve  finding  a  basis  in  belief  34 
Here,  and  in  the  case  of  pride,  above,  extending  the  range  of  our  emotions  involves  not 
merely  extending  our  sense  of  the  appropriate  range  of  objects  of  given  emotion,  but 
extending  our  range  of  kinds  of  emotion.  Could  art  help  us  with  this?  On  the  face  of  it  we 
might  think  it  could.  Many  who  have  never  been  in  love  can  gain  some  understanding  of 
what  the  emotion  is  like  from  reading  Proust  or  listening  to  Wagner.  This  is  presumably 
part  of  La  Rochefoucauld's  point.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  would  it  help  us  to  love?  It  is 
hard  to  see  how  it  could-  understanding  what  being  in  love  is  like  is  obviously  not 
sufficient  for  the  ability  to  love. 
The  attempt  to  move  from  the  understanding  to  the  emotion,  presents  many  difficulties. 
For  example,  with  respect  to  a  wide  range  of  emotions  there  are  obvious  incentives  which 
might  seduce  us  into  believing  that  we  possess  the  relevant  capacity.  Love  may  be  a  good 
example.  It  is  an  emotion  we  all  like  to  think  ourselves  capable  of.  It  will  be  tempting 
therefore  to  construe  our  emotional  responses  as  falling  into  that  category.  But  we  may 
find  ourselves  in  emotional  states  which  could  plausibly  be  construed  in  this  way  but 
which  fall  crucially  short  of  the  real  thing  in  some  respects.  Construing  them  as  the  real 
thing  can  be  plausible  because  the  identity  of  many  our  emotions  is  not  obvious.  A  good 
example  of  this  is  David  Hamlyn's  discussion  of  a  real  case  concerning  a  trial  at  which  he 
was  a  juror.  The  point  which  concerns  Hamlyn  is  the  nature  of  the  defendant's  attitude 
towards  his  family.  Although  apparently  devoted  to  his  children,  always  carrying 
34  David  Hamlyn  argues  this  point  in  "Learning  to  Love",  in  Perception,  learning  and  the  Self. 
231 photographs  of  them,  and  devoting  himself  to  his  wife  and  helping  her  overcome  her 
problems,  it  was  not  clear  that  his  attitude  was  really  one  of  love; 
"...  even  in  the  woman's  case,  it  was  arguable  that  what  was  important  to  him  was  seeing 
himself  as  standing  in  a  relation  to  her,  just  as  he  saw  himself,  with  apparently  less  reality, 
as  standing  in  a  relation  to  his  children.....  What  is  important  for  our  purposes  is  that  a 
medical  witness  described  him  as  someone  who  had  not  learnt  to  love,  despite  abundant 
evidence  that  he  had  a  propensity  to  devote  himself  to  other  people.....  As  I  have 
indicated,  one  thing  that  seemed  very  important  to  the  man  was  his  conception  of  himself 
as  standing  in  certain  relationships  to  others.  At  the  trial,  he  kept  referring  to  the  woman 
as  "My...  ".  It  might  be  said  in  consequence  that  there  was  a  sense  in  which.....  those 
feelings  were  not  quite  genuine.  " 
(Hamlyn.  P.  290) 
Hamlyn  remarks  that  we  might  interpret  this  as  a  case  of  self-deception,  where  the  man 
does  not  really  feel  love  and  knows  it,  but  manages  to  convince  himself  that  he  does. 
There  are  cases  of  this  sort,  of  course.  But  Hamlyn  regards  the  man  in  this  case  as  less 
knowing.  Rather  than  being  a  case  of  self-deception,  he  was  simply  in  error;  he  genuinely 
believed  his  emotions  to  be  those  of  love.  And  this  mis-diagnosis  on  his  part  is  a 
consequence,  Hamlyn  suggests,  of  his  having  failed  to  discover  what  love  really  involves 
and  of  having  failed  to  love  for  that  reason. 
One  thing  the  man  had  failed  to  do,  Hamlyn  claims,  was  to  develop  an  appropriate 
epistemic  base  for  his  attitudes  3S.  He  had  failed  to  ground  his  emotion  in  the  right  way. 
Nevertheless,  we  can  see  how  he  might  have  taken  his  emotion  for  love.  The  dangers  for 
readers  of  fiction  or  theatre-goers  is  akin  to  the  plight  of  Hamlyn's  defendant.  Fiction  may 
not  encourage  the  development  of  appropriate  epistemic  bases,  in  ways  that  we  shall  see. 
We  may  as  a  result  take  our  imaginative  response  to  the  Prelude  to  Tristan  and  Isolde  as 
revealing  our  passionate  nature;  our  compassionate  reaction  to  the  fate  of  Oedipus  as  a 
sign  of  our  sympathy  and  concern  for  others;  and  our  indignation  at  the  inflated  self- 
35  So,  although  he  allows  that  love  in  its  basic  form  does  not  require  this  episteniic  form,  since  it  is  a  natural 
response,  perhaps  involving  seeing-as,  the  mature  form  must  be  grounded  in  beliefs,  if  there  is  to  be  stability 
and  continuity  of  response.  If  this  is  correct,  then  it  follows  that  in  the  cases  of  some  emotions,  the  ability  to 
experience  the  phantasia  will  not  be  sufficient.  In  addition  the  emotion  must  be  grounded  in  judgement  and 
belief.  Education  in  these  cases  must  then  involve  education  of  judgements  and  beliefs  too. 
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question  is  whether  these  responses  do  in  fact  reveal  anything  at  all  about  our  real 
emotions. 
To  be  set  against  these  doubts  however,  there  are  experiences  of  the  sort  described  by 
John  Stuart  Mill,  when,  during  a  long  bout  of  depression  he  came  to  regard  himself  as 
incapable  of  caring  about  anything  or  anyone,  as  a  consequence  of  his  severe  educational 
upbringing.  A  chance  reading  of  Marmontel's  memoirs,  proved  a  revelation; 
"`..  [I]  came  to  the  passage  which  relates  his  father's  death,  the  distressed  position  of  the 
family,  and  the  sudden  inspiration  by  which  he,  then  a  mere  boy,  felt  and  made  them  feel 
that  he  would  be  everything  to  them-  would  supply  the  place  of  all  that  they  had  lost.  A 
vivid  conception  of  the  scene  and  its  feelings  came  over  me,  and  I  was  moved  to  tears. 
From  this  moment,  my  burden  grew  lighter.  The  oppression  of  the  thought  that  all  feeling 
was  dead  within  me,  was  gone.  I  was  no  longer  hopeless:  I  was  not  a  stock  or  a  stone.  " 
(Autobiography.  P.  117) 
Mill's  relief  was  not  however  confined  to  fictional  responses,  and  he  found  himself  able  to 
take  enjoyment  in  "sunshine  and  sky,  in  books,  in  conversation,  in  public  affairs...  ".  But 
while  we  need  not  question  the  genuineness  of  Mill's  response,  it  is  easy  to  see  ways  in 
which  it  might  not  have  been  genuine.  In  the  first  place,  the  very  real  desire  to  feel,  could 
have  influenced  his  reaction.  Secondly,  perhaps  Mill  read  into  the  scene  some  detail  of  his 
own  life,  in  which  case,  although  his  response  might  be  genuine  enough,  he  would  have 
mistaken  its  object.  This  last  kind  of  danger  is  particularly  pressing  in  responses  to  music, 
for  example,  where  the  expression  of  emotion  has  no  object.  On  one  account  of  musical 
experience,  what  the  listener  does  is  to  imagine  the  music  as  an  expression  of  their  own 
emotional  state,  although  the  music  does  not  indicate  what  the  object  of  the  sadness,  say, 
is.  Here,  the  listener  does  not  mistake  the  object,  but  the  experience  seems  to  provide  great 
scope  for  projection.  This  need  not  be  a  defect,  but  it  may  encourage  a  kind  of  wallowing. 
Let  us  try  to  sum  up  what  we  have  said  about  emotional  education  so  far.  First, 
anything  that  is  to  count  as  educating  an  emotion  will  not  be  concerned  simply  with 
beliefs.  Rather  it  will  bring  experience  into  line  with  our  beliefs  and  values.  Second,  the 
basis  of  the  change  must  be  in  experience  itself.  Third,  the  changes  can  involve  both 
developing  the  appropriateness  of  our  responses,  and  also  the  range  of  emotions  we  can 
feel.  To  these  two  we  should  add  a  third  point,  that  education  should  aim  at  stability  and 
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how  we  do  this,  how  we  improve  our  emotional  habits,  will  probably  not  be  perspicuous 
to  us.  But  there  is  still  something  that  we  do.  Techniques  which  may  be  helpful  in 
whatever  it  is  that  in  fact  we  do  will  include  articulation  and  identification.  But  perhaps 
not  only  that.  Expanding  our  range  may  involve  the  exercise  of  the  imagination  in  obscure 
ways.  When  I  hear  the  Tristan  Prelude  as  an  expression  of  yearning,  the  emotion  I  feel  (if 
I  feel  anything)  may  be  something  like  that  yearning  itself.  But  this  kind  of  extension  of 
range  involves  at  bottom  some  kind  of  leap  of  imagination. 
I  turn  now  to  a  consideration  of  two  problems  which  concern  the  relationship  between 
works  of  art  and  our  emotional  responses  to  them.  The  first  is  the  "paradox  "of  fiction,  as 
it  has  been  called,  and  the  second  is  the  paradox  of  negative  emotions.  Discussion  of  these 
problems  will  help  to  reveal  exactly  how  our  emotional  responses  to  fiction  differ  from 
real-life  emotions. 
234 Chapter  Seven; 
"A  Strange  Kind  of  Sadness"? 
My  aim  in  this  chapter  is  to  consider  the  role  art  might  play  in  moral  education.  Since  that 
is  a  very  large  topic,  in  order  to  restrict  myself  to  something  more  manageable,  I  will 
concentrate  on  the  role  certain  kinds  of  art,  specifically  novels,  tragedies  and  perhaps 
films  and  music  have  in  the  education  of  our  emotions.  I  therefore  make  two  assumptions; 
first  that  the  education  of  our  emotions  is  an  essential  part  of  ethical  education.  Second, 
that  it  is  at  least  initially  plausible  to  think  of  our  reading  of  novels,  watching  tragedies 
and  films  as  potentially  contributing  to  this  process.  I  do  not  assume,  however,  that 
emotional  education  requires  the  reading  of  novels  and  the  watching  of  films  and 
tragedies.  Perhaps  most  emotional  education  goes  on  without  them.  But  since  emotional 
education,  like  ethical  education,  is  an  open-ended  process,  these  media  may  nevertheless 
make  a  contribution  as  that  process  unfolds. 
The  question  I  want  eventually  to  focus  on  is  the  following;  how  do  our  emotional 
responses  to  fiction  (hereafter  this  term  will  stand  for  the  various  art  forms  above)  relate  to 
our  everyday  emotional  experience?  One  suggestion  might  be  that  when  I  respond 
emotionally  to  music,  to  the  fate  of  a  character  in  a  novel  or  a  drama,  I  give  myself  what 
we  might  call  an  emotional  "workout".  This  means,  not  only  that  I  exercise  emotional 
capacities  I  already  have,  but  that,  in  addition,  I  may  expand  my  emotional  range  and 
repertoire.  Something  like  this  is  the  natural  way  in  which  we  might  try  to  capture  the 
educational  role  of  fiction  with  respect  to  our  emotions.  This  view  is  expressed  by  Jerrold 
Levinson,  in  the  passage  quoted  in  the  previous  chapter; 
"  The  individual  whose  emotional  faculty  is  inactive,  shallow,  or  one-dimensional  seems 
to  us  less  of  a  person.  Since  music  has  the  power  to  put  us  into  the  feeling  state  of  a 
negative  emotion  without  its  unwanted  life  consequences,  it  allows  us  to  partly  reassure 
ourselves  ...  of  our  ability  to  feel.  Having  a  negative  emotional  response  to  music  is  like 
giving  our  emotional  engines  a  "dry  run"....  Furthermore,  in  exercising  our  feeling 
capacities  on  music  we  might  be  said  to  tone  them  up,  or  get  them  into  shape,  thus 
readying  ourselves  for  intenser  and  more  focused  reactions  to  situations  in  life.  " 
('Music  and  Negative  Emotion") 
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seem  even  greater.  Martha  Nussbaum,  for  example,  claims  that  literature  educates  by 
sharpening  our  perception.  And  part  of  this  process  involves  emotional  response.  This 
emphasis  on  the  perception  of  the  particular-  on  particular  people  in  particular  situations- 
in  ethical  learning  has  already  been  discussed  in  chapter  three.  It  contrasts  with  rival  views 
which  picture  moral  understanding  as  involving  a  grasp  of  abstractions,  generalities  and 
rules.  But  on  this  account  literature  in  addition  widens  experience  through  the  active 
imagination; 
"Our  experience  is,  without  fiction,  too  confined  and  too  parochial.  Literature  extends  it, 
making  us  reflect  and  feel  about  what  might  otherwise  be  too  distant  for  feeling.  " 
(Love's  Knowledge.  p.  47) 
Further,  in  addition  to  engaging  and  broadening  our  imaginative  sympathies,  the 
experience  of  fiction  provides  other  advantages  over  lived  experience; 
"The  point  is  that  in  the  activity  of  literary  imagining  we  are  led  to  imagine  and  describe 
with  greater  precision,  focusing  our  attention  on  each  word,  feeling  each  event  more 
keenly-  whereas,  much  of  actual  life  goes  by  without  that  heightened  awareness,  and  is 
thus,  in  a  sense,  not  fully  or  thoroughly  lived.. 
. 
So  literature  is  an  extension  of  life  not  only 
horizontally,  bringing  the  reader  into  contact  with  events  or  locations  or  persons  or 
problems  he  or  she  has  not  otherwise  met,  but  also,  so  to  speak,  vertically,  giving  the 
reader  experience  that  is  sharper,  deeper  and  more  precise  than  much  of  what  takes  place 
in  life.  " 
(p.  48/9) 
Finally,  in  confirmation  of  the  significance  many  of  us  find  in  our  emotional  reactions  to 
fiction,  there  is  the  famous  description  from  Mill's  autobiography  which  I  quoted  in  the 
previous  chapter.  It  is  in  general  clear,  I  think,  then,  what  the  role(s)  of  literature  and 
music  in  education  is  thought  to  be.  I  will  set  them  out  formally; 
a)  Art,  such  as  music,  enables  us  to  experience  emotions.  This  is  good  practice.  It  may 
also  be  a  source  of  self-knowledge,  as  it  was  for  Mill. 
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are  shown  new  and  perhaps  unfamiliar  people,  places  and  actions.  Literature  offers  us  a 
way  of  understanding  them.  This  understanding  involves  responding  emotionally  to 
them.  ' 
c)  In  this  way,  we  can  extend  our  emotional  understanding  in  new  ways.  We  learn  to  see 
new  things  and  people  as  sad,  selfish,  ridiculous,  generous  and  shameful.  This  is  an 
extension  of  the  objects  we  feel  a  given  emotion  towards. 
d)  Music  and  literature  can  also  extend  our  range  of  emotions.  Reading  Proust  we  may 
learn  what  it  is  like  to  be  in  love,  say  -  an  emotion  of  which  we  were  ignorant;  we  may 
share  the  remorse  of  Oedipus,  and  our  experience  of  this  emotion  be  something  quite 
novel. 
e)  Through  all  of  the  above  we  increase  our  understanding  of  the  particular,  not  of 
abstract  general  conceptions  or  rules. 
These  claims  will  be  evaluated  in  the  second  half  of  the  following  chapter.  However,  an 
assumption  made  by  them  is  that  there  can  be  a  smooth  transition  from  our  emotional 
responses  to  fiction  to  our  emotional  responses  in  real  life-  and  this  is  the  assumption 
which  I  will  focus  on  here.  There  might  be  various  difficulties  with  it,  but  the  one  I  will 
concentrate  on  is  this-  that  for  various  reasons  our  emotional  responses  in  fictional 
contexts  are  too  unlike  real  emotions  to  help  with  our  real,  non-fictional  emotional  lives. 
However,  in  virtue  of  these  dissimilarities,  a  more  worrying  prospect  than  this  also 
emerges.  This  is  the  thought  that  responding  emotionally  to  fiction  may  establish  bad 
habits,  so  that  our  emotions  in  real  life  may  in  many  cases  be  too  like  the  emotions  we 
feel  in  response  to  fiction. 
Developing  these  worries  will  involve,  first  of  all  saying  in  more  detail  why  emotional 
responses  to  fiction  are  distinct  from  emotional  responses  to  real  objects.  To  do  this  I  will 
set  out  and  discuss  two  well  known  paradoxes,  the  Paradox  of  Fiction  and  the  Paradox  of 
t  This  again  involves  the  thesis  of  earlier  chapters  that  emotional  respoe  can  be  a  distinct  kind  of 
understanding. 
237 Tragedy,  or  Negative  Emotion.  I  begin,  however,  by  considering  the  nature  of  emotional 
ambiguity,  since  it  will  turn  out  later  that  this  has  some  bearing  on  the  nature,  not  only  of 
emotional  responses  to  fiction,  but  of  many  of  our  "aestheticised"  emotions  in  everyday 
life. 
Ambiguous  Emotions. 
We  generally  assume  that  the  experience  of  emotional  ambiguity  is  sufficiently  familiar 
to  us.  As  a  first  attempt  to  describe  the  phenomenon-  and  given  a  cognitive  account  of 
emotions-  we  might  think  that  it  is  the  thought  component  of  an  emotion  that  is 
ambiguous.  Furthermore,  if  we  take  the  term  "ambiguous"  to  mean  strictly  contradictory, 
then  ambiguity  will  require  me  to  assert  a  given  thought  and  at  the  same  time  deny  it.  But 
this  seems  to  place  a  great  strain  on  our  capacity  to  compartmentalise  contrary  thoughts. 
Ambiguity  in  this  sense  constantly  threatens  to  become  obvious,  and  once  obvious  will 
create  pressure  for  a  resolution,  since  rationality  demands  that  one  of  two  contradictory 
beliefs  has  to  go.  But  the  whole  point  about  emotional  ambiguity  is  surely  that  it  is 
supposed  to  linger,  in  a  way,  outside  the  scope  of  rational  resolution  of  this  sort. 
If  we  move  to  a  weaker  notion  of  ambiguity,  we  might  try  the  following  example.  If  my 
friend  and  I  botlienter  a  competition  and  he  wins,  I  may  be  both  happy  at  his  success  and 
upset  that  I  did  not  win.  However,  while  familiar  enough,  we  may  doubt  whether  this 
situation  is  really  ambiguous.  Talk  of  emotional  ambiguity  is  an  attempt  to  capture  a 
conflict  of  some  sort  within  an  emotion  or  between  an  emotion  and  something  else.  But  is 
the  thought  that  it  is  good  that  he  won  obviously  incompatible  with  the  hope  that  I  would 
win?  Not  strictly;  the  thoughts  need  not  be  antagonistic-  in  fact  there  is  nothing 
contradictory  even  in  the  impossible  hope  that  every  competitor  might  win.  Of  course,  I 
know  that  only  one  person  can  win,  and  knowing  that,  I  may  hope  that  that  person  will  be 
me.  But  it  seems  clear  that  I  can  feel  happiness  for  his  victory  and  sadness  that  I  have  lost, 
without  feeling  any  kind  of  conflict;  I  might  genuinely  wish  him  well  in  his  success  while 
lamenting  my  own  poor  performance. 
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involve  some  kind  of  contradiction.  Is  it,  however,  a  contradiction  in  the  thoughts  the  two 
emotions  involve?  The  thought  that  (a)  he  did  not  deserve  to  win  (as  much  as  I  did,  say) 
does  seem  to  conflict  with  the  thought  that  (b)  it  is  good  that  he  has  won.  But  must  they 
conflict?  I  think  we  can  imagine  circumstances  in  which  they  are  in  fact  compatible.  The 
friend  who  is  pipped  at  the  post-  as  they  see  it,  by  luck-  (and  so  holds  belief  (a))  need  not 
be  unhappy  or  resent  his  friend's  victory.  And  so  someone  might  hold  both  (a)  and  (b) 
without  any  conflict. 
What  is  left  out  by  focusing  on  belief  in  ways  we  have  been  considering  is  the  vital  fact 
that  emotions  involve  affects.  ects.  If  there  is  a  contradiction  between  (a)  and  (b)  it  is  because 
of  the  way  the  people  are  affected  by  them.  If  someone  holds  belief  (a)  and  on  the  basis  of 
it  resents  his  friend's  having  won,  then  it  clearly  would  be  odd  to  also  find  him  holding 
belief  (b).  But  this  is  to  restate  the  conflict  at  the  level  of  emotions,  not  to  explain  it.  So 
conflicting  beliefs  of  the  sort  we  have  looked  at  are  not  sufficient  for  emotional  ambiguity. 
One  suggested  explanation  of  this  fact  -  one  which  is  consonant  with  what  I  have  claimed 
in  previous  chapters-  is  that  the  cognitive  elements  of  emotions  are  not  beliefs.  If  I  am 
right  in  claiming  that  the  cognitive  element  is  a  gestalt  or  "seeing-as",  this  might  explain 
the  incompatibility;  it  would  be  an  improvement  on  beliefs  since  it  would  show  how  the 
cognitions  themselves  might  be  incompatible.  To  see  things  as  unjust  in  the  relevant  way, 
just  is  to  be  affected  by  it.  This  is  the  sort  of  account  suggested  in  earlier  chapters. 
But  whether  or  not  we  accept  this  account  of  the  nature  of  emotional  states,  a  natural 
assumption  which  we  have  made  so  far  about  emotional  ambiguity  is  that  it  involves 
experiencing  contradictory  emotions  simultaneously.  But  is  it  really  the  case  that  we  feel, 
say,  happiness  and  guilt  at  the  same  instant?  I  think  there  are  two  considerations  that  tell 
against  this  description.  First  of  all,  if  we  reflect  on  experience  it  is  more  typical  to  think 
instead  of  feeling  them  serially,  one  after  the  other.  If  I  have  ambiguous  feelings  about 
someone,  for  instance  I  will  typically  experience  these  alternately.  Indeed  the  idea  that  I 
can  experience  two  emotions  simultaneously  is  rather  puzzling.  Nevertheless,  we  may 
refuse  to  give  up  our  intuition  that  we  experience  something  simultaneously.  We  need  not, 
however,  deny  this.  But  a  second  consideration  suggests  that  whatever  it  is  that  we 
experience,  it  is  not  simultaneous  discrete  emotions.  This  is  simply  the  fact  that  the 
ambiguity  we  are  familiar  with  does  not  seem  to  be  that  between  say,  anger  and  joy,  since 
these  are  separately  identifiable  emotions.  The  experience  of  emotional  ambiguity, 
however,  has  an  elusive  quality-  we  sense  that  the  elements  in  conflict  are  not  discrete,  but 
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this  suggests  something  other  than  two  simultaneous  yet  discrete,  emotions. 
We  might,  in  view  of  considerations  of  this  sort,  offer  a  different  account  of  ambiguity- 
in  terms  of  split-level  emotions;  that  is,  emotions  of  different  orders.  I  may,  for  instance, 
be  angered  by  my  guilt,  proud  of  my  compassion  and  disgusted  at  my  selfishness.  All  of 
these  reactions  involve  second  order  reactions  to  first  order  emotions.  But  neither  this  nor 
the  serial  explanation  seems  to  capture  the  essence  of  ambiguity.  Both  explanations 
separate  the  contradictory  elements.  If  we  find  the  explanation  in  terms  of  a  contradiction 
at  different  levels  or  between  emotions  had  serially,  disappointing,  this  perhaps  reveals 
something  about  the  nature  of  the  conflict  in  cases  of  ambiguity. 
What  is  worrying  about  emotional  ambiguity  is  that  it  seems  to  reveal  a  lack  of  single- 
mindedness  on  the  subject's  part.  And  this  kind  of  disunity  of  perspective  -  as  we  have 
already  seen  -  can  exist  between  judgements  or  between  beliefs  and  emotions,  or  between 
desires  and  emotions(  Recalcitrant  emotions  exemplify  this  kind  of  conflict  with  beliefs  or 
judgements).  We  have  already  seen  some  reason  to  think  that  emotional  ambiguity 
involves,  not  two  separate,  but  in  some  way  contrary  emotions,  but  a  third  entity  which  is 
neither  one  thing  nor  the  other,  but  in  some  way  an  amalgam.  An  example  of  this  was 
offered  in  the  previous  chapter  -  Shaw's  stage  direction  "contemptuous  amusement  in  the 
midst  of  anxiety".  What  remains  unclear  is  what  the  "elements"  of  this  amalgamated 
entity  are  and  how  they  come  into  conflict.  Since  they  are  -  ex  hypothesi  -  not  whole 
emotions,  it  remains  to  be  seen  how  the  conflict  (which  we  have  concluded  is  a  necessary 
feature  of  ambiguity)  is  generated  and  in  what  it  consists.  Something  of  this  kind  of 
emotional  ambiguity  is  familiar  -  however  obscure  the  details  may  be  -  from  the  well 
known  problem  of  tragedy,  and  consideration  of  this  problem  may  shed  light  on  emotional 
ambiguity  itself.  The  ultimate  goal  of  this  discussion,  recall,  is  to  illuminate  the  relation 
between  emotional  states  in  real  and  fictional  contexts,  and  to  see  how  experience  of  the 
latter  might  have  a  beneficial  effect  on  the  former.  Before  outlining  the  problem  of 
tragedy,  it  will  be  helpful  -  for  reasons  which  will  emerge  shortly-  to  have  an  account  of 
the  related  paradox  of  fiction. 
240 The  Paradox  of  Fiction. 
We  can  state  the  paradox  of  fiction  succinctly  in  the  following  three  premises2. 
1)  Emotions  typically  involve  beliefs  in  the  existence  and  features  of  the  objects  of 
those  emotions.  If  I  am  frightened  of  a  lion,  I  believe  I  am  in 
danger.  If  I  pity  you  for  your  suffering,  I  believe  you  to  be  suffering. 
2)  When  we  are  reading  novels  or  watching  films  and  tragedies,  we  are  aware  that 
what  we  are  watching  is  not  real.  We  do  not,  therefore,  have  the  relevant  beliefs 
about  these  objects  which  are  known  to  be  fictional. 
3)  We  frequently  experience  emotional  reactions  when  reading  or  watching  fiction.  I 
feel  terrified  by  Dracula,  I  pity  Anna  Karenina,  and  I  share  the  guilt  of  Raskolnikov. 
The  apparent  paradox  then  arises  out  of  the  features  of  our  emotional  responses  in 
fictional  contexts.  Specifically,  they  lack  important  sorts  of  beliefs,  and  those  beliefs  are 
necessary  -  so  it  is  claimed-  if  something  is  to  be  an  emotion  at  all.  The  various  solutions 
to  the  paradox  involve  denying  one  or  other  of  the  premises. 
One  solution  would  be  to  deny  premise  (2),  and  insist  that  theatre-goers  and  novel  readers 
do  in  fact  believe-  while  they  are  caught  up  imaginatively  in  them-  in  the  existence  and 
qualities  of  the  characters  and  situations.  This  alternative,  however,  pictures  theatre  goers 
unflatteringly;  as  easily  gulled  by  appearance.  Additionally  it  does  not  ring  true.  People  do 
not  generally  jump  onto  the  stage  to  protect  Desdemona  from  the  homicidal  Othello,  as 
they  presumably  would  if  they  believed  what  they  were  watching.  Furthermore,  in  its 
"suspension  of  disbelief'  variety,  it  suggests  that  the  suspension  can  be  carried  out  at  will. 
And  this  implausibly  assumes  that  our  beliefs  are  subject  to  the  will. 
We  might  alternatively  deny  1),  that  emotions  require  beliefs.  This  is  the  alternative  I 
have  favoured  in  previous  chapters3.  Phobic  fear,  for  instance,  is  a  case  of  an  emotion  that 
2  Discussions  of  this  Paradox  which  I  have  drawn  on  include,  Noel  Carroll,  The  Philosophy  of  Horror; 
Kendall  Walton,  "Fearing  Fictions",  Journal  ofPhilosophy  1975;  Alex  Neill,  "Fiction  and  the  Emotions", 
American  Philosophical  Quarterly,  1993;  Derek  Matravers,  Art  and  Emotion;  and  Jerrold  Levinson, 
"Emotion  in  Response  to  Art"  in  Laver  and  Hjort,  (eds.  )  Emotion  and  The  Arts,  1997. 
241 lacks  the  relevant  beliefs.  Recalcitrant  emotions  are  also  of  this  sort.  On  this  basis,  I 
suggested  it  would  be  better  to  think  of  the  cognitive  component  of  emotions  as  a  "seeing- 
as".  So  it  may  seem  that  I  am  denying  (1)  myself.  But  whether  that  is  true  or  not,  phobic 
and  recalcitrant  emotions,  although  lacking  beliefs  about  the  qualities  of  their  objects, 
may  -  it  is  claimed  by  some4-  still  involve  beliefs  in  the  existence  of  the  objects.  These 
existential  beliefs  explain  why  phobics  still  run  away  from  the  objects  of  their  phobias, 
even  though  they  do  not  believe  them  to  be  genuinely  dangerous5.  "The  sticking  point  of 
the  paradox  of  fiction  is  the  dimension  of  existence  or  non-existence.  ",  says  Jerrold 
Levinson.  So  even  phobics  need  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  what  they  are  frightened  of. 
I  do  not,  however,  think  this  argument  succeeds,  but  I  will  not  present  an  argument  against 
it  until  the  next  chapter.  However,  in  anticipation  of  that  argument,  I  therefore  conclude 
that  rejecting  assumption  (1)  is  my  preferred  alternative. 
What,  however,  about  rejecting  (3)?  Can  we  claim  that,  despite  appearances,  we  do  not 
experience  emotions  in  response  to  fictional  characters  and  situations? 
One  way  we  might  do  this  is  to  claim  that  while  the  focus  of  our  emotions  is  the  fictional 
characters  or  situation,  these  are  really  just  surrogates.  The  real  object  of  our  emotion  is 
real  people  and  real  situations,  for  which  the  fictions  stand  proxy.  This  solution  aims  to 
solve  the  paradox  by  claiming  that  our  emotions  take  real  -  and  not  fictional  -objects.  The 
trouble  with  this  solution  is  that  it  distorts  the  phenomenology  of  the  experience  of  fiction. 
It  is  probably  true  that  in  the  background  of  our  experience  of  reading  about  fictional 
3  In  addition,  I  noted  in  chapter  three  that  the  Stoic  strategy  of  redefining  emotion  so  as  to  refer  only  to  the 
assent,  as  a  means  of  avoiding  counter-examples,  has  much  in  common  with  the  same  strategy  of  those  like 
Kendall  Walton  in  "Fearing  Fictions",  who  defines  an  emotion  as  involving  belief.  In  a  later  article,  Kendall 
talks  of  responses  to  fiction  being  "run  off-line".  He  takes  this  to  be  a  way  of  explaining  the  fact  that  these 
emotions  lack  beliefs  and  (consequently)  do  not  lead  to  behaviour.  But  phobias  also  lack  beliefs,  yet  they  do 
involve  behaviour;  people  still  want  to  run  away  from  what  they  are  phobically  afraid  of.  This  suggests  that 
being  run  "off-line"  has  nothing  especially  to  do  with  the  absence  of  beliefs.  The  lack  of  connection  between 
emotion  and  motivation  cannot  be  explained  simply  by  the  absence  of  belief.  A  possible  reply  to  this 
objection  might  be  simply  to  distinguish  between  two  types  of  belief-  beliefs  about  existence  and  beliefs 
about  appropriateness.  (  See  below).  These  issues  are  pursued  further  in  the  next  chapter.  Cf.  Walton, 
"Simulation,  Spelunking  and  Slime"  in  Hjort  and  Laver  eds.  "Emotion  and  the  Arts. 
4  For  example  by  Jerrold  Levinson  in  "Emotion  in  Response  to  Art"  in  Hjort  and  Laver  (Op.  Cit.  ) 
s  In  fact  I  think  this  reply  does  not  succeed,  and  explain  why  in  the  following  chapter.  For  the  moment,  I 
accept  it. 
6  In  Levinson  (Op.  Cit.  ). 
242 characters  and  situations,  there  are  experiences  of  real  people  and  situations  like  the 
fictional  ones.  But  while  this  is  true,  our  experience  of  emotions  is  in  the  end  for  those 
fictional  characters.  If  I  despise  a  fictional  character,  this  may  be  in  part  because  I  have 
met  and  despised  such  people  in  real  life.  But  my  present  contempt  cannot  be  reduced  to 
my  contempt  for  them;  in  the  end,  it  is  directed  at  the  fictional  character.  I  conclude  that 
unless  we  endorse  the  claim  that  all  emotions  must  involve  beliefs  (the  previous 
alternative),  we  have  no  grounds  for  insisting  that  emotions  about  fictions  are  not  real 
emotions.  Nevertheless,  it  is  true  that  I  do  not  believe  that  the  suffering  I  read  of  in  a 
novel  or  watch  on  the  stage  is  really  happening  to  anyone.  And  this  does  make  a 
difference  to  my  experience;  it  is  not  as  horrible-  nor  do  I  try  to  stop  it.  In  fact,  I  enjoy  it. 
But  if  what  I  experience  in  the  theatre,  say,  really  deserves  to  be  called  pity,  how  can  it  be 
pleasant?  This  question  bring  us  to  the  second  paradox. 
The  Paradox  of  Tragedy 
We  can  state  this  second  paradox  as  follows.  Tragedy  involves  the  experience  of  what  we 
might  call  "negative"  emotions;  fear,  pity,  horror  and  so  on.  But  these  emotions  are 
typically  unpleasant.  If  I  witness  someone  experiencing  great  pain  and  suffering  this  is 
characteristically  an  experience  I  would  not  care  to  repeat.  Yet  theatre-goers  who  emerge 
from  a  production  of  the  Oedipus  plays,  during  which  they  have  seen  a  city  visited  by  a 
curse,  someone  unwittingly  murder  his  father  and  marry  his  mother,  and  then  gouge  his 
eyes  out  in  an  attempt  at  atonement,  will  say  they  have  spent  a  marvellous  evening  in  the 
7  While  I  conclude  that  emotional  responses  to  fiction  are  instances  of  real  emotion,  I  do  not  think  this  is  the 
end  of  the  matter.  Above  all,  it  does  not  follow  from  this  that  there  is  no  problem  about  the  relationship 
between  emotional  responses  to  fictions  and  our  real-life  emotional  responses.  The  potential  problems  for 
any  view  which  endorses  the  educational  effects  of  aesthetic  experience  on  our  everyday  emotional  lives  are 
not,  then,  solved  by  settling  this  question.  In  particular,  the  possibility  remains  that  other  features  of  aesthetic 
experience-  to  be  considered  below-  may  have  a  corrupting  influence.  This  is  because,  while  we  may  allow 
that  responses  to  fictions  are  real  emotions,  what  we  want  emotional  development  to  achieve  is  integration, 
and  this  (as  we  saw  in  the  previous  chapter)  may  require  that  our  emotions  do  come  with  the  relevant  beliefs. 
Some  real  emotions,  then,  may  simply  not  be  up  to  the  task  of  emotional  education  and  character-building. 
243 theatre.  Since  these  emotions  are  unpleasant,  how  can  we  enjoy  them?  And  if  we  can 
enjoy  them,  can  they  really  be  those  same  emotions? 
One  way  of  looking  at  this  problem  might  be  to  see  the  challenge  as  how  we  can  have 
two  distinct  emotional  reactions  simultaneously;  how  can  I  experience  pleasure  and 
displeasure,  say,  at  the  same  time.  This  is  perhaps  puzzling  in  its  own  right8,  but  the 
problem  of  tragedy  is  more  puzzling  in  a  way,  because  here  the  pleasure  does  not  merely 
co-exist  with  the  sadness,  but  they  are  connected.  As  Hume  notes,  the  spectators  of  a 
tragedy, 
" 
...  are  pleased  in  proportion  as  they  are  afflicted,  and  never  are  so  happy  as  when  they 
employ  tears,  sobs  and  cries  to  give  vent  to  their  sorrow  and  relieve  their  heart,  swollen 
with  the  tenderest  sympathy  and  compassion.  "  9 
In  the  words  of  John  Hospers,  quoted  by  Marcia  Eatoni0,  "Strange  kind  of  sadness  that 
brings  pleasure".  So  it  is  not  merely  that  we  have  a  painful  and  a  pleasant  experience 
concurrently,  but  that  they  are  in  addition  related.  If  we  were  offered  the  possibility  of  a 
reduction  in  the  sadness  of  the  tragedy,  most  people  would  refuse  it,  since  their  pleasure 
would  thereby  also  be  impaired.  The  question  then  is  how  we  should  explain  this. 
Hume's  own  solution  might  be  dubbed  a  "conversion  "  theory.  He  argues  that  since  our 
experience  of  fictional  suffering  does  not  involve  existential  beliefs,  this  qualifies  and 
reduces  its  unpleasant  nature  (p.  127/8),  and  in  fact  converts  it  into  a  pleasure.  In  this 
process  of  conversion,  the  experience  of  the  other  aesthetic  qualities  of  the  work  play  an 
important  role; 
6  For  example,  if  someone  stands  on  my  foot  at  the  cinema,  while  I  am  enjoying  a  film,  do  I  continue  to 
enjoy  the  film  while  at  the  same  time  experiencing  the  pain,  or  does  the  pain  distract  my  attention  from  the 
film  and  take  its  place? 
9  David  Hume,  "Of  Tragedy"  in  Selected  Essays,  (p.  126). 
io  Marcia  Eaton,  "A  Strange  Kind  of  Sadness",  Journal  of  Aesthetics  and  Art  Criticism  vol.  41.  Other 
discussions  of  this  issue  are,  Alex  Neill,  "On  a  Paradox  of  the  Heart"  Philosophical  Studies  65;  Noel  Carroll, 
"A  Response  to  Alex  Neill"  Philosophical  Studies  65;  Berys  Gaut,  "The  Paradox  of  Horror",  British  Journal 
ofAesthetics,  1993;  Flint  Schier,  "The  Claims  of  Tragedy",  Philosophical  Papers,  1989,  and  Susan  Feagin, 
,,  The  Pleasures  of  Tragedy",  American  Philosophical  Quarterly  1983. 
244 "...  the  exercise  of  these  noble  talents,  together  with  the  force  of  expression,  and  beauty 
of  oratorial  numbers,  diffuse  the  highest  satisfaction  on  the  audience,  and  delight  the  most 
delightful  movements.  By  this  means,  the  uneasiness  of  the  melancholy  passions  is  not 
only  overpowered  and  effaced  by  something  stronger  of  an  opposite  kind,  but  the  whole 
impulse  of  those  passions  is  converted  into  pleasure...  " 
(p.  129) 
In  addition,  since  tragedy  is  a  form  of  imitation,  and  since  imitation  is  always  pleasant, 
there  is  yet  another  positive  factor  which  converts  the  unpleasant  emotions  into  pleasures. 
So,  the  conversion  requires  an  absence  of  existential  beliefs,  pleasure  in  aesthetic  qualities 
of  expression  and  pleasure  taken  in  imitation  for  its  own  sake. 
Some  of  what  Hume  says  seems  right,  on  the  basis  of  what  we  have  already  said  about 
emotions  in  fictional  contexts;  lacking  existential  beliefs  the  experience  is  not  as  vivid,  or 
as  vividly  unpleasant  as  experiencing  the  real  thing.  "  But  although  make-believe  emotion 
is  less  unpleasant, 
12  it  is  not  automatically  pleasant.  I  can  imagine  being  in  a  variety  of 
terrifying  situations  or  suffering  a  variety  of  unpleasant  fates,  and  these  experiences  are 
unpleasant,  though  in  a  "make-believe"  way. 
There  are  at  least  two  difficulties  with  Hume's  account  however.  First,  as  Susan 
Feagin13  remarks,  for  unpleasant  emotions  to  be  mitigated  by  pleasures  would  be  one 
thing.  Sweetening  a  bitter  pill  is  something  we  are  familiar  with.  But  Hume's  claim  is  that 
the  pleasures  convert  the  unpleasant  experience  into  a  pleasure,  not  merely  that  they 
mitigate  it.  How  this  occurs  is  not  explained,  however.  The  second  problem  is  that  the 
paradox  is  dissolved  by  supposing  that  the  experience  of  tragedy  is  in  fact  totally  pleasant. 
It  is  not,  on  Hume's  view,  that  negative  emotion  is  overcome  in  some  way  but  remains  in- 
tact,  with  the  result  that  we  have  both  negative  and  positive  elements.  On  Hume's  view 
the  experience  is  totally  pleasant  since  the  negative  elements  have  been  transformed.  But 
this  solution  seems  to  deprive  us  of  the  ambiguity  of  the  experience,  which  is  that  there  is 
something  negative  or  unpleasant  about  what  is  also  a  pleasant  experience. 
II  In  Humean  terms,  the  distinction  between  impressions  and  ideas,  seems  analogous  in  a  way  to  the 
difference  between  real  and  fictional  emotions. 
12  It  is  worth  emphasising  that  a  fictional  emotion  is  less  unpleasant,  not  merely  in  the  sense  of  being  less 
intense,  as  a  pain  might  be  less  intense.  It's  content  is  different.  It  is  less  painful  because  we  know  its  not 
happening.  This  is  what  we  should  expect  since  pain  and  pleasure  are  themselves  intentional  phenomena. 
13  Susan  Feagin,  Op.  Cit. 
245 Can  an  experience  be  both  pleasant  and  unpleasant?  If  we  experience  the  same  thing  as 
both  pleasant  and  unpleasant,  that  requires  some  explanation.  In  the  case  I  imagined 
above,  when  someone  stands  on  my  toe  in  the  cinema,  it  may  be  that  I  experience  both 
pleasure  and  pain,  though  not  in  the  same  thing,  and  probably  not  at  the  same  time. 
In  other  cases,  may  I  experience  pleasure  and  pain  at  the  same  time  though  not  in  the 
same  thing  ?  In  the  midst  of  my  grief,  for  example,  I  may  happen  to  eat  my  favourite  ice 
cream.  Perhaps  I  will  not  enjoy  it  with  the  usual  gusto,  my  attention  being  absorbed  by 
other  things.  Yet  cannot  a  certain  amount  of  pleasure  survive,  so  that  I  can  still  enjoy  my 
strawberry  Sunday  in  a  muted  way  -  through  my  tears?  It  certainly  seems  that  this  may 
happen.  More  interesting,  in  a  way,  is  the  case  where  it  does  not.  It  might  equally  be, 
surely,  that  my  experience  may  destroy  totally  the  pleasure  I  formally  took  in  my  ice 
cream.  In  such  a  case,  it  would  be,  not  that  I  experience  the  usual  pleasure  and  am 
indifferent  to  it,  but  that  the  experience  is  simply  not  pleasant.  Surely  pleasures  can  be 
ruined  by  illness  and  boredom  and  other  things  in  just  this  way.  If  so,  this  would  seem  to 
be  an  instance  of  the  possibility  raised  by  Hume's  account,  that  a  pleasure  may  be 
transformed  by  something  unpleasant,  and  not  merely  mitigated.  However,  while  it  loses 
its  pleasure,  it  does  not  thereby  become  unpleasant.  And  that  would  be  the  equivalent  of 
Hume's  claim. 
If  we  are  reluctant  to  accept  that  a  pleasure  can  be  transformed  in  this  way,  it  is 
probably  because  we  are  thinking  ofpleasure  as  a  sensation.  But  pain  and  pleasure  depend 
-at  least  within  certain  limits-  on  how  we  conceive  them.  Occasionally  we  experience 
sensations  about  which  we  are  initially  unsure-  we  do  not  know  whether  they  are  pleasant 
or  unpleasant,  and  only  after  a  moment  or  two  can  we  tell.  An  interesting  example  of  the 
way  pain  might  depend  on  how  it  is  conceived  is  that  of  the  masochist.  Should  we  say  that 
the  masochist  experiences  pain  in  the  way  others  do  -  that  is,  as  unpleasant-  but  finds  that 
experience  pleasant?  Or  should  we  say  that  the  pain  he  experiences  is  transformed  into 
something  like  a  pleasure,  in  the  way  the  pleasure  of  the  ice  -cream  was  transformed?  In 
the  first  description,  he  has  two  experiences;  the  pain  and  then  a  second-order  response  to 
that  pain,  namely  pleasure.  On  the  second  description,  he  experiences  what  to  others 
would  be  an  unpleasant  experience  as  pleasant;  its  nature  has  been  transformed.  Neither  of 
246 these  is  obviously  implausible.  But  perhaps  such  transformations,  if  they  exist,  can  only 
be  achieved  within  certain  limits;  some  pains  may  just  remain  stubbornly  painful.  14 
Is  it  plausible  then  to  think  of  our  experience  of  tragedy  as  involving  transformations  of 
the  unpleasant  along  these  lines?  The  main  reason  for  rejecting  this  account,  as  I  noted 
above,  is  that  it  seems  to  deprive  the  experience  of  tragedy  of  its  ambiguity.  If  what  is 
transformed,  namely  the  negative  emotion,  becomes  pleasant,  the  experience  is  simply 
pleasant.  And  this  account  seems  wrong.  But  think  again  of  the  masochist's  pain.  If  it  is 
transformed,  it  becomes  pleasant,  but  it  is  still  the  case  that  what  is  pleasant  is  the  pain. 
Since  the  pleasure  is  in  the  pain,  something  of  the  original  nature  of  the  pain  must  remain, 
if  it  is  still  to  be  the  pain  that  is  pleasant.  It  cannot,  we  feel  like  saying,  be  merely  pleasant. 
Yet  if  it  is  pleasant,  how  can  it  be  pain?  What  we  encounter  here  is  a  reformulation  for  the 
case  of  pain,  of  the  original  problem  of  tragedy  with  which  we  started. 
The  conceptual  difficulty  is  how  we  can  transform  an  experience  which  is  negative  into 
something  that  is  positive,  while  allowing  something  negative  to  remain,  so  that  it  is  not 
merely  positive.  Another  example  of  this  is  danger.  When  we  watch  horror  films  or  go  on 
roller-coaster  rides,  we  are  frightened.  But  not  nearly  as  much  as  we  would  be  by  some 
real  and  present  danger.  If  someone  enjoys  the  fear  of  their  roller-coaster  ride,  how  should 
we  describe  their  experience?  They  experience  "make-believe"  fear,  which  is  not  the 
same,  we  have  said,  as  real  fear,  but  still  perhaps  unpleasant.  15  And  people  who  enjoy 
roller  coaster  rides  take  pleasure,  not  merely  in  the  ride,  but  in  the  thought  that  there  is  an 
element  of  danger  about  it.  It  is  the  sense  of  danger  that  is  exhilarating.  This  is  the  roller- 
coaster  analogue  of  Hume's  point  that  an  audience  takes  pleasure  in  their  sadness.  Should 
we  say  that  the  experience  of  the  make-believe  fear  is  basically  unpleasant  but  that 
pleasure  is  then  taken  in  that  unpleasant  experience,  or  should  we  say  that  the  experience 
is  transformed,  with  the  result  that  the  experience  is  pleasant?  If  we  adopt  that  second 
description  the  familiar  problem  is,  what  has  become  of  the  negative  element?  Is  the 
experience  simply  pleasant? 
14  There  is  a  parallel  here  with  the  question  considered  in  chapter  three  concerning  the  perception  of  aspects. 
While  a  range  of  aspects  are  clearly  learned  and  may  be  subject  to  the  will  (as  Wittgenstein  and  Scruton 
claim)  some  can  seem  unavoidable.  To  see  something  as  green,  solid  or  as  an  object  seem  less  under  our 
control. 
is  Again  I  can  imagine  standing  at  the  edge  of  the  roof  of  a  very  tall  building.  This  imaginary  experience  is 
unpleasant,  although  not  as  much  as  the  real  thing  would  be-  beliefs  make  a  difference. 
247 Clearly  it  cannot  be;  when  we  watch  King  Lear  or  read  Anna  Karenina  we  do  not 
experience  unalloyed  pleasure;  we  are  in  some  way  pained  by  the  fate  of  the  characters  in 
these  works,  even  if  we  take  pleasure  in  it  also.  But  equally,  the  experience  does  not  have 
the  same  unqualifiedly  negative  hedonic  tone  that  experiencing  such  events  in  real  life 
would  have,  and  this  seems  to  be  related  to  the  evident  fact  that  we  do  not  believe  they  are 
really  occurring.  But  the  problem  of  what  the  pleasant  and  unpleasant  elements  are  in 
detail,  remains.  Nevertheless,  according  to  what  we  have  said  so  far,  we  can  think  of  some 
of  our  responses  to  fiction  as  giving  rise  to  experiences  which  are  ambiguous  to  the  extent 
that  the  contain  pleasure  and  displeasure. 
A  slightly  different  account  is  offered  by  Susan  Feagin16.  According  to  her,  our 
response  to  tragedy  involves  two  emotions,  one  direct  and  the  other  indirect.  First,  my 
direct  response  to  the  tragedy  is  the  "make-believe"  negative  one  of  compassion,  pity, 
sadness,  etc,  which  is  unpleasant  but  not  as  much  as  the  real  thing.  I  then  have  a  second- 
order  response  to  that  emotion,  which  is  a  pleasant  one.  She  writes, 
"Whence  the  pleasure?  It  is,  I  suggest  a  meta-  response,  arising  from  our  awareness  of  and 
in  response  to,  the  fact  that  we  do  have  unpleasant  direct  responses...  We  find  ourselves 
to  be  the  kind  of  people  who  respond  negatively  to  villainy,  treachery  and  injustice.  The 
discovery...  is  something  which,  quite  justly,  yields  satisfaction.  " 
(p.  307) 
There  are  at  least  three  worries  we  might  raise  about  this  account.  The  first  is  about  the 
response  itself.  Since  the  meta-response  is  a  response  to  my  own  emotion,  it  is  not  a 
response  to  the  play,  obviously.  But  the  point  about  the  alleged  ambiguity  of  our 
responses  to  tragedy  seems,  then,  to  disappear,  since  the  pleasure  and  the  pain  are  felt 
towards  different  things.  But  since  one  of  these  reactions  is  not  to  the  play  at  all,  our 
appreciation  of  it  seems  unambiguous.  Secondly,  is  it  clear  that  these  second-order 
reactions  are  as  healthy  as  Feagin  makes  them  out  to  be?  On  the  face  of  it  they  seem  to 
reveal  an  unhealthy  preoccupation  with  oneself.  We  need  not  deny  that  people  have 
responses  of  this  sort,  but  there  is  room  for  doubt  that  Feagin's  analysis  captures  the 
typical  response.  Third,  according  to  Feagin,  this  kind  of  meta-response  is  all  right  in 
fictional  contexts,  but  would  be  in  poor  taste  in  the  face  of  real  suffering, 
16  Feagin,  (OP.  Cit.  ) 
248 "In  art  ... 
however,  one  experiences  real  sympathy  without  there  having  been  real 
suffering,  and  this  is  why  it  is  appropriate  to  feel  pleasure  at  our  sympathetic 
responses...  whereas  it  is  not  appropriate  to  feel  pleasure  at  our  sympathetic  responses  in 
reality.  There,  the  sympathy  comes  at  too  great  a  cost.  " 
(p.  312) 
But  if  our  self-satisfaction  is  justified  in  the  fictional  context,  why  isn't  it  equally  justified 
in  real  contexts?  If  I  do  feel  the  right  thing,  is it  not  legitimate  to  feel  satisfied  whether  the 
context  is  real  or  fictional?  Most  of  us,  I'm  sure,  would  agree  that  such  a  response  would 
indicate  some  error  of  judgement,  but  this  may  be  because  we  take  a  different  view  of 
what  is  going  on  in  the  fictional  cases.  The  conclusion  that  I  think  we  should  reach  is  that 
Feagin's  two-level  response  should  be  rejected.  It  is  not,  however,  one  of  my  aims  to  offer 
a  full  account  of  our  experience  of  tragedy,  and  for  my  purposes  the  conclusion  already 
reached  is  sufficient-  that  it  involves  both  pleasure  and  pain. 
Returning  then  to  the  topic  with  which  I  began,  that  of  emotional  ambivalence,  we  may 
now  see  more  clearly  one  way  in  which  our  emotional  lives  may  be  ambiguous;  we  can 
experience  negative  emotions  towards  things,  which  are  pleasant  to  experience.  A  strange 
kind  of  negative  emotion  indeed,  but  it  is  an  open  question  whether  it  is  one  that  is 
restricted  to  our  experience  of  fiction.  What  makes  this  transformation  possible,  in  the 
fictional  context,  we  have  seen,  is  that  emotional  responses  to  fiction  lack  existential 
beliefs,  and  as  a  result,  they  are  less  unpleasant,  and  they  do  not  motivate  us  to  act  in  the 
way  real  emotions  do.  The  result,  we  might  be  prepared  to  say,  is  a  kind  of 
disengagement]?  The  question  which  suggests  itself  now  is  whether  other  areas  of  our 
emotional  lives  might  be  disengaged  in  a  similar  way.  That  is,  could  it  be  the  case  that 
many  of  what  we  take  to  be  our  real  emotions  towards  existing  things  are  in  fact 
disengaged  in  the  way  fictional  emotions  are?  And  if  so,  what,  if  anything,  does  that  imply 
about  the  reading  of  fiction? 
17  What  Davud  Pugmire  calls  "attenuated  engagement"  ("Conflicting  Emotions  and  the  Indivisible  Heart", 
Philosophy,  1996). 
249 Real  Emotion  and  Attenuated  Engagement. 
In  considering  the  Paradox  of  Fiction,  I  asked  whether  emotional  responses  to  fiction 
which  lack  appropriate  beliefs  deserve  to  be  called  real  emotions.  And  my  argument  for 
thinking  that  they  should  will  be  given  in  the  next  chapter.  In  earlier  chapters  I  have 
argued  that  emotions  involve  appearances,  a  cognitive  element  quite  distinct  from  belief. 
So,  to  revert  to  my  standard  examples,  phobias  and  recalcitrant  emotions  lack  beliefs  but 
are  still  real  emotions,  since  they  involve  this  kind  of  cognitive  element;  phobic  fear  is 
still  real  fear.  On  the  other  hand,  if  I  witness  someone  who  really  is  suffering  and 
experience  something  like  the  pity  I  feel  in  response  to  fictional  cases,  we  would  rightly 
think  this  a  defect  of  some  sort.  Nevertheless  it  is  a  real  emotion.  Equally,  akratic 
emotions,  such  as  the  case  of  laughing  at  the  racist  joke  may  not  represent  what  I  really 
believe,  or  what  my  real  values  are  -but  it  too  is  a  real  emotion.  18 
It  is  also  true  that  it  would  be  odd  to  experience  emotions  typical  of  fictional  contexts  in 
real  life  situations,  particularly  ones  involving  pain  and  suffering.  Nevertheless,  the  points 
already  made  open  up  several  more  alarming  possibilities  with  respect  our  real-life 
'8  David  Pugmire  has  recently  argued  that  there  are  some  emotions  which  do  demand  a  proper  basis  in 
judgement  and  belief  if  they  are  to  count  as  real  emotions.  The  two  examples  he  offers  are  "fondness"  and 
"rejoicing  that  I  have  been  reprieved".  In  the  first  of  these,  my  fondness  for  someone  may  be  drug-induced 
and  my  real  judgements  about  the  person  remain  unaffected.  This,  suggests  Pugmire,  is  not  real  fondness.  In 
the  second  example,  I  cannot  really  rejoice  that  I  have  been  reprieved  if  I  do  not  believe  that  I  have  been.  In 
the  first  of  these  cases  though,  I  would  claim  that  if  my  perception  of  the  person  is  altered,  it  may  be  real 
fondness  whether  it  represents  my  true  beliefs  and  judgements  or  not.  It  is  one  question  whether  an  emotion 
really  reflects  my  judgements,  but  a  quite  different  question  whether-  irrespective  of  the  answer  to  that 
question  -  it  is  a  real  instance  of  that  emotion.  If  the  fondness  involves  no  cognitive  alteration,  I  would  claim 
it  is  not  fondness  at  all,  real  or  otherwise.  In  the  second  of  Pugmire's  examples,  it  may  be  true  that  in  a  sense 
I  cannot  rejoice  that  I  have  been  reprieved  while  not  believing  this.  However  this  does  not  seem  to  me  to 
establish  very  much.  There  may  always  be  something  I  have  to  believe  in  any  case  of  emotion.  The  point 
however  is  whether  I  must  believe  the  representational  content  of  the  emotions;  need  I  believe  that  my 
experience  of  something  as  horrible  or  terrifying  is  true?  I  have  argued  that  we  don't.  See  Pugmire,  "Real 
Emotion",  Philosophy  and  Phenomenological  Research,  March  1994. 
250 emotions.  One  is  that,  parallel  to  the  phobia  case  which  is  not  based  on  judgement,  I  may 
experience  "facsimiles"  of  emotions  which  I  do  not  really  feel.  The  worry  here  is,  not  that 
the  emotion  is  not  a  real  emotion,  but  that  I  take  myself  to  have  a  full  emotion,  complete 
with  the  relevant  judgement  (belief),  when  in  fact  I  do  not.  Imagine  that  you  experience 
what  you  take  to  be  grief-  everything  about  it  is  indistinguishable  from  grief.  But  grief  -  in 
most  cases-  does  involve  the  genuinely  assented  to  judgement  (in  addition  to  the  relevant 
appearance)  that  something  of  great  value  has  been  lost.  It  may  be  possible  to  discover, 
however,  that  the  real  judgement  is  not  one  you  hold;  you  do  not  really  believe  it.  Michael 
Stocker  offers  a  less  dramatic  example  of  the  same  phenomenon.  19  You  may,  on  hearing 
the  details  of  your  friends'  recent  trip  to  Spain,  suddenly  recall  your  own  previous  visit 
there,  and  as  a  result  of  listening  to  their  enthusiastic  stories,  suddenly  conceive  a  desire  to 
return  there  yourself.  However,  later  you  may  recall  that  really  you  disliked  it  there  and 
have  no  real  desire  to  return.  Their  enthusiasm  infected  you  and  created  a  facsimile 
emotion,  which  seemed  to  embody  judgements  you  did  not  in  fact  hold.  And  the  account 
of  emotions  offered  in  chapter  one  makes  it  clear  how  such  a  thing  is  possible;  it  is  easy  to 
take  the  appearance  for  a  judgement,  and  this  for  the  reason  which  was  suggested  in 
19  Michael  Stocker,  Valuing  Emotions.  Another  way  such  facsimiles  may  arise  is  through  mimicking  or 
acting  out.  Football  supporters  act-out  emotions  and  as  a  result  come,  no  doubt,  to  feel  something  like  the 
real  thing.  Psychological  research  may  reveal  something  of  the  basis  of  phenomena  of  this  sort.  In  the 
"Feedback  Reaction"  discussed  by  Laird,  subjects  asked  to  mimic  facial  expressions  associated  with  various 
emotions  reported  feeling  slight  signs  of  the  emotions  themselves.  Laud  quotes  the  following  lyrics  from 
Rogers  and  Hammerstein; 
"Whenever  I  feel  afraid, 
I  hold  my  head  erect 
And  whistle  a  happy  tune 
So  no  one  will  suspect  I'm  afraid. 
The  result  of  this  strange  deception, 
Is  very  strange  to  tell, 
For  when  I  fool  the  people  I  fear 
I  fool  myself  as  well.  " 
Cf.  James  Laird,  "Emotional  Self-Control  and  Self-Perception"  in  R.  Harr6,  (ed.  )  The  Emotions.  Laird's 
example  is  also  cited  in  Mary  Haight,  Self-  Deception.  Christopher  Janaway  also  attributes  this  point  to  Plato 
as  one  of  the  reasons  for  his  hostility  towards  the  arts-  that  it  promotes  assimilation  to  what  is  experienced. 
Cf.  Janaway,  Images  of  Excellence. 
251 chapter  three,  and  which  will  be  developed  further  in  the  next  chapter,  that  the  appearance 
is  convincing-  quite  apart  from  whether  it  is  believed  or  not.  Consequently  it  is  not  easy  in 
many  cases  to  distinguish  a  facsimile  version  from  emotion  with  judgement. 
A  notorious  instance  of  this  difficulty  arises  in  the  case  of  love  ("do  I  really  love 
him?  ")-  perhaps  because  we  are,  in  addition,  unsure  what  the  judgement  is  that  we  should 
be  endorsing  if  our  emotion  is  a  real  instance  of  love.  In  such  cases,  then,  we  may  have 
difficulties  in  identifying  not  only  whether  we  believe  the  relevant  beliefs,  but  also  in 
deciding  what  those  beliefs  are.  Sometimes  we  have  no  direct  access  to  what  we  need  to 
know  and  intensity  or  duration  is  our  only  reliable  indicator20-  a  point  Wittgenstein  notes; 
"  "If  it  passes,  then  it  was  not  true  love"  Why  was  it  not  in  that  case?  Is  it  our  experience, 
that  only  this  feeling  and  not  that  endures?..  .  we  test  love  for  its  inner  character,  which  the 
immediate  feeling  does  not  discover.  Still,  this  picture  is  important  to  us.  Love,  what  is 
important,  is  not  a  feeling,  but  something  deeper,  which  merely  manifests  itself  in  the 
feeling.  ,  21 
The  opaque  nature  of  such  emotions  makes  us  particularly  vulnerable  to  the  kind  of 
mistaken  identity  I  have  been  referring  to.  Another  indicator  of  whether  an  emotion  is  a 
mere  facsimile  or  not  may  be  -  as  the  foregoing  remarks  might  suggest-  whether  it  is 
pleasureable  or  painful.  David  Pugmire22  offers  the  example  of  the  "culture  of 
victimhood"  in  which  those  who  lament  their  own  fate  secretly  take  enjoyment  in  their 
role.  In  such  cases  -  assuming  they  exist  -  the  fact  that  someone  can  experience  pleasure 
suggests  that  they  do  not  really  endorse  their  judgements-  do  not  really  believe  them. 
Taking  pleasure  in  negative  emotions  is,  in  real-life  contexts,  an  indicator  of  real 
ambiguity,  and  perhaps  a  lack  of  complete  honesty.  But  it  need  not  be.  As  Pugmire  also 
suggests,  in  a  case  of  real  embarrassment,  the  person  is  rarely  able  to  make  the  necessary 
"switch"  in  order  to  see  the  funny  side  of  their  situation.  The  ability  to  perform  this  switch 
may  come  with  time  as  the  pain  of  the  original  emotion  fades.  But  the  fading  pain  need 
20  A  fact  which  may  help  to  make  the  Romantic  reliance  on  intensity  of  emotional  experience  as  a  criterion 
of  authenticity  -  discussed  in  chapter  five-  more  understandable. 
21  Wittgenstein  , 
Remarks  on  the  Philosophy  of  Psychology,  vol.  1,115.  And  relatedly,  at  Philosophical 
Investigations  174e,  he  asks,  "-Why  does  it  sound  queer  to  say,  "For  a  second  he  felt  deep  grief'-  only 
because  it  so  seldom  happens?  " 
22  pugmire,  "  Conflicting  Emotions  and  the  Indivisible  Heart",  Philosophy  1996,  (p.  327) 
252 not  always  make  the  emotion  any  less  real  or  sincerely  held.  In  a  case  of  genuine  grief,  the 
fading  intensity  of  the  emotion  may  be  a  source  of  anxiety  and  even  guilt  to  the  person 
concerned,  precisely  because  other  things  -  for  instance  pleasures  -  are  not  any  longer 
precluded23. 
While  experiences  of  this  sort  will  not  attract  reproach,  emotional  distancing  of  a  kind 
which  may  is  illustrated  by  the  case  of  the  painter  Monet.  On  seeing  his  wife  on  her 
deathbed  his  emotional  experience  was  one  that  we  might  describe  as  "aestheticised"- 
disengaged  in  some  way; 
"(Seeing)  haunts  my  days;  it  is  their  joy,  their  torment.  To  the  point  that  once  by  the  bier 
of  a  woman  who  had  been  and  was  still  very  dear  to  me,  I  caught  myself,  my  eyes  fixed 
on  her  forehead,  in  the  act  of  composing  the  scene  in  a  sequence  of  colours...  seeking  to 
make  my  own  the  gradation  of  colour  death  had  just  settled  upon  the  immobile  face...  see 
to  what  a  pass  things  had  come.  The  desire  was  natural  enough  to  reproduce  the  last 
likeness  of  her  who  was  going  to  leave  us  forever. 
-my  reflexes  led  me  in  spite  of  myself 
into  an  unconscious  operation  which  repeated  the  daily  course  of  my  life.  So  the  beast  in 
his  treadmill.  924 
What  seems  to  have  occurred  in  Monet's  case,  similar  to  the  cases  above,  is  that  his 
reaction  -  his  grief-  did  not  preclude  the  taking  of  such  aesthetic  pleasure.  It  is  not  clear, 
however,  which  is  cause  and  which  effect-  whether  it  is  his  focus  on  the  aesthetic  features 
which  precludes  the  grief,  or  the  fact  that  the  grief  is  disengaged  which  permits  the 
enjoyment  of  aesthetic  features.  But  his  comments  suggest  that  it  is  the  habitual 
perception  of  things  in  aesthetic  terms  that  is  the  problem.  Given  what  we  have  been 
saying,  it  is  tempting  to  conclude  that  this  habitual  "aestheticising"  of  experience  is  in 
some  way  responsible  for  the  absence  of  real  grief-  although  Monet  himself  does  not 
explicitly  say  this. 
Monet,  however,  is  at  least  aware  of  his  situation.  But  this  is  not  always  the  case,  as  we 
can  see  from  the  fictional  case  of  the  Duke  of  Mantua  from  Verdi's  opera  Rigoletto  25  The 
Duke  is  presented  as  a  libertine  who  enjoys  the  seduction  of  women  whose  beauty  or 
23  And  importantly,  in  the  case  of  fading  grief,  the  pleasure  is  not  connected  to  the  pain  as  it  is  in  our 
experience  of  tragedy-  we  do  not  take  pleasure  in  the  pain. 
24  Quoted  in  Marcia  Baron  (Op.  Cit). 
25  Discussed  by  Irving  Singer,  The  Pursuit  of  Love  (P.  47). 
253 charm  arouse  his  sexual  appetite.  But  in  the  second  act  he  tells  the  audience  that  his 
feelings  for  Gilda  are  different  from  any  he  has  experienced  before.  He  claims  that  she  has 
elicited  in  him  a  true  and  abiding  love  which  has  made  him  forget  his  own  selfish 
pleasures.  The  music  which  accompanies  these  declarations  is  thoroughly  convincing;  he 
sounds  like  a  young  man  enthused  by  the  purity  of  Romantic  love.  However,  when  the 
courtiers  who  have  abducted  Gilda  carry  her  to  the  duke's  bedroom,  he  rapes  her  in  his 
usual  libertine  manner.  In  the  face  of  this,  what  are  we  to  make  of  his  declarations  of 
love?  One  alternative  is  that  the  Duke's  is  a  case  of  self-deception.  He  knows  he  is  not 
really  in  love  but  conceals  this  fact  from  himself.  This  is  of  course  possible.  But  must  it  be 
the  only  alternative?  More  interesting  is  the  possibility  that  he  simply  mistakes  his  own 
emotional  state,  for  the  kinds  of  reasons  which  were  discussed  above. 
My  contention  then,  is  that  in  view  of  the  kinds  of  cases  discussed  in  this  section,  we 
should  accept  the  possibility  that  art  may  have  harmful  emotional  effects  of  the  sort 
described.  The  basic  difficulty  is  that  since  emotion  does  not  require  sincere  judgement  or 
belief,  and  yet  can  be  convincing,  we  are  vulnerable  to  mistaking  the  state  we  are  in. 
Moreover  it  may  lead  to  a  lack  of  unity  or  single-mindedness  in  our  perspective. 
Something  of  this  criticism,  can  also  be  found  in  Plato.  Christopher  Janaway26  writes  that, 
in  addition  to  various  other  criticisms  of  art,  what  worried  Plato  was  the  idea  that  through 
imaginative  engagement  with  imitation,  we  become  a  little  like  what  is  imagined;  we 
become  in  effect,  multiple; 
"Plato  shows  that  the  root  of  his  position  is  a  fear  of  diversity  or  plurality  within  the 
individual....  By  the  Principle  of  Assimilation,  anyone  who  imitates  many  things  becomes 
like  each  of  them,  hence  becoming,  in  a  sense,  a  multiple  person.  -the  more  models  he 
permitted  himself  to  imitate,  the  less  single  he  would  be  to  his  commitment  to  developing 
"Z7  the  one  character  he  regarded  as  his  ideal. 
26  Janaway,  (Op.  Cit.  ) 
27  In  one  way,  if  we  take  Plato's  objection  to  be  simply  that  people  "identify"  straightforwardly  with 
characters  in  works  of  art,  then  there  seem  to  be  reasons  for  thinking  this  is  false.  Readers/viewers  do  not 
feel  the  same  things  as  characters  they  read  about  (for  reasons  considered  above)  nor  are  they  disposed  to  do 
the  same  things.  Furthermore,  there  is  little  direct  evidence  that  people  tend  then  or  later  to  "act  out"  what 
they  have  seen.  As  Noel  Carroll  argues,  as  readers  and  viewers  we  typically  do  not  respond  in  a  Walter 
Mitty-ish  way  to  what  we  read  or  see.  Nevertheless,  there  may  be  more  subtle  ways-  parallel  to  the  facsimile 
cases  of  emotions  -  in  which  we  do  something  like  acting  out,  even  if  we  are  unaware  that  this  is  what  we  are 
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And  if,  in  addition,  the  result  of  this  is  that  we  take  pleasure  in  real  life  situations  of 
suffering  for  example,  this  will  be  an  ethically  bad  result.  Art  then  can  be  bad  for  our 
ethical  health.  But  how  damning  an  admission  is  this?  In  a  sense  it  merely  highlights  a 
danger  that  is  ever-present.  But  it  should  not  blind  us  to  the  positive  educational  functions 
art  may  have.  Importantly,  we  have  seen  no  reason  to  think  that  the  nature  of  the  emotions 
we  experience  in  response  to  art  works  are  not  the  sorts  of  things  to  play  an  educational 
role  with  respect  to  our  real-life  emotions  28 
. 
In  fiction  we  have  the  opportunity  to  scrutinise  our  emotions,  to  sift,  discriminate  and 
savour  them,  in  ways  we  usually  do  not.  Admittedly,  this  might  encourage  a  habitual 
attitude  of  attending  to  our  own  emotional  states,  making  them  the  primary  focus  of  our 
attention.  This  seems  to  be  the  kind  of  thing  which  might  be  a  natural  consequence  of 
Feagin's  account  of  the  Paradox  of  tragedy.  But  art  need  not  have  these  effects,  and  there 
is  no  need  to  suppose  that  it  normally  does.  I  conclude  then,  that  the  worries  with  which 
this  chapter  began  need  not  lead  to  the  dramatic  consequences  we  have  considered. 
Having  dealt  with  this  objection  to  the  idea  that  art  may  play  a  role  in  emotional 
education,  I  turn  now  to  a  more  general  issue.  Whether,  what  and  how  we  can  learn  from 
doing.  For  criticism  of  the  "identification"  model  of  reader  response,  see  Noel  Carroll,  A  Philosophy  of  Mass 
Art  ch.  5 
28  Also  of  considerable  relevance  to  this  point  is  the  question  of  how  we  should  describe  what  it  is  that  we 
do  when  we  -  for  example-  read  a  novel.  Here  our  inquiry  rubs  up  against  another  debate-  that  between 
`"Theory"  theorists  and  "Simulationists".  There  is  a  real  question  whether  we  should  think  of  folk 
psychology  -  our  understanding  of  others'  mental  states-  as  a  "theory"  which  we  possess  and  apply.  The 
"Theory"  theorists,  who  endorse  this  kind  of  description,  also  conceive  reading  a  novel  as  an  exercise  in 
theory  application.  "Simulationists",  on  the  other  hand,  take  the  view  that  both  in  our  everyday  capacities  to 
understand  others,  and  in  our  empathy  with  fictional  characters,  we  are  not  applying  a  theory,  but  rather 
"simulating"  what  it  is  like  for  the  other  person.  The  ability  to  simulate  is  a  brute  imaginative  capacity.  On 
the  simulationist  view,  we  can  learn  things  from  literature  by  finding  out  what  it  must  be  like  to  be  in  a 
variety  of  circumstances,  to  suffer  a  variety  of  fates,  and  so  on,  through  our  ability  to  simulate,  to  grasp 
things  from  an  imaginary  perspective.  Art  is  then  a  considerable  resource  since  it  educates  us  in  what  things 
are  like  in  ways  we  might  have  been  unaware  of.  For  an  example  of  this  kind  of  account  of  what  we  can 
learn  from  art  see  Noel  Carroll,  A  Philosophy  of  Mass  Art  ch.  5.  For  the  complicated  debate  between  Theory 
theorists  and  Simulationists,  see  the  two  collections,  Folk  Psychology  and  Mental  Simulations,  both  edited 
by  M.  Davies  and  T.  Stone.  Some  of  the  considerations  in  favour  of  simulation  are  mentioned  briefly  in  the 
next  chapter. 
255 art,  are  questions  I  now  postpone  until  the  second  half  of  the  following  chapter,  where  I 
consider  Plato's  attack  on  the  arts. 
First  I  propose  to  return  to  a  general  issue  which  has  already  been  raised.  In  chapter 
three  I  offered  a  criticism  of  the  Stoic  account  of  emotion  which  focused  on  the  point  that 
phantasia  or  appearances  can  be  convincing,  whether  or  not  they  are  believed.  This  point 
was  framed  within  a  more  general  one-  that  philosophical  accounts  of  our  psychology 
tend  to  go  wrong  by  assuming  that  cognitive  elements  must  be  characterised  as  beliefs. 
This  is  the  more  general  issue  which  I  discuss  in  the  next  chapter,  and  which  will  lead  us 
to  consider  Plato's  reasons  for  denying  that  the  arts  are  a  source  of  knowledge. 
256 Chapter  Eight;  Beyond  Belief. 
In  this  chapter,  I  approach  the  more  general  issue  of  psychological  description 
through  a  consideration  of  some  of  the  work  of  Donald  Davidson.  In  his 
article  "Rational  Animals"1  Davidson  argues  that  animals  which  are 
incapable  of  belief  are  similarly  incapable  of  rationality.  He  further  argues 
that  creatures  which  do  not  possess  language  are  incapable  of  belief. 
Consequently,  only  species  which  count  as  language  users  qualify  as  rational. 
Although  Davidson  concedes  that  the  argument  is  not  quite  water-tight,  to 
the  extent  that  it  is  compelling,  its  force  derives  from  the  work  done  by  the 
notion  of  belief.  In  the  following,  my  central  aim  is  to  argue  that  Davidson 
exaggerates  the  importance  of  belief.  His  paired-down  "belief  and  desire" 
psychology  is  too  limited,  I  claim,  to  do  justice  to  the  range  of  mental 
phenomena  we  encounter  both  in  ourselves  and  in  other  species,  and  I  shall 
argue  for  an  expanded  taxonomy  of  the  mental.  Such  a  taxonomy  is  not  new; 
in  fact,  it  was  already  well  developed  in  the  writings  of  classical  authors  such 
as  Aristotle  and  the  Stoic  Chrysippus2. 
My  second  aim  is  to  connect  this  charge  against  Davidson's  psychology  with 
some  difficulties  which  arise  in  connection  with  the  emotions.  This  connection 
is  not  however  artificial.  In  the  first  place,  Davidson  himself  explicitly  applies 
his  own  account  to  cover  hopes,  fears  and  other  emotional  states,  and  has 
written  an  article  devoted  to  the  nature  of  one  emotion3  in  particular-  pride. 
In  addition,  the  two  problems  which  I  will  focus  on-  so-called  "arational"4 
actions  done  in  the  grip  of  emotion;  and  the  problem  of  emotional  responses 
to  fictions-  are  problematic  precisely  because  they  are  instances  of  belief-free 
IL  "Rational  Animals"  in  Actions  and  Events;  Essays  on  Donald  Davidson.  Ed.  E.  LePore. 
2  As  we  have  already  seen  in  chapter  four. 
3  This  view  was  considered  in  chapter  one. 
4  Discussed  in  R.  Hursthouse.  "Arational  Actions".  Journal  of  Philosophy.  1991,  and 
mentioned  in  chapter  one. 
6  There  is  now  a  large  literature  on  this  topic,  beginning  with  Kendall  Walton,  "Fearing 
Fictions".  Journal  of  Philosophy,  1978  and  Colin  Radford,  "How  can  we  be  Moved  by  the  Fate 
257 states.  As  such,  they  have  been  thought  to  be  at  best  arational,  or  worse, 
irrational.  Those  writers  who  have  subscribed  to  this  conclusion  evidently 
share  Davidson's  conviction  that  without  belief  there  can  be  no  rationalitys.  In 
general,  it  is  a  failing  of  much  recent  theorising  about  the  emotions  that  it 
insists  on  belief  as  a  component  of  any  emotional  state.  This  has  been  due,  I 
think,  to  the  same  unwillingness  to  recognise  any  "cognitive"  states  other 
than  belief  which  we  can  identify  in  Davidson. 
Thirdly,  while  there  is  a  need  for  an  expanded  taxonomyof  mental  states, 
and  while  I  think  this  can  be  used  to  combat  some  of  Davidson's  arguments,  it 
leaves  us  with  the  separate  question  of  whether  such  states  and  actions  based 
on  them  can  count  as  rational.  This  is  true  both  of  animal  states  and  of  the 
problematic  emotional  states  I  referred  to  above.  The  question  of  why  we  call 
anything  rational  is  the  third  and  last  question  I  address. 
I  begin  by  outlining  Davidson's  argument  in  the  first  section.  In  the  second,  I 
introduce  the  related  emotional  cases.  In  the  third,  I  consider  how  some  of 
Davidson's  arguments  might  be  met.  In  Section  four  I  say  a  little  more  about 
the  alternative  accounts  of  the  mental  lives  of  animals  (and  ourselves)  found 
in  Aristotle  and  the  Stoics,  and  in  the  final  section  I  try  to  argue  that  much  of 
what  we  commend  in  describing  something  as  rational  can  be  found  in  (at 
least)  the  emotional  cases.  In  this  limited  way,  I  try  to  argue  that  there  can  be 
rationality  beyond  belief. 
of  Anna  KareninaT',  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Society,  1975"  Recent  accounts  of  the 
debate  can  be  found  in  Noel  Carroll,  The  Philosophy  of  Horror,  1990,  ch,  2  and  Jerrold 
Levinson,  "Emotion  in  Response  to  Art"  in  Hjort  and  Laver  (eds.  )  Emotion  and  the  Arts  1997. 
This  topic  is  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter. 
6  There  are  two  separate,  though  related  questions  here;  first,  what  the  requirements  are  for 
a  creature  to  be  rational;  secondly,  what  makes  a  mental  state  or  an  action  rational. 
258 Davidson's  Argument. 
Davidson  begins  by  citing  an  example  of  Norman  Malcolm's.  A  dog  is  chasing 
a  cat.  The  cat  runs  towards  an  oak  tree,  but  at  the  last  minute  swerves  and 
disappears  up  a  nearby  maple.  The  dog  misses  this  and  upon  reaching  the 
oak  it  rears  up  on  its  hind  legs,  as  if  trying  to  scale  it.  Observing  all  this,  we 
say  naturally  of  the  dog,  "It  thinks  the  cat  went  up  the  oak  tree.  " 
Davidson  asks  whether  this  attribution  of  belief  to  the  dog  can  be  correct. 
Certainly  there  is  some  behavioural  evidence  for  it,  but  this  is  not  sufficient. 
How  should  we  describe  what  it  is  that  the  dog  believes,  asks  Davidson.  Does 
the  dog  believe  that  the  animal  went  up  that  thing;  or  that  it  went  up  the 
tree;  or  went  up  the  oak  tree,  and  so  on?  Intensionality  is  a  feature  of  beliefs. 
There  is  always  a  description  under  which  the  believer  believes.  But  are  any 
of  these  descriptions  "ones  that  would  suit  the  dog"?  7  Can  the  dog  believe  of 
an  object  that  it  is  a  tree,  for  example?  Davidson  replies, 
"This  would  seem  impossible  unless  we  suppose  the  dog  has  many  general 
beliefs  about  trees;  that  they  are  growing  things,  that  they  need  soil  and 
water...  there  is  no  fixed  list  of  things  someone  with  the  concept  of  a  tree  must 
believe,  but  without  many  general  beliefs  there  would  be  no  reason  to  identify 
a  belief  as  a  belief  about  a  tree...  similar  considerations  apply  to  the  dog's 
supposed  thinking  about  the  cat.  " 
(p.  475) 
So,  according  to  Davidson,  if  the  dog  has  beliefs,  there  will  be  some  correct 
description  of  what  it  believes,  and  that  description  will  involve  concepts. 
Concepts,  in  turn  require  not  just  one,  but  many  related  beliefs.  This  point 
about  concepts  is  related  to  another  point  Davidson  makes  use  of  here  and 
elsewhere8-  the  "holism  of  the  mental".  If  someone  believes  that  there  are  a 
7  Davidson,  (op.  cit.  )  p.  475. 
8  In  "Mental  Events",  in  Essays  on  Actions  and  Events. 
259 hundred  people  in  the  room,  then  they  believe  there  are  more  than  fifty 
people  in  the  room.  This  is  a  fact  that  anyone  with  number  concepts  would  be 
expected  to  agree  to  if  asked.  Similarly,  if  you  want  something  yet  do  nothing 
to  get  it,  there  will  have  to  be  some  explanation  for  your  inertia,  because  what 
it  is  to  want  something  just  is  to  be  motivated  to  get  it  in  the  absence  of  any 
countervailing  considerations.  Akrasia,  is  for  this  reason,  another  of 
Davidson's  worries.  Rationality  itself  is  a  fundamental  constraint  on  human 
thought  and  action.  As  Davidson  sums  it  up,  "Radical  incoherence  in  belief  is 
therefore  impossible.  "9 
Returning  to  animals,  if  we  attribute  the  belief  that  the  cat  went  up  the  tree, 
we  should  expect  to  be  able  to  attribute  a  range  of  other  beliefs  to  the  dog,  at 
the  very  least,  other  beliefs  about  cats  and  trees.  But  at  some  point  the 
evidence  for  these  further  attributions  will  dry  up; 
"It  seems  to  me  that  no  matter  where  we  start,  we  very  soon  come  to  beliefs 
such  that  we  have  no  idea  at  all  how  to  tell  whether  a  dog  has  them,  and  yet 
such  that,  without  them,  our  original  attribution  looks  shaky.  "  (p.  475) 
In  addition  to  this  point  about  the  holism  of  beliefs,  Davidson  points  out  that 
all  other  propositional  attitudes  depend  on  beliefs.  If  you  are  worried  by 
someone's  lateness  in  arriving,  then  you  believe  they  are  late,  if  you  pity 
someone's  misfortune,  then  you  believe  them  to  be  suffering  misfortune,  and 
so  on.  Without  beliefs  such  states  are  incoherent-  irrational.  In  fact  we  will 
see  that  this  is  exactly  the(alleged)  problem  with  emotional  responses  to 
fiction.  A  further  consequence  of  the  arguments  so  far  considered,  -  which 
Davidson  doesn't  explicitly  indicate-  is  that  they  entail  that  animals  do  not 
have  emotions;  or  at  least,  not  like  our  emotions.  This  follows  simply  from  the 
facts  that  (according  to  Davidson)  they  cannot  have  beliefs  and  that  emotions 
require  beliefs. 
Now,  on  the  basis  of  the  arguments  already  advanced,  Davidson  argues  that 
the  complexity  necessary  for  correct  attributions  of  (complexes  of)  belief  only 
seems  to  occur  when  a  creature  possesses  language.  Once  he  has  established 
the  necessary  connection  between  belief  and  language,  we  can,  he  says,  be 
9  `Rational  Animals"  (p.  475). 
260 content  to  go  on  attributing  beliefs  and  desires  to  animals  just  as  we  might  to 
thermostats  and  heat-seeking  missiles,  in  the  manner  of  Dennett's 
"Intentional  Stance",  in  the  knowledge  that  such  attributions  are  functionally 
profitable,  but  strictly  inaccurate  (p.  477/8). 
The  argument  for  the  necessity  of  language  has  two  steps.  The  first  step  is 
to  argue  that  in  order  to  have  beliefs  a  creature  will  require  the  concept  of 
belief.  Secondly,  it  is  argued  that  in  order  to  have  the  concept  of  belief  the 
creature  will  require  language  (p.  748).  To  argue  for  the  first  claim,  Davidson 
focuses  on  the  phenomenon  of  surprise; 
"Suppose  I  believe  there  is  a  coin  in  my  pocket.  I  empty  my  pocket  and 
find  no  coin.  I  am  surprised....  Surprise  requires  that  I  be  aware  of  a 
contrast  between  what  I  did  believe  and  what  I  come  to  believe.  Such 
awareness,  however,  is  a  belief  about  a  belief.  "  (p.  479) 
This  phenomenon  of  surprise,  says  Davidson,  reveals  what  is  required  if  a 
creature  is  to  have  the  concept  of  belief.  A  creature  cannot  be  surprised  if  all 
that  occurs  is  that  it  changes  from  having  the  belief  that  the  pocket  contains  a 
coin  to  the  belief  that  it  does  not.  Surprise  requires  an  awareness  that  the 
first  belief,  though  sincerely  held,  was  false.  This  shows  that  the  concept  of 
belief  involves  the  notion  of  truth.  To  have  a  belief  is  just  to  think  that  what  is 
believed  is  true,  and  this  also  amounts  to  possession  of  the  concept  of  belief. 
The  second  step  of  the  argument-  showing  that  the  concept  of  belief  requires 
language-  works  by  claiming  that  the  contrast  between  how  things  seemed 
and  how  they  were,  which  is  required  by  the  concept  of  belief,  can  only  be 
possessed  by  a  creature  with  the  concept  of  a  shared  world  about  which  we 
can  say  true  things.  Davidson  confesses  that  although  language  is  sufficient 
for  this  conception-  since  it  assumes  a  shared  world-  he  does  not  know  how  to 
show  that  it  is  necessary  for  it.  This  final  stage  of  the  argument  remains  then, 
he  admits,  incomplete. 
To  sum  up,  Davidson's  argument  works  by  setting  out  the  conditions  that 
would  have  to  be  satisfied  if  a  creature  can  be  said  to  have  beliefs.  If  it  cannot 
have  beliefs  then  it  cannot  be  rational.  It  is  clear  that  Davidson  is  sceptical  of 
the  claim  that  in  Malcolm's  example,  with  which  he  begins,  the  dog  believes 
261 the  cat  went  up  the  tree.  Since  the  dog  cannot,  he  claims,  have  beliefs- 
although  we  can  go  on  treating  it  as  if  it  did-  it  is  not  rational.  The  only 
difference  between  the  dog  and  the  heat  seeking  missile  is  a  wider  range  of 
behaviour  (p.  476.  ).  Clearly,  in  this  argument  everything  hinges  on  the  notion 
of  belief.  In  advance  of  asking  whether  the  argument  is  a  good  one  or  not,  we 
should  at  least  wonder  at  the  fact  that  by  an  a  priori  argument  Davidson 
claims  to  show  that  there  is  no  difference  between  the  mental  lives  of  a  dog 
and  a  missile.  This  is  not  his  main  conclusion  of  course  -  that  is  a  conclusion 
about  rationality.  To  the  extent  that  the  argument  has  intuitive  appeal,  it 
relies  on  the  idea  that  rational  creatures  evaluate  their  beliefs  and  try  to 
adopt  procedures  which  make  them  match  up  with  the  way  the  world  is,  and 
that,  in  a  similar  way,  they  act  in  ways  which  generally  promote  their  ends. 
Rationality  is  opposed,  on  this  picture,  to  automatism.  The  main  question 
which  we  will  have  to  consider,  if  we  find  this  picture  acceptable,  is  whether  a 
creature  requires  beliefs  to  be  a  part  of  it.  I  will  now  outline  the  two 
problematic  areas  concerning  the  emotions. 
262 "Arational  actions"  and  Emotional  Responses  to 
Fiction. 
The  standard  model  used  for  explaining  action-  one  which  Davidson  himself 
endorses-  is  the  "belief  and  desire"  model.  If  we  ask  why  someone  acted  as 
they  did,  we  will  find  a  pair  of  mental  states  (which  Davidson  calls  the 
"Primary  Reason"10)  which  together  explain  the  action.  Often,  once  we  find 
one  of  this  pair,  say  the  desire,  it  is  not  necessary  to  mention  the  belief  also.  If 
I  ask  you  why  you  went  into  the  next  room  and  I  find  out  you  wanted  a  drink, 
I  normally  do  not  need  to  ask  if  you  also  believed  that  by  going  into  the  next 
room  you  could  satisfy  that  desire.  Nevertheless,  such  a  pair,  however 
obvious,  can  always  be  found.  This  is  the  minimum  condition  upon  rational 
action.  If  I  ask  why  you  drank  a  can  of  paint  and  your  answer  is  just  "because 
it  is  Tuesday",  your  explanation  is  unintelligible.  We  may  then  start  to  seek 
for  further  desires  or  beliefs  which  would  enable  us  to  understand  why  you 
drank  the  paint.  If  there  are  none,  we  might  conclude  there  is  some  other  type 
of  explanation  for  what  you  did-  say  a  pathological  one. 
Intelligibility,  the  possibility  of  "seeing  the  point"  of  an  action,  is  what  is 
minimally  required  for  an  action  to  be  rational,  and  this  sort  of  intelligibility 
is  provided  by  belief  and  desire  explanation.  This  does  not  imply  that  every 
action  which  is  rational  in  this  sense  is  rational  in  a  stronger,  normative 
sense.  A  wife  may  suspect  here  husband  of  infidelity  simply  because  he  is 
whistling  and  in  a  good  mood.  This  is  intelligible  but  may  be  irrational  in  the 
stronger  sense. 
However,  there  are  some  actions  which  appear  to  fall  between  these  two 
cases.  They  are  intelligible,  in  a  sense,  but  no  belief/  desire  explanation  can  be 
found  for  them.  Here  are  a  few  examples";  after  a  heated  argument  with 
to  In  "Actions  Reasons  and  Causes",  (p.  1). 
11  The  examples  are  from  Hursthouse.  (Op.  cit.  )  The  present  section  briefly  recaps  material 
originally  presented  in  section  nine  of  chapter  one. 
263 someone,  I  tear  up  their  photograph;  frightened  by  the  thought  of  ghosts  or 
burglars,  I  hide  under  the  bedclothes;  jumping  for  joy;  infuriated  by  my  tin 
opener,  I  throw  it  into  the  corner;  I  kick  the  cupboard  door  that  refuses  to 
shut;  talking  to  a  photograph;  at  a  crucial  moment  in  a  horror  film  I  cover  my 
eyes,  although  they  are  already  shut. 
The  difficulty  with  these  cases  and  others  like  them,  is  in  finding  a  suitable 
pair  of  beliefs  and  desires  that  will  explain  the  actions  even  in  the  minimal 
sense.  It  may  be  tempting  to  assume  that  if  the  actions  are  genuinely 
intentional  that  there  must  be  some  explanation  of  the  required  sort.  But  that 
is  not  born  out  by  the  facts.  Take  the  case  of  tearing  up  a  photograph  in 
anger.  You  might,  in  doing  this,  desire  to  hurt  the  person  in  the  photograph, 
and  believe  that  it  is  a  photograph  of  them.  But  this  is  not  the  required  kind 
of  explanation.  If  the  desire  is  to  hurt  the  person  or  scratch  their  face,  the 
connecting  belief  would  have  to  be  something  like  the  belief  that  the 
photograph  is  the  person.  In  searching  for  an  appropriate  belief,  we  are 
searching  for  something  with  which  to  complete  a  statement  like,  "he  acted  in 
order  to....  ",  or  "he  was  trying  to...  "12.  But  it  quickly  becomes  clear  that  there 
is  none  available. 
Suppose  we  try  saying  that  the  person  tore  the  picture  in  order  to  express 
their  emotion13.  But  this  suggestion  attributes  to  the  person  in  question  a 
desire  to  express  their  emotion  and  a  belief  that  by  acting  as  they  did,  they 
would  express  it.  But  is  this  characteristically  what  is  going  on  in  these  cases? 
It  might  be  if  the  person  was  acting  on  the  advice  of  a  psychiatrist  who 
counselled  them  to  express  their  emotions  more  openly.  This  however  pictures 
the  agent  as  trying  to  express  their  emotions,  and  hitting  upon  a  way  of  doing 
it.  But  this  is  not  usually  the  case.  Nor  is  it  usually  the  case  that  we  have  a 
distinct  desire  of  this  sort,  apart  from  the  desire  simply  to  rip  up  the  picture. 
If  it  is  not  plausible  that  the  person  ripped  the  photograph  in  order  to  express 
their  emotion,  is  it  possible  then  that  they  ripped  it  as  an  expression  of  the 
emotion?  While  true,  this  new  explanation  is  not  really  an  explanation  at  all, 
12  Hursthouse.  Op.  cit.  (p.  59). 
13  The  suggested  explanation,  and  the  argument  against  it  are  Hursthouse's. 
264 since  it  adds  nothing  to  the  original  description  of  these  cases,  that  the 
person  acts  out  of  emotion. 
The  upshot  then  seems  to  be  that  these  cases  are  not  rational.  Are  they  then 
irrational?  No;  that  would  be  like  the  wife  suspecting  adultery-  it  would 
embody  a  failure  of  reason,  such  as  reaching  a  belief  on  insufficient  grounds 
or  acting  so  as  to  frustrate  your  ends.  The  point  about  these  cases  is  that  they 
are  not  done  for  reasons  at  all  and  so  do  not  constitute  failures  of  rationality. 
It  is  better  then  to  class  them  as  arational. 
The  second  kind  of  case  can  be  stated  more  concisely.  In  responding 
emotionally  to  the  fate  of  characters  in  fiction-  in  novels  or  on  the  stage-  we  do 
not,  at  the  same  time  really  believe  these  characters  exist.  We  do  not 
therefore  believe  that  they  are  suffering,  or  that  they  die,  succeed  or  get 
married.  But  if  we  lack  these  beliefs,  how  can  we  have  these  emotions? 
Davidson,  we  have  already  seen,  argues  that  emotions  require  beliefs.  If  I  pity 
someone,  I  must  believe  they  are  suffering.  To  lack  the  beliefs  and  yet  have 
the  emotion  is  a  form  of  irrationality.  Davidson  is  not  the  only  person  to  take 
this  view,  either  of  what  emotions  in  general  require,  or  of  the  irrationality  of 
responses  to  fiction14. 
It  seems  we  have  then  two  kinds  of  action  or  emotion  which  are  not  rational, 
even  in  the  minimal  sense.  What  makes  them  irrational  or  arational  is  the 
absence  of  appropriate  beliefs,  and  this  is  the  connection  with  Davidson's 
discussion  of  rationality  in  part  one,  to  which  I  now  return. 
14  Radford  (op.  cit)  makes  the  same  claim.  A  related,  though  distinct,  question  (raised  by 
Walton)  is  whether  such  emotions  are  genuine  emotions,  given  the  absence  of  belief. 
265 Criticisms  of  Davidson's  Argument. 
"Does  the  dog  think  the  cat  went  up  the  tree?  "  That  was  the  question 
Davidson  started  with.  Is  that  the  same  question  as  "Does  the  dog  believe  the 
cat  went  up  the  tree?  "  Davidson  introduces  Malcolm's  example  as  an  attempt 
to  give  an  affirmative  answer  to  the  first  question,  but  discusses  it  as  if  it  was 
giving  an  answer  to  the  second.  As  Davidson  says  (eg.  p.  475)  all  propositional 
attitudes  are  thoughts.  But  are  all  thoughts  propositional  attitudes? 
Davidson  doesn't  show  any  explicit  interest  in  this  question,  and 
presumably  the  reason  for  this  is  that  he  accepts  the  following  two  claims. 
First,  if  the  dog  thinks  the  cat  went  up  the  tree  then  it  has  propositional 
thoughts.  Secondly,  if  the  dog  has  propositional  thoughts,  it  must  have 
concepts  (this  was  the  point  of  asking  whether  a  cat  believes  something  is  a 
tree.  Having  beliefs  involves  concepts,  so  it  involves  many  other  beliefs). 
So,  even  if  we  shift  from  beliefs  to  thoughts,  Davidson  might  say,  we  can't 
avoid  attributing  propositions  and  concepts  (or  equally,  that  to  attribute  these 
is  already  to  come  very  close  to  attributing  beliefs).  But  without  these,  the 
dog  can't  think  the  cat  went  up  the  tree.  And  neither  of  these  attributions  is 
plausible,  according  to  Davidson. 
As  a  means  of  considering  Davidson's  argument,  I  will  focus  on  the 
following  three  questions;  (a)  Can  an  animal  have  perceptual  experiences 
with  intentional  content  without  having  beliefs?  The  point  of  this  question  is 
to  see  whether,  for  example,  the  dog  could  see  that  the  cat  went  up  the  tree 
without  believing  it,  where  perceptual  experience  is  a  kind  of  thought  with 
intentional  content.  (b)  Can  an  animal  have  perceptual  experience  with 
intentional  content  without  having  concepts?  (  c)Could  an  animal  which  had 
experiences  with  intentional  content,  but  which  lacked  beliefs  and  concepts, 
be  rational? 
266 First  of  all  then,  what  is  the  relationship  between  belief  and  perception?  The 
idea  that  perception  and  perceptual  content  is  simply  a  matter  of  belief  and 
the  content  of  belief  would  be  a  mistake.  Some  philosophers15  have  argued 
that  perceptual  content  can  be  reduced  to  belief,  but  there  are  serious 
objections  to  such  a  view.  For  example  when  I  look  at  the  Muller-Lyer 
illusion,  what  I  see  are  two  lines  of  apparently  different  length.  This  remains 
the  perceptual  content  of  my  experience  even  if  I  believe  that  the  two  lines  are 
in  fact  the  same  in  length.  Since  the  content  of  my  belief  is  not  the  same  as 
the  content  of  my  perception,  belief  and  perceptual  content  are  not  the  same 
thing.  Aristotle  made  the  same  point  when  he  argued  that  the  perceived 
diameter  of  the  sun  is  a  foot  across,  but  I  do  not  believe  that  the  diameter  of 
the  sun  is  a  foot  across16.  Again,  since  I  have  no  belief  corresponding  to  the 
content  of  the  experience,  perceptual  content  is  not  a  matter  of  belief.  It  is 
also  obvious  that  my  perceptual  experience  can  have  intentional  content 
without  my  explicitly  expressing  it  (to  myself,  for  example,  in  my  head)  in 
propositional  form  in  natural  language.  When  I  swerve  to  avoid  an  oncoming 
car,  my  perceptual  experience  has  definite  content,  even  though  I  do  not  stop 
to  formulate  it  explicitly. 
These  points  seem  sufficient  to  answer  our  first  question;  I  can  have 
perceptual  content  even  though  I  have  no  corresponding  beliefs.  Why  then 
could  an  animal  not  have  perceptual  experiences  even  though  it  lacks  belief? 
One  reason  Davidson  mentions  is  that  beliefs  involve  concepts  -  which  brings 
us  to  my  second  question.  Can  an  animal  have  experiences  with  intentional 
content  without  having  concepts?  Can,  as  Davidson  puts  it,  the  dog  think  that 
the  cat  ran  up  the  tree?  Can  it  even  think  that  something  is  a  tree?  This  is  a 
tricky  question  to  answer,  not  primarily  because  of  the  nature  of  animal 
thought,  but  because  there  is  no  agreement  among  philosophers  about  what  it 
is  to  have  concepts. 
15  For  example,  D.  M.  Armstrong,  A  Materialist  Theory  of  the  Mind.  Criticism  of  this  view  is 
contained  in  Fred  Dretske,  "Sensation  and  Perception"  in  Dancy  (ed.  )  Perceptual  Knowledge. 
16  De  Anima  3.3  (428b) 
267 Davidson  argues  that  to  have  the  concept  "tree"  is  to  have  a  range  of  beliefs 
about  trees.  In  one  way  this  is  right  enough.  To  have  full  mastery  of  many 
concepts  requires  such  complexes  of  beliefs.  An  example  of  this  would  be 
mastery  of  our  range  of  concepts  for  family  relationships;  "uncle", 
"grandmother",  "nephew",  "brother-in  law",  etc.  Children  often  struggle  to 
grasp  the  full  implications  of  these  concepts,  and  typically  find  it  difficult  to 
grasp  converse  relations;  that  if  Jane  is  Bob's  aunt,  then  Bob  is  Jane's 
nephew,  and  so  on.  In  fact  these  concepts  are  all  interconnected,  so  that  to 
have  full  mastery  of  some  is  to  have  mastery  of  many.  But  even  for  those 
accomplished  in  the  use  of  these  concepts,  some  relations  still  take  strenuous 
"working  out".  So  for  this  and  other  sorts  of  case,  Davidson  has  a  point.  But 
are  all  concepts  like  this?  Why  could  an  animal  not  have  something  that 
amounted  to  a  concept-  that  served  as  a  "marker"  of  some  kind,  and  as  a 
means  of  discrimination-  without  it  being  richly  interwoven  with  a  range  of 
other  concepts. 
This  explicitly  raises  the  issue  of  what  it  is  to  have  a  concept.  Consider 
someone  looking  at  a  mountain-side'?  . 
They  may  notice  and  appreciate  its 
irregular  contour.  But  it  would  seem  that  such  a  person  can  notice  the 
irregularity  without  having  a  concept  which  matches  it.  He  may  have  the 
concept  "irregularity",  but  that  is  too  general  to  account  for  the  content  of  the 
perceptual  experience.  Does  this  count  as  a  concept?  One  reason  for  thinking 
it  does  not,  would  be  if  recognition  is  held  to  be  a  necessary  condition  of 
concept-possession;  this  case  may  fail  to  satisfy  that  requirement  since  the 
spectator  may  later  be  unable  to  distinguish  that  very  mountainside  again 
from  others. 
Another  kind  of  case  is  that  of  facial  recognition.  When  we  "learn"  a  face  we 
can  often  recognise  it  from  different  distances,  at  different  angles,  through 
time  and  slightly  altered,  we  can  recognise  it  from  portions  of  it,  and  we  can 
identify  caricatures  of  it.  This  range  of  judgmental  capacities  looks  not  unlike 
what  is  involved  in  the  grasp  of  a  concept  -  and  would  satisfy  the  recognition 
requirement  that  the  subject  be  able  to  re-identify.  Should  we  then  allow  that 
17  The  example  is  taken  from  Richard  Sorabji,  Animal  Minds  and  Human  Morals. 
268 this  grasp  of  a  face  is  a  concept?  If  we  do,  we  seem  to  have  an  argument 
against  Davidson,  since  it  is  not  a  richly  interwoven  concept.  If  we  do  not,  it  is 
also  an  argument  against  Davidson,  since  if  my  perceptual  experience  can 
feature  a  face,  why  not  a  tree? 
Admittedly,  "tree"  is  a  universal  and  can  be  extended  to  other  instances, 
but  the  face  example  has  something  of  this  too,  albeit  within  a  more  limited 
range.  The  same  kind  of  argument  can  be  given  for  colours.  Think  of  all  the 
shades  of  red  that  there  are.  We  do  not  have  linguistic  concepts  for  them  all. 
Yet  I  can  identify  and  discriminate  amongst  them,  and  even,  with  a  good 
memory  re-identify  them.  Here  too  we  can  either  say  that  such  recognitional 
and  discriminatory  capacities  are  not  conceptual18  -  and  so  intentional  content 
is  not  exhaustively  conceptual  -  or  we  can  say  that  it  is  conceptual,  but  the 
concepts  are  not  linguistic  ones,  but  ones  that  can  be  derived  from  experience. 
One  more  example.  Take  the  concept  "Dahlia"19.  No  doubt  this  is  a  rich 
concept  of  the  sort  Davidson  has  in  mind,  and  full  grasp  of  it  will  involve  a 
range  of  beliefs  about  the  origins,  nature  and  treatment  of  dahlias.  However, 
if  two  people  look  at  a  dahlia,  and  one  of  them  has  full  mastery  of  the  concept 
while  the  other  lacks  it,  is  their  perceptual  experience  different?  If  the  claim 
that  the  intentional  content  of  experience  is  exhaustively  conceptual  were 
true,  it  should  be.  But  the  person  who  lacks  the  concept  will  successfully 
discriminate  between  dahlias  and  other  flowers  (within  limits,  perhaps.  But 
dahlias,  unlike  aunts  and  uncles,  can  be  picked  out  in  perception  without 
complex  criteria).  But  more  importantly,  it  seems  plausible  to  say  that  his 
(intentional)  perceptual  experience  of  the  flower  is  unaffected  by  the  absence 
or  acquisition  of  the  concept.  This  is  not  to  deny  that  if  you  do  acquire  the  full 
concept  you  will  be  able  to  make  discriminations  that  you  could  not  before. 
Rather  the  point  is  that  you  can  make  some  discriminations  without  it. 
To  sum  up  these  considerations  about  concepts,  we  can  say,  with  regard  to 
animals,  either  that  there  can  be  intentional  perceptual  content  which  is  not 
18  This  is  the  option  taken  by  Michael  Tye  in  Ten  problems  of  Consciousness. 
19  The  example  is  taken  from  Allan  Millar,  "What's  in  a  look",  Proceedings  of  The  Aristotelian 
Society  1985. 
269 conceptual,  or  we  can  claim  that  this  content  is  conceptual,  or  proto- 
conceptual,  but  not  like  the  complex  concepts  requiring  beliefs  that  we  have. 
If  this  is  correct,  then  we  can  see  how  the  dog  might  see/think  that  the  cat 
went  up  the  tree  without  having  (our)  concepts  such  as  tree  and  cat. 
If  it  is  correct  that  the  dog  could  have  this  thought,  but  not  have  our 
concepts,  how  would  this  differ  from  believing  that  the  cat  went  up  the  tree, 
and  would  the  difference  mean  that  the  dog  could  not  be  rational? 
One  difference  would  be  the  one  Davidson  mentions,  that  the  belief  would  be 
systematically  connected  with  other  propositions.  We  have  admitted  that  the 
weaker  dog-thought  would  not  possess  this  feature.  However,  other 
differences  suggest  themselves.  Might  the  dog  not  also  lack  any  distinction 
between  how  things  seem  and  how  they  are,  as  Davidson's  remarks  suggest? 
Would  the  dog  not  merely  take  things  at  face  value,  always  automatically 
accepting  appearances,  unable  to  evaluate  them?  And  would  the  lack  of  belief 
not  also  make  the  dog  incapable  of  inference-making,  which  is  an  important 
feature  of  rationality.  I  think,  however,  there  is  reason  to  deny  these 
implications,  and  in  order  to  say  why,  I  shall  now  turn  to  the  accounts  of  the 
mental  lives  of  animals  offered  by  the  Stoics  and  Aristotle. 
270 Aristotle  and  the  Stoics. 
Both  Aristotle  and  the  main  Stoic  writers  such  as  Chrysippus,  Zeno, 
Posidonius  and  Seneca,  would  have  agreed  with  Davidson  that  animals  are 
not  rational.  However,  in  denying  them  rational  belief,  they  expanded  the 
account  of  the  perceptual  experience  of  animals  in  order  to  explain  their 
capacities20. 
Aristotle  argues  (De  Anima  2.6)  that  qualities  are  perceived  by  animals  as 
belonging  to  objects.  So  an  animal  sees  a  black  cat,  a  white  ball,  and  so  on  21. 
The  animal  does  not  merely  have  the  perceptual  experience  of  whiteness,  but 
of  whiteness  belonging  to  something  or  located  somewhere.  Aristotle  is 
prepared  to  allow,  unlike  Davidson,  that  the  dog  can  see  the  cat  run  up  the 
tree.  In  addition,  if  we  return  for  a  moment  to  the  Muller-  Lyer  illusion,  we 
saw  there  a  need  to  distinguish  the  appearance  of  things  in  perception,  and 
beliefs  about  them.  Aristotle  employs  the  Greek  term  "phantasia"  to  refer  to 
the  appearance,  in  contrast  to  "doxd',  or  beliefs.  The  appearance  of  the  sun 
then,  is  that  it  is  twelve  inches  across,  but  this  is  not  what  we  believe. 
Aristotle  also  associates  a  further  feature-  conviction  ("pistis')  with  belief22. 
When  we  believe  something  we  are  convinced  by  it,  and  this  involves  being 
persuaded  (or  succeeding  in  self-persuasion).  Persuasion,  furthermore,  is  a 
rational  matter.  The  situation  is  different  with  mere  appearances.  Human 
thinking  often  requires  phantasia,  but  in  addition  it  possesses  a  further  layer 
of  persuasion  and  conviction.  Appearance  (phantasia)  alone  does  not  involve 
this  element  and  so  lacks  conviction  (pistis).  This  reflective  level  is  the  level  of 
20  This  section  recaps  some  of  the  points  presented  in  chapter  four,  concerning  Stoic  views  of 
the  emotions. 
21  Richard  Sorabji,  in  his  discussion  of  Aristotle  calls  this  predicational  perception,  in  order  to 
distinguish  it  from  propositional  perception  (seeing  that...  )  which  might  be  reserved  for 
perception  involving  concepts.  Cf.  Animal  Minds,  p.  17) 
22  De  Anima'3.3.  (428b  3-10).  Aristotle's  use  of  the  notion  is  discussed  in  Sorabji,  op.  cit.  ch.  3 
271 belief.  It  is  similar  to  Davidson's  claim  that  humans  have  beliefs  about  beliefs. 
Aristotle  claims  that  animals  lack  this  kind  of  conviction.  And  consequently, 
just  as  they  cannot  be  convinced,  they  cannot  be  unconvinced  either. 
This  point  is  also  made,  although  in  a  slightly  different  way,  by  the  Stoics. 
For  them,  perception  is  not  merely  an  appearance,  but  an  assent  to  an 
appearance.  Animals  possess  the  appearances  but  not  the  ability  to  assent  or 
withhold  assent;  they  accept  automatically  the  way  things  seem.  Should  we 
accept  these  claims  about  animal  conviction  and  assent?  Here  empirical 
evidence  is  called  for,  and  it  surely  seems  as  if  animals  are  capable  of  this 
kind  of  withholding  assent.  How  safe  would  the  blind  man  be  if  his  guide  dog 
could  not  withhold  assent  from  the  command  to  cross  the  busy  road;  23  or 
alternatively,  what  is  going  on  when  the  mouse  hesitates  to  take  the  cheese 
from  the  mousetrap,  and  learns  not  to:  or  the  gorillas  who  withhold  assent 
from  the  warning  calls  of  other  gorillas  who  have  cried  "wolf'  too  often?  In 
addition,  ethologists  have  argued  that  some  animals  are  capable  of  having 
beliefs  about  beliefs(for  example,  beliefs  about  the  beliefs  of  other  animals). 
A  second  subject  which  we  have  already  mentioned  is  emotion.  Aristotle 
denies  beliefs  to  animals,  yet  acknowledges  that  they  have  emotions.  He 
insists  that  the  emotion  must  have  intentional  content  (or  cognitive  content), 
but  thinks  it  can  have  this  without  beliefs.  Again  he  employs  phantasia  to 
provide  intentional  content  distinct  from  belief.  This  analysis  is  consistent 
with  some  modern  accounts  which  wish  to  avoid  the  difficulties  inherent  in 
belief-models  of  emotion.  24  Emotion,  on  such  an  account  is  a  matter  of  the 
situation  appearing  a  certain  way  to  the  observer.  This  does  not  mean  that 
animal  emotions  are  the  same  as  human  emotions.  They  may  be  similar 
through  a  certain  range.  But  many  of  our  emotions-  such  as  pride,  guilt, 
remorse  and  so  on-  involve  evaluations  and  concepts  of  the  self.  So  it  is  a 
23  The  examples  are  Richard  Sorabji's,  op.  cit. 
24  For  example;  Robert.  C.  Roberts,  "What  an  Emotion  is",  Philosophical  Review  1988; 
C.  Calhoun,  "Cognitive  Emotions?  "  in  Calhoun  and  Solomon  (eds.  )  What  is  an  Emotion?; 
P.  Greenspan,  Emotion  and  Reasons;  D.  Hamlyn,  "The  Phenomena  of  Love  and  Hate",  in 
Perception,  Learning  and  the  Self  ;  Noel  Carroll,  op.  tit. 
272 further  question  whether  animals  have  these  emotions.  25The  Stoics,  in 
general  taking  the  view  that  emotion  requires  assent  and  judgement,  deny 
that  animals  have  emotion.  But  two  other  points  made  by  the  Stoics  are  more 
interesting.  First,  Chrysippus  notes  that  beliefs  can  outlive  emotion26.  To  find 
a  joke  funny,  for  example,  cannot  simply  be  to  believe  that  it  is  funny,  since 
that  belief  remains,  even  when,  through  time,  you  no  longer  find  the  joke 
funny.  To  explain  this,  he  introduces  the  terms  "freshness",  to  cover  what  it  is 
that  fades27.  This  freshness  has  intentional  content.  This  thought  can  be  seen 
as  a  precursor  of  the  modern  claim  that  aesthetic  experience  is  not  a  matter  of 
belief; 
"It  is  of  importance  to  note  first,  that,  broadly  speaking,  aesthetics  deals 
with  a  kind  of  perception.  People  have  to  see  the  grace  or  unity  of  a  work, 
hear  the  plaintiveness  or  frenzy  of  the  music,  notice  the  gaudiness  of  a  colour 
scheme,  feel  the  power  of  a  novel,  its  mood,  or  its  uncertainty  of  tone.  "28 
It  is  not,  in  other  words,  sufficient  for  the  appreciation  of  a  work  that  you 
have  a  complex  of  appropriate  and  even  true  beliefs  about  it.  This  is,  I  think, 
directly  analogous  to  the  point  that  belief  is  insufficient  for  having  emotional 
experience.  In  both  cases  the  reason  is  quite  simple;  it  is  that  description  in 
terms  of  belief  is  not  the  correct  description  for  the  content  of  these  states,  just 
as  it  is  not  the`correct  description  of  perceptual  content  generally. 
The  second  and  related  point  is  made  by  Posidonius29;  that  merely  believing 
something  is  the  case,  believing  that  someone  is  suffering  is  usually  not 
25  In  his  book  Dogs  Never  Lie  About  Love,  Jeffrey  Masson  claims  that  dogs  feel  the  full  range 
of  emotions,  including  pity,  love  and  forgiveness. 
26  Textual  evidence  can  be  found  in  Long  and  Sedley  The  Hellenistic  Philosophers  (sec.  65). 
27  The  application  of  "freshness"  to  the  case  of  humour  is  taken  from  Julia  Arenas,  Hellenistic 
Philosophy  of  Mind  (p.  111).  Although  it  is  the  belief  which  Chrysippus  claimed  to  be  fresh,  I 
suggest  that  we  can  think  of  freshness  as  being  part  of  the  cognitive  content  of  the  state, 
apart  from  belief. 
28  Frank  Sibley,  "Aesthetic  and  Non-Aesthetic",  quoted  in  Derek  Matravers,  Art  and  Emotion. 
29  See  Long  and  Sedley,  op.  cit.  sec.  65,  and  Sorabji,  (p.  57). 
273 sufficient  to  arouse  an  emotion  such  as  pity.  Something  else  is  required.  I  will 
return  to  these  two  points  below. 
Although  Aristotle  and  the  Stoics  want  to  withhold  reason  from  animals, 
they  augment  their  perceptual  content,  by  allowing  phantasia  to  have 
predicational  content.  This  is  enough  of  a  rival  account  to  be  set  against 
Davidson's,  and  in  view  of  the  empirical  evidence,  Davidson's  view  is  not  the 
obvious  winner.  I  will  now  try  to  draw  together  what  I  have  said  about  animal 
rationality,  and  the  two  earlier  problems  about  emotion. 
A  Common  Problem-  Belief. 
To  recap;  the  deficiency  in  the  mental  lives  of  animals  according  to  Davidson 
is  that  they  lack  belief.  Similarly,  the  problem  about  "Arational'  actions  and 
emotional  responses  to  fiction-  again,  on  Davidson's  account-  is  that  the  are 
not  underpinned  by  belief.  The  question  now  is,  does  this  matter;  and  does  it 
matter  as  much  as  Davidson  claims? 
The  essential  question  is;  what  is  it  we  are  commending  in  calling  a 
creature  or  a  belief/action  rational?  We  have  already  looked  at  some  answers 
to  this  question.  One  is  that  rationality  involves  evaluation;  it  involves  not 
merely  accepting  appearances  automatically,  or  acting  automatically.  We 
have  also  seen  some  reason  to  think  that  animals  have  this  capacity  without 
having  beliefs.  More  ambitiously,  rationality  may  be  taken  to  involve 
networks  of  beliefs  bound  together  by  concepts  and  inferences.  Again,  we  have 
seen  some  reason  not  to  insist  on  this;  animals  can  have  thoughts  and 
perhaps  concepts,  can  evaluate  thoughts  and  avoid  automatism  without  these 
advanced  capacities.  Animals,  unlike  us,  cannot  perhaps  do  logic  and 
mathematics  or  construct  and  evaluate  explicit  syllogisms,  but  why  should  we 
pin  rationality  on  such  refined  abilities?  Especially  when  much  of  our  own 
274 inferential  thought  -  for  example  in  the  realm  of  practical  reasoning-  does  not 
involve  explicit  inference-making.  A  practical  syllogism  can  be  constructed 
afterwards,  but  nobody  claims  that  that  we  actually  go  through  the  steps  at 
the  time.  Often  then,  we  don't  deliberate  either. 
Another  key  feature  of  belief  is  that  it  is  related  to  truth.  Davidson  makes 
this  point  by  claiming  that  belief  provides  believers  with  a  distinction 
between  how  things  seem  and  how  they  are.  But  there  is  no  a  priori  argument 
to  show  that  non-believers  cannot  have  that  distinction.  In  addition,  the 
empirical  evidence  mentioned  above  suggests  that  some  of  them  do  have  it. 
The  connection  with  truth  is  one  of  two  main  ways  in  which  belief  is 
connected  with  rationality.  The  second,  is  in  practical  reasoning.  If  I  am  a 
believer  then  I  can  have  good  reason  to  think  that  the  action  I  undertake  will 
satisfy  my  goals  and  desires  and  promote  what  I  value.  So  just  as  the  aim  of 
rationality  in  relation  to  thought  about  how  things  are  is  truth,  the  aim  of 
rationality  in  the  sphere  of  action  is  success  of  a  certain  sort  (at  least,  as  far  as 
means/end  reasoning  is  concerned.  It  is  another  question  whether  ends 
themselves  can  be  rational). 
Turning  back  to  the  two  kinds  of  problem  associated  with  emotions,  both  of 
which  lack  appropriate  beliefs,  one  notable  fact  about  them  is  that  neither  of 
them  is  obviously  concerned  either  with  satisfying  ends  or  with  finding  out 
how  the  world  is.  Emotional  responses  to  fiction  do  not  suppose  anything 
about  what  is  the  case-  that  is  precisely  the  problem  with  them.  "Arational" 
actions  are  not  attempts  to  further  some  goal.  This  is  then  one  way  of  seeing 
what  is  meant  by  saying  that  these  actions  and  emotions  are  not  rational. 
However,  should  we  then  say  that  such  responses  are  misguided  in  some 
way,  or  that  they  are  merely  automatic?  I  don't  think  so.  People  who  respond 
in  these  ways  can,  I  suppose,  withhold  the  response  if  required.  Furthermore, 
in  both  cases  there  is  a  normative  feature,  such  as  that  the  response  is 
appropriate  or  fitting.  Someone  who  is  saddened  by  the  fate  of  Anna  Karenina 
or  enjoys  the  adventures  of  Huckleberry  Finn,  will  think  their  emotional 
responses  appropriate  to  their  objects,  despite  the  absence  of  appropriate 
existential  beliefs.  The  same  can  be  said  for  arational  actions;  in  some  sense 
275 they  too  are  appropriate  to  the  circumstances.  In  general,  appropriateness  in 
these  contexts  embodies  the  evaluative  feature  of  rationality  that  Davidson 
prizes,  but  without  a  basis  in  belief.  Perhaps  these  cases  fall  not  into  either 
the  sphere  of  theoretical  reasoning  or  practical  reasoning,  but  into  the  sphere 
of  the  aesthetic30.  This  might  allow  us  to  see  why  such  cases  do  not  involve 
belief,  although  they  may  still  possess  the  features  we  value  in  rationality. 
To  pick  up  to  the  two  points  made  at  the  end  of  the  last  section,  aesthetic 
experience  generally  involves  notions  of  what  is  fitting  and  appropriate  (as 
does  the  ethical).  In  these  cases,  the  sense  of  what  is  appropriate  can  only  be 
located  within  the  aesthetic  experience  itself,  and  is  not  a  feature  of  beliefs 
about  aesthetic  works  (Sibley's  point,  in  the  previous  section).  Which  brings 
me  to  my  last  point,  concerning  phantasia.  Posidonius  remarked  that  beliefs 
alone  are  insufficient  to  produce  emotions.  Many  people  are,  for  example, 
unmoved  by  (their  own)  beliefs  about  tragedies  and  the  misfortunes  suffered 
by  others  , 
but  are  moved  by  visual  images  of  these  people.  This  suggests  that 
the  phantasia  may  perform  something  like  the  function  of  convincing  or 
persuading  that  Aristotle  thought  of  in  connection  with  belief.  This  suggestion 
may  seem  mistaken,  however,  since  we  might  think  that  any  phantasia  will 
convince,  providing  it  in  some  sense  has  the  relevant  content.  But  if  we  turn 
to  aesthetic  experience,  we  find  that  this  is  not  so.  Differences  between  media, 
for  instance,  can  be  sufficient  to  produce  different  degrees  of  conviction. 
Reading  a  horror  novel  may  not  have  the  same  effect  on  me  as  watching  a 
horror  film;  the  film  may  produce  a  much  more  intense  emotional  effect. 
Similarly,  phobics  may  respond  to  some  visual  images  of  the  feared  objects 
but  not  others". 
30  To  use  in  a  rough  way  Kant's  threefold  classification  of  human  understanding. 
31  For  example,  a  photograph  may  produce  the  same  effect  as  a  television  image,  while  a 
crude  pencil  drawing  may  not.  The  cruder  the  image,  the  closer  the  phobic's  state 
approximates  to  the  mere  belief  that  the  image  depicts  the  feared  object.  This  is  the  argument 
against  Levinson's  view,  referred  to  in  chapter  seven,  that  belief,  at  least  in  its  existential 
form,  is  a  necessary  condition  of  emotions.  The  present  objection  shows  Levinson  to  be 
mistaken  in  this,  I  think. 
276 This  point  bears  directly  on  the  paradox  of  fiction.  Jerrold  Levinson32 
argues  that  the  paradox  of  emotional  responses  to  fiction  cannot  be  mitigated 
by  introducing  the  example  of  phobias  as  instances  of  emotional  states  which 
also  lack  beliefs; 
"With  phobic  fear  we  can  say  that  although  the  subject  doesn't  believe  the 
animal  in  question  is  dangerous,  the  subject  at  least  views  the  animal  as 
dangerous,  all  the  while  clearly  believing  that  the  animal  exists". 
(P.  33  n.  11.  ) 
And  again, 
"..  it  seems  that  such  emotions  [in  response  to  fictions]  must  still  involve 
existential  beliefs  in  regard  to  those  objects,  or  something  very  close  to  that- 
that  is,  attitudes  or  stances  on  the  order  of  taking  to  exist,  or  regarding  as 
existent.  Otherwise,  the  state  attributed  becomes  unintelligible...  "  (p.  25.  ) 
So,  according  to  Levinson,  in  cases  of  phobia,  (unlike  cases  of  responses  to 
fiction)  there  is  always  an  existential  belief  about  the  object  of  the  fear,  even  if 
the  belief  that  the  fear  itself  is  appropriate  is  lacking.  But  is  this  so?  Phobics 
may  respond  to  television  images  or  pictures  or  drawings,  just  as  much  as 
real  entities,  and  in  these  cases  there  is  no  existential  belief.  Should  we  say  in 
these  cases  that  phobic  fear  is  not  real  fear,  just  as  it  is  suggested  that 
emotional  responses  to  fiction  are  not  real  emotions? 
This  point  seems  to  make  room,  then,  for  what  Aristotle  seemed  to  deny, 
that  phantasia  can  be  convincing  or  unconvincing;  some  kinds  of  appearances 
will  produce  fear  in  the  phobic,  and  others  won't.  This  difference  cannot  be 
explained  either  in  terms  of  the  representational  content  of  the  appearance 
(since  that  may  be  shared)  or  in  terms  of  beliefs  the  subjects  have  about  the 
appearances.  This  point  is  I  think  left  out  of  contemporary  discussions  of  the 
paradox  of  fiction,  although  a  recognition  of  it  hovers  implicitly  in  the 
32  LevinsOn,  op.  cit. 
277 background  of  the  following  quotation  from  Derek  Matravers33.  In  discussing 
Walton's  account  of  fearing  fictions,  Matravers  argues  that  someone  watching 
a  horror  film  does  not  believe  that  they  are  threatened,  but  he  is  forced  to 
acknowledge  that  in  some  sense  the  spectator  comes  to  lack  a  conviction  that 
what  he  is  seeing  is  not  real; 
"Charles  [is]  on  the  edge  of  his  seat...  his  confidence  that  he  is  seeing  a 
report  is  thrown  into  a  maelstrom...  he  is  forced  to  review  all  the  things  he 
believes  to  be  true-  such  as,  for  example,  that  because  this  is  a  report,  the 
slime  cannot  be  trying  to  get  him.. 
. 
Within  the  fiction,  it  is  not  true  that  the 
slime  can  get  him,  but  it  is  true  that  the  behaviour  of  the  slime  undermines 
his  confidence  that  he  is  safe  in  a  particularly  vivid  fashion.  "34 
So  Charles  does  not  abandon  his  beliefs  in  the  non-existence  of  what  he  is 
watching,  nor  in  the  absence  of  a  real  threat,  yet  his  "conviction"  is  shaken. 
But  if  conviction  is  not  belief,  what  is  it?  In  fact  it  is  quite  clear  that  belief  and 
conviction  are  not  the  same;  a  schoolboy  in  the  heat  of  an  examination  may 
believe  the  battle  of  Hastings  to  have  taken  place  at  the  correct  date,  but 
through  nerves,  not  be  convinced  by  his  belief.  In  Waltons  example,  Charles' 
conviction  is  undermined  by  the  quality  of  the  visual  representation  which  is 
particularly  "life-like"35.  There  is  in  principle  a  wide  range  of  features  of 
aesthetic  and  perceptual  experience  which  could  be  relevant  to  whether  the 
experience  is  convincing  in  this  way  or  not.  36  If  this  is  correct,  then  Aristotle 
was  incorrect  to  argue  that  phantasia  is  unconnected  with  persuasion. 
33  That  belief  is  not  necessary  for  emotion  is  explicitly  recognised  in  Morreall,  "Fear  Without 
belief',  Journal  of  Philosophy,  1993,  and  Carrot,  The  Philosophy  of  Horror,  ch.  2. 
34  Matravers,  "The  Paradox  of  Fiction"  in  Hjort  and  Laver,  (  op.  cit.  ),  and  also  in  Art  and 
Emotion. 
35  Although  it  would  be  wrong  to  suggest  that  realism  is  the  only  property  relevant  to  making 
a  phantasm  convincing.  Some  drawings  may  be  more  frightening  than  the  real  thing. 
36  In  short  then;  in  the  schoolboy  example,  belief  is  not  sufficient  for  conviction.  Similarly, 
belief  is  not  sufficient  for  an  emotion.  In  Walton's  cinema  example,  and  cases  of  phobia, 
278 It  is  important  to  emphasise  that  this  point  does  not  apply  merely  to 
fictional  contexts.  A  smoker  may  not  be  persuaded  to  give  up  by  reading  lists 
of  statistics  relating  smoking  and  disease,  while  in  contrast,  witnessing  the 
dissection  of  a  smoker's  lungs  may  have  the  desired  effect.  Once  we  notice  this 
fact,  it  becomes  clear  that  imagination  is  a  more  crucial  feature  of  emotional 
experience  than  belief.  Simply  by  imagining  a  dangerous  situation,  or  a 
disgusting  action,  I  can  produce  the  relevant  emotional  responses.  And  in 
these  cases,  it  is  also  true  that  to  see,  for  example,  a  television  image  of  the 
same  situation  may  produce  a  more  intense  response  than  can  be  achieved  by 
the  unaided  imagination.  But  again,  this  difference  has  nothing  necessarily  to 
do  with  the  introduction  of  a  belief. 
With  respect  to  the  fictional  cases,  however,  a  work's  failure  to  produce 
emotional  responses  in  the  viewer/reader  is  more  likely  to  result  from  a 
failure  on  the  writer/director's  part  to  successfully  construct  the  fiction  in 
such  a  way  that  the  viewer/  reader  is  engaged  and  cares  about  the  fate  of  the 
characters,  than  it  is  to  be  caused  by  an  absence  of  belief.  37Much  of  our 
imaginative  engagement  with  fiction  should  then  be  explained-  as  we  might 
expect-  by  features  of  the  work  other  than  its  belief-inducing  ones. 
One  final  point  is  worth  making  in  connection  with  another  opposition 
which  attracted  considerable  attention  in  ancient  times;  the  distinction 
between  reason  and  rhetoric  (considered  below).  The  function  of  the  former  is 
to  produce  true  beliefs  (by  the  correct  means).  The  latter  is  accused  by  Plato  of 
working  by  devious  means  and  circumventing  reason  by  appeal  to  low 
emotion.  The  details  of  this  claim  would  have  to  be  argued,  but  we  may  make 
one  general  point  on  the  basis  of  what  has  been  said  above.  Since  the  function 
of  art  is  not  merely  the  production  of  true  beliefs  (this  is  Sibley's  point),  it 
might  be  argued  that  the  same  is  true  of  rhetoric.  That  both  these  forms 
appeal  often  to  the  emotions  and  produce  states  which  embody  cognitive 
something  is  at  stake  which  is  not  belief,  which  I  am  calling  "conviction".  Problems  of  the 
same  kind  were  considered  briefly  at  the  end  of  chapter  four.  I  return  to  the  idea  that 
phantasia  can  be  convincing  later  in  the  chapter. 
37  The  point  is  made  by  Carroll,  (op.  cit.  ),  ch.  2. 
279 elements  as  well  as  affective,  need  not  count  against  them  unless  you  are 
already  wedded  to  an  account  of  emotion  as  pernicious  or  cognitively  empty. 
If  emotions  involve  phantasia,  then  art  forms  which  produce  emotional 
responses  may  be  said  to  produce  kinds  of  cognitive  experiences  quite  distinct 
from  belief38.  This  would  allow  us  to  see  how  rhetoric  and  art  might  make 
important  contributions  to  our  cognitive  lives  in  ways  that  batteries  of 
syllogisms  might  not  be  capable  of.  This  is  not  to  downgrade  argument,  but  to 
suggest  that  argument  alone  may  not  be  enough,  as  Aristotle  claims  (in  the 
Nicomachean  Ethics)  for  correct  perception  and  understanding. 
38  And  consequently,  we  should  expect  good  rhetoric  to  engage  us  through  convincing 
phantasia,  in  the  same  way  as  good  fiction  engages  us.  The  relevant  features,  just  as  in  the 
case  of  fictions  will  not  be  the  work's  belief-inducing  properties. 
280 Meaning  and  World. 
Before  passing  on  to  the  topic  of  rhetoric,  there  is  another,  more  general  point 
to  be  made  concerning  the  role  of  belief.  This  point  can  again  be  conveniently 
made  through  a  consideration  of  Davidson's  writings-  this  time  his  theory  of 
meaning.  39The  point  I  will  try  to  make  is  this;  paradoxically,  Davidson  does 
not  offer  an  account  of  the  experience  of  meaning  at  all.  Indeed,  he  does  not 
set  out  to  do  so.  However,  the  account  of  meaning  he  does  offer  suggests  a 
picture  of  the  experience  of  understanding  which  is  starkly  at  odds  with  the 
one  we  should  naturally  give  of  it.  That  account  takes  us  back  to 
Wittgenstein's  description  of  aspect  perception  (chapter  three)  as  picture  of 
what  understanding  involves. 
We  can  then  construct  a  parallel  opposition  to  that  between  belief  and 
phantasia  ;  that  between  experiencing  meaning  (understood  as  aspect- 
perception)  and  interpretation  (Davidson's  account).  The  oppositions  are 
closely  parallel  since  in  both  cases  we  have  something  whose  content  is  not 
reducible  to  beliefs,  but  is  tied  to  experience.  One  way  of  putting  this  general 
conclusion  is  to  say  that  phantasia,  aspect  perception  and  the  experience  of 
meaning  all  have  a  phenomenology.  In  contemporary  analytic  philosophy, 
much  of  the  discussion  of  the  related  topics  of  perception,  meaning  and 
emotion,  is  dogged  by  assumptions  which  can  be  traced  to  the  central  role 
granted  to  belief.  Accounts  of  perception  such  as  Armstrong's;  theories  of 
emotion  which  see  the  cognitive  element  as  belief;  and  accounts  of  meaning 
and  understanding  such  as  Davidson's  all  go  wrong  by  exaggerating  the  role 
of  belief.  In  contrast  with  such  accounts  I  will  end  by  briefly  trying  to  locate 
these  issues  in  a  different  tradition,  that  of  phenomenology. 
39  References  are  to  Inquiries  into  Truth  and  Interpretation. 
281 Davidson  on  Meaning. 
"Kurt  utters  the  words  "Es  Regnet"  and  under  the  right  conditions  we  know 
that  it  is  raining.  Having  identified  his  utterance  as  intentional  and 
linguistic,  we  are  able  to  go  on  to  interpret  his  words;  we  can  say  what  his 
words,  on  that  occasion,  meant.  What  could  we  know  that  would  enable  us  to 
do  this?  "  (ITI,  p.  125.  ) 
Davidson's  task  is  to  provide  an  account  of  what  understanding  linguistic 
utterances  involves.  But  he  does  not  see  this  as  an  empirical  enquiry.  Rather, 
it  involves  theoretical  speculation  about  what  understanding  must  involve; 
"Claims  about  what  would  constitute  a  satisfactory  theory  of  interpretation 
are  not....  claims  about  the  propositional  knowledge  of  an  interpreter,  nor  are 
they  claims  about  the  details  of  the  inner  workings  of  some  part  of  the  brain. 
They  are  rather  claims  about  what  must  be  said  to  give  a  satisfactory 
description  of  the  competence  of  the  interpreter.  We  cannot  describe  what  an 
interpreter  can  do  except  by  appeal  to  a  theory  of  a  certain  sort.  "40 
One  of  the  mysteries  of  linguistic  comprehension  Davidson  (amongst  others) 
thinks  must  be  explained  is  our  ability  to  comprehend  novel  sentences. 
According  to  Davidson,  we  can  solve  this  mystery  only  if  we  assume  that  the 
meaning  of  sentences  depends  upon  the  meanings  of  sub-sentential 
components.  A  language  can  then  be  described  as  a  recursive  structure  (in 
the  manner  of  Tarski's  theory  of  truth)  composed  of  a  "vocabulary"  (sub- 
sentential  components)  plus  a  body  of  rules  governing  composition. 
The  meaning  of  a  sentence,  says  Davidson,  can  in  one  way  be  given  by 
stating  its  truth  conditions  (though  he  does  not  equate  meaning  and  truth- 
40  "A  Nice  Derangement  of  Epitaphs°.  In  LePore  (ed.  )  Truth  and  Interpretation. 
282 conditions).  Therefore  the  meaning  of  a  sentence  can  be  analysed  as  being 
composed  of  elements  from  the  "vocabulary"  in  truth-relevant  ways,  and  the 
first-order  predicate  calculus  will  enable  us  to  describe  the  modes  of 
composition. 
Anyone  in  possession  of  such  a  recursive  structure,  claims  Davidson, 
possesses  a  theory  which  should  enable  them  to  make  hypotheses  about 
speaker's  meaning.  The  Radical  Interpreter  then  tries  to  confirm  these 
hypotheses  using  non-linguistic  evidence; 
"First  we  look  for  the  best  way  to  fit  our  logic  onto  the  new  language;  this 
may  mean  reading  the  logical  structure  of  first-order  quantification 
theory...  into  the  language...  treating  this  much  of  logic  as  a  grid  to  be  fitted 
onto  the  language  in  one  fell  swoop...  "(ITI,  p.  136.  ) 
and, 
"...  the  evidence  must  be  of  a  sort  that  would  be  available  to  someone  who 
does  not  already  know  how  to  interpret  utterances  the  theory  is  designed  to 
cover;  it  must  be  evidence  that  can  be  stated  without  essential  use  of  such 
linguistic  concepts  as  meaning,  interpretation,  synonymy  and  the  like".  (ITI, 
p.  128.  ) 
At  the  level  of  a  single  utterance,  the  evidence  that  an  individual  sentence 
should  be  linked  to  a  given  set  of  truth  conditions  is  quite  slim.  Davidson 
claims,  therefore,  that  it  is  the  totality  of  T-sentences  that  should  fit  the 
evidence  about  sentences  believed  by  native  speakers.  This  is  the  tendency 
towards  holism  in  Davidson  that  we  have  already  noted.  The  theory  which 
the  interpreter  possesses  reveals  the  interconnections  between  the  meanings 
of  different  sentences;  it  does  not  alter  the  conditions  under  which  a  sentence 
is  true.  Further,  since  the  interpretation  of  meaning  involves  the  ascription  of 
beliefs  to  speakers  and  since  beliefs  can  only  be  ascribed  as  whole  patterns  of 
belief,  holism  is  the  result  of  such  ascriptions  also41. 
41  This  is  a  convenient  place  to  note  the  connection  between  Davidson's  theory  of 
interpretation  and  the  debate  between  "Theory"  theorists  and  "Simulationists",  mentioned  in 
the  previous  chapter.  Davidson's  view  is  that  when  we  ascribe  beliefs,  hopes  and  desires, 
these  imputed  entities  are  merely  theoretical  constructions.  In  other  words,  he  is  not  a  realist 
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questions  we  can  raise  about  it.  First,  Davidson  uses  "interpretation"  and 
"understanding"  interchangeably; 
"What  is  essential  to  my  argument  is  the  idea  of  an  interpreter,  someone 
who  understands  the  utterances  of  another"  (ITI,  p.  157.  ) 
But  interpretation  is  concerned  with  a  movement  from  one  medium  or 
language  into  another.  And  in  this  way  it  is  natural  to  suppose  there  will  be 
rules  of  some  sort  governing  this  translation.  To  make  the  picture  of  linguistic 
comprehension  as  interpretation  seem  plausible,  Davidson  concentrates  on 
examples  from  foreign  languages  (as  in  the  opening  example).  But  Davidson 
insists  the  idea  of  interpretation  also  describes  cases  of  local  understanding, 
within  the  same  language.  (ITI,  p.  125.  )  But  how  plausible  is  this?  As  Ian 
Hacking42  notes,  the  suggestion  seems  unconvincing  since  it  requires  us, 
every  time  we  enter  into  conversation  with  another  English  speaker,  to  hold 
before  us  the  possibility  that  he  is  an  alien.  There  may  be  cases  where  what 
someone  says  makes  no  sense  and  in  which  I  then  actively  engage  in 
interpretative  strategies.  But  this  kind  of  understanding  is  not  typical  of 
someone  listening  to  a  stream  of  conversation. 
It  has  been  suggested  by  several  writers43  that  the  assumption  underlying 
Davidson's  account  of  interpretation,  and  one  that  explains  his  illicit 
about  mental  phenomena.  (On  this  point  see  John  Heil's  discussion  of  Davidson  in  Heil,  The 
Philosophy  of  Mind).  This  relates  directly  to  "Theory"  theory.  If  folk  psychology  really  is  a 
theory,  then,  like  all  theories  it  can  be  disproven,  supplanted  and  replaced.  But  this  implies  a 
lack  of  commitment  to  realism  about  the  mental.  Davidson  is  therefore  a  "Theory"  theorist. 
Those  inclined  to  realism  about  the  mental  will  be  correspondingly  ill-disposed  towards 
"Theory"  theory.  A  further  difficulty  with  "Theory"  theory  follows  from  the  fact  that  it 
construes  our  capacity  to  ascribe  states  to  others  as  the  result  of  a  process  of  inference.  The 
difficulty  is  that  the  "Theory"  theorist  seems  forced  to  offer  a  similar  account  of  how  we  know 
our  own  mental  states.  But  this  -  for  reasons  discussed  above  and  in  chapter  one  -  seems 
straightforwardly  false.  We  do  not,  in  general,  infer  the  identity  of  our  mental  states.  Here  we 
see  a  further  instance  of  the  inference  model  that  has  recurred  at  various  points  in  different 
chapters. 
42  In  "A  Parody  of  Conversation".  In  LePore.  Op.  cit 
43  By  Stephen  Muthall,  in  On  Being  in  the  World;  and  John  McDowell,  Mind  and  World. 
284 extension  of  the  notion  of  interpretation  to  normal  contexts,  is  that  all  we 
really  hear  are  "bare"  sounds.  Davidson  himself  explicitly  suggests  this; 
"The  only  candidate  for  recurrence  we  have  is  the  interpretation  of  sound- 
patterns;  speaker  and  hearer  must  repeatedly,  intentionally  and  with  mutual 
agreement,  interpret  relevantly  similar  sound-patterns  of  the  speaker  in  the 
same  way"  (ITI,  p.  227.  ) 
This  assumption,  that  the  world  we  perceive  is  devoid  of  meaning,  seems  to 
reveal  an  implicit  commitment  to  what  Davidson  himself  (ironically) 
elsewhere  describes  as  the  "Third  Dogma"  of  empiricism.  (ITI,  p.  189).  The 
idea  that  bare  sounds  are  the  basis  for  understanding  is  analogous  to  the 
theories  of  perception  attacked  by  Wittgenstein  in  his  account  of  aspect 
perception;  both  assume  that  our  everyday  experience  of  the  world  is  best 
thought  of  as  a  theoretical  construction  out  of  brute  data-  the  "Given". 
Wittgenstein's  target  then,  proves  not  merely  to  be  a  straw  man,  but 
embodies  the  assumptions  which  lie  behind  one  of  the  dominant  research 
programmes  in  current  philosophy  of  language. 
If  Davidson's  view  of  understanding  is  not  acceptable,  what  kind  of  account 
would  be?  Whatever  the  truth  about  underlying  "theories"  or  grammars  a 
speaker  might  be  said  to  implicitly  possess,  understanding  has  a 
phenomenology,  and  any  account  of  understanding  must  respect  that 
phenomenology.  The  same  is  true,  we  saw  in  chapter  three,  for  perception. 
Whether  or  not  there  is  some  processing  system  which  explains  perception  at 
some  level,  what  is  left  over  is  the  content  of  perceptual  experience. 
In  the  previous  section  I  considered  perception  and  emotional  content,  and 
argued  that  neither  can  be  reduced  to  belief.  The  same  is  true  of  linguistic 
understanding.  The  phenomenology  of  understanding  is  compatible  with,  and 
usually  generates,  beliefs;  but  belief  alone  is  compatible  with  the 
phenomenology-free  linguistic  experience  of  the  radical  interpreter.  If  these 
claims  are  right,  what  do  they  show?  Apart  from  illustrating  the  charge  of 
systematic  bias  in  favour  of  belief  on  the  part  of  many  analytic  philosophers, 
they  may  make  us  pause  and  consider  whether  an  alternative  approach  to 
these  kinds  of  understanding  might  not  be  more  profitable.  Certainly,  this  is 
285 what  has  been  attempted  in  the  Phenomenological  tradition.  Heidegger  offers 
an  account  which  captures  many  of  the  features  we  have  so  far  wanted  to 
include  in  our  account  of  perception,  linguistic  understanding  and  emotion. 
Phenomenology,  Cognitivism  and  The  Will. 
In  this  section  I  briefly  consider  the  account  philosophers  in  the 
phenomenological  tradition  -specifically  Heidegger  and  Sartre-  have  given  of 
emotion.  This  will  serve  to  bring  out  the  points  made  in  the  previous  section, 
and  will  allow  me  to  raise  again  an  issue  which  I  brought  up  in  the  first  two 
chapters-  namely  cognitivism.  In  addition,  it  will  return  us  to  the  issue  of 
subjectivity  raised  in  chapter  five,  in  connection  with  Kant  and  the 
Romantics. 
The  most  important  factor  common  to  both  Heidegger's  and  Sartre's  account 
of  emotional  states  is  their  emphasis  on  phenomenology.  Both  philosophers 
conceive  emotions  as  ways  of  seeing  the  world;  as  states  through  which  the 
world  is  revealed  as  being  a  certain  way.  This  way  of  putting  it-  that  it  is  the 
world  that  is  revealed,  or  some  feature  of  it-  will  then  provide  the  connection 
with  cognitivism  about  value. 
One  view  of  emotional  states  might  be  that  they  reveal  nothing  more  than  a 
subjective  attitude  of  the  subject  whose  states  they  are;  that  they  are 
frightened  or  angered,  say,  by  whatever  the  object  of  their  emotion  is.  But 
such  states  reveal  nothing  about  the  world.  One  kind  of  assumption  which 
might  encourage  such  an  account  is  the  empiricist  construal  of  "the  world". 
Being  "frightening"  or  "unjust",  it  might  be  claimed,  are  not  properties  of 
anything  in  the  world.  If  "the  world"  is  as  empiricists  claim,  then  it  is 
essentially  devoid  of  meaning,  and  any  meaning  we  claim  to  locate  in  it  must 
286 be  projected  onto  it.  And  this  would  be  as  true  for  semantic  meaning  as  it  is 
for  value. 
Related  to  this  account  of  what  the  world  really  contains,  is  a  story  about 
our  experience  of  the  world.  As  we  saw  in  the  account  of  perception  offered  by 
Wittgenstein's  imaginary  interlocutor  in  the  discussions  of  aspect-perception, 
and  as  we  have  also  seen  in  Davidson's  account  of  meaning,  what  the 
empiricist  claims  we  have  experience  of  are  simply  the  empirical  properties  of 
entities  in  the  world.  And  he  is  then  left  having  to  explain  anything  else  as  a 
projection  onto  those  more  basic  features.  However,  the  preceding  section 
offered  reasons  for  rejecting  such  an  account  of  our  experience.  To  this  extent 
then  the  empiricist  ontology  constrains  his  limited  phenomenology.  But  this  is 
not  always  so.  Famously,  empiricists  like  Locke44  have  allowed  that  we  can 
have  experiences  whose  phenomenology  attributes  properties  experienced  to 
entities  in  the  world,  even  when  there  really  are  no  such  properties.  The  most 
obvious  instance  of  this  is  the  case  of  secondary  properties.  Colour,  for 
example,  is  perceived  as  belonging  to  objects  in  the  world,  yet  Locke  argues 
that  such  properties  are,  in  an  important  sense,  subjective.  There  are  not 
really  (independently  of  our  experience  of  them)  any  such  properties  in  the 
world45. 
This  granted,  we  could  then  expect  some  supplementary  explanation  for 
this  "error".  Why  does  it  seem  to  us  that  the  world  does  contain  such 
properties?  Fortunately,  in  the  case  of  secondary  properties,  there  is  a 
plausible  causal  explanation  available.  The  moral  of  this  is  simply  that 
44  An  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding,  bk.  2. 
45  Colin  McGinn  describes  what  he  terms  the  "Janus  -faced"  nature  of  experience  in  the 
following  way;  "...  subjective  aspects  of  experience  involve  a  reference  to  the  subject 
undergoing  the  experience-  this  is  what  their  subjectivity  consists  in.  But  we  can  also  say  that 
perceptual  experiences  have  a  world-directed  aspect:  they  present  the  world  in  a  certain  way, 
say  as  containing  a  scarlet  sphere  against  a  blue  background.  This  is  their  representational 
content,  what  states  of  affairs  they  are  as  of.  Thus  perceptual  experiences  are  Janus-faced: 
they  point  outward  to  the  external  world  but  they  also  present  a  subjective  face  to  their 
subject;  they  are  of  something  other  than  the  subject  and  they  are  like  something  for  the 
subject.  "  ("Consciousness  and  Content",  in  The  Problem  of  Consciousness  p.  29.  ) 
287 phenomenology,  though  no  guarantor  of  truth,  creates  the  demand  for 
explanation  when  it  is  claimed  to  be  in  error.  I  return  to  this  point  below. 
To  bring  out  the  relevance  of  the  point  just  made,  and  its  connection  with  the 
empiricist  construal  of  emotions  as  projections,  suggested  above,  I  will 
contrast  the  empiricist  view  of  emotions  with  Heidegger's. 
Heidegger  rejects  the  empiricist  account  of  emotions.  In  his  view  emotions 
do  reveal  something  about  the  world; 
"A  mood  is  not  related  to  the  psychical....  and  is  not  itself  an  inner  condition 
which  then  reaches  forth  in  an  enigmatical  way  and  puts  its  mark  on  things 
and  persons....  It  comes  neither  from  "outside"  nor  from  "inside",  but  arises 
out  of  Being-in  -the  World,  as  a  way  of  such  being.  "4s 
Here  Heidegger  begins  by  rejecting  the  idea  that  emotions  involve  merely 
projections  onto  the  world  from  an  inner  psychological  state.  But  he  also 
claims  that  it  is  not  merely  a  question  of  the  world  possessing  certain  features 
either.  In  the  case  of  fear,  for  example,  (on  which  he  concentrates)  we  perceive 
the  object  of  our  state  as  fearful.  But  the  object  only  has  this  feature  to  those 
who  are  in  the  state  of  fear,  and  whether  someone  is  in  this  state  and 
perceives  this  feature  is  "existentially  determined  beforehand"  (p.  176). 
Essentially  the  same  explanation  can  be  given  in  support  of  Heidegger's 
insistence  on  the  revelatory  character  of  emotional  states  as  has  already  been 
given  for  aspect  perception.  Just  as  in  the  case  of  duck/rabbit  perception,  it 
would  be  wrong  to  suggest  that  what  the  viewer  sees  is  the  bare  shape  onto 
which  he  projects  the  duckness  or  rabbitness,  so  it  would  be  wrong  to  claim 
that  the  emotional  subject  experiences  the  world  of'  bare  facts"  onto  which 
they  project  the  fearfulness,  say.  In  both  cases  the  content  of  the  experience  is 
located  in  the  objects  themselves.  The  duck  aspect  is  what  is  seen,  and  the 
object  as  fearful  is  what  is  experienced.  This  content  is  located  in  the  world, 
and  that  this  is  so  is  a  constitutive  feature  of  these  experiences.  47 
46  Being  and  Time,  (p.  176) 
47  A  similar  claim  is  John  McDowell's,  that  "empirical  substance  is  infused  into  concepts  at 
the  ground  level"  (Mind  and  World  p.  7).  McDowell  argues,  along  Kantian  lines,  against  a 
divorce  of  empirical  content  from  conceptual  scheme.  ' 
288 Projectivist  accounts  of  value  similarly  start  from  the  fact  that  the 
attribution  of  value  to  some  feature  in  the  world  begins  with  a  reaction  on 
the  part  of  the  subject,  and  conclude  that  the  attribution  is  merely  a 
projection  of  this  response.  Underlying  this  is  a  causal  picture;  that  some 
feature  in  the  world  causes  a  reaction  in  the  subject,  who  then  mistakenly 
attributes  further  properties  to  the  cause.  This  kind  of  "error"  theory  about 
value  offers  a  causal  explanation  akin  to  the  sort  offered  for  our  experience  of 
secondary  qualities.  It  is  another  question  (which  I  shall  not  address)  how 
plausible  such  explanations  are. 
If  "projection"  implies  an  active  process,  then,  it  is  mistaken.  But  must  it 
imply  this?  We  have  seen  that  Locke  did  not  think  this  about  experience  of 
secondary  properties.  A  slightly  different  example  is  afforded  by  Hume,  who 
famously  argued  that  causal  relations  were  not  strictly  perceivable. 
Nevertheless  we  attribute  them.  But  if  Hume  is  correct,  we  can  have  no 
experience  of  them.  Presumably,  Hume  did  not  think  that  we  actively  project 
these  relations  onto  the  world,  but  that  we  come  to  believe  such  relations  to 
obtain,  ultimately  because  of  our  constitution.  Unlike  the  case  of  secondary 
qualities,  there  is  not  obviously  anything  here,  in  the  phenomenology  of  the 
experience,  which  remains  unaccounted  for,  or  requiring  explanation,  once 
our  alleged  error  has  been  exposed48.  It  is  plausible  to  say  here  that  it  is  our 
beliefs  in  causal  relations  which  are  projected.  There  are  consequently  no 
recalcitrant  phenomenological  features  requiring  explanation.  This  simply 
provides  another  example  of  the  point  made  above,  that  phenomenology 
requires  explanation  even  or  especially,  when  the  experience  involves 
mistaken  attributions. 
We  should  also,  briefly,  ask  what  the  status  of  secondary  properties  is.  First 
of  all,  should  we  assume  that  secondary  properties  are  less  real?  If  mind- 
independence  is  the  criterion  of  the  real,  then  they  are  clearly  not  real.  But  by 
the  same  criterion  mental  states  and  consciousness  itself  may  not  count  as 
48  This,  at  least,  is  Hume's  view;  causal  relations  are  not  perceived  and  so  we  have  no 
immediate  experience  of  them. 
289 genuine  features  of  reality.  49  But  even  if  we  are  forced  to  accept  this  definition 
of  "real",  the  sting  may  have  been  removed  to  some  extent  from  the  charge.  If 
values  are  as  real  as  secondary  properties  or  minds,  then  that  may  be  a 
satisfactory  result50. 
For  it  is  clear  that  the  sense  of  "subjective"  which  means  "not  independent 
of  minds"  is  quite  distinct  from  that  intended  in  saying  that  my  dislike  of 
asparagus  is  subjective.  In  the  latter  case,  "subjective"  implies  personal 
idiosyncrasy.  It  is  also  distinct  from  another  sense  of  "subjective"  which 
implies  a  contrast  with  experiences  which  are  veridical;  in  this  sense,  a 
hallucination  is  subjective.  But  this  is  not  a  sense  we  can  attribute  generally 
to  values  or  emotions.  As  we  have  seen,  there  are  standards  of 
appropriateness  which  apply  to  emotional  states  and  values.  This  brief 
discussion  is  not  intended  to  settle  the  question  of  the  status  of  values,  but  it 
indicates  two  points  which  block  any  straightforward  denial  of  their 
objectivity.  First,  the  phenomenology  of  value  locates  them  in  the  world.  This 
puts  paid  to  any  simple  account  of  them  as  "decisions"  or  active  projections. 
Second,  it  does  not  immediately  follow  from  the  fact  of  their  mind-dependence 
that  they  are  subjective. 
The  claim  that  emotions  and  values  are  a  kind  of  decision,  is  however  one 
that  both  Heidegger  and  Sartre  make.  The  point  is  worth  staying  with  for  a 
moment  since  in  both  writers  this  claim  sits  alongside  the  phenomenological 
claim  that  emotions  reveal  something  about  the  world.  Can  these  two  claims 
be  consistently  held?  Secondly,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Heidegger  explicitly 
uses  a  theory  of  interpretation  or  understanding  ("Verstehen")  which  he 
describes  as  the  "as-structure"51,  the  affinity  with  aspect  perception  is  even 
49  These  issues  are  raised  in  McDowell,  "Values  and  Secondary  Properties"  in  Honderich  (ed.  ) 
Morality  and  Objectivity,  and  in  T.  Nagel,  "Subjective  and  Objective"  in  Mortal  Questions,  and 
The  View  from  Nowhere.  The  analogy  between  values  and  secondary  properties  is  disputed  by 
Crispin  Wright,  "Values,  Projection  and  Secondary  Qualities",  Proceedings  of  The  Aristotelian 
Society,  Supplementary  Volume  1988,  and  Colin  McGinn  The  Subjective  View  ch.  8. 
50  This,  at  least,  is  McDowell's  claim;  it  is  disputed  by  Wright,  op.  cit. 
51  See  Being  and  Time  (p.  149-150),  and  for  discussion,  Frederick  Olafson,  Heidegger  and  the 
Philosophy  of  Mind.  ch.  5. 
290 closer52.  So  the  question  arises  how  aspect-perception  can  be  a  product  of  the 
will. 
In  chapter  two  I  referred  to  the  claim  made  by  both  Roger  Scruton  and 
Wittgenstein  himself  that  aspect-perception  is  subject  to  the  will.  The 
argument  for  this  claim  was  that  it  can  make  sense  to  say  to  someone,  "Now 
see  it  as  a...  ",  where  the  command  is  completed  by  referring  to  one  of  the 
aspects  under  which  the  object  can  be  seen.  But  if  aspects  are  a  product  of  the 
will,  then  they  must  surely  be  subjective  in  some  quite  substantial  sense. 
How  good  an  argument  is  this?  First  of  all,  there  is  the  point  that  even  if 
the  command  makes  sense-  to  the  extent  that  it  is  intelligible  to  ask  someone 
to  try  to  see  something  under  an  aspect-  the  subject  may  not  always  succeed, 
either  because  he  does  not  have  the  ability  to  see  aspects  of  that  sort  (perhaps 
aesthetic  ones)  or  because,  although  he  has  the  ability  he  cannot  exercise  it  on 
this  occasion".  So  aspect-perception  is  not  subject  to  the  will 
straightforwardly.  Secondly,  the  command  is  intelligible  only  in  cases  where 
the  figure  is  an  ambiguous  one;  that  is  to  say  where  there  is  room  for 
alternative  conceptions  (the  same  is  true  of  ethical  dilemmas).  Thirdly,  there 
is  no  sense  in  which  I  can  see  aspects  at  will,  if  this  means  simply  "see  them 
as  I  decide  to".  This  is  because  aspect-perception  involves  concepts.  Also,  just 
in  the  same  way  as  is  true  of  belief,  aspect  perception  is  in  an  important  sense 
passive.  Descartes  for  instance,  famously  attempts,  in  the  Meditations,  to 
explain  errors  of  judgement  as  products  of  the  will.  But  the  difficulties  of  this 
claim  are  well  known. 
In  the  case  of  Sartre,  the  aspect  of  his  theory  of  the  emotions  to  have 
attracted  most  attention  among  contemporary  philosophers  is  his  claim  that 
emotions  are  purposive54.  However,  Sartre  also  endorses  the  view  we  have 
52  Stephen  Mulhall  provides  an  extended  comparison  of  Wittgenstein  and  Heidegger  on 
aspect-perception  in  Being  in  the  World;  Wittgenstein  and  Heidegger  on  Seeing  Aspects. 
53  Similar  points  apply  to  any  ability. 
54  Eg.  Robert  Solomon,  "Emotion  and  Choice"  in  Rorty,  A.  (ed).  Explaining  Emotions,  and  in 
his  book  The  Passions. 
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features  of  the  world;  55 
"When  I  suddenly  conceive  an  object  to  be  horrible...  the  horrible  is  now  in 
the  thing,  at  the  heart  of  it,  is  its  emotive  texture,  is  constitutive  of  it.  Thus, 
during  emotion,  an  overwhelming  and  definitive  quality  of  the  thing  makes 
its  appearance...  The  "horrible"  means  indeed  that  horribleness  is  a 
substantial  quality,  that  there  is  horribleness  in  the  world.  "56 
As  far  as  his  claim  about  the  purposiveness  of  emotional  states  goes,  several 
objections  can  be  raised.  First,  many  of  his  examples  are  far-fetched  and 
implausible57.  Secondly,  his  account  does  not  obviously  fit  cases  of  immediate 
emotional  reactions  such  as  fear  on  seeing  a  face  at  the  window.  Thirdly, 
although  the  claim  that  emotion  resolves  conflict  by  providing  a  substitute  for 
effective  action  seems  plausible  for  a  range  of  cases,  its  range  of  applicability 
is  not  as  great  as  Sartre  claims.  In  addition  to  the  cases  of  spontaneous 
emotions  noted  above,  cases  of  positive  emotions-happiness,  joy  etc.  -  do  not 
seem  to  fit  the  construal  as  a  product  of  inner  conflict58.  Fourthly,  even  if  the 
theory  is  then  restricted  to  the  range  of  negative,  non-spontaneous  emotions, 
does  it  follow  either  that  such  emotions  must  involve  false  projections  of 
properties  onto  the  world,  or  that  strategies  of  conflict  resolution  reveal  the 
essence  of  such  emotional  states? 
Sartre's  view  is  that  emotions  resolve  conflicts  between  our  desires  and 
beliefs  about  the  world,  not  by  changing  our  desires,  but  by  altering  our 
perception  of  the  world.  Since  it  is  assumed  that  the  world  itself  has  not 
changed,  our  altered  perception  must  be  false.  However,  even  in  cases  where 
68  However,  he  seems  to  differ  from  Heidegger  in  tending  to  see  the  "magical"  properties  of 
emotions  as  falsely  projected  onto  the  world.  If  this  is  correct,  then  he  seems  to  be  employing 
an  empiricist  conception  of  the  "world",  at  odds  with  his  Heidegger-inspired  conception  of  the 
world  as  phenomenologically  related  to  human  purposes. 
56  Sketch  for  a  Theory  of  the  Emotions,  p.  81-82. 
5  The  point  is  made  by  Gregory  McCulloch  in  Using  Sartre(p.  19/20).  A  good  discussion  of 
Sartre's  theory  is  "Sartre,  Emotions  and  Wallowing"  by  David  Weberman,  (American 
Philosophical  Quarterly  1996). 
58  This  point  is  discussed  in  detail  by  Weberman  op.  cit. 
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involved  in  the  emotion  is  false?  It  may  be  that  the  world  has  changed,  (  for 
example  in  the  case  of  grief,  when  someone  dies),  and  it  may  be  that 
emotions,  rather  than  revealing  false  "facts"  about  the  world  or  encouraging 
false  beliefs,  reveal  (truly)  facets  of  the  world  we  might  not  have  recognised 
otherwise.  Further,  even  if  there  are  some  cases  of  the  sort  Sartre  describes,  it 
is  one  thing  to  say  that  these  emotions  have  the  function  he  describes,  and 
another  to  say  that  this  reveals  the  essence  of  the  emotion.  Sometimes 
specifying  the  function  of  something  is  also  to  specify  its  essence  (eg.  organs  of 
the  body).  But  not  always;  for  booksellers  the  chief  function  of  books  is  to 
produce  profit,  but  the  essence  of  a  book  is  something  else59,  and  something 
similar  can  be  said  of  emotions. 
To  sum  up  then,  Sartre  may  have  identified  a  limited  range  of  cases  in 
which  it  is  possible  to  claim  that  emotions  serve  the  function  of  conflict 
resolution  and  action  avoidance.  It  does  not  follow  from  this  that  they  involve 
projections,  in  the  relevant  sense,  onto  the  world.  Nor  does  it  follow  that 
emotions  are  the  product  of  the  will. 
Decision  figures  in  Heidegger's  theory  in  a  different  way.  Frederick  Olafson 
summarises  Heidegger's  view  thus; 
"What  interpretation  articulates  is  not  a  meaning  that  it  first  introduces, 
but  the  actual  entity  in  question  itself  as  it  has  been  antecedently  taken  by 
Dasein  and  situated  within  the  referential  totality  of  its  projects  and  so,  of  its 
world.  "60 
and  he  quotes  Heidegger; 
"...  interpretation  has  always  already  decided  either  finally  or  with 
reservations  in  favour  of  a  certain  way  of  conceiving  what  it  has  to  deal  with.  " 
(Being  and  Time  p.  100). 
59  The  example  is  Weberman's,  op.  cit. 
60  Olafson  op.  cit  (p.  118/9) 
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permits  "interpretation-as",  is  chosen  and  the  product  of  decision.  This  is  true 
even  though  the  subject  makes  no  choice  or  decision  (as  we  have  already 
argued)  himself,  and  confronts  the  world  as  already  interpreted,  and 
demanding  to  be  seen  in  a  certain  way. 
Heidegger's  explanation  of  this  fact  is  that  the  interpretative  background, 
the  network  of  concepts  and  practices  which  make  our  experience  of  the  world 
meaningful  is  socially  fixed  or  decided  in  advance  of  any  individual  subject. 
This  has  an  obvious  bearing  on  emotions.  Exactly  which  emotions  we  can 
have  is  a  function  of  the  concepts  and  vocabulary  available  to  us,  and  these 
are  themselves  located  within  a  network  of  meanings  and  practices.  Stephen 
Mulhall  comments; 
"When  one  claims  that,  for  example,  no-one  in  late  20th  century  Britain  can 
experience  the  pride  of  the  Samurai  warrior  because  the  relevant  vocabulary 
is  unavailable,  "vocabulary"  refers  not  merely  to  a  set  of  Japanese  terms,  but 
to  their  role  in  a  complex  web  of  customs,  assumptions  and  institutions.  And 
because  our  affective  life  is  conditioned  by  the  culture  in  which  we  find 
ourselves,  being  immersed...  in  a  particular...  feeling  is  revelatory  of 
something  about  the  world  in  a  further  way.  For  our  feeling  horrified,  for 
example.....  also  shows  that  our  world  is  one  in  which  the  specific  complex  of 
feeling,  situation  and  response  that  constitutes  horror  has  a  place-  a  world  in 
which  horror  has  a  place.  "6' 
This  claim  that  our  affective  experience  is  a  function  of  our  local  practices 
and  vocabulary  need  not  in  itself  lead  to  any  radical  scepticism  about  the 
objectivity  of  value  upon  which  emotion  relies.  The  fallacy  of  inferring 
negative  conclusions  of  this  sort  from  the  empirical  fact  of  cultural  divergence 
is  well  known.  Nevertheless,  as  an  empirical  fact,  the  claim  is  an  interesting 
61  Mulhall,  "Heidegger  and  Being  and  Time"  (p.  81). 
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similar  claims  regarding  the  relation  between  culture  and  emotion.  62 
However,  if  this  is  what  is  meant  by  saying  that  emotion  is  a  product  of  the 
will,  it  resolves  into  further  questions  about  the  "objective"  status  of  value,  of 
the  sort  mentioned  above.  There  is  no  suggestion  that  it  involves  anyone  in 
actual  decision-making. 
So  far  then,  I  have  been  trying  to  defend  the  phenomenology  of  emotional 
and  value  experience  as  suggesting,  prima  facie,  an  objective  construal  of  the 
features  so  revealed.  The  preceding  arguments  have  attempted  to  show  that 
claims  to  the  effect  that  these  experiences  are  the  product  of  the  will,  are  not 
effective  in  challenging  this  suggestion.  In  addition,  we  can  perhaps  also  see 
that  discussions  of  value  and  emotion  which  are  conducted  solely  in  terms  of 
beliefs  which  subjects  have  about  features  of  the  world  tends  to  conceal  the 
phenomenological  features  of  our  experience.  The  net  result  of  this  is  to  fail  to 
acknowledge  something  which-  at  least  prima  facie-  supports  an  objectivist 
account.  Further,  even  if,  in  the  final  analysis  the  objectivist  account  proves 
to  be  mistaken,  the  alternative  theory  will  have  to  provide  an  explanation  not 
merely  for  our  false  beliefs,  but  for  the  phenomenology  of  our  experience63. 
Contemporary  discussions  of  ethics  generally  acknowledge  the 
phenomenological  character  of  ethical  experience.  Discussions  of  emotions, 
however,  tend  to  be  dominated  by  talk  of  beliefs,  which  sidelines  the 
phenomenology  of  these  states  and  makes  it  easier  to  think  of  them  as 
projections. 
62  For  a  representative  selection,  see  R.  Harre  (ed)  The  Emotions;  Social,  Cultural  and 
Biological  Dimensions.  A  similar  kind  of  argument  is  presented  in  Peter  Berger,  "The 
Obsolescence  of  the  Concept  of  Honour"  in  Maclntyre  (ed)  Illuminations. 
63  Just  as  different  explanations  are  called  for  the  "projections"  discussed  by  Locke  and  Hume, 
(above)  respectively. 
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At  the  end  of  the  section  before  last,  I  tried  to  connect  two  things;  the 
difference  between  the  ideas  of  "phantasia"  and  belief  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the  idea  of  conviction.  I  claimed  that  conviction  was  not  merely  a  matter  of 
acquiring  the  right  beliefs.  We  can  have  those  and  yet  remain  unconvinced. 
What  the  unconvinced  believer  lacks,  I  suggested,  can  usefully  be  thought  of 
in  terms  of  what  Aristotle,  the  Stoics  and  others  meant  by  "phantasia"-  a  kind 
of  appearance,  or  way  of  seeing  things.  The  difference  between  this  kind  of 
experience  and  belief  alone  is  also  striking  in  the  case  of  emotion.  Animals  are 
said  by  Aristotle  to  lack  belief  but  have  emotions,  and  in  our  own  case,  our 
emotional  states  often  lack  the  relevant  beliefs.  This  is  most  striking  perhaps 
in  the  case  of  emotional  responses  to  fiction,  where  there  is  something 
cognitive  which  amounts  to  a  kind  of  being  convinced,  but  lacks  the 
commitment  to  truth  which  characterises  belief. 
I  suggested  also  that  one  area  in  which  we  could  observe  emotional 
phantasia  constituting  the  basis  of  conviction  is  in  the  practice  of  rhetorical 
persuasion.  This  is  the  claim  that  I  will  now  try  to  defend.  In  fact  persuasion 
of  the  relevant  sort  is  quite  widespread,  and  not  strictly  confined  only  to  those 
works  which  we  would  recognise  or  class  as  works  of  rhetoric  or  to  the 
speeches  of  gifted  orators.  Literary  works  of  art  (and  perhaps  works  in  other 
media  too  -  although  I  shall  concentrate  on  literature  here.  )  share  many  of  the 
same  features  as  rhetoric,  and  differ  from  the  unalloyed  belief-inducing 
nature  of  deductive  argument  in  the  same  way.  Fortunately  this  pairing  of 
literary  art  with  rhetoric  is  not  new.  Plato,  the  philosopher  most  notoriously 
hostile  to  the  practice  of  rhetorical  persuasion,  believed  they  were  alike  in 
possessing  many  of  the  same  inadequacies. 
My  discussion  of  rhetoric  will  be  selective,  focusing  in  Plato's  main 
objections  to  it  and  to  art.  I  will  also  refer  occasionally  to  Aristotle's  treatise 
296 on  Rhetoric.  My  aim  is  not  to  be  comprehensive,  historically  or  otherwise64, 
but  to  relate  the  problem  of  rhetoric  specifically  to  the  range  of  problems 
discussed  above. 
The  Problem  with  Rhetoric. 
When  we  describe  an  argument  as  "rhetorical'  this  is  generally  taken  to 
imply  something  pejorative.  Is  this  because  we  assume  that  rhetoric  appeals 
to  the  emotions  rather  than  to  reason,  whereas  we  take  it  that  an  argument 
should  provide  solid  facts  and  reasons  deductively  connected?  Is  it  true,  in 
that  case,  that  rhetoric  does  not  provide  arguments?  Or  is  it  that,  in  addition 
to  any  arguments  it  may  offer,  the  real  force  of  rhetoric  is  its  sway  over  the 
emotions,  which  might  amount  to  manipulation  rather  than  rational 
persuasion? 
To  articulate  some  of  these  suspicions  more  clearly  I  will  begin  by 
summarising  what  I  think  have  been  the  most  lasting  and  influential 
arguments  against  rhetoric,  and  then  deal  with  each  of  them  in  turn. 
1.  Rhetoric  works  by  appeal  to  emotion,  and  emotion  always  distorts  things. 
Stirring  up  emotion  can  only  cloud  perception  and  encourage  failures  of 
understanding,  exaggeration  and  bias. 
2.  Rhetoric  manipulates  its  audience  through  the  arousal  of  emotion. 
Argument,  by  contrast,  is  not  open  to  this  charge;  it  appeals  directly  to  the 
facts  and  proceeds  deductively.  It  engages  the  rational  subject  and  so  does  not 
indulge  in  manipulation. 
64  A  good  survey  of  the  ancient  literature  which  is  both  historical  and  analytic  is  Wardy's  The 
Birth  of  Rhetoric 
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contrary  claims  or  arguments.  Furthermore  it  is  not  based  in  any  kind  of 
knowledge.  It  is  therefore  empty,  mere  words. 
4.  Rhetoric  can  always  be  put  to  bad  ends;  in  the  hands  of  a  dishonest  orator, 
an  audience  can  be  persuaded  to  endorse  what  is  false  or  pernicious.  A  good 
argument,  on  the  other  hand,  is  always  a  good  argument,  whoever  uses  it, 
because  it  always  bears  the  same  relation  to  truth. 
5.  Rhetoric  (and  art)  seek  to  produce  pleasure  in  their  audiences.  They 
therefore  pander  to  their  listeners'  tastes  just  as,  say,  cookery  does  to  culinary 
pleasures.  Consequently,  they  embody  no  concern  for  what  is  right  or  good. 
6.  Related  to  the  last  objection,  it  is  claimed  that  both  rhetoric  and  art  have  a 
bad  effect  on  the  characters  of  their  audience,  because  in  pandering  to 
pleasures  and  engaging  the  audience's  emotions,  they  appeal  to  the  worst 
element  in  human  beings. 
If  these  arguments  can  be  successfully  dealt  with,  the  possibility  will  be  open 
for  us  to  offer  a  positive  account  of  the  value  of  art  and  rhetoric.  Let  us  turn 
then  to  the  first  objection. 
First  Objection. 
This  first  objection  makes  the  familiar  mistake  of  assuming  that  emotions  can 
only  ever  interfere  with  the  cognitive  processes  of  Reason,  but  do  not 
themselves  involve  the  cognitive  grasp  of  anything.  We  have  seen  that  this  is 
a  mistake.  Emotions  involve  understanding,  and  can  be  rational  and 
appropriate  to  their  object.  It  is  of  course  true  that  emotion  can  distort 
judgement.  But  it  is  also  true  that  our  reasoning  procedures  themselves  can 
lead  to  error.  That  emotions  can  be  inappropriate  or  misleading  is  no  more  an 
argument  against  them  than  the  fact  that  beliefs  and  reasons  can  equally  be 
inappropriate  or  can  mislead  is  an  argument  against  them. 
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What  is  it  to  manipulate  someone?  The  second  objection  offers  an  answer  to 
this  question.  It  claims  that  we  manipulate  someone  when  we  fail  to  engage 
the  agent  himself  (or  his  "autonomous  self')  and  it  then  adds  that  the  real  or 
autonomous  self  is identical  with  the  agent's  Reason.  Subliminal  advertising, 
for  example,  might  be  an  instance  of  such  manipulation  in  that  it  is  said  to 
work  by  a  causal  mechanism  which  bypasses  the  agent's  deliberative 
faculties. 
However,  let  us  suppose  we  accept  the  first  of  these  two  claims,  that 
manipulation  is  a  failure  to  engage  the  real  person,  and  even  his  deliberative 
faculties.  Why,  however,  must  we  also  accept  the  second  claim  that  emotional 
states  play  no  part  in  this?  What  supports  the  claim  that  to  appeal  to 
someone's  emotions  is  not  to  appeal  to  or  engage  the  real  person?  Nothing 
could  support  it  because,  first  of  all,  it  embodies  the  same  basic  error  as  the 
first  objection-  that  is,  that  reason  and  emotion  are  quite  distinct.  But  again, 
this  is  what  has  been  denied  above;  emotions  are  rational.  Furthermore,  it 
simply  assumes  that  the  subject's  "real  self'  is  identical  with  his  "Reason", 
and  this  claim  is  both  unsupported  and  insupportable. 
Third  Objection. 
We  can  break  the  third  objection  down  into  three  separate  charges; 
First,  that  rhetoric  does  not  involve  argument.  Second  that  it  does  not  prove 
or  refute  anything,  and  third,  that  it  is  not  based  on  any  kind  of  knowledge. 
The  first  of  these  is  fairly  obviously  false.  Aristotle,  in  his  treatise  on 
rhetoric,  distinguishes  three  genres;  Epedeictic  or  ceremonial  rhetoric; 
Forensic  rhetoric,  and  Deliberative  rhetoric.  The  last  two  of  these  in 
particular-  suited  to  court-room  persuasion  and  addressing  an  audience  who 
are  faced  with  some  important  decision  to  make,  respectively-  clearly  do 
involve  the  presentation  of  arguments.  Aristotle  is  especially  keen  to  deny 
that  rhetoric  involves  only  appeals  to  emotion.  In  both  these  two  forms  of 
rhetoric,  persuasion  must  involve  a  presentation  and  consideration  of 
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particularly  appropriate  form  of  argument65.  The  "enthymeme"  is  an 
argument  that  is  not  strictly  deductively  valid.  Like  much  rhetorical 
argument  it  relies  on  general  commonly  held  beliefs  ("endoxa").  So  in  the 
forensic  context,  the  orator  might  argue,  for  instance,  that  since  a  suspect's 
footprints  were  at  the  scene  of  the  crime,  his  fingerprints  were  found  on  the 
murder  weapon  and  he  had  harboured  a  grudge  against  the  victim  that  it  is 
reasonable  to  conclude  that  he  was  guilty  of  murder66.  Deliberative  rhetoric 
must  also  be  based  on  arguments  since  the  reliability  of  the  orator's  views  will 
face  the  test  of  time;  events  will  either  prove  him  right  or  wrong,  and  his 
reputation  as  an  orator  will  depend  on  this  outcome. 
Since  it  seems  clear  that  rhetoric  does  involve  argument,  we  might  think 
that  the  rhetorical  elements  are  then  something  over  and  above  the 
arguments,  but  themselves  involve  no  argument.  In  the  forensic  case  just 
described,  the  argument  concerns  the  probability  of  the  suspect's  guilt  given 
the  evidence.  And  as  such  it  stands  or  falls  on  its  own  merits.  The  rhetorical 
elements  enter  in  the  presentation  of  the  argument;  whether  it  is  put  in  such 
a  way  as  to  produce  conviction,  whether  the  speaker  portrays  himself  in  such 
a  way  as  to  inspire  confidence,  whether  his  tone  of  voice,  stock  of  metaphors 
and  so  on,  produce  the  correct  result.  If  this  is  correct,  however,  it  shows  that 
rhetoric  does  have  a  role  in  producing  a  distinct  cognitive  state,  namely 
conviction,  as  opposed  to  mere  belief.  This  is  what  was  argued  above.  So  we 
can  conclude,  I  think,  that  the  first  part  of  the  objection  which  we  started 
with,  has  not  been  substantiated. 
The  second  part  of  this  objection  is  the  claim  that  rhetoric  does  not  refute  or 
prove  anything67.  However,  from  what  we  have  just  said,  it  is  clear  that 
rhetoric  can  refute  and  prove  in  the  uncontroversial  way  that  argument  can, 
because  it  involves  argument.  The  objector,  however,  may  concede  this  point, 
65  The  Art  of  Rhetoric  1368a30ff. 
66  The  example  is  from  Amelie  Rorty,  "Structuring  Rhetoric"  (p.  4)  in  Essays  on  Aristotle's 
Rhetoric,  eds.  Rorty  and  Nussbaum. 
67  This  is  one  of  Plato's  arguments  against  rhetoric  in  the  Gorgias  (472). 
300 but  still  insist  that  it  is  the  arguments  that  prove  and  refute,  not  the  rhetoric. 
And  so  rhetoric  itself  is  incapable  of  proof  or  refutation. 
Certainly,  if  "proof'  is  defined  as  the  conclusion  of  a  deductive  argument, 
then  it  will  of  course  be  true  that  nothing  but  argument  can  result  in  proof. 
However,  if  we  do  not  make  this  stipulation,  then  some  room  remains  for 
things  other  than  deductive  arguments  to  deliver  proof.  I  shall  shortly  give 
reasons  why  we  should  not  make  this  stipulation.  This  will  allow  us  to  claim 
that,  in  addition  to  producing  conviction  (as  opposed  to  belief)  rhetoric  can  be 
a  vehicle  of  proof  in  a  way  in  which  deductive  argument  cannot.  I  will  return 
to  these  points  below. 
The  third  part  of  the  present  objection  is  that  rhetoric  and  art  are  not  based 
on  any  kind  of  knowledge.  This  claim  is  one  that  is  made  by  Plato  in  the  early 
dialogue  Ion68,  in  his  attack  on  rhetoric  in  the  Gorgias69,  and  in  the 
Republic70.  There  are  two  allied  points  here.  First  is  that  the  rhetorician 
possesses  no  expertise  (techne),  no  real  body  of  knowledge  upon  which  his 
activities  are  based.  The  second  is  that  while  the  poet  or  orator  presents  us 
with  images  of  excellence  in  the  form  of  noble  and  heroic  characters,  which 
convince  their  audience,  the  poet  does  not  possess  real  knowledge  of  human 
excellence.  Knowledge  of  the  required  sort  is  the  province  of  dialectic  and 
philosophy.  What  the  poet  produces  is  a  beguiling  appearance  of  excellence.  If 
this  is  correct  then  it  follows  not  only  that  there  is  nothing  that  the  poet 
knows  which  the  philosopher  doesn't  -  quite  the  reverse  in  fact-  but  that 
there  is  nothing  to  be  learned  from  the  writings  of  poets.  Or,  to  be  more 
precise,  nothing  that  we  can  learn  from  them  that  we  couldn't  learn  at  the 
hands  of  the  philosopher,  or  from  some  other  source. 
The  first  of  these  two  points  then  is  that  for  activity  to  be  the  product  of  real 
knowledge,  there  must  be  a  statable  body  of  rules  or  principles  which  are 
tested  and  reliable.  Nothing  which  does  not  meet  the  standards  of  a  techne 
can  count  as  knowledge.  Plato's  examples  of  a  techne  are  medical  and 
ss  Ion  534c-d 
69  Gorgias  459. 
70  Republic  598e-599c. 
301 mathematical  knowledge,  where  it  is  indeed  plausible  that  there  are  such 
bodies  of  principle  and  rule.  But  is  all  knowledge  like  this?  It  was  one  of  the 
main  claims  of  chapter  two  that  this  assumption  is  an  error.  Much  of  our 
understanding  in  different  fields  is  not  the  result  of  grasping  principles  and 
rules  which  can  then  be  formulated,  and  this  is  sufficient  to  defuse  the 
present  objection. 
The  second  point  is  that  real  knowledge  is  arrived  at  through  dialectic,  and 
it  consists  in  general  principles.  Thus  to  answer  a  typical  Socratic  question 
such  as,  "What  is  X?  ",  by  offering  examples  of  X's,  involves  a 
misunderstanding.  The  answer,  whatever  it  is,  will  take  the  form  of  a  general 
account  of  what  X  is  as  such.  Since  poetry  and  rhetoric  do  not  offer  this  kind 
of  knowledge,  they  do  not  offer  real  knowledge  at  all.  In  reading  about  Homer 
or  Anna  Karenina  we  do  not  gain  any  new  knowledge  since  we  are  told 
nothing  that  could  count  as  knowledge.  All  we  are  offered  is  a  detailed 
account  of  the  lives  of  a  group  of  characters.  We  might  try  perhaps  to  cull 
from  art  works  some  kind  of  generalisations;  such  as,  from  Pride  and 
Prejudice-  "Stubborn  pride  and  ignorant  prejudice  keep  attractive  people 
apart";  from  Crime  and  Punishment,  "Punishment  for  a  crime  frightens  a 
criminal  less  than  we  think  because  the  criminal  himself  demands  it"71. 
Perhaps  these  are  truths  that  we  can  claim  to  find  in  these  works,  but  the 
value  of  reading  novels  surely  does  not  consist  in  grasping  them. 
The  objection  can  be  met  if  we  can  show  how  we  can  gain  knowledge  or 
understanding  which  is  not  of  the  general  sort  required  by  Plato.  The  only 
thing  Plato  counts  as  real  knowledge  is  episteme72;  general  truths,  statable  in 
71  The  examples  are  from  J,  Stolnitz,  "On  the  Cognitive  Triviality  of  Art",  British  Journal  of 
Aesthetics,  1992. 
72  Cf.  Christopher  Janaway,  Images  of  Excellence.  Janaway  takes  issue  with  Plato's  account; 
'Plato  suffers  less  from  a  radical  misconception  about  poetry  than  from  his  severe  and 
outlandish  conception  of  what  qualifies  as  knowledge.  One  powerful  reply  to  Plato...  begins 
with  the  thought  that  there  is  a  knowledge  that  is  best  acquired  from  imaginative 
engagement  with  images  of  human  beings  in  the  particularity  of  their  actions  and  feelings:  ' 
(p.  130).  It  is  of  course  true  that  in  Plato's  account  of  our  grasp  of  the  Form  of  the  Good  (in  the 
Republic)  this  insistence  on  propositional  knowledge  is  abandoned.  The  image  of  the  sun  as 
302 propositional  form.  The  assumption  Plato  makes  is  that  in  the  case  of  ethical 
understanding,  for  example,  anything  that  could  count  as  such  understanding 
will  consist  in  the  grasp  of  some  general  propositions.  But  perhaps  not  all 
learning  and  understanding  is  of  this  sort.  Below  I  will  argue  that  Plato  is 
mistaken  in  this  assumption  and  that  therefore  it  is  the  case  both  that  art 
may  be  based  on  knowledge  and  that  we  can  learn  from  it  things  we  cannot 
learn  from  philosophy. 
This  completes  my  consideration  of  the  third  objection,  with  two  points 
outstanding  which  will  be  addressed  below. 
Fourth  Objection. 
The  fourth  objection  suggests  a  difference  between  rhetoric  and  dialectic  or 
argument;  namely  that  while  a  good  argument  is  always  a  good  argument  (ie; 
validly  deduced,  with  true  conclusions  etc.  )  successful  persuasion  is  not 
always  good  but  can  easily  be  put  to  bad  ends,  for  example  if  used  by  a  wicked 
orator.  So,  rhetoric  and  dialectic  do  not  bear  the  same  relation  to  knowledge 
and  truth.  This  is  another  of  Plato's  objections  from  the  Gorgias73.  We  might 
sum  it  up  this  way;  knowledge  and  truth  have  intrinsic  value,  which  is  always 
the  same,  since  what  is  true  does  not  become  any  the  less  true  given  a  change 
of  circumstances.  Rhetoric,  on  the  other  hand,  only  possesses  instrumental 
value;  if  it  is  used  to  good  ends  then  it  may  be  valuable,  but  if  used  in  pursuit 
of  what  is  not  good  then  it  loses  its  value. 
This  objection  is  taken  up  by  Aristotle  in  his  treatise  on  rhetoric.  In  the 
Gorgias,  Socrates's  interlocutor  had  claimed  that  rhetoric  should  never  be  put 
to  unjust  ends.  Aristotle  makes  a  stronger  claim;  he  admits  that  rhetorical 
persuasion  can  go  wrong  in  the  relevant  sense,  but  he  claims  that  there  is  less 
danger  of  this  than  we  might  suppose,  and  the  reason  he  offers  in  support  of 
his  optimism  is  the  belief  that  truth  is  naturally  more  convincing  than 
something  that  resists  codification  and  requires  to  be  seen  suggests  the  importance  of 
perception.  However  this  qualification  does  not  substantially  effect  the  present  point. 
73  Gorgias  461. 
303 untruth.  74This  is  connected,  in  Aristotle,  with  his  view  (Metaphysics  989A21) 
that  "people  naturally  desire  to  know"  :  So  Aristotle's  reply  to  the  Socratic 
objection  is  that  we  have  a  natural  disposition  to  be  convinced  by  the  truth 
rather  than  by  falsehood,  and  this  constitutes  a  limit  on  the  extent  to  which 
rhetoric  can  be  misused.  No  doubt  Aristotle  is  here  being  over-optimistic 
about  the  extent  to  which  people  do  desire  the  truth  rather  than  pleasing 
falsehood.  It  is  not  really  clear  either  why  truth  should  be  intrinsically  more 
convincing  than  falsehood. 
In  any  case,  even  if  we  are  forced  to  concede  Socrates'  point,  how  damaging 
is  it  to  the  case  for  rhetoric?  What  follows  from  the  fact  that  we  can  persuade 
someone  of  what  is  not  true?  As  remarked  in  the  discussion  of  the  previous 
objection,  what  the  defender  of  rhetoric  wants  to  maintain  is  first;  that 
rhetoric  involves  conviction  rather  than  simply  belief,  and  that  argument 
typically  leads  to  belief;  second,  there  are  cases  where  rhetoric  can  be  a  means 
of  proof,  which  argument  cannot.  Are  either  of  these  two  claims  threatened  by 
the  present  objection?  I  don't  think  so.  Both  of  these  claims  are  compatible 
with  the  acknowledgement  that  there  is  a  range  of  instances  in  which 
persuasion  convinces  us  of  what  is  false  rather  than  true.  In  addition,  it  is  not 
so  obvious  that  argument  itself  does  not  lead,  on  occasion,  to  false  beliefs. 
Consider  someone  being  led  through  the  steps  of  Zeno's  or  the  Sorites 
Paradox.  They  might  (falsely)  be  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the  arrow  will 
never  reach  its  target  or  that  there  is  no  clear  distinction  between  baldness 
and  having  hair.  In  acquiring  such  beliefs,  they  may  of  course  remain 
unconvinced  by  them,  but  there  is  nothing  to  stop  them  acquiring  such  false 
beliefs. 
Fifth  Objection. 
This  objection  is  also  due  to  Plato75.  The  idea  is  that  dialectic  proceeds  by 
argument;  example,  counter-example,  refutation76  are  its  usual  methods. 
74  Rhetoric  (1355A37-8);  "to  speak  without  qualification,  what  is  true  and  what  is  better  are 
always  naturally  easier  to  argue  for  and  more  persuasive.  " 
75  Gorgias  467. 
304 Rhetoric  does  not  attempt  to  instruct  its  audience  in  this  way,  since  such 
instruction  is  demanding  in  a  variety  of  ways.  Instead  it  appeals  to  the  lowest 
common  denominator-  pleasure.  Dialectic  aims  at  truth,  while  rhetoric  aims 
at  conviction.  It  achieves  this  through  appeal  to  pleasure,  and  in  this  way 
shows  little  or  no  regard  for  truth  or  the  good.  Like  many  television 
programmes,  for  example,  rhetoric  panders  to  low  tastes,  with  no  regard  to 
whether  the  pleasure  is  appropriate  or  good. 
In  replying  to  this  objection,  should  the  defender  of  rhetoric  admit  that  it 
can  be  used  to  appeal  to  low  tastes,  or  should  he  try  to  insist  that  this  is 
impossible?  In  the  same  spirit  as  our  previous  reply,  it  seems  better  to  allow 
that  rhetoric  can  involve  an  appeal  to  cheap  emotion;  it  can  seek  to  gratify  a 
crowd  by  whipping  up  emotion  of  a  pleasant  sort  (pleasant  wrath  or  self- 
righteous  indignation,  for  example.  ).  But  what  follows  from  this?  In 
particular,  does  it  follow  that  rhetoric  always  and  only  does  this?  Surely  not. 
We  may  want  to  accept  that  a  large  amount  of  everyday  political  rhetoric,  for 
example,  involves  such  appeals.  Politicians  may  appeal  to  nationalist 
emotions  as  a  means  of  currying  favour  for  a  given  policy,  and  such  appeals 
may  be  a  calculated  dodge.  There  may  be  tricky  and  substantive  issues  the 
politician  is  attempting  to  gloss  over.  But  in  conceding  this,  we  are  not  forced 
to  admit  that  the  same  must  true  of  any  use  of  rhetoric. 
By  comparison,  Martin  Luther  King's  famous  "I  have  a  dream"  speech 
might  be  defended  as  an  attempt  to  appeal  to  and  arouse  emotions  that  are 
appropriate  to  the  context.  Indeed,  we  might  argue  that  the  emotional 
response  is  precisely  what  the  situation  requires.  This  last  point  has  divided 
legal  theorists.  There  are  those  who  claim  that  legal  argument  can  never 
legitimately  appeal  to  emotion,  and  there  are  others  who  argue  that  an 
appropriate  emotional  response  is  often  what  is  required  if  we  can  be  thought 
to  have  grasped  the  situation  correctly.  77  These  are  points  I  will  return  to 
76  There  is  disagreement  over  whether  the  Socratic  elenchus  can  be  strictly  a  refutation,  since 
what  it  really  consists  of  is  pointing  to  a  contradiction  implicit  or  explicit  in  what  has  been 
said.  Neither  of  these  contradictory  views  has  yet  been  refuted. 
77  These  issues  are  explored  in  more  detail  by  Nussbaum  in  her  Poetic  Justice. 
305 below,  but  for  the  present,  it  should  be  clear  that  we  are  not  forced  by  the 
present  objection  to  concede  that  rhetoric  always  appeals  to  low  emotion 
without  regard  to  what  is  good  or  appropriate.  The  same  is  true  of  art. 
Dickens,  for  instance,  occasionally  succumbs  to  lapses  of  judgement-  the 
death  of  Little  Nell  is  a  notorious  example  of  appeal  to  emotion  which  is 
generally  agreed  to  be  sentimental.  Generally,  however,  his  writing  does  not 
suffer  from  this  defect.  He  appeals  to  emotion,  certainly,  often  as  a  means  of 
convincing  us  of  some  social  evil,  but  both  the  appeal  and  the  emotions 
aroused  are  usually  appropriate.  The  present  objection  therefore  fails. 
Sixth  Objection. 
The  final  objection  also  features  in  Plato78.  It  is  related  to  the  previous 
objection  via  the  pleasure-giving  qualities  of  art.  The  charge  in  essence  is  that 
by  taking  pleasure  in  the  fate  of  fictional  heroes  and  characters,  at  the  safe 
distance  afforded  by  their  fictional  status,  we  let  down  our  guard  and  fail  to 
recognise  the  fact  that  these  emotions  will  insinuate  themselves  into  our  real 
lives.  There  are  at  least  two  points  which  need  to  be  distinguished  in  this 
claim.  One  is  the  point  that  by  allowing  ourselves  to  take  pleasure  in  the 
misfortunes  of  fictional  characters,  the  effect  of  this  will  be  to  distance 
ourselves  from  our  own  experience-  to  aestheticise  it  and  ultimately  take 
pleasure  in  it79.  A  second  point  is  that  by  appeal  to  the  lower  part  of  our 
nature,  the  rational  part  of  us  is  subordinated,  and  this  has  a  pernicious  effect 
on  our  character.  This  charge  shares  something  with  the  first  objection 
considered  above,  that  bypassing  rationality  is  a  danger  because  it  is  an 
abandoning  of  self-mastery  and  ultimately  selfhood. 
How  should  we  respond  to  this  attack?  First  of  all,  we  should  not  be  too 
quick  to  dismiss  Plato's  thinking  here.  If  we  are  at  all  optimistic  about  the 
role  of  literature  in  the  educational  process,  we  shall  have  to  endorse  the 
78  Especially  Republic  (606-7). 
79  VVhile  this  objection  is  primarily  directed  at  art  rather  than  rhetoric,  rhetoric  may  itself 
urge  emotional  responses  to  fictional  deeds  and  characters,  and  to  that  extent  is  open  to  the 
same  attack. 
306 claim  that  imaginative  engagement  with  fictional  characters,  and  especially 
the  emotions  aroused  in  response  to  them,  can  play  some  role  in  the  process  of 
altering  our  real-life  emotional  responses.  This  point  has  been  argued  in  a 
previous  chapter.  But  if  we  concede  that  imaginative  engagement  with 
fictions  can  have  this  kind  of  effect  upon  real  life,  we  leave  open  the  kind  of 
possibility  that  worries  Plato.  For  the  easiest  response  to  Plato's  challenge  is 
simply  to  declare  that  our  responses  to  fictions  have  no  bearing  on  our  real 
emotions  and  attitudes.  Contemporary  controversy  about  the  effect  of 
television80,  say  -  and  in  particular  of  television  violence-  on  the  emotions  and 
character  of  viewers,  raises  the  same  issue.  And  it  is  a  fairly  typical  response 
to  this  kind  of  allegation  to  simply  deny  that  any  such  relation  exists.  But  to 
insist  on  this  also  involves  cutting  off  the  same  route  by  which  fictions  might 
educate. 
In  view  of  this,  I  think  we  should  refrain  from  this  response.  In  addition,  we 
might  object  that  it  is  one  thing  to  take  pleasure  in  the  misfortunes  of  Don 
Quixote  or  even  Ana  Karenina,  and  another  to  take  pleasure  in  the  graphic 
depiction  of  violent  acts.  What  is  found  pleasant  will  be  different  in  these 
cases.  The  first  two  cases  arguably  involve  aesthetic  elements  lacking  in  the 
third.  Is  it  possible  nevertheless  that  someone  could  come  to  enjoy  the 
depiction  of  violent  acts?  Nothing  can  rule  this  out.  However  experience 
suggests  that  even  repeated  viewing  of  such  scenes  may  not  lessen  their 
repellent  aspect  for  most  viewers.  Most  viewers  come  to  such  scenes  with 
fairly  deeply  entrenched  reactions  towards  suffering.  It  is  difficult  to  say  with 
any  precision  what  conditions  are  required  to  alter  a  person's  attitude 
towards,  say,  scenes  of  torture,  so  that  they  come  to  take  pleasure  in  them, 
but  it  is  plausible  to  think  that  a  considerable  revolution  in  attitude  is 
necessary.  However,  such  a  revolution  is  not  required  for  us  to  aestheticise 
our  own  experience.  This  is  something  we  can  slip  into  almost  unnoticed.  So 
Plato  is  perhaps  on  more  solid  ground  in  this  case.  But  again,  we  can  grant 
the  presence  of  this  danger  without  being  forced  to  admit  that  it  always 
80  The  parallel  between  Plato's  argument  and  debates  about  television  is  pointed  out  by  A. 
Nehamas  in  "Plato  and  the  Mass  Media",  Monist  1988. 
307 occurs.  Furthermore  Plato  seems  simply  mistaken  in  his  claim  that  art 
bypasses  our  reasoning  faculty;  when  we  respond  to  fictions  we  usually  think 
our  responses  are  appropriate  to  their  objects.  He  seems  to  be  wrong  then  to 
insist  that  art  always  appeals  to  a  lower  part  of  the  soul. 
This  concludes  my  review  of  the  main  objections  to  art  and  rhetoric  outlined 
above.  I  have  not  claimed  that  these  objections  are  exhaustive.  However,  they 
do  represent  the  most  persistent  sources  of  hostility  to  rhetoric  in  the  relevant 
literature.  If  they  can  be  successfully  rebutted-  as  I  have  claimed  they  can  be- 
we  shall  be  well  on  the  way  to  a  defence  of  rhetoric  and  art.  However,  there 
remain  two  points  which  I  left  outstanding  in  the  discussion  above.  The  first 
was  the  claim  that  rhetoric  can,  in  addition  to  being  a  source  of  conviction 
distinct  from  argument,  itself  be  a  form  of  proof.  The  second  was  the  claim 
that  there  can  be  understanding  and  knowledge  which  is  unlike  the  episteme 
which  Plato  focuses  on.  If  correct,  this  would  allow  us  to  see  how  we  could 
learn  things  from  literature  which  we  cannot  learn  from  philosophy.  81 
How  could  rhetoric  itself  be  a  form  of  proof?  What  makes  us  hostile  to  the 
claim  that  it  could  be  is,  I  suggest,  our  conventional  ideas  about  proof  and 
rationality.  That  is,  we  typically  assume  that  a  good  argument  is  one  that 
begins  from  premises  which  any  rational  person  will  accept  as  true  and 
proceeds  by  valid  deductions  to  a  conclusion  which  is  also  true.  It  is  easy  to 
81  A  recent  account  of  our  understanding  of  works  of  fiction,  which  is  parallel  in  some  respects 
to  Plato's,  is  that  of  Lamarque  and  Olsen; 
"...  if  literary  works  are  construed  as  having  the  constitutive  aim  of  advancing  truths  about 
human  concerns  by  means  of  general  propositions  implicitly  or  explicitly  contained  in  them, 
then  one  should  expect  some  kind  of  supporting  argument,  the  more  so  since  the  purported 
truths  are  mostly  controversial.  However,  there  are  no  such  arguments  or  debates,  either  in 
the  works  themselves  or  in  literary  criticism.  ",  Lamarque  and  Olsen,  Truth,  Fiction  and 
Literature,  p.  368. 
The  authors  then  argue  that  since,  "knowledge  is  achieved  by  marshalling  evidence  for 
whatever  truth-claim  is  being  made"  (p.  368),  the  only  possible  way  to  argue  for  the  cognitive 
status  of  literary  works  is  either,  "  to  redefine  the  concepts  of  knowledge  and  truth-seeking,  at 
least  loosening  the  connection  with  supportive  evidence  and  argument  "  (p.  369),  or  to  concede 
that  whatever  value  literary  works  have,  it  does  not  lie  in  the  cognitive  contribution  they 
make.  It  is  the  first  of  these  strategies  I  am  pursuing  here. 
308 assume  that  this  is  what  rationality  must  be.  Such  a  picture  of  rationality  has 
already  been  confronted  in  chapter  three  when  we  looked  at  the  ideas  of 
Jonathan  Dancy  and  John  McDowell,  who  argue  -  adopting  arguments  of 
Wittgenstein  -  that  this  misconceives  the  nature  of  our  understanding.  The 
assumption  lying  behind  it  is  that  if  an  issue  or  attitude  is  capable  of  proof 
then  that  proof  is  something  which  will  convince  all  rational  agents  and  is 
statable  in  propositional  form.  And  we  assume  that  both  these  are  necessary 
features  of  anything  that  can  be  called  rational.  But  the  problem  with  this 
account-  as  I  have  already  argued-  is  that  the  starting  points,  the 
"uncontroversial"  premises,  may  not  be  obviously  true  to  everyone.  Seeing  the 
truth  of  the  premise  may  require  judgement  and  perception-  "correct  seeing" 
in  Aristotle's  terms  . 
The  fact  that  we  have  to  be  able  to  see  that  the  starting 
point  is  true  means,  of  course,  that  we  cannot  arrive  at  its  truth  as  the  result 
of  a  further  argument.  But  if  this  is  correct,  there  will  be  a  crucial  gap  in  our 
understanding  which  argument  itself  cannot  fill. 
In  moral  and  aesthetic  contexts,  for  instance,  there  is,  notoriously,  no  valid 
deductive  argument  whose  conclusion  is  that,  for  example,  a  given  action  is 
selfish,  or  that  a  certain  architectural  form  is  beautiful.  82 
Several  objections  may  spring  to  mind  at  this  point.  In  the  first  place  it 
might  be  doubted  that  anything  "perceived"  in  this  way  could  be  objective  in 
the  way  we  required  for  proof.  Secondly,  we  might  insist  that  only  what  is 
deductively  valid  could  be  proof.  These  objections  are  however  mistaken.  First 
of  all,  there  are  many  things  I  know  to  be  true  without  having  them  proved  to 
me.  When  I  am  in  pain,  I  neither  have  nor  require  proof  that  I  am  in  pain;  at 
least,  if  anything  is  proof  then  the  pain  certainly  is.  This  then  is  a  kind  of 
knowledge  that  does  not  require  proof  -  knowledge  by  acquaintance,  perhaps. 
So  it  is  clear  that  deductive  argument  is  not  the  only  legitimate  route  to 
knowledge.  And  the  notion  of  legitimacy  is  what  motivates  the  value  we 
ascribe  to  "proof';  we  mean  something  like  some  consideration  that  leads 
82  It  may  however  be  possible  to  offer  an  argument  to  the  effect  that  someone  is  selfish,  which 
relies  on  acceptance  of  the  fact  that  certain  behaviour,  for  instance,  betrays  a  selfish  nature. 
But  this  connection  is  not  itself  deductively  established. 
309 appropriately  to  correct  understanding.  "Proof'  is  a  normative  idea.  But  once 
we  accept  this,  we  can  see  that  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  only 
argument  could  provide  an  appropriate  basis. 
The  same  point  can  be  put  using  the  notion  of  rationality.  When  completing 
the  arithmetic  series  2,4,6,8...  is  it  rational  to  think  that  the  next  number  will 
be  10?  We  would  normally  think  it  is,  but  the  question  raises  all  the  issues 
about  rule-following  discussed  in  chapter  two.  Those  arguments  show  that 
there  is  no  deductively  valid  argument  to  prove  that  10  is  the  correct  choice.  If 
it  is  rational  to  complete  the  series  in  that  way  what  makes  us  accept  this  is 
at  bottom  a  certain  grasp  of  things,  a  perspective,  a  way  of  seeing.  And  this 
cannot  itself  be  the  result  of  argument. 
I  have  argued  that  we  should  accept  that  things  other  than  argument  can 
count  as  proof,  where  that  means  some  kind  of  consideration  which  leads 
appropriately  to  correct  understanding.  For  instance,  in  coming  to  see  that  an 
action  is  selfish  or  the  form  of  a  building  is  beautiful,  I  will  perhaps  listen  to 
the  description  of  someone  who  already  sees  things  in  that  way,  and  try,  by 
exercising  some  imagination,  to  think  myself  into  this  point  of  view.  The 
description  however  leads  appropriately  to  my  correct  perception,  although  it 
is  only  seen  to  be  appropriate  from  within  the  perspective  attained. 
One  function  of  rhetoric,  and  of  some  art,  is  to  facilitate  the  process  of 
correct  perception.  In  the  case  of  rhetoric,  a  speech  such  as  Martin  Luther 
King's  "I  have  a  dream"  or  Lincoln's  Gettysburg  Address  is  a  conscious 
attempt  to  encourage  the  correct  perspective  in  the  audience.  But  in  these 
cases,  the  correct  perspective  is  one  that  involves  emotion.  Here  we  meet 
again  the  claim  that  emotion  is  itself  a  kind  of  right  seeing,  and  something 
distinct  from  belief.  So  we  have  three  claims  about  rhetoric;  that  it  can  lead  to 
correct  seeing;  that  this  correct  seeing  is  a  kind  of  conviction,  distinct  from 
belief;  and  lastly,  that  the  correct  seeing  involved  requires  an  emotional 
response83,. 
83  In  other  words,  good  rhetoric  produces  convincing  phantasia,  and  convincing  phantasia  are 
those  which  produce  the  emotional  response.  Other  writers  have  noted  the  connection 
between  phantasia  and  rhetoric;  A.  Rorty  "Structuring  Rhetoric"  (p.  20-21),  G.  Striker, 
310 Someone  listening  to  King's  speech  will  hopefully  have  a  vivid  sense  of  the 
injustices  of  racism  and  the  nobility  of  the  ideals  King  describes84.  And  it 
seems  that  poems  and  novels  can  perform  a  similar  function.  85  Where  they 
succeed,  they  produce  understanding  by  (ideally)  appropriate  means.  But  if 
we  are  prepared  to  grant  this,  we  seem  to  be  allowing  that  the  understanding 
or  knowledge  which  such  works  afford  us  is  not  propositional  in  nature. 
Reading  Anna  Karenina  does  not  convince  us  of  the  truth  of  some  general 
proposition86.  But  how  then  can  it  amount  to  knowledge  at  all?  This  brings  us 
to  the  second  point  I  promised  to  pick  up  from  the  previous  discussion.  How 
can  there  be  real  knowledge  which  is  not  in  the  form  of  episteme,  as  Plato 
claimed?  If  we  want  to  defend  the  importance  of  literature  as  a  source  of 
"Emotions  in  Context;  Aristotle's  Treatment  of  the  Passions"  (p.  289)  (Both  in  A.  Rorty  ed. 
Essays  on  Aristotle's  Rhetoric);  and  R.  Wardy  The  Birth  of  Rhetoric  (p.  114-115).  On  Aristotle's 
treatment  of  phantasia  itself,  I  have  drawn  on;  M.  Schofield,  "Aristotle  on  the  Imagination", 
D.  Frede  "The  Cognitive  Role  of  Phantasia"  (Both  in  A.  Rorty  ed.  Essays  on  Aristotle's  De 
Anima)  and  M.  Nussbaum,  Aristotle's  De  Motu  Animalium,  essay  five;  R.  Sorabji,  Animal 
Minds  and  Human  Morals,  chs.  1-4;  Nussbaum,  "Aristotle  on  Emotions  and  Ethical  Health" 
in  The  Therapy  of  Desire;  Nancy  Sherman,  Making  a  Necessity  of  Virtue,  ch.  2.4. 
84  King's  speech  also  serves  as  a  good  reminder  that  the  speaker  plays  a  crucial  role.  First,  as 
Aristotle  notes  (Art  of  Rhetoric),  the  speaker  portrays  himself  as  a  certain  kind  of  character- 
as  trustworthy,  and  so  on.  But  whether  a  speaker  can  achieve  this  effect  will  depend  on 
factors  about  him  beyond  his  control.  Voice  and  visual  aspect  are  important  factors  in  the 
overall  impression,  and  must  be  acknowledged  in  any  account  of  the  factors  which  make 
rhetoric  "convincing". 
85  In  her  article  "Anything  but  Argument?  "(Philosophical  Investigations  1985)  Cora  Diamond 
also  argues  against  the  monopoly  of  argument  and  in  support  of  the  role  of  literature  as  a 
source  of  conviction.  She  compares  a  philosophical  argument  to  the  effect  that  killing  animals 
simply  to  eat  them  is  immoral  (the  argument  is  Peter  Singer's)  with  a  satirical  poem.  The 
poem  works  by  encouraging  a  cosy  view  of  farm  animals  and  our  relationship  to  them,  then 
brutally  breaks  the  spell  of  this  illusion  in  a  way  that  highlights  the  inconsistencies  in  our 
attitudes  towards  animals.  Both  of  these  can  be  convincing  in  their  different  ways,  and  both, 
she  claims,  can  be  appropriate  grounds  for  change  of  perception  and  understanding. 
8s  See  note  72  above. 
311 learning  there  are  several  questions  we  must  address87.  Do  works  of  art 
embody  knowledge,  and  if  so,  what  sort  of  knowledge;  and  secondly  why  is 
this  knowledge  something  that  could  not  be  grasped  by  other  means-  through 
philosophical  dialectic88,  for  instance?  Plato,  even  in  the  later  dialogues, 
particularly  the  Phaedrus,  in  which  his  hostility  towards  poetry  is  modified 
and  he  allows  it  a  valuable  role,  still  insists  that  is  only  a  supplement  to 
philosophical  enquiry,  which  remains  the  real  source  of  knowledge.  So  what 
can  we  learn  from  novels  that  can  only  be  learned  from  them? 
Nussbaum  offers  three  considerations  in  support  of  the  art  work89.  First,  if 
we  assume  that  there  is  a  level  of  generality  at  which  we  can  state  the 
content  of  a  work  of  art,  such  as  the  examples  given  above  from  Pride  and 
Prejudice  and  Crime  and  Punishment  (see  n.  72)  then  these  are  surely 
propositions  which  philosophy  can  show  to  be  either  true  or  false.  So  if  this  is 
what  we  understand  from  novels,  then  it  is  hard  to  see  why  we  need  a  novel 
to  grasp  it.  Indeed  it  may  in  some  cases  seem  that  dialectic  is  the  only 
legitimate  means  of  establishing  the  truth  of  such  claims.  Nussbaum's 
response  is  to  argue  that  even  these  general  claims  cannot  easily  be  evaluated 
by  philosophical  method.  What  such  evaluation  would  require  is  looking  in 
detail  at  a  specific  case  which  can  then  be  said  to  be  typical  in  certain 
respects.  But  the  need  for  detail,  for  the  in-depth  depiction  of  a  particular  case 
is  what  the  novel  provides  and  what  dialectic  cannot90.  Nussbaum's  example 
87  The  following  discussion  draws  on  Martha  Nussbaum's  "Flawed  Crystals"  and  other  papers 
in  her  collection  Love's  Knowledge. 
88  Nussbaum  (p.  6-7)  offers  the  comparison  of  children  learning  mathematics  through  stories. 
It  may  be  that  this  makes  learning  easier  but  there  is  nothing  about  such  knowledge  which 
could  only  be  grasped  in  this  way. 
89  Nussbaum  (op.  cit)  p.  140-142. 
90  Here  we  can  distinguish  at  least  two  kinds  of  contribution  novels  might  make.  The  first  is 
that  novels  are  capable  of  the  kind  of  detailed  description  of  the  complexity  of  situation  and 
character  which  we  require  for  real  understanding.  Philosophical  style  (see  Nussbaum's  third 
point,  below)  cannot  deliver  this  kind  of  complexity. 
Secondly,  as  has  been  argued  above,  novels  may  offer  a  kind  of  understanding  that  is,  as  we 
might  put  it,  "perspectival".  One  feature  of  such  understanding,  which  has  been  argued  above, 
is  that  what  is  understood  is  not  available  from  all  perspectives  (Dancy  and  McDowell's 
312 is  drawn  form  Henry  James'  The  Golden  Bowl  which  offers  the  detailed 
depiction  of  the  relationship  between  a  father  and  daughter.  A  full  grasp  of 
the  ethical  dimensions  of  the  characters,  their  deliberations  and  perceptions, 
Nussbaum  claims,  is  the  kind  of  thing  needed  to  support  any  general 
proposition  we  might  reach  on  the  basis  of  it.  So  dialectic  alone  is 
inadequately  equipped  to  provide  this  sort  of  understanding. 
The  second  consideration  Nussbaum  offers  is  that  lying  behind  the  Platonic 
claim  about  episteme  is  the  assumption,  applied  to  ethical  knowledge,  that 
understanding  must  consist  in  the  grasp  of  general  principles.  However  we 
have  already  seen  reason  -  in  chapter  three-  to  doubt  this  account  of 
understanding.  First  of  all,  grasp  of  general  principles  will  be  insufficient  to 
cope  with  the  complexity  of  decision-making.  Second,  understanding  may  be 
the  sort  of  thing  which  is  only  shown  in  the  grasp  of  particulars. 
Understanding  is,  in  another  sense,  however,  general-  we  can  apply  it 
generally  to  a  range  of  cases.  It  may  also  be  universalisable,  at  least  within 
broad  limits91.  Someone  may  have  a  grasp  of  general  principles  and  have 
point).  This  bears  a  relation  to  Thomas  Nagel's  discussion  of  subjectivity.  Nagel  claims  that 
not  all  knowledge  should  be  thought  of  as  grasped  from  a  completely  external  point  of  view. 
Much  of  our  knowledge  is  in  one  sense  subjective  (see  discussion  in  previous  section)  -  for 
instance  our  knowledge  of  what  it  is  like.  It  therefore  seems  plausible  to  suggest  that  novels 
offer  knowledge  of  just  this  sort. 
Lamarque  and  Olsen  object  to  this  claim  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  not  legitimate  to  assert 
that  understanding  based  on  experience  in  this  way  constitutes  knowledge; 
"...  it  seems  a  much  less  acceptable  extension  of  terminology  to  say  that  an  experience  as  such 
can  be  a  kind  of  knowledge  (albeit  "subjective"  knowledge,  or  "knowledge  what  it  is  like").  It  is 
more  plausible  to  suppose,  not  that  the  experience  is  the  knowledge,  but  that  knowledge 
arises  as  a  result  of  the  experience.  "  (  Truth,  Fiction  and  Literature  p.  373) 
However,  I  do  not  share  these  intuitions;  it  seems  to  me  perfectly  acceptable  usage  to  say 
that  perceptual  experience  say,  of  colour,  is  knowledge  of  colour.  To  insist  that  this  at  best 
gives  rise  to  knowledge  is  simply  to  insist  that  that  all  knowledge  must  be  "knowledge  that...  ". 
But  this  assumption  seems  highly  questionable,  indeed  false. 
9'  Although  what  counts  as  "same  case"  precludes  any  crude  universalisability.  In  addition 
there  may  areas  of  our  lives  where  universalisability  is  not  a  requirement;  eg  the  cases 
discussed  by  Winch  in  "Universalisability". 
313 general  beliefs  about  good  conduct,  expressible  using  them,  but  conspicuously 
fail  when  it  comes  to  particular  cases.  This  may  be  either  because,  although 
they  have  the  general  principles  they  are  unable  to  correctly  apply  them,  or 
simply  because  the  rules  are  themselves  simply  not  sufficiently  fine-grained 
to  cope  with  specific  cases.  The  first  of  these  two  difficulties  shows  that  even  if 
the  person  deliberating  possesses  rules,  understanding  them  must  amount  to 
more  than  the  mere  grasp  of  the  rules.  Knowing  when  they  apply  is  not 
something  that  can  be  explained  in  terms  by  referring  to  the  rules 
themselves,  on  pain  of  infinite  regress.  This  suggests  that  if  literature  can 
help  in  the  learning  process,  it  will  do  so  by  educating  perception;  but  this 
process  is  certainly  not  one  of  acquiring  general  propositions  of  the  sort  that 
would  meet  the  standards  of  episteme92. 
The  third  point  made  by  Nussbaum  concerns  style.  If  the  job  of 
understanding  requires  the  presentation  of  particulars,  then  the  style  of 
moral  philosophy  is  not  conducive  to  it; 
"..  it  cannot  easily  be  done  by  texts  which  speak  with  the  hardness  or 
plainness  which  moral  philosophy  has  traditionally  chosen  for  itself-  for  how 
can  this  style  at  all  convey  the  way  in  which  "the  matter  of  the  practical' 
appears  before  the  agent  in  all  of  its  bewildering  complexity,  without  its 
morally  salient  feature  stamped  on  its  face".  (P.  142) 
Under  pressure  from  the  idea  that  moral  theory  -  if  it  is  to  count  as 
knowledge  -  must  be  something  that  meets  the  standards  of  techne  and 
episteme  as  Plato  sees  them,  the  style  of  philosophical  writing  in  matters  of 
ethics,  broadly  construed,  is  often  chosen  to  meet  this  standard  rather  than  as 
a  means  of  promoting  real  understanding.  93  These  points  support  the  claim 
92  Nussbaum  quotes  Wittgenstein;  "Can  one  learn  this  knowledge?  Yes;  some  can.  Not, 
however,  by  taking  a  course  in  it,  but  through  "experience"-  Can  someone  else  be  a  man's 
teacher  in  this?  Certainly.  From  time  to  time  he  gives  him  the  right  tip.  -  That  is  what 
"learning"  and  "teaching"  are  like  here.  -  What  one  acquires  here  is  not  a  technique;  one 
learns  correct  judgements.  There  are  also  rules,  but  they  do  not  form  a  system,  and  only 
experienced  people  can  apply  them  right.  "  (Philosophical.  Investigations.  part  2,  sect,  227e) 
93  Other  writers  concur  with  Nussbaum  in  this  diagnosis.  Michael  Tanner,  after  taking  a  wry 
look  at  W.  Newton  Smith's  conditional  analysis  of  the  concept  of  love  concludes,  "What  is 
314 that  understanding  is  not  simply  a  grasp  of  generalities,  but  a  "discernment 
of  particulars".  This  is  the  approach  to  understanding  that  was  described  and 
defended  in  chapter  two,  and  it  shows  how  art  can  be  a  source  of 
understanding  which  philosophical  argument  cannot  provide94. 
In  addition  to  the  three  arguments  offered  by  Nussbaum,  we  may  add,  I 
think,  a  more  general  one.  In  thinking  about  understanding  a  proposition, 
say,  it  is  easy  to  suppose  that  what  is  grasped  is  strictly  limited,  or  finite. 
Take  for  example  the  proposition  that  "many  memories  tend  with  time  to 
become  exaggerated  or  distorted  and  ultimately  untrue".  What  does 
understanding  this  come  to?  Certainly,  a  grasp  of  the  meanings  of  the  words, 
and  of  the  sentence  as  a  whole  is  required.  But  is  that  sufficient  for  real 
understanding?  An  alternative  picture  might  be  that  such  understanding  is 
the  starting  point,  but  that  understanding  is  really  a  process  that  is  open- 
ended;  we  discover  more  of  what  the  proposition  means  in  detail,  for  instance, 
as  we  live  through  circumstances  in  which  it  is  borne  out.  But  this  filling  out 
is  not  merely  a  supplement  to  understanding  the  proposition,  it  is 
understanding.  Consider  the  following  passage  from  Harriet  Doerr's  novel 
"Stones  for  Ibarrd'95; 
"Every  day  for  a  month  Richard  has  reminded  Sara,  "We  mustn't  expect  too 
much".  And  each  time  his  wife  has  answered,  "No".  But  the  Evertons  expect 
too  much.  They  have  experienced  the  terrible  persuasion  of  a  great-aunt's 
recollections  and  adopted  them  as  their  own.  They  have  not  considered  that 
memories  are  like  corks  left  out  of  bottles.  They  swell.  They  no  longer  fit". 
needed  is  a  recognition  that  there  are  other  modes  of  rigour  and  precision  than  quasi-formal 
ones,  and  ways  of  being  profound  that  do  not  require  near  unintelligibility".  (Nussbaum  p.  20) 
94  Lamarque  and  Olsen  (Truth,  Fiction  and  Literature  p.  386ff.  )  object  to  Nussbaum's  view  on 
the  grounds  that,  as  an  account  of  the  value  of  art,  it  is  inadequate.  Were  this  the  intent  of 
Nussbaum's  account,  they  would  have  a  point,  since  clearly  not  all  art  works  aim  to  provide 
(ethical)  understanding  in  the  way  Nussbaum  describes.  But  taken  simply  as  an  argument  to 
the  effect  that  some  art  works  contribute  to  our  understanding  in  this  way,  the  objection  is 
beside  the  point. 
95  Quoted  in  Feagin,  Reading  with  Feeling  p.  26. 
315 This  short  passage,  and  the  simile  with  which  it  ends,  describe  the  distortion 
of  memory.  The  simile  comparing  memories  to  swollen  corks  provides  us  with 
a  suggestive  image  of  how  this  process  works,  and  for  the  way  in  which 
memory  becomes  distorted.  Do  we  understand  anything  new  by  reading  this 
passage-  something  that  we  did  not  grasp  in  the  original  proposition  with 
which  I  began?  The  only  reason  for  assuming  the  answer  must  be  "no"  can  be 
the  assumption  which  I  questioned  above.  But,  in  contrast  to  that  idea,  as  I 
have  suggested,  our  understanding  has  been  enhanced  and  fleshed  out.  We 
understand  it  differently;  the  simile  has  transformed  our  understanding  of 
the  general  proposition. 
But  what  is  it  that  the  passage  really  adds  to  our  understanding?  The 
simile  is  itself  general-  it  talks  about  memories  (in  general)  being  like  corks. 
What  the  simile  adds,  is  not  (pace  Nussbaum)  the  benefit  of  a  particular 
instance.  Rather,  what  it  offers  is  something  concrete.  So,  a  general 
proposition,  then,  can  be  contrasted  not  only  with  the  particular,  but  with  the 
concrete  as  well.  What  the  simile  offers,  that  the  general  proposition  lacks,  is 
detail.  These  two  features  are  connected,  since  particulars,  unlike 
generalities,  possess  detail.  In  moral  judgement,  for  example,  what  we 
require  is  to  be  able  to  perceive  details  correctly,  and  the  novel,  according  to 
Nussbaum,  is  an  excellent  medium  for  just  this  kind  of  detail.  On  the  basis  of 
the  arguments  given  in  the  preceding  paragraphs,  then,  I  claim  we  can  reject 
the  Platonic  claim  that  understanding  is  general  and  must  be  in  the  form  of 
episteme. 
316 Phantasia  and  Conviction. 
So  far,  I  have  tried  to  allay  some  of  the  more  persistent  worries  we  may  have 
about  rhetoric.  To  do  this,  I  have  appealed  to  the  general  difference  between 
belief  and  "conviction",  and  to  the  account  of  "phantasia"  we  can  find  in 
Aristotle  and  the  Stoics.  In  the  last  section  I  claimed  that  art  and  rhetoric 
provide  us  with  concrete  understanding,  distinct  from  general  propositions.  In 
this  last  section  I  want  to  say  a  little  more  about  these  points.  In  particular, 
there  are  three  questions  I  will  focus  on.  First,  how  do  the  notions  of 
phantasia  and  the  concrete  connect?  Second,  what  does  conviction  amount  to, 
if  it  isn't  belief?  And  third,  what  are  the  connections  between  being  convinced 
and  being  emotionally  affected? 
Taking  the  first  of  these,  we  may  begin  by  saying  that,  roughly  speaking, 
phantasia  are  concrete.  Aristotle's  own  use  of  phantasia96  covers  a  relatively 
wide  range  of  phenomena,  from  visual  appearances  (eg.  the  Muller-Lyer 
illusion)  to  mental  images  (thinking  of  your  home  town,  for  example)  to  the 
general  conceptual  schemata  under  which  we  have  perceptual  experience.  It 
has  rightly  been  compared  with  Wittgenstein's  notion  of  "seeing-as"97. 
Nevertheless,  what  each  example  of  the  phenomenon  shares  is  that  it  is 
concrete  and  particular.  The  phantasia  which  is  the  experience  of  looking  at 
the  Muller-Lyer  illusion  has  a  concrete  content  that  is  of  a  particular  group  of 
lines.  It  is  true  that  beliefs  too  can  be  specific  and  concrete  to  a  degree;  I  can 
believe  that  the  Muller  Lyer  illusion  appears  to  people  as  it  does.  But  this 
96  For  references  to  secondary  literature  on  Aristotle's  use  of  phantasia,  see  footnotes  below. 
97  See  references  to  Nussbaum,  Schofield  and  Frede,  below. 
317 belief,  although  it  refers  to  the  details  of  the  appearance,  lacks  the  specific 
content  of  the  experience.  This,  then,  serves  to  answer  our  first  question. 
My  second  question  was;  what  does  conviction  amount  to  if  it  is  not  belief? 
Let  us  look  at  some  examples.  Earlier,  I  offered  Walton's  example  of  the 
cinema-goer  who  is  frightened  of  the  slime  on  the  screen,  even  though  he  does 
not  believe  he  is  threatened  or  in  danger.  Further  examples  would  be;  the 
phobics  who  believe  neither  that  their  fear  is  appropriate  nor  (contrary  to 
Levinson  and  others)  that  there  exists  any  object  that  their  fear  is  fear  of.  It 
might  be  wondered  though,  what  sense  there  is  in  talking  of  "conviction"  in 
these  cases;  isn't  it  just  that  the  fear  occurs  as  a  result  of  exposure  to  a  given 
stimulus?  Is  it  not,  in  other  words,  merely  a  causal  relation,  making  talk  of 
conviction  out  of  place? 
Admittedly,  there  is  some  oddity  in  talking  of  conviction  in  a  context  other 
than  that  of  belief;  since  epistemic  conviction  is  the  only  kind  of  conviction  we 
usually  talk  about,  it  leaves  it  unclear  exactly  what  we  are  talking  about,  if 
not  that.  In  answer  to  this  query,  my  suggestion  is  that  talk  of  conviction 
involves  attributing  a  certain  quality  to  the  experience,  to  the  phantasia.  We 
might  cast  around  for  synonyms  for  this  quality,  such  as  "life-like",  or 
"realistic",  or  "vivid".  However,  as  I  have  already  claimed  these  attempts  to 
capture  it  miss  the  point  since  realism  is  not  what  is  at  stake.  Instead,  I 
suggest  that  we  think  of  the  emotional  response  elicited  as  itself  a  criterion  of 
the  quality.  The  reason  behind  this  suggestion  is  the  idea  that,  for  the 
1 
phantasia  to  be  convincing,  it  has  to  succeed  in  some  way,  although  clearly, 
not  to  succeed  in  producing  belief.  But  in  what  then  would  success  consist? 
Here  we  can  take  a  leaf  from  the  book  of  those  philosophers  like 
Armstrong  who  claim  that  all  perception  is  reducible  to  belief.  I  argued  above 
that  this  view  is  mistaken.  But  what  Armstrong  says  about  the  states  I  am 
referring  to  as  phantasia  is  suggestive.  Faced  with  such  states,  he  attempts  to 
analyse  them  into  dispositions  to  believe.  So,  on  looking  at  the  Muller-Lyer 
illusion,  I  am  disposed  to  believe  the  illusion;  what  prevents  me  is  the 
presence  of  a  contrary  belief. 
318 This  idea  has  been  rightly  criticised  on  the  grounds  that  it  gets  things  the 
wrong  way  round;  even  if  I  am  disposed  to  believe,  it  must  be  on  the  basis  of 
the  way  things  seem,  and  it  is  that-  the  visual  appearance-  which  is  the 
content  of  the  experience  and  which  needs  analysed.  And  it  cannot  be 
analysed  in  terms  of  belief.  While  accepting  this  objection,  we  can  concede 
that  Armstrong's  suggestion  nevertheless  captures  something  about  the 
quality  of  the  appearance,  namely  that  it  moves  or  disposes  us  towards  belief, 
without  actually  producing  it.  This  quality  of  experience  can  be  thought  of  as 
a  kind  of  conviction,  then-  it  disposes  us  to  believe  -  but  it  is  distinct  from 
belief. 
Let  us  take  another  of  the  examples  I  gave  earlier-  the  nervous  schoolboy. 
In  this  case,  the  schoolboy  has  the  correct  belief,  and  although  something 
suggests  to  him  that  it  is  the  right  answer,  he  is  tempted  not  to  accept  it.  He 
is  not  convinced,  he  doubts  his  own  knowledge.  It  might  be  objected  that  the 
problem  here  is  simpler  than  I  suggest;  it  is  that  he  doesn't  really  even  believe 
that  the  date  is  correct.  The  correct  answer  comes  to  mind-  as  the  result  of 
some  unknown  process-  but  he  rejects  it.  There  is  therefore  no  conflict 
between  belief  and  conviction.  However,  while  there  might  be  such  a  case  as 
this,  equally  it  might  be  different.  It  might  be  that  he  does  believe  it,  but  is 
not  quite  convinced.  For  instance,  sometimes  we  are  not  certain  if  we  turned 
the  gas  off  before  leaving  the  house98.  In  such  a  case  it  seems  we  can  believe 
we  did,  while  still  entertaining  doubts.  A  lack  of  certainty,  or  the  presence  of 
doubt  should  not  be  taken  to  indicate  an  absence  of  belief. 
There  is  an  additional  reason  for  not  wanting  to  tie  the  idea  of  conviction  too 
closely  to  that  of  belief.  In  the  phobia  cases,  the  phantasia  are  convincing.  But 
whether  it  is  a  drawing  or  a  television  image  that  provokes  the  response,  the 
phobic  need  not  be  tempted  to  believe  that  there  is  an  existing  object  of  his 
fear  or  an  existing  threat.  So  here  it  seems  that  conviction  cannot  be  cashed 
out  in  terms  of  its  belief-disposing  tendencies.  Perhaps  though,  this  could  be 
doubted.  Should  we  not  say  that  phobics  are  at  least  tempted  to  believe  that 
the  object  of  their  fear  is  dangerous?  Our  inclination  to  say  this  however,  is 
98  1  owe  this  example  to  Mary  Haight. 
319 the  result  of  our  awareness  that  experience  possesses  features  relevant  to 
belief  which  are  not  however  reducible  to  it.  And  this  is  the  feature  which  I 
am  referring  to  as  being  "convincing". 
If  we  accept  this  picture,  we  can  claim  that  conviction  is  a  quality  of 
phantasia  of  different  sorts.  In  the  Muller-Lyer  example  it  does  not  lead  to 
belief  (when  it  doesn't)  because  we  have  acquired  the  contrary  belief  (usually) 
from  another  source.  In  some  people  who  are  unaware  of  the  illusion  it  may 
lead  directly  to  the  belief.  In  the  case  where  we  have  the  contrary  belief,  that 
belief  is  in  tension  with  the  convincing  nature  of  the  phantasia99.  In  emotional 
cases,  the  phantasia  will  produce  emotion  when  it  is  convincing,  just  as  it  will 
produce  a  convincing  appearance  in  the  Muller-Lyer  example.  In  both  cases 
there  are  additional  normative  considerations  to  which  these  phantasia  are 
subject;  in  the  Muller-  Lyer  example,  we  decide  whether  the  appearance 
should  be  assented  to,  or  believed,  and  in  the  emotional  case  we  evaluate  the 
response  and  decide  if  it  is  appropriate  or  not.  In  both  cases  there  can  be 
responses  we  might  describe  as  akratic  ;I  might  be  unable  to  convince  myself 
the  bridge  is  safe'°°,  although  that  is  what  I  believe,  and  I  may  find  the  racist 
joke  funny  although  I  find  this  response  morally  repugnant.  This,  then,  is  a 
tentative  account  of  what  "conviction"  consists  in. 
I  now  turn  to  my  third  question,  namely  the  connection  between  convincing 
phantasia  and  emotional  arousal.  This  raises  the  question  of  how  lower-level 
features  of  our  experience  relate  to  the  whole.  So  far  I  have  talked  about  a 
phantasia's  being  "convincing"  as  an  overall  property  of  the  experience.  But 
whether  it  is  convincing  will  depend  on  lower  level  properties  of  the 
experience.  In  the  phobia  example,  for  instance,  some  images  will  produce  the 
response  and  others  will  not.  But  this  must  be  because  of  the  properties  of  the 
images. 
99  By  contrast,  in  the  schoolboy  example,  if  the  phantasia  is  convincing,  he  will  not  have 
doubts. 
100  This  was  Gosling's  example,  discussed  in  chapter  four. 
320 Consider  an  example  from  Sartre'°'.  He  is  watching  the  impersonator 
Franconay  on  stage;  she  is  impersonating  Maurice  Chevalier.  The  act,  he 
says,  is  completely  convincing  -  although  we  do  not  of  course  believe  we  are 
watching  Maurice  Chevalier.  Sartre  makes  an  interesting  point  about  this 
phenomeno  ;  he  remarks  that  we  see  the  impersonator  as  Chevalier,  even 
though  we  are  aware  at  the  same  time  that  we  are  not  watching  a  tall,  thin, 
grey  haired  man,  but  rather,  a  dark-haired  woman  of  average  height  and 
curvaceous  figure.  Given  these  discrepancies  between  the  lower  level 
properties  (size,  shape,  colour  etc.  )  of  the  image  of  Chevalier  and  the 
appearance  of  Franconay,  we  might  ask  how  such  an  image  could  be 
convincing  -  why  does  the  discrepancy  not  jar  with  us  and  destroy  the 
illusion?  Sartre  says  simply  that  we  "override"  these  differences.  In  fact,  we 
are  both  aware  and  yet  unaware  of  them.  Aware  in  the  sense  that  we  have 
beliefs  about  them,  but  unaware  in  that  they  are  not  part  of  the  appearance, 
the  phantasia.  We  can  generalise  from  this.  Only  certain  features  will  make 
an  appearance  convincing,  and  equally,  only  certain  features  will  make  it 
unconvincing.  The  relationship  between  the  higher  level  property  of  being 
convincing  and  the  lower  level  properties  that  must  be  present  is  difficult  to 
state,  and  perhaps  cannot  be  stated102.  No  doubt  other  impersonators  of 
Chevalier  might  be  closer  in  physical  appearance  to  him,  yet  produce  less 
convincing  impersonations. 
As  regards  works  of  fiction,  similar  general  remarks  apply.  It  is  difficult  to 
say  in  advance  what  the  relation  is  between  whether  a  work  is  convincing  and 
its  more  detailed  properties.  But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  there  is  such  a 
relation.  This  is  borne  out  by  the  following  example;  in  The  Great  Tradition, 
F.  R.  Leavis  begins  his  discussion  of  Joseph  Conrad  with  an  analysis  of  his 
minor  works  and  less  successful  novels.  A  powerful  but  flawed  work  in  Leavis' 
101  From  The  Psychology  of  the  Imagination  p.  57-59. 
102  This  might  be  so,  for  instance,  if  the  property  of  being  convincing  is  supervenient  (or  some 
similar  relation)  upon  lower  level  features.  Sibley,  for  instance,  argues  in  this  way  about  the 
impossibility  of  predicting  aesthetic  properties  on  the  basis  of  non-aesthetic  ones  ("Aesthetic 
Concepts",  Philosophical  Review  1959). 
321 opinion  is  Heart  of  Darkness.  IRavis  draws  attention  to  certain  misuses  of 
language  which  he  feels  rendeissome  of  the  writing  hollow.  After  praising 
much  of  the  detail  of  the  writing,  he  comments; 
"There  are  however,  places  in  the  Heart  of  Darkness  where  we  become 
aware  of  comment  as  an  inter-position,  and  worse,  as  an  intrusion,  at  times 
an  exasperating  one.  Hadn't  he,  we  find  ourselves  asking,  overworked 
"inscrutable",  "inconceivable",  "unspeakable"  and  that  kind  of  word  already?  - 
Yet  still  they  recur.  Is  anything  added  to  the  oppressive  mysteriousness  of  the 
Congo  by  such  sentences  as- 
It  was  the  stillness  of  an  implacable  force  brooding  over  an  inscrutable  intention-?  " 
(The  Great  Tradition  p.  204) 
Leavis'  comment  that  the  language  comes  as  an  "intrusion"  echoes  Sartre's 
comments  above.  The  successful  work,  the  one  that  convinces,  lacks  this 
jarring  quality;  the  higher  level  appearance  or  phantasia  overrides  lower  level 
features  which  might  conflict-  such  as  Franconnay's  height.  Some  features 
may  intrude,  however,  and  when  this  occurs  the  overall  effect  is  ruined.  In 
this  respect  the  unity  of  our  experience  is  relevant  to  our  evaluation  of  a 
work's  success  or  failure  -  the  aesthetic  experience  is  a  synthesising  one,  as  we 
might  put  it. 
This  concludes  my  consideration  of  the  nature  of  convincing  phantasia.  In 
this  chapter  I  have  tried  to  draw  together  various  themes  touched  on  at 
different  points  in  the  overall  argument  of  this  thesis,  and  used  them  to  offer 
a  particular  account  of  the  role  art  may  have  in  the  process  of  emotional 
education.  I  shall  end  with  a  summary  of  what  I  hope  these  arguments  have 
established. 
322 Conclusion 
In  this  thesis  my  starting  point  has  been  the  two  questions  (a)  what  is  the 
nature  of  emotional  states,  and  (b)  why  should  we  think  emotional  states  are 
valuable.  Chapter  one  offered  an  account  of  what  emotional  states  are  which 
depended  on  a  contrast  between  types  of  cognitive  state.  In  particular,  I 
claimed  that  the  cognitive  component  of  an  emotion  is  not  a  belief  but 
something  that  I  characterised  as  a  "seeing-as",  or  alternatively,  in  terms  of 
Aristotle's  term  phantasia. 
This  account  limits  what  we  can  credibly  say  in  response  to  the  second 
question.  I  have  claimed  (in  chapter  two)  that  the  value  of  emotions  should  be 
explained  in  terms  of  their  cognitive  contribution.  Fortunately  -I  have 
claimed-  the  account  of  the  nature  of  emotions  I  offer  allows  us  a  way  out  of  a 
difficulty  which  arises  immediately  when  we  claim  that  it  is  the  cognitive 
value  of  emotion  that  matters.  The  problem  is  that  it  seems  possible  to  have 
whatever  cognitive  component  an  emotion  might  possess  without  having  the 
emotion  itself.  Chapter  two  attempted  to  show  why  this  assumption  might  be 
mistaken. 
If  that  conclusion  is  correct,  it  follows  that  those  who  have  not  been  educated 
to  have  the  correct  emotional  response,  will  be  cognitively  deficient  to  some 
extent.  This  account  of  the  value  of  emotion  was  consistent  with  Aristotle's 
ethical  theory,  which  also  ascribes  considerable  value  to  emotional  states. 
That  theory  was  elaborated  in  chapter  four.  Working  out  the  details  of 
Aristotle's  view  involved  saying  how  the  education  of  emotion  involves  the 
development  of  character,  and  how  emotion  is  related  to  practical  reasoning 
or  phronesis.  In  addition,  chapter  three  considered  and  rejected  a  variety  of 
arguments  to  the  effect  that  it  is  a  mistake  to  ascribe  value  to  emotions- 
among  them  Kantian,  utilitarian  and  Stoic  positions. 
While  endorsing  Aristotle's  views  against  those  of  the  Stoics  and  others,  I 
have  however  conceded  that  such  an  account  does  not  explain  the  value  of  all 
emotion.  To  explore  this  issue,  I  considered,  in  chapter  five,  the  views  of  the 
323 Romantics,  and  in  particular  focused  on  the  emotion  of  love.  My  conclusion 
was  that  there  is  a  valid  distinction  to  be  made  between  emotions  and 
passion. 
This  account  of  the  value  of  emotion  assumes  in  addition  that  the  education 
of  emotion  is  feasible  (and  desirable-  I  also  considered  Nietzsche's  objections 
on  this  score  in  chapter  six).  Chapter  six  attempts  to  offer  a  general  account  of 
what  such  a  process  might  consist  in.  Above  all,  I  claimed  that  given  the 
account  of  emotions  suggested  here,  emotional  education  must  consist  in  more 
than  the  education  of  belief.  As  part  of  this  process  I  have  also  considered 
whether  there  might  be  a  connection  between  our  experience  of  art  works  and 
the  development  of  our  emotions  (in  chapters  six  and  seven).  One  difficulty 
arises  from  the  fact  that  emotional  responses  to  fictions  appear  to  be 
importantly  different  to  real-life  emotions.  Furthermore,  the  process  of 
emotional  education  requires  the  establishing  of  consistent  patterns  of 
response-  in  fact,  it  requires  integrity  and  character.  But  responses  to  fiction 
seem  to  lack  the  features  (above  all,  belief)  which  seem  to  be  required  for  this 
kind  of  psychological  integration.  Indeed  such  emotions  threaten  to  subvert 
the  process  of  integration  by  contributing  to  a  process  of  distancing  from  real 
life,  and  a  consequent  and  disturbing  alteration  in  the  nature  of  our  real  life 
emotional  experience.  I  conclude  that  despite  the  possibility  of  this  effect, 
works  of  fiction  can  nevertheless  contribute  to  the  educational  process. 
The  issue  of  integration  of  emotion  with  the  rest  of  our  mental  life  in 
addition  raises  more  general  issues  relevant  to  psychological  explanation.  It 
is,  I  have  claimed,  a  persistent  temptation  to  construe  all  cognitive  states  as 
belief.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  so  many  writers  have  simply  assumed  that  if 
emotions  are  cognitive  then  they  must  involve  beliefs.  While  I  have  insisted 
that  the  putative  divorce  between  reason  and  emotion  is  a  mistake  (emotions 
are  rational),  I  have  also  argued  that  the  attempt  to  picture  our  cognitive  life 
(including  our  emotional  life)  as  exhaustively  a  matter  of  belief,  is  another 
mistake.  The  Plato  of  the  Protagoras,  and  the  Stoics  are  guilty  of  this  error.  In 
contrast  I  suggest  that  we  should  allow  that  belief  itself  can  be  in  conflict  with 
other  cognitive  states.  I  introduce  this  contention  in  chapter  four  in 
324 connection  with  the  Stoics,  and  suggest  that  there  can  be  akratic  cognitive 
responses  (not  being  convinced)  which  are  in  conflict  with  belief,  parallel  to 
the  way  there  can  be  akratic  emotional  responses,  also  in  conflict  with  belief. 
This  point  was  picked  up  again  in  chapter  eight  where  the  notion  of  a 
convincing  phantasia  was  explored,  and  used  to  reject  some  current  attitudes 
(eg.  Levinson's)  towards  the  Paradox  of  Fiction.  I  also  claimed  that  the 
concept  was  relevant  to  our  experience  of  art  works  and  works  of  rhetoric. 
Two  other  issues  were  then  explored  through  this  distinction  between 
beliefs  and  other  cognitive  states.  The  first  was  the  application  of  the  term 
"rational'  to  actions  and  responses.  One  construal  of  this  term  ties  it 
exclusively  to  belief;  but  on  this  model,  I  argue,  we  are  forced  to  regard  much 
of  our  emotional  lives  as  irrational  or  arational  (chapter  eight).  However,  I 
argue  that  we  should  reject  this  "belief/desire"  psychology  and  allow  that 
rationality  has  a  wider  application.  This  wider  application,  I  claim,  still 
employs  the  normative  contrasts  we  associate  with  rationality. 
The  same  picture  of  human  psychology  which  produces  this  mistaken 
account  of  rationality  also  produces  a  mistaken  picture  of  understanding.  In 
particular,  it  emphasises  the  notions  of  inference  and  interpretation  and 
construes  all  understanding  as  propositional.  This  picture  is  rejected  in 
chapter  three,  through  a  consideration  of  the  work  of  Wittgenstein.  Once  we 
reject  this  account,  we  are,  I  claim,  in  a  better  position  to  see  that  the  same 
mistakes  also  lead  to  mistaken  accounts  of  emotion,  of  the  sort  discussed  in 
chapters  one  and  eight. 
Chapter  eight  employs  the  distinction  between  beliefs  and  other  cognitive 
states  to  show  how  works  of  fiction  might  contribute  to  our  understanding. 
The  Platonic  assumption  that  they  cannot,  turns  out,  I  contend,  to  assume  the 
very  picture  of  understanding  which  was  rejected  in  earlier  chapters.  I  also 
attempt  to  show  that  emotional  responses  can  be  a  form  of  understanding. 
Attempting  to  answer  my  initial  two  questions  about  the  nature  and  value  of 
emotional  states,  therefore,  quickly  leads  to  more  general  issues  concerning 
psychological  explanation,  and  our  taxonomy  of  the  mental,  and  these  in  turn 
are  connected  to  still  wider  normative  issues  such  as  the  nature  of  rationality. 
325 In  this  respect,  while  some  broad  consensus  now  exists  amongst  philosophers 
on  certain  issues  -  everyone  now  rejects  Humean  and  Cartesian  accounts  of 
the  emotions,  for  instance  -  there  remains  substantial  disagreement  not  only 
over  the  details  of  the  correct  account,  but  also  over  the  many  contiguous 
questions  upon  which  the  issue  bears  -  how  wide  a  vocabulary  we  require  for 
psychological  explanation,  what  we  take  the  nature  of  understanding  and 
rationality  to  be,  and  what  room  we  allow  for  the  imagination,  are  issues 
which  will  both  influence  the  account  of  the  emotions  which  we  will  end  up 
with,  and  which  will  themselves  be  evaluated  in  the  light  of  that  account. 
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